Mi6

Part of the debate – in Westminster Hall at 11:15 am on 19 July 2006.

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Photo of Kim Howells Kim Howells Minister of State (Middle East), Foreign & Commonwealth Office 11:15, 19 July 2006

It is a great pleasure to serve under you, Mr. Conway—I do not think that we have had the pleasure before. I congratulate Norman Baker on securing this debate. I welcome the opportunity to set out the Government's position to the House and to reassure him of the integrity and professionalism of the United Kingdom intelligence services.

I am certainly to glad to hear the hon. Gentleman welcome the existence of MI6 or, as it normally called, the Secret Intelligence Service or SIS—I say that so that I can reply more quickly. As someone helping to co-ordinate the evacuation of thousands of very frightened people from Lebanon, I find it difficult to imagine how a safe evacuation could be carried out without high-quality intelligence from our intelligence services. That is literally a matter of life or death.

I have heard lots of names of journalists and newspapers from the hon. Gentleman. We all have our favourite journalists and favourite newspapers, but I would not expect some of them to write a good story about the Government this side of the next millennium.

The hon. Gentleman is right to note that the United Kingdom is close to the United States of America and that the UK intelligence services are close to their US opposite numbers. I am sure that the House expects nothing less. International co-operation is critical, especially in these times, when it comes to countering international terrorism. Our relationship with the United States is a mutually beneficial one that enables us to co-operate closely where our interests coincide and to discuss, debate and disagree privately where they differ.

However, any suggestion that the SIS is unquestioning in its relationship with the Americans—whether with the CIA or with anyone else—is to mistake the nature of that relationship. For obvious reasons, it is impossible to discuss the operations of the SIS or its co-operation with the CIA in detail, but I should like to set out its legally defined functions, since they are at the heart of what the hon. Gentleman asked me. I should also like to discuss the oversight mechanism, which I hope will offer him the reassurance that he seeks.

The SIS was placed on a statutory basis by the House in the Intelligence Services Act 1994, which was modified by the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. The functions of the SIS as Britain's foreign intelligence service were set out in that legislation as follows:

"to obtain and provide information relating to the actions or intentions of persons outside the British Islands; and...to perform other tasks relating to the actions or intentions of such persons."

The Acts also stipulated that those functions should only be carried out by the SIS if they are

"in the interests of national security, with particular reference to the defence and foreign policies of Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom; or...in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom; or...in support of the prevention or detection of serious crime."

In order to ensure that the SIS carried out those functions and those functions only—it is important to remember this, as the hon. Gentleman has raised some interesting questions—the two Acts set up the following oversight mechanisms.

First, if the SIS wished to carry out an action that would be otherwise unlawful, it could apply for an authorisation to be issued by the Foreign Secretary. The authorisation may only be issued if the Foreign Secretary thinks it necessary for the discharge of the SIS's functions that a particular action is taken and is satisfied that the proposed action is proportionate and reasonable.

Secondly, the decisions of the Secretary of State to give authorisations are subject to the review of the Intelligence Services Commissioner who reports at least once a year to the Prime Minister, who in turn lays the commissioner's report before Parliament. The commissioner must be a person who holds, or has held, high judicial office and every member of the SIS is under a statutory duty to provide him with all the documents and information he needs to carry out his functions.

Thirdly, there is a tribunal of judges and senior lawyers with the power to investigate individuals' complaints against the SIS, make awards of compensation or, for example, quash or cancel any warrant or authorisation. If a complainant is dissatisfied with a decision of the tribunal, they may decide to take their case to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.

The operations of the SIS are therefore carried out within a strict statutory framework, overseen by the Foreign Secretary and scrutinised by members of the senior judiciary.

The hon. Gentleman has questioned the use of intelligence in the run-up to the war in Iraq, and the degree to which the agencies were happy with that use of intelligence. He has also raised concerns over the behaviour and the subsequent appointment of John Scarlett as chief of the Secret Intelligence Service.

I do not propose to revisit the exhaustive work carried out by Lord Butler of Brockwell, or the conclusions and recommendations of his report—no doubt that will be debated and discussed as long as the assassination of Kennedy—but I will highlight that, as noted by the Intelligence and Security Committee in its annual report, which was debated in the House as recently as 11 July, the Government have adopted Lord Butler's recommendations to improve both the validation of intelligence and the ability of dissenting voices to challenge conclusions based on that intelligence.

