In debating stage 1 of the bill last week, we made it clear that this was emergency legislation and that it was about one thing and one
This is not the time or place to change that; this is about closing the door-that is all. It is not about, as some have implied, opening the doors of the state hospital to a cohort of new people with mental illnesses, whether they are currently in the community or in prison. The bill will not do that because hospital admission will still require section 17 of the 1984 act to be satisfied: it will still need to be shown that, if the mental disorder from which a patient suffers is persistent, manifested only by abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct, treatment in hospital is likely to alleviate the condition or prevent it from deteriorating, and that it is necessary for the health or safety of the person, or for the protection of others, for him to receive such treatment in hospital. That is a very important sentence, although a particularly difficult one to read.
It is clearly for doctors to reach that view; in our view, the bill imposes no new responsibilities on doctors or psychiatrists in that respect. The bill affects those seeking to leave detention in hospital; it does not change the process of admission. I gave this assurance yesterday to the Royal College of Psychiatrists and I am happy to give it again in this chamber. We are closing a door; that is all. We are not opening new ones.
The Executive is in no doubt about the importance of mental health and the issues surrounding it. We well understand the complexity and difficulty of the definitions of mental disorder, and are conscious of the differing and deeply held convictions regarding such matters, even within the mental health community. That is why we will not open the door to that debate today. Involved in that debate is the MacLean committee, which is examining how to deal with serious offenders, including those with personality disorders. Also involved is the Millan committee, which is, as we asked, reviewing mental health legislation-a difficult job. We will not and must not burst in on those deliberations-they are too important. I acknowledge that even to think about such matters without beginning to stray into MacLean's and Millan's territory is extremely difficult, but to
The Minister for Health and Community Care and I will throw open the doors to the debate on modernising mental health when the time is right. We will examine all the issues fully in the light of all the experience and expertise available, but we will not do it today because this bill should do as little as possible, commensurate with its aim of improving public safety. As drafted, with the clarifying amendments, improving public safety is what the bill does, and it goes no further.
I say again: the bill does not seek to allow anyone to be admitted to hospital who could not be detained under the existing law. For those few-and it is a few-whom the bill affects, we give the assurance, as the Deputy First Minister has already done, that resources will be available for treatment which is considered to be appropriate by clinicians in the state hospital. However, we will not try to define that today, which is why Susan Deacon has asked the Mental Welfare Commission for Scotland to report on this matter properly and separately from the consideration of public safety, with which we are involved today. All around us are interesting and important doors that we need to open, but not today. Today, we have one door to close and these amendments will help us to do that. We all know what we have to do-let us close that door now.
I move amendment 37.
Section 3 of the bill seeks to widen the definition of mental disorder in the Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984 to include personality disorder. The 1984 act states that "'mental disorder' means mental illness or mental handicap, however caused or manifested".
I believe that the definition in the bill is too wide-ranging and could have unacceptable consequences. In the Parliament's debate last week, members throughout the chamber raised the issue of how to define personality disorder; they were concerned that the bill would classify personality disorder as a mental illness. Unfortunately, ministers failed adequately to deal with those concerns. Amendment 28 would address some of those issues by providing greater clarity in defining personality disorder.
In recent years, psychiatric thinking on personality disorders has changed; as a result of
"I have no difficulty with the definition of personality disorder as a mental disorder, but psychiatrists have great difficulty with it being placed in the category of mental illness, as is proposed in the bill."-[Official Report, 2 September 1999; Vol 1, c 117.]
I see that Dr Simpson-who is, I understand, a psychiatrist-is here today and can stand by his remarks. The purpose of amendment 28 is to bring the bill into line with the psychiatric thinking that Dr Simpson highlighted last week. I hope that, in the light of his statement, he will join us in agreeing to the amendment.
