[Mr. David Amess in the Chair] — World Trade (Doha Development Agenda)

Part of the debate – in Westminster Hall at 2:55 pm on 12 October 2006.

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Photo of John Bercow John Bercow Conservative, Buckingham 2:55, 12 October 2006

It is a pleasure and a privilege to take part in the debate, and I begin by paying tribute to Malcolm Bruce, the Chairman of the Select Committee on International Development, for his work in bringing about the report, to which all members of the Committee have signed up.

I am sad to say that, on the strength of experience, I am inclined to agree with the verdict of Hugh Bayley. I fear that his pessimism is all too justified, because we do not have to look into a crystal ball when we can read the book. That said, we have an overriding obligation to try to rescue the Doha development round, and the British Government have an important role to play in that process, in the hope that some sort of arrangement can be fashioned, the net effect of which will be to reduce the poverty of the poorest at the expense—let us be explicit—of some necessary and considerable sacrifice by the richest.

In the brief time available, I should like to focus on a couple of points. First, both because it is significant on its own and because it is emblematic of the wider problem with which we are wrestling, I shall talk about duty-free and quota-free access. There was a widespread hope and a partial commitment that 100 per cent. duty-free quota-free access would be provided for the least developed countries to export their produce and to reduce thereby their destitution.

In fact, we got something rather different. We got—principally on the ultimate insistence of the United States that it was thus far and no further—an agreement only to 97 per cent. The significance of that can hardly be overstated. It would be easy to be beguiled by the rhetoricians, the spin doctors and the press release merchants—of whom a plentiful supply was in evidence in Hong Kong in the delegations both of the United States and of the European Union—and to suppose that 97 per cent. was really quite good. I might be thought rather churlish to suggest that the cup was half empty rather than half full. In fact, the situation is worse than that. The cup is not just half empty; there is scarcely any water remaining in it.

Let me explain why I say that. If we think about the 3 per cent. that has been protected, we see that we are in practice talking about somewhat more than 300—probably nearer 330—product lines that are exempt from the duty-free quota-free access arrangement. Are they a purely incidental and arbitrarily chosen 330 lines? Is it a matter of happenstance whether or not a line is included in the agreement? No, that is not the case at all. Those that are excluded and fall within the 3 per cent. have deliberately been put into the exempt category to satisfy the selfish commercial interests of states that are much more powerful, principally the United States and the European Union—a collection of states—and, to a considerable degree, Japan.

Just reflect on the facts. Under the agreement, unless it is amended and improved, the United States will still be able to resist the export of textiles from Bangladesh, and Japan will be able to resist the export of rice from Cambodia. So far as Bangladesh is concerned—to pluck out one important example—about 20 to 25 product lines account for two thirds of its exports. When one reflects on those limited but important statistics, one recognises just how desperately damaging it is that the agreement so far is for only 97 per cent. and not 100 per cent.

I have flayed the United States, and I make no apology for doing so, because it has taken a thoroughly selfish and irresponsible approach thus far to the negotiations, but let us not suppose for one moment that the European Union can or should be let off the hook. The Chairman of the Select Committee mentioned the EU's original insistence on large numbers of sensitive products. I think that the figure has sharply fallen since then, but even now the European Union is positing a scenario in which a significant number of products shall be judged to be sensitive so far as it is concerned, and developing countries will therefore not have an opportunity to export them. That is wrong. If we are serious about trade reform, about a development deal, and particularly about a pro-poor outcome, which was the whole rationale behind this set of negotiations in the first instance, we must resolve to secure a far superior outcome to the unsatisfactory mish-mash that is currently on the table.