The SIS has also reorganised and strengthened staff responsible for the overall quality of intelligence and the process by which it is produced, and that is very important. Mechanisms have been put in place to ensure that senior officers in the Defence Intelligence Staff see all relevant information. A confidential guide on the nature, collection and use of intelligence has been produced for those who read and use it. Assessment boxes are included on the Joint Intelligence Committee's assessments papers to explain the limitations of the intelligence on which the assessment has reached its conclusions. I am appreciative of that, as it helps a great deal if we have an explanation of where intelligence has come from, how reliable it is likely to be and whether it can be corroborated from elsewhere. I think that is an important step forward.

A professional head of intelligence analysis has been appointed and is leading work on the training of analysts, and the JIC assessments staff have been expanded. Written dissent from JIC assessments can be included in the paper to which they refer, the JIC assessments staff have access to the Agencies' Staff Counsellor, and the DIS has a mechanism for expressing dissent within the Ministry of Defence.

The Intelligence and Security Committee welcomed these changes, and has said that it hopes that they

"will have a positive impact on decision-making at the highest level of the intelligence community."

I will now try to answer at least some of the hon. Gentleman's questions. I noted around 15 questions, but I will try to answer the most important.

First, the hon. Gentleman raised a number of issues about John Scarlett, or C as he is officially known. The former Foreign Secretary—now Leader of the House—appointed John Scarlett on the basis of recommendations he had received from a totally independent selection panel following standard Civil Service Commission practice. The process followed precisely the same pattern used to select similarly graded permanent secretaries. The key consideration was to appoint the best person for the job and on the advice of the selection board, the former Foreign Secretary concluded that John Scarlett was indeed the best candidate. The Prime Minister did not intervene in the selection process, but was consulted as it came to an end, when he gave his approval.

The SIS has made considerable progress since John Scarlett's appointment and steps that can be described publicly include the implementation of the recommendations of the Butler review—welcomed by the Intelligence and Security Committee—and the unprecedented move to open recruitment to enable the expansion necessary to counter terrorism, which was also welcomed by the ISC. The SIS has set up a new website and I am sure the hon. Gentleman knows the address, but I will tell him anyway: www.mi6.gov.uk.

On the SIS carrying out illegal operations, as the hon. Gentleman knows, the SIS is drawn from the ranks of the UK population. The staff therefore share the legal and human rights priorities of the UK as a whole and are trained to operate within the Acts that define the service's role. The SIS's compliance with legislation is clear from the reports of the commissioner that have been made over many years. In the extremely unlikely event that officers of the SIS attempted to carry out an operation that required the Secretary of State's authorisation without obtaining approval, they would be subject to the same liability in law as any other UK citizen. I welcome that and hope that the hon. Gentleman does too.

There are both internal and external systems in place to prevent unauthorised action. Internally, the SIS is structured in such a way as to prevent any person or group carrying out an illegal operation without it coming to the attention of officers who report directly to SIS's senior management. The SIS reports any errors in its oversight process to the Intelligence Services Commissioner, who includes them in his report to the Prime Minister. The right of access to SIS's records by the commissioner and the Investigatory Powers Tribunal means that any attempt to act independently of ministerial authorisation could be detected either as a result of a direct complaint or in the course of the commissioner's routine and regular scrutiny.

Infuriatingly, we are running out of time, but I want the hon. Gentleman to know that the Government are not involved in any form of torture in any way, nor do we condone torture, or tactics that undoubtedly were used at some stage in the past by people with whom we ally ourselves. I have made many visits to Afghanistan and Iraq, and I believe that nations are judged to be civilised and modern on the basis of how they treat not only their own citizens but the citizens of other countries. That means, at its most acute moment, how they treat those they have in custody, where they may be able to do things to people that they would not normally be able to. I want to make it clear that the Government are not involved in any of those activities whatever and that we would not for one moment allow such behaviour.

We have tried very hard to convince people, including the hon. Gentleman—who among others has quite properly tabled a number of questions on the subject—that we have never played a part in extraordinary rendition other than the examples that my right hon. Friend the former Foreign Secretary readily and openly gave to the House. The Government will continue to be open about extraordinary rendition and try to answer all questions properly.