Dr Jim Dyer, for whom I have considerable respect, having been a student in acute psychiatry under him at the Royal Edinburgh hospital, is the director of the Mental Welfare Commission for Scotland. He echoes the concerns about the wide definition of personality disorder in the bill; he, too, wants the bill to be brought into line with current medical thinking. He has gone on record and has written to all members of the Scottish Parliament to indicate his concern on this issue. Given his public statement and his statutory responsibility to highlight such issues to the Scottish Executive and the responsible ministers, I hope that the Executive will recognise that this amendment seeks to address the same concerns as those highlighted by the Mental Welfare Commission for Scotland.
Amendment 28 also seeks to focus the bill on those individuals with a particular type of personality disorder who are a marked risk to society. In last week's debate, several members expressed the concern that the bill fails to take account of the fact that the majority of those with such a personality disorder pose no risk to society. Dennis Canavan remarked that if we did not tighten up the bill's definition of personality disorder, this chamber could be rather empty. In my view, it is likely that the press benches will be even emptier. [Laughter.] I am sure that I will get good copy for that tomorrow.
Even the Government agrees that many individuals with a personality disorder pose no risk to society. The Government paper, "Managing Dangerous People With Severe Personality Disorder", which was published in July, states that "the overwhelming majority do not pose a risk to the public and live reasonably ordered, crime free, lives".
The Mental Welfare Commission for Scotland and the Law Society of Scotland have highlighted that point, but the bill fails to make the matter clear. I understand that the commission has written to ministers to inform them of its concerns.
The amendment would enhance the bill in three ways. First, it would bring the bill into line with current psychiatric thinking and clarify the view that personality disorder is not a mental illness. Secondly, it would ensure that the bill is precisely focused on those individuals with a personality disorder who pose most risk to society. Thirdly, when an organisation such as the Mental Welfare Commission for Scotland raises concerns about the bill, it should be listened to-the amendment goes some way to addressing those concerns.
Jim Wallace made it clear that he had given the Mental Welfare Commission the responsibility to review service provision in the state hospital at Carstairs because it was the appropriate body. The commission, which Iain Gray said knew most about this issue, has expressed its concerns, which is why this amendment has been lodged.
I, therefore move amendment 28.
The purpose of amendment 29 is similar to the one that Mr Matheson indicated in speaking to amendment 28. I do not think that I need take up the committee's time in replicating many of the points that he made in his substantial contribution to the debate.
It is a great pity that the Parliament was unable to give fuller consideration to the definition of mental disorder when it discussed stage 1 of the bill. I was advised by the clerk that, because mental disorder is mentioned in the long title of the bill, the amendment of its definition is one of the bill's general principles and that an amendment to delete section 3 in its entirety, as recommended by the Mental Welfare Commission for Scotland, would not be competent. I assure members that that was the ruling that was given to me. Whether it is correct, I do not know. The matter might be investigated.
The memorandum from the Mental Welfare Commission to the minister on 6 September arrived too late for the matter to be considered at stage 1 of the bill. That is not a criticism of the commission, but it does give rise to the concern flagged up by Kenny MacAskill that, in preparing the bill and presenting it to Parliament for approval, the Executive was remiss in not consulting the commission.
I was interested to hear Jim Wallace talking about the need to maintain the narrow focus of the bill so as to concentrate on the specific problem that the bill is designed to remedy, which arose as a result of the decision in Mr Ruddle's case. In essence, Mr Gray made the same point, although he did so in a more colourful way and, being a master of metaphor, introduced more windows and doors into the debate than C R Smith could. His point was that we should not be opening doors or closing windows-or whatever the case may
That throws into focus the point made by the Mental Welfare Commission-it is not necessary, for the purposes of remedying the deficiency in the law highlighted by the Ruddle case, to go as far as to amend the definition of mental disorder or mental illness to include persons affected by a generality of personality disorders. That is why in amendment 29 we have sought, like Mr Matheson in amendment 28, to narrow the definition so that it applies to a smaller category of people.
It cannot be right-given that the amendment relates to a definition in the principal act-that all forms of personality disorder be treated as mental disorders or mental illnesses for the purposes of the act. So wide a definition could extend the scope of the whole act so that many individuals who have never come within the scope of the criminal justice system could now be subject to civil detention.
