I am sorry, Mr. O'Hara. I meant that there is a great deal to say within the time allocated for the debate.

Alan Irwin is a licensed aircraft engineer who is facing criminal prosecution in Greece for manslaughter as a consequence of a fatal air accident in summer 2005. In that accident, 121 people died. It would be difficult for any of us to understand or imagine the impact that it has had on his family, and on him and his health, or the consequences of having to live with and deal with such an event hanging over someone. That is why I asked for this debate. I gave the Minister notice of it, and I hope that we can get some good, conclusive answers.

At 9.7 am on 14 August 2005, Helios Airways Flight 522 left Larnaca for Athens on the first leg of a flight to Prague. The aircraft only partially pressurised and both pilots succumbed to hypoxia, which is caused by oxygen deprivation. Their performance deteriorated rapidly, and they soon lapsed into unrecoverable unconsciousness. With no further input from the pilots, the aircraft continued on its pre-programmed flight to Athens.

The flight was on autopilot for about three hours. It ran out of fuel and crashed at Grammatiko, north-west of Athens, at 12.3 pm. All 121 people on board lost their lives. The accident received worldwide media attention —indeed, I remember it well—but particularly in Cyprus, Greece and the United Kingdom.

The Greek Air Accident Investigation and Aviation Safety Board investigated the accident, and the final report was published on 10 October 2006. It is highly contested on several issues, one of which is the unsupported assumption that Mr. Irwin left the pressurisation mode selector in manual after a pre-flight maintenance task. The report makes it clear that the accident was caused by the crew not identifying the aircraft's failure to pressurise, due in part to the use by the Boeing Company of a misleading warning horn. The United States Federal Aviation Administration recently said that the system creates an unsafe condition in this widely used aircraft. In layman's language, the same sound and tone of horn is emitted for two completely different faults. The pilot and aircrew misinterpreted the sound of the horn as indicating a different fault.

The report found that both pilots were licensed and qualified in accordance with international standards, and that they were adequately rested and medically fit to conduct the flight. The aircraft also conformed to international standards and had no recorded defects. The Cypriot company, Helios Airways, was found to be in compliance with the European joint aviation requirements known as JAR-OPS 1. The last audit of the company, in July 2005, was conducted by UK Civil Aviation Authority inspectors who were contracted to the Cypriot authority.

Mr. Irwin was working on a short-term contract with Helios Airways for the summer of 2005. It was the second season that he had worked for Helios Airways in Cyprus. He is now facing criminal charges in Greece for manslaughter with potential intent, which carries a maximum penalty of life imprisonment. There is also the emotional impact of knowing that 121 people died on the flight. Although there is only one charge of manslaughter, Mr. Irwin is facing criminal charges for 121 deaths, not one.

Mr. Irwin was not insured for the prohibitive cost of defending himself, and his continued defence is now in jeopardy because of the lack of financial support available to him. Helios Airways did not carry legal expenses insurance, which would have indemnified him in respect of the defence costs he now faces.

At 4.25 am on 14 August, the aircraft arrived at Larnaca from London Heathrow. The cabin crew reported freezing around the rear service door seal at cruise altitude, and loud bangs during the flight. The captain consequently requested a full inspection of the door. With two other engineers, Mr. Irwin carried out an inspection of the rear service door of the aircraft. They found no fault when they inspected the door on the ground, so Mr. Irwin pressurised the aircraft to reproduce conditions similar to those experienced in flight. This is a normal procedure for a flight engineer. Again, the engineers found no fault with the door, so the aircraft was depressurised. During the test pressurisation, the aircraft pressurised as normal, and as it would have done at altitude in flight.

Mr. Irwin entered the details of his actions in the aircraft technical log and recorded that no fault had been found with the rear service door. At 6.15 am, he signed off the maintenance procedure. That was about two hours before the flight crew arrived to start their pre-flight preparations.

The accident report maintains that Mr. Irwin left the pressurisation mode selector in the manual, as opposed to the automatic, position after depressurising the aircraft. He has stated that he left the selector in the automatic position—the normal position for flight—as was his usual practice over, I believe, 20 years.

The final accident report states that

"the Board concluded that if the Ground Engineer number one had not returned the mode selector to the AUTO position, this could not be considered an omission as there was no specific requirement to do so."

I repeat that he was not required to leave the selector in the automatic position.

However, the report inconsistently concludes that a contributing factor in the accident was the omission of returning the pressurisation mode selector to auto after unscheduled maintenance of the aircraft. It is that conclusion which forms the foundation of the prosecution of Mr. Irwin.

Since the accident, Mr. Irwin has carried out certain tests recorded on video in the presence of various aviation experts. The tests demonstrate that it is unlikely that he had left the pressurisation mode selector in the manual position after depressurising the aircraft.

The draft final report was issued by the Greek board in May 2006. It was sent to the various entitled states for comment under the provisions of "Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation", which is annex 13 to the Chicago Convention 1944. Despite the fact that Mr. Irwin's alleged omission was the key to the predicted accident scenario, the Greek board would not give permission for him to have a copy of the draft report. After representations by Helios Airways, he was eventually allowed to see only those pages that related directly to his actions. Even though he was unable to appreciate the full picture, having only been given selected pages, he made limited comments through his lawyer on 11 July 2006. Although the state agency is entitled to receive a copy under annex 13, chapter 6.3 of the Chicago convention, the United Kingdom Air Accidents Investigation Branch did not receive a copy of the draft final report when it was first issued.

On about 23 July 2006, the AAIB was able to send a copy of the report to Mr. Irwin to enable him to make significant and substantial comments. He was given 28 days to submit his comments, instead of the usual 60 days mandated by Greek law. Mr. Irwin acknowledged receipt of the report on the following day and included details of the tests he had carried out. On 26 July, the AAIB forwarded these comments to the Greek board by e-mail and post. On 4 August, the AAIB forwarded Mr. Irwin's final comments, which again included details of the test, to the Greek board by e-mail and post. Mr. Irwin requested:

"Should the final report not be amended to include my formal comments, I would like them to be appended."

The state of the United Kingdom is entitled to make such a request under the provisions of annex 13, chapter 6.3. The state of Greece is obliged to comply with such a request under the same provision, but it did not do so. Although the AAIB was led to believe that Mr. Irwin's comments had been received by the Greek board, it has since transpired that the comments were either not received or have been mislaid. Therefore, details of the tests that cast reasonable doubt on the contention that Mr. Irwin left the selector in manual were neither included in nor appended to the final report.

Annex 13, chapter 5.13 of the Chicago convention makes provision for an investigation to be reopened if new and significant evidence becomes available. As the comments of the state of the United Kingdom on behalf of Mr. Irwin do not appear to be in the possession of the Greek board and have not been included in or appended to the final report, they constitute new and significant evidence—obviously, as they were not included.

The UK AAIB has been asked to make representations to the Greek board to reopen the investigation to consider the comments of the state of the United Kingdom on behalf of Mr. Irwin, particularly those related to the tests. Annex 13, chapter 3.1 of the Chicago convention states:

"The sole objective of the investigation of an accident or incident shall be the prevention of accidents and incidents. It is not the purpose of this activity to apportion blame or liability."

It has always been the case that any major air accident has been investigated with the sole purpose being not to apportion blame, but to take the evidence from that investigation to prevent accidents from occurring in future. The Greek final report into this accident is being used openly as the basis for the criminal charges that Mr. Irwin now faces, although his statement was not taken under caution and he was not afforded the usual protection of persons under investigation for criminal wrongdoing.

There is no direct evidence that Mr. Irwin's actions contributed to the accident, yet he has been publicly vilified at extreme personal cost. Mr. Irwin's name was released to the United Kingdom, Greek and Cypriot media during an extremely emotional time—children were on board the flight—and as a consequence he became a figure of public hate. Mr. Irwin's actions were portrayed in the media as a causal factor in this accident, and he is now facing criminal prosecution in Greece.

Even if Mr. Irwin had left the selector in manual, which he did not, it is a basic principle in aviation that an aircraft engineer is never responsible for configuring an aircraft for flight: this is the sole responsibility of the flight crew, as part of their pre-flight checks, and the ultimate responsibility rests with the captain.

The cost of a criminal defence in Greece is prohibitive and Mr. Irwin faces the prospect of funding his defence personally. A small amount of funding for all the defendants was secured when the Greek charges were initially served. However, there is now a parallel criminal prosecution in Cyprus and although Mr. Irwin is not yet named in the Cypriot proceedings, this has placed an immense strain on the diminishing funds that are available. Those funds will shortly be exhausted. Mr. Irwin is not in a position to continue funding his defence personally, although the failure to mount a proper defence could lead to a custodial sentence in Greece—a life sentence.

It is anticipated that the Cypriot proceedings will overtake the Greek proceedings: they are already at an advanced stage, owing to the differences in the two criminal justice systems. Mr Irwin will not be entitled to a reimbursement of the fees paid in Greece, regardless of the outcome of the proceedings. For the sake of clarity, it is important to highlight the fact that parallel criminal proceedings in two different European jurisdictions are as yet not prohibited, though this is the subject to debate at European Commission level.

Thankfully, Mr. Irwin is not included in both cases, but the double proceedings do have an impact on him. The legal resources are now split between two countries and the funding has to be divided between both cases to ensure that a full and proper defence is mounted in both courts. Mr. Irwin's legal team believes that he may not receive a fair trial in view of the damaging and speculative press stories that circulated in the aftermath of the accident.

This accident had a huge emotional impact in both Greece and Cyprus. Mr. Irwin's name and actions were freely discussed in media reports and his home address was also published. Despite receiving various retractions from the UK press after the defamatory comments had been published, the belief remains in the public's eyes that his actions caused this accident. Various senior aviation experts disagree with this allegation, but, as far as Mr. Irwin and his family are concerned, the damage has been done. If the case is allowed to continue in Greece, it is obvious that the media-fuelled speculation and rumours will have an effect on the courts.

Neither Helios Airways nor Mr. Irwin had access to any of the components of the pressurisation system after the accident. They cannot therefore review the tests done during the investigation or carry out their own independent tests. The relevant components are still being held by the Greek Government, although the major part of the wreckage has been released.

I have a number of questions to ask the Minister, of which he is aware. Will he address Mr. Irwin's case with his counterpart in Greece? In light of the issues highlighted in this debate, it is apparent that the prosecution in Greece is misconceived and the use of the accident report is inappropriate under the circumstances. Can the use of the official accident report in respect of criminal prosecutions be raised by the UK with the International Civil Aviation Organisation? Will the Government assist Mr. Irwin with his defence costs in Greece?

Article 1 of European Union Council directive 94/56/EC of 21 November 1994, establishing the fundamental principles governing the investigation of civil aviation accidents, states:

"The purpose of this Directive is to improve air safety by facilitating the expeditious holding of investigations, the sole objective of which is the prevention of future accidents and incidents."

Both the UK and Greece have adopted this directive. Will the Minister now make representations to the EU for its members to adhere to the overriding objective of the directive and prevent the misuse of air accident reports being used to criminalise aviation? Will the Minister make representations to the UK AAIB to request that the investigation be re-opened in accordance with annex 13, chapter 5.13 of the Chicago convention, in the light of the evidence that was not considered by the Hellenic Air Accident Investigation and Aviation Safety Board?