It is good to see you in the Chair this afternoon, Mr. Marshall. It has taken some time to secure this debate about the release of military information, which I believe is an important subject not just for the military, but for others, including the family and friends of people serving overseas. We have heard much comment in the media over the past few months about how the military and their tremendous achievements in both Iraq and Afghanistan need to be appreciated by people in the United Kingdom. I question whether the military do enough to encourage that situation, and the purpose of the debate is to highlight the fact that they could do more and do it better. That point has been accepted none the less, and as a result, parades and receptions have been held to welcome back troops from active service overseas. We must never underestimate the contribution that they have made, and continue to make, in some of the toughest fighting since the second world war. My admiration for our troops is boundless, and I am relieved that the UK can still attract the calibre of young people who, with appropriate training and experience, are every bit as good as their forefathers.

However, the world has changed considerably and the shots are now called by a media that do not necessarily give a fair and accurate summary of what is happening in the field. Competing priorities and competition from other news stories can drive accurate reporting of operations off the front pages and television, but, using the Musa Qaleh operation as the basis for this debate, the only competition for news during that period was the missing person presumed dead for five years following a canoeing incident on the north-east coast—someone who was subsequently discovered to be very much alive.

A great opportunity was lost by the military to capture the imagination of the public, and it was lost under the camouflage of NATO, ISAF—the international security assistance force—the Afghan army and operational security. Although media information would have had to be shared with those organisations, none of them has any interest in, or responsibility for, the reaction of the British people to the battle of Musa Qaleh. Although the powers that be quite naturally wanted to promote the Afghan national army and the Afghan Government, the Ministry of Defence should have had as its priority the promotion of news to the British public, not least because it is important for the recruitment and retention of personnel in our armed services.

The families of serving personnel in Afghanistan, who had an obvious interest in developments, had to resort to foreign media and even to the Taliban for progress reports during the Musa Qaleh operation. The only information on the MOD website was an 82-word news article published on Friday 7 December 2007, which was replaced by another short article of 139 words the following day. It was left to newspapers to provide adequate coverage. For example, Rupert Hamer, the Sunday Mirror correspondent, gave details about what was happening in Musa Qaleh while accompanying the British Brigade Reconnaissance Force. At this point, I offer my condolences following the deaths of Jack Sadler and Darryl Gardiner and the injuries incurred by the reconnaissance force.

That event could prove to be the turning point in the whole Afghanistan war. There was a long build-up to the taking of Musa Qaleh and most knew that it was happening—certainly the Taliban did. When the important flow of news is deliberately hidden behind the excuse of operational security, the army pays a high price in the loss of good public relations. However, sensibly handled news, which would also have been picked up by the Taliban, could have been used to the advantage of the allies as it has so often been before. Just as the military operation for Musa Qaleh was meticulously planned and executed, so should have been the public relations exercise. The news of the steady push up the Sangin valley by British and Afghan forces could have been fed to the media, together with appropriate photographs, rather than the few outdated ones that were used. The purpose of the operation, the importance of the strategy, the breaking of the Taliban's hold on the drugs trade and the sheer intensity of the battle, which took place over the weekend of 7, 8 and 9 December 2007 could have been explained.

The flow of good material, backed by photographs and video footage, could have dominated the British media for several days, sending out a very clear message about the achievements of the military. Instead, we had a complete public relations disaster in so far as a valuable opportunity was lost, very little material was available and virtually an information vacuum followed. However, we know that British forces are still harrying the Taliban, holding and rebuilding positions that have been taken to make it more difficult for the insurgents to re-group in the spring, and the complete lack of sympathetic coverage is not the way for the military to gain the enthusiastic backing of the British people.

If the Minister replies that the reason for the void is operational security, I shall feel like screaming, because I do not accept it. The situation was caused by a total failure of the military and the MOD to understand the power and importance of good public relations in informing the public about what was happening. It is as important to take the British people along with us, as it is to win the battle on the ground, because if that is not achieved, the calls for withdrawing from military action could escalate, with the result that recruitment and retention become ever more difficult.

In a further article, which was published on 23 December 2007, Rupert Hamer wrote:

"The reason they"— the Brigade Reconnaissance Force— are so busy is that the Taliban, through a network of informers the soldiers call 'dickers', monitor their every move."