I invite the minister to explain more fully why he considers the amended definition to be absolutely necessary to fulfil the purpose of the bill, which-as the Minister for Justice acknowledged in the debate on earlier amendments-is limited.
In that context, I also ask the minister whether the expansion of the definition of mental disorder and mental illness to encompass personality disorders has implications for criminal law in Scotland and for the plea of diminished responsibility. As he will be aware, one line of defence open to an accused charged with murder is to establish that he was suffering from diminished responsibility at the time of the killing. A finding to that effect would enable the jury to reduce the conviction from murder to culpable homicide so that the accused received a determinate sentence instead of the mandatory life sentence.
Criminal case law indicates that a judge will allow the plea of diminished responsibility to go to the jury for decision only if there is evidence of mental disorder, mental illness or disease. Evidence of severe personality disorder may not in itself be sufficient. If a personality disorder is now treated as a mental illness for the purposes of the act, that may impact on the plea of diminished responsibility under criminal law. It cannot be right that persons who are simply wicked by nature may be able to exploit such a change in the law to reduce the charge on which they are convicted in the criminal courts.
The aim of amendment 30 is very similar to the aims of the amendments supported by Michael Matheson and David
Section 3(1) will insert the phrase "(including personality disorder)" into the 1984 act. I think that it would be in the general interest if the words "personality disorder" were more focused. A considerable proportion of the people of Scotland suffer from personality disorders, but I hope that they will never come within the scope of this bill, and I hope that it is not the Executive's intention that they should ever do so. So why on earth should they be included by the use of such a wide phrase as "personality disorder"? That is what is proposed in the wording of the bill as it stands.
Last week, I lodged some parliamentary questions about the issue-I do not know whether the minister knows about that, but I hope that I will get a reply in due course. I did not really expect to get a reply before today's debate, but perhaps the minister will give some indication of the official estimate of the number of people in Scotland who suffer from a personality disorder. How many people in Carstairs state hospital or other state hospitals suffer from personality disorders? How many of those people have personality disorders that can be classified as presenting some danger to the public?
As Bruce Millan said in his letter to the Deputy First Minister, it is very important that we do not imagine, or put across to the general public, that people who suffer from mental illness are all going to pose some threat to the general public, because that is untrue. Unlike Dr Simpson, I am not a psychiatrist, but I imagine that the overwhelming majority of people with personality disorders do not present any threat to the general public at all. I do not see why they should be included within the scope of this bill.
From my reading in preparation for this debate, I understand that some people use the term "psychopath" similarly, if not synonymously, to the way in which they use the phrase "someone with an anti-social personality disorder". Is that correct? Is that an accurate definition in the eyes of psychiatrists, the law or both? I would welcome an explanation from the minister.
As members can see, I have proposed that, instead of the phrase "(including personality disorder)", we should have "(including dangerous anti-social personality disorder)". As Michael Matheson said, that would help to focus this emergency legislation on the small minority of people on whom it is meant to be focused.
In proposing amendment 28, the Scottish National party is seeking to do two things: to clarify the definition of personality disorder, and to ensure that personality disorder is classified as
Personality disorders are not uncommon. As Michael Matheson pointed out, it is fair to say that many members in the chamber today have a personality disorder of one kind or another. If one believes what has been written in some of the newspapers, our disorders range from having a somewhat suspect personality to being deemed to have had a complete personality bypass.
If the description is not amended it will include people who may have an obsession with washing their hands and cleanliness, or those who suffer from agoraphobia or claustrophobia.
We must realise the importance of ensuring that the definition does not become a catch-all, which could have serious implications that go far beyond closing the loophole that emerged as a result of the Ruddle case.
The comments that Kay Ullrich has just made seem to imply that the legislation would somehow affect people whose personality disorders did not make them a risk to the public.
As I said during a presentation that I made last week, the legislation is designed to close a loophole. The reference that Kay Ullrich made is unhelpful. Such references have been made consistently and they paint a false picture of what the legislation is intended to do. Will she comment on that?