Secondly, I am disappointed that far too little attention was paid to the subject of special and differential treatment. I think that the Committee also felt that an opportunity was lost. When reflecting on this subject, we have to adjust our mindset to the context of the totality of the negotiations. In this day and age, in the light of industrial development around the world, it is a mistake to view the debate as consisting of a Manichean divide between the forces of good and darkness, or even between the forces of developed and developing countries. That is part of the debate, but it is a simplistic characterisation because there is a world of difference between the position of India, China, or, indeed, Brazil, and the circumstances faced by Bangladesh, Ethiopia, or, dare I say it, Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali and Chad. If we are to create equitable and sustainable deals that respect the different circumstances of developing countries, we in the international community must be prepared to roll up our sleeves and attend politically, but, more importantly, intellectually, to the different circumstances faced by a range of countries. On that basis, we can come to arrangements that on the whole favour the poorest and the poorer, rather than the richest or richer.

My third point is that although there is a desperate threat of insecurity, collapse into failed states, internal conflict, and the acquisition of small arms and unregulated circulation of such weaponry, which kills about 400,000 people around the world each year, there is also an ultimate threat of terrorism. I have made the point before, and I make no apology for repeating it, that if as a matter of calculated policy we exacerbate the plight of the poor and increase the gap between them and us, it is only a matter of time before a proportion of them decide to pursue another route to redressing the balance. They may do it voluntarily, or they may find themselves being used by others, but it will happen.

There is another danger, which is a less apocalyptic scenario than that which the hon. Member for City of York validly articulated, that we will make next to no progress in the pursuit of the millennium development goals. There is a danger, in the international development debate, that we end up discussing these issues in a compartmentalised fashion. In the conduct of domestic politics, it is often said that we need joined-up government; the Government say that they are delivering it, and we sometimes claim that they are not, but there is a regular debate about it. We need a similar approach to the formulation of policy on international development.

It is no good the European Union, the United States, Japan and others patting themselves on the back and feeling some sense of vindication, and perhaps of collective altruism, that they are doling out substantial sums of taxpayers' money, the better to assist the poorest countries in the world, if they pursue trade policies that go in precisely the opposite direction. The danger is even greater when trade massively exceeds aid in volume—as we frankly know it does. Realistically, it always will. If we continue to operate in that way, we will be giving $1 with one hand and taking probably nearer to $6 with the other. I think that those are the denominations in which the debates should be conducted. There is a hugely greater sum involved with agricultural turnover than with the contributions made by OECD states in the form of Government assistance to the poorest countries in the world.

My final point, in expressing the hope that what looks like a calamity might be prevented, is that there is no moral equivalence between the position of rich countries pursuing unfair trade—hugely subsidising their own produce and dumping the surplus on the poorest people on the planet—and developing countries declining wholly to agree, or, perhaps, to agree at all, with the demand from the richest countries on earth that they should open their markets. The richest countries on earth are perfectly entitled to take the view that markets should be opened for services and the like, but developing countries are perfectly entitled to take the view that they do not want to do so because they prefer for substantial periods to enjoy policy space to build up their own domestic markets and to pursue their priorities. They are also entitled to take the view that they will consider doing so over a graduated period, depending on their economic strength, or when they have had the Doha offer, which they thought was the whole purpose of and rationale for the negotiations in the first place.

I do not like the fact that people, particularly in the western world, sometimes become so embroiled in the minutiae of the negotiations, or, in a professional capacity, are so stuck within the interstices of the system, that they can genuinely find themselves persuaded that it is really a question of a bit of give and take on both sides, and that if we are to consider abandoning or heavily reducing our agricultural subsidies, it is only reasonable for us to say to developing countries, "You've got to give us something in return"—the principle of the quid pro quo. I confess that I do not accept that principle. It seems to me that in the conduct of international trade, ethics do not have much to do with it, but they should. As well as a healthy dose of realism, which should of course inform any constructive approach to political negotiation, we should not lose sight of the need for a decent dose of idealism. It is wrong for the European Union massively to subsidise its agricultural produce in a way that hugely distorts trade and makes poor people in developing countries still poorer, and we should commit, within a specified, and preferably short, timetable to stop it. If we are then able to persuade other countries to give something to us in recognition of our contribution, so be it, but we should stop it in any event.