The Taliban know exactly what is happening: they have mobile phones to get information, and they use them in the same way as the foreign press, which, for example, phoned residents in Musa Qaleh to find out what was happening on the ground. "Operational security" appears to have been used damagingly against our own side in that case, rather than against the enemy.

What can be done about the utter failure to use public relations to the UK's advantage? When operating in a joint force, such as NATO, ISAF, the Afghan national army or any other, it should be made clear from the outset that if British forces are to take part, the British should handle the dissemination of news and the public relations agenda, and not rely, as happened recently, on other organisations to make the running. If British forces are to be used anywhere in the world, the moral obligation to keep the British people informed should be fulfilled, and that obligation should form part of our covenant with the military.

It is important to give the maintenance of good public relations a prominent role at all levels of training. Officers need to understand that it is vital to win the hearts and minds of the public—particularly commanders in the field who are responsible for making the decision to release information to the media. All pre-deployment training should include public relations training, because it is almost as important to inform the public as it is to win the battle.

However, the strategy cannot work unless a thorough overhaul of the chain of command is undertaken to decide how best material can be released, because I suspect that, as in all large organisations, there are blockages. The Ministry should be at the forefront of the release of news material; it should not lag days behind, or be dictated to and led by other media sources. Recent events have proved that the MOD is not at the forefront of reporting the activities and successes of our forces. In the case of Musa Qaleh, publicity could have been prepared in advance alongside the excellent military planning and successful execution. The superb co-operation between allied forces and the brilliant performance of the military went almost unrecognised because the British people were not told the full facts about what had been achieved, for the simple reason that the release of media information was never an integral part of the overall planning.

With the relatively small military force that the United Kingdom now has, it should be possible to know where every man and woman comes from, not just where they are based. Very few local newspapers follow the progress of service personnel originating from their area, because little information is given to them, yet local media, including newspapers, radio and television, command a greater circulation and coverage than the national media. There are so many exciting things going on in the military that a string of inspiring news stories about local people could go out to local communities. That would be a low-cost way of getting across the message about our armed services, and it would give youngsters an incentive to seek such a career. Too often, the only military story found in the local media is when someone is killed or injured.

The MOD should be the driving force of media coverage, and its website should be at the forefront at all times. I realise that that would put out of joint the noses of a few media outlets, because they rely on exclusives, but many have their own reporters and photographers embedded with our forces and get more detailed, precise and personal exclusive stories from them. In an operation such as Musa Qaleh, the MOD could have held briefing sessions supported by its website. The simple fact is that news that should have come directly from the military did not. I doubt whether the MOD ever got it in the first place.

It is no good the military moaning about a lack of public support when they do not go out of their way to inform the public. They have material in abundance, and not just about war-fighting, which they could provide to the news media. They cannot blame anyone but themselves for the failure to get the message over to the nation as a whole. I appreciate the fact that running any news outlet, whether a website or a blog, is not easy. To be effective, one has to update it continually, be ahead of the game and understand and promote the flow of stories. Some of the regimental sites are often out of date, but the MOD, given the authority to get on with the job and with a small, dedicated team, could be a pathfinder and lead by example. With the right will and determination, it could be done.

A written parliamentary reply on 18 December stated that the Ministry of Defence directorate of public relations comprised 69 personnel. I cannot work out why the smallest service, the Royal Navy, has the most, but there must be a reason. Perhaps the Minister will be able to tell me what it is.

I hope that the Minister, the military and the MOD will take the debate seriously and set about reorganising the whole operation of news coverage, the release of news to the media and the monitoring of coverage. The motivation for the effort is to benefit the military, of whom we are all immensely proud. If undertaken well, the project would assist all our armed services.

There is much good will for our serving Army, Navy and Air Force personnel, which must never be taken for granted. Would not the parades of returning servicemen and women have meant even more to the public if their operational tour had been well covered in the local press throughout their deployment? The purpose of insurgency, which the UK is trying to counter, with great difficulty, particularly in Afghanistan, is not only to take control of an area but to undermine those who oppose it and to destroy support for foreign troops in their home territory. The calls for withdrawal then intensify, but the best way to counter them is to have established an excellent narrative and communication with the British people, who support the armed services for their professional and unselfish service on behalf of our country and its people.

I congratulate Ann Winterton on securing the debate, and I thank her for what she said. I agree with some of what she said, but not all—I have my earplugs ready—and I do not agree with some of the conclusions that she drew. I hope that I might be able to persuade her to my view at least partly. The matter is complex and important, and it has an impact on our operational effectiveness and force protection, so I welcome the opportunity to respond on a subject to which, you will not be surprised to hear, Mr. Marshall, I attach the utmost seriousness.

Before I respond to the specific points raised in the debate, I am sure that those present will wish me to pay tribute to the professional, dedicated and courageous men and women of armed forces, serving in Iraq and Afghanistan among other operational theatres.

We face a complex dilemma in handling information on live operations. We are often faced with trying to manage two generally conflicting pressures. First, we have a responsibility to the public and, even more importantly, to the families of our service personnel, to keep them as fully informed as possible about the activities of our armed forces. The public have a right to know what our armed forces are doing in their name, and there is a proper expectation that there should be sensible debate about and scrutiny of our armed forces' activities.

Will the Minister give way?

I shall give way to the hon. Lady later, if she will allow me to put a few things on the record first.

We manifestly cannot seek to control what the media report, nor should we. A free press is a vital organ of democracy, and as such we should and do seek to engage proactively with the media. First and foremost, for the reasons already mentioned, that is the correct thing to do. Moreover, it represents operational pragmatism. Our enemies certainly put their side of the story; regularly it is deliberately slanted or falsified, but it is a story none the less. There is a risk that, in the absence of proper facts, such propaganda becomes established public perception, which is manifestly not in our interests.

Will the Minister give way?

I shall give way to the hon. Gentleman later.

The second pressure is our overriding responsibility to protect operational security. We ask much of our armed services personnel and put them in positions of threat, danger and pressure, and I am simply not prepared to countenance anything that might exacerbate those risks. The premature release of information heralding our intentions or activity on current operations amounts to precisely that.

There is no simple template that we can use to get the balance right. Often it is highly situationally dependent. For example, on occasions it is right to make public in advance details of an operation. That might be necessary to ensure that civilians have an opportunity to move away from areas of military activity, thereby minimising the risk of civilian casualties. Equally, surprise is a key principle of military operations, acting as a force multiplier and providing considerable force protection, and it can be critical to success. Achieving it is difficult and necessitates a much more restrictive information release policy. Such a policy cannot, of course, prevent ill-informed media speculation and rumour-mongering, but we cannot advocate the sacrifice of operational security on the altar of bad journalism. The hon. Lady said that our top priority should be the promotion of news to the British public. I do not underplay that, but our top priority, despite the fact that it makes her want to scream, has to be operational security.

May I confirm that I did not say it should be the top priority? Of course, it should not be the top priority. I said that if one knew someone fighting in the battle of Musa Qaleh, for example, one would not get any information on the MOD website that had not already been put out in the local press directly from correspondence in the field. One might not know what was happening from the MOD website or from the military in any way, but might know it from elsewhere. If the MOD and the military put out the facts—if they drove a news agenda that suited them—it would benefit operational security and would certainly benefit those at home who are concerned.

If I misheard the hon. Lady, I apologise. She did say, however, that the Taliban knew "exactly" what we were planning to do.

I said—

That is what the hon. Lady said. The only word that she said that I have difficulty with is "exactly". The Taliban did not know exactly what we were going to do. This issue needs to be judged on the outcomes. In the Musa Qaleh situation, the Taliban were well bedded into a civilian area and were aware that an attack was imminent. They paraded themselves in front of the world's media, saying that they were up for it, ready for it and capable of defending the situation. The outcome was, tragically, that we had two British casualties—but only two—and low numbers of casualties within the Afghan army and among civilians. Then, in front of the world's media, whether they cared to report it or not, the Taliban fled. I cannot get my head around how anyone can say that that operation, taken in the round, was not a success.

First, may I apologise for my late arrival? I absolutely take the points that my hon. Friend has made. I pay tribute to the gallantry and leadership of Brigadier Andy Mackay and the 52 Infantry Brigade in the seizure of Musa Qaleh, and I deeply regret the deaths and casualties that came with that. The brigadier's counter-insurgency strategy is clear. He is no fool and he makes it obvious that G5 and the communication of operational intent to the enemy are key tools in his armoury. That outstanding brigadier has been let down badly at MOD level, and I should like to know why there is no single service chief in charge of public relations, as there used to be.

How we structure ourselves is an issue for debate, as it has been in the past and will be in the future, but I refer the hon. Gentleman to the points that I have made about our overall first priority in this case. The outcome is clear for all to see. I want our armed forces to have the opportunity to let the British public know exactly what they are doing on the public's behalf and what their capabilities are, but that has to be put into context. Operational considerations have to come first and always will. I agree with the hon. Lady about exploiting the regional media and about stories on local men and boys. I am not sure that we do enough in that regard. It is not MOD policy to do anything other than exploit that, but whether we do it as well as we could is worth considering.

Making judgments on this issue is far from easy and requires careful co-ordination up and down the chain of command. We should therefore be careful about drawing conclusions on the basis of partial information, especially when that is done with the advantage of hindsight.

Against the background that I have given, let me say some more about the Musa Qaleh operation. It was complex, multi-faceted and involved a large number of troops drawn from many nations, with Afghans at the vanguard. It was critical to the operation's success that we obtained and maintained the support of the people of Musa Qaleh in the face of a determined campaign of intimidation by the Taliban. It was therefore vital that we adopted a proactive information campaign. That was subject to detailed planning and was achieved in part by embedding two journalists in the UK units that were providing support to the Afghan forces. The journalists provided reports to newspapers and TV stations in the UK and internationally.

Embedding journalists in military units enables us to afford them access to military operations that simply would not be possible otherwise. In return, we expect them to be responsible in their reporting and not to breach operational security or endanger our people. Evidence suggests that the Musa Qaleh operation is a prime example of such a relationship of mutual trust working well. The embedded journalists did not publish their first reports until 9 December—two days after the original announcement that the operation had commenced. Their journalistic responsibility was subject to particularly sensitive influence, as they were embedded in the patrol in which Sergeant Johnson of the 2nd Battalion the Yorkshire Regiment was tragically killed on 8 December by a suspected mine strike. I am pleased to say that they did not report that incident until Sergeant Johnson's family had been told, through the appropriate channels, and an appropriate period of grace had been observed.

The decision to embed journalists was the right one. They played an important part in ensuring that media reporting of the operation was generally factual and properly balanced, and they did not breach operational security or ignore the needs of the next of kin.

Will the Minister assure me that all the lessons that were learned from the aggressive handling of public relations in Northern Ireland are now thoroughly understood in relation to current operations?

I can never give blanket assurances like that, and the hon. Gentleman knows it. One has to learn all the time. Collective memory can sometimes be short. We have to pick up and relearn the lessons of history. Surely, we must try to embed in the armed forces, the MOD and any other organisation the ability to pick up and relearn the lessons that need to be learned and the ability to adapt quickly. So, no, I cannot tell him that every lesson that was learned over 30 years of complex, dangerous operations in Northern Ireland has been learned and remembered by the individuals in the MOD. We have to stay on top of that, and he has to help us to stay on top of that through the processes that we are undertaking today.

I emphasise what I said to the hon. Lady earlier. I agree with much of what she said, but I have concentrated on some of the issues on which I do not agree. I believe that the Musa Qaleh operation was totally successful from beginning to end. We cannot sort out all the ills of our media, but I agree with her reasons for securing the debate.

The Government know that public support and understanding of the activities of the armed forces are important to their long-term success. To that end, we have a duty to share as much information as we can about their work. We should and do, not least through stories about local men, concentrate on regional media and have a regional plan, much along the lines described by the hon. Lady. Moreover, public relations are factored into pre-deployment training, as would be expected. However, we must not confuse the issue. Operational security has the casting vote; it is and will remain the overriding factor that determines whether it is reasonable and safe to release information. That is as true a principle in the Musa Qaleh operation as elsewhere. Any alternative will endanger the lives of our troops. I simply am not prepared to do that, and I am certain that the hon. Lady would not want that either.

It being Two o'clock, the motion for the Adjournment of the sitting lapsed, without Question put.