Let us not lose sight of the fact that the vast majority of people who have a personality disorder live what are by popular definition normal lives. They do not commit crimes and they do not pose a threat to public safety. Let us be precise in the group that we target. We are targeting the Ruddles of this world-those with a personality disorder that makes them seriously anti-social, violent and a danger to society.
I therefore ask the committee to support amendment 28.
I have some sympathy for the amendments-in particular amendment 28, which was spoken to by
I have heard the minister say that this is simply a clarification of the existing law. We may or may not agree about that, but it will certainly have legal consequences. David McLetchie spoke of the possibility of it being used in a plea of diminished responsibility. Undoubtedly that will happen. I would like to say two things to David about that. First, one cannot have it both ways. People cannot be defined as bad and wicked for the purposes of conviction, but be defined as ill for some other purpose. Secondly, it will still be for the courts to decide how a person is disposed of. If a jail sentence or life imprisonment is appropriate, that is what will happen. That is not a serious consequence.
Despite my reservations about the bill, I firmly believe that amendment 28 does not help. It is not a better way forward. It involves a detailed definition of a particular kind of personality disorder, which may or may not turn out to be helpful. It puts a particular kind of personality disorder in a class of its own in the overall category of mental disorder. Without boring members to death, I will say that that will also have problems of application and interpretation. Whichever way we approach the problem is not without difficulty.
The bottom line is that we urgently need to review the subject, which is what will happen when the Millan committee and the MacLean committee report. I hope that any changes that we make will be in the round, not in isolation, because anything less than that is not ideal. However, for the moment, we need to close the loophole in the interests of public safety. The simplest, most direct and most effective short-term way of doing that is to create a stated sub-category of personality disorder within the broad category of mental disorder and mental illness.
We should not be scaremongering. The legislation does not mean that anyone with a personality disorder will somehow be whipped off to Carstairs, any more than it means that any person with a degree of mental illness will be taken into custody. There will always be other safeguards and other important criteria to take into account. We must recognise that the legislation means that people-not those with personality disorders such as ourselves, but those who have killed other human beings or who are seriously violent and are a continuing danger because of their mental state-can be kept in a secure environment. That must be our priority.
For now, the bill is a simple, direct and effective
One of the drawbacks of being called towards the end of a debate is that everyone has said what you were going to say. However, the benefit is that you can work out the terms of the debate.
I listened to the minister, to Mr McLetchie and to Mr Jackson, and there appears to be much unanimity and consensus on many areas-and on two areas in particular. First, everyone accepts that we are focusing on a narrow area of law. Secondly, we are not undertaking a fundamental review. I will not canvass how we arrived at that position, but it is accepted that a fundamental review will have to be considered by the MacLean committee and the Millan committee. At some stage-either next year or the year after-the Parliament will doubtless have to revisit and reconsider the matter, because we are debating and discussing an area of law and psychiatry that has proved to be fundamental over the past 20 to 40 years.
We need to be clear about what we are trying to achieve in the interim. I have a great deal of sympathy with Dr Dyer, who was mentioned earlier. I appreciate his point of view, because the number of people we seek to address in the legislation is relatively few. Everyone accepts that there are a significant number of people in Carstairs, but the number who will be affected by the legislation can be counted, if not on the fingers on one hand, on not many more. The number of those who will be affected will also be reduced on the recommendations of the Millan committee and MacLean committee.
I can understand why Dr Dyer says that we should seek to amend section 3; I can appreciate his position. However, I think that the public would view the Parliament as being derelict in its duty if it failed to address the possibility that the people affected, who may be counted on the fingers of one hand, might be released without conditions or without any element of treatability being addressed.
On page 3 of his briefing, Dr Dyer says that we should not do that. He says that should Parliament wish to add the term "personality disorder" to the category of mental disorder, it should do so in addition to the terms "mental illness" and "mental handicap", as that is in keeping with current psychiatric thinking, which views the concept of personality disorder as different from the concept of mental illness. That point was canvassed by other MSPs, in particular Mr Jackson.
We must recognise that the issue will be dealt with by the MacLean committee, not by a fundamental review. The failure to address section
As my colleague Mr Matheson commented, the difficulty is that the term "personality disorder" affects many people and is wide-ranging. Numerous people in Carstairs, the state hospital institution, might be affected by the proposal and, although they might not be the most sympathetic of those we choose to associate with, we have a duty to look after their interest and to take cognisance of their rights. That means that the definition of "personality disorder" must be tight. We are talking not about someone who is slightly eccentric, but about people who are a danger. That is what the public wish us to address and where I differ from Dr Dyer.
In considering personality disorder, we have a duty to ensure that the remit is as tight as possible, which means that we must specify those with whom we are dealing. I believe that amendment 28 deals with that. It shows that we are dealing not with personality disorder per se, but with "personality disorder manifested principally by abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct".
The public have charged us as parliamentarians with dealing with those people. We have to be quite strict and tight in our definition, so that in the general rush to introduce the emergency legislation, we do not catch the innocent among those whose position needs to be addressed seriously and which we have a duty to investigate.
I, too, have some sympathy with amendment 28 moved by Mr Matheson, but our problem is that we are trying to do something specific and limited. The members who support the SNP amendment and others are trying to move everything forward to 1999 from 1984 instead of considering the parts that we need to amend to achieve our focused objective.
I have a dilemma. When the Millan committee considers the issue, it will need to investigate this aspect in detail and with extreme care, but it is not necessary for us to amend the bill in the way suggested by the amendment. I am unhappy with the terms that are used in the amendment. It is unnecessary and goes beyond the scope of the change that is needed. As I understand it, section 17 still applies-I hope that the minister will confirm that, because I am not a lawyer-and that is the test that must be passed before one comes to the tests that we are now talking about. If that is
I will be brief-that is a compliment to those who have gone before me.
I share Mr McLetchie's concerns about the speed with which the legislation is being dealt with. I think that everyone has a great deal of sympathy with the fact that it has to be rushed through, but that excuse cannot be used to justify a slap-dash approach, which is evident in this wide definition.
One of the things that has been forgotten is that in the Parliament's infancy members decided that it would listen a lot more to expert evidence and that it would be a fully inclusive Parliament. If that is so, and we have agreement across the board-including that of the Law Society of Scotland, the Mental Welfare Commission for Scotland and, from its own publications, the Government-on the differentiation between personality disorder and mental illness, it seems odd that we are deliberately turning away from that. If we are turning away from that, I need more of an explanation of why it is an advantageous move. It is not good enough to say, "We want to focus on today and that is the only reason why we are turning away from it."
If the Government wants to focus, it needs to really focus and to get down to the nuts and bolts of the people it is trying to affect. That is why amendment 28 was lodged. It tries to specify the group of people who are targeted by the amendment and, in that way, tries to protect the rights of others.
I listened to what Mr Jackson said with some interest; he made some excellent points. I noted his reservations about the Government's position against the background of his long and distinguished legal career.
We are left with one of two positions. Either we can get it wrong and choose the wide and unfocused definition that is before us, in the interest of a catch-all, or we can opt for a more thoughtful and focused definition in the short term and look forward to the committees dealing with the issue in the longer term.
As Mr MacAskill said, this is an interim measure. That is the point, so let us make it absolutely focused. If that is the driving force behind the Government, I cannot see its logic in refusing to accept the amendment. We are trying to close loopholes-the Parliament and the Government owe it to the public to ensure that those loopholes are shut-and we must do it together and cleverly. The bill does not meet those criteria. What is the advantage in being deliberately out of date? I cannot see how that moves the process forward
I will endeavour to be brief, as a number of the points that have been raised have been debated fully. For Mr McLetchie's benefit, I will try to respond without a safety metaphor. [Laughter.] I want to return to the purpose of what we are doing. A number of members-and they are right-have said that we must focus on our narrow purpose, which is to close the loophole. The question then was why we need to make this clarification-for that is what we believe it is-in the definition of mental disorder.
We must be open: this is a belt and braces measure. We believe that personality disorder is included in mental disorder, and has been for many years. We want to make that absolutely clear so that there is no possibility of opening up a slightly different loophole. We do not intend to widen the definition of personality disorder.
All these amendments seek to qualify the reference to personality disorder and, in different ways, to limit its scope. We have studied them very carefully and I am grateful-particularly to Mr Matheson, Mr McLetchie and Mr Canavan-for setting out so clearly the reasoning behind their amendments. We have listened to them very carefully. We have also listened to the concerns of the mental health community. I reiterate, however, that this is a topic on which psychiatrists hold very different views, as do the various bodies in the mental health community.
Several members have mentioned the Mental Welfare Commission for Scotland, the important views of which have been considered. Reference has also been made to the Scottish Association for Mental Health, which thinks that the clarification that we have made is useful, correct and does not broaden the definition of mental disorder at all.
Amendment 28 seeks to reduce the scope of the definition by including the words:
"including a persistent personality disorder manifested principally by abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct".
It is our belief that the amendment is not necessary. The tests from section 17 will apply. The reaction of the chamber to Mrs Ullrich's suggestion that those who have obsessive handwashing syndrome would be brought into the ambit of the act showed how far behind the terms of the debate that kind of suggestion is.
I have only two minutes, Ms Cunningham, and I am summing up, so I should move on.
Amendment 29 would add "anti-social" to the
The more serious concern is that the amendments stray far into the territory of MacLean and Millan. Mr Canavan's question about clarification of the term psychopath is a good indication of how complex that territory is. It is not a term favoured by psychiatrists, but many psychologists use it. To make changes such as "anti-social" or "dangerously anti-social" is to go down a road that we do not have time to explore properly today. For those reasons we cannot accept the amendments.
Division number 3
For: Aitken, Bill, Campbell, Colin, Canavan, Dennis, Crawford, Bruce, Cunningham, Roseanna, Douglas-Hamilton, Lord James, Elder, Dorothy-Grace, Ewing, Dr Winnie, Ewing, Fergus, Ewing, Mrs Margaret, Fergusson, Alex, Gallie, Phil, Gibson, Mr Kenneth, Goldie, Miss Annabel, Grahame, Christine, Hamilton, Mr Duncan, Harding, Mr Keith, Hyslop, Fiona, Ingram, Mr Adam, Johnston, Mr Nick, Johnstone, Alex, MacAskill, Mr Kenny, MacDonald, Ms Margo, Marwick, Tricia, Matheson, Michael, McGrigor, Mr Jamie, McGugan, Irene, McIntosh, Mrs Lyndsay, McLeod, Fiona, McLetchie, David, Monteith, Mr Brian, Morgan, Alasdair, Mundell, David, Quinan, Mr Lloyd, Reid, Mr George, Robison, Shona, Russell, Michael, Salmond, Mr Alex, Sheridan, Tommy, Sturgeon, Nicola, Tosh, Mr Murray, Ullrich, Kay, Welsh, Mr Andrew, White, Ms Sandra, Wilson, Andrew, Young, John
Against: Alexander, Ms Wendy, Baillie, Jackie, Barrie, Scott, Boyack, Sarah, Brankin, Rhona, Brown, Robert, Chisholm, Malcolm, Craigie, Cathie, Curran, Ms Margaret, Deacon, Susan, Dewar, Donald, Eadie, Helen, Galbraith, Mr Sam, Gillon, Karen, Godman, Trish, Gorrie, Donald, Grant, Rhoda, Gray, Iain, Harper, Robin, Henry, Hugh, Home Robertson, Mr John, Hughes, Janis, Jackson, Dr Sylvia, Jackson, Gordon, Jamieson, Cathy, Jamieson, Margaret, Jenkins, Ian, Kerr, Mr Andy, Lamont, Johann, Livingstone, Marilyn, Lyon, George, Macdonald, Lewis, MacKay, Angus, MacLean, Kate, Macmillan, Maureen, Martin, Paul, McAveety, Mr Frank, McCabe, Mr Tom, McMahon, Mr Michael, McNeil, Mr Duncan, McNeill, Pauline, Morrison, Mr Alasdair, Muldoon, Bristow, Mulligan, Mrs Mary, Munro, Mr John, Murray, Dr Elaine, Oldfather, Ms Irene, Peacock, Peter, Peattie, Cathy, Radcliffe, Nora, Robson, Euan, Rumbles, Mr Mike, Scott, Tavish, Simpson, Dr Richard, Smith, Elaine, Smith, Iain, Smith, Margaret, Stephen, Nicol, Stone, Mr Jamie, Wallace, Mr Jim, Welsh, Ian, Whitefield, Karen, Wilson, Allan
Abstentions: Paterson, Mr Gil
Division number 4
For: Aitken, Bill, Canavan, Dennis, Douglas-Hamilton, Lord James, Fergusson, Alex, Gallie, Phil, Goldie, Miss Annabel, Harding, Mr Keith, Johnston, Mr Nick, Johnstone, Alex, McGrigor, Mr Jamie, McIntosh, Mrs Lyndsay, McLetchie, David, Monteith, Mr Brian, Mundell, David, Scanlon, Mary, Sheridan, Tommy, Tosh, Mr Murray, Young, John
Against: Alexander, Ms Wendy, Baillie, Jackie, Barrie, Scott, Boyack, Sarah, Brankin, Rhona, Brown, Robert, Chisholm, Malcolm, Craigie, Cathie, Curran, Ms Margaret, Deacon, Susan, Dewar, Donald, Eadie, Helen, Galbraith, Mr Sam, Gillon, Karen, Godman, Trish, Gorrie, Donald, Grant, Rhoda, Gray, Iain, Harper, Robin, Henry, Hugh, Home Robertson, Mr John, Hughes, Janis, Jackson, Dr Sylvia, Jackson, Gordon, Jamieson, Cathy, Jamieson, Margaret, Jenkins, Ian, Kerr, Mr Andy, Lamont, Johann, Livingstone, Marilyn, Lyon, George, Macdonald, Lewis, MacKay, Angus, MacLean, Kate, Macmillan, Maureen, Martin, Paul, McAveety, Mr Frank, McCabe, Mr Tom, McConnell, Mr Jack, McMahon, Mr Michael, McNeil, Mr Duncan, McNeill, Pauline, Morrison, Mr Alasdair, Muldoon, Bristow, Mulligan, Mrs Mary, Munro, Mr John, Murray, Dr Elaine, Oldfather, Ms Irene, Peacock, Peter, Peattie, Cathy, Radcliffe, Nora, Robson, Euan, Rumbles, Mr Mike, Scott, Tavish, Simpson, Dr Richard, Smith, Elaine, Smith, Iain, Smith, Margaret, Stephen, Nicol, Stone, Mr Jamie, Wallace, Mr Jim, Watson, Mike, Welsh, Ian, Whitefield, Karen, Wilson, Allan
Abstentions: Campbell, Colin, Crawford, Bruce, Cunningham, Roseanna, Elder, Dorothy-Grace, Ewing, Dr Winnie, Ewing, Fergus, Ewing, Mrs Margaret, Gibson, Mr Kenneth, Grahame, Christine, Hamilton, Mr Duncan, Hyslop, Fiona, Ingram, Mr Adam, Lochhead, Richard, MacDonald, Ms Margo, Marwick, Tricia, Matheson, Michael, McLeod, Fiona, Morgan, Alasdair, Paterson, Mr Gil, Quinan, Mr Lloyd, Reid, Mr George, Robison, Shona, Russell, Michael, Salmond, Mr Alex, Sturgeon, Nicola, Ullrich, Kay, Welsh, Mr Andrew, White, Ms Sandra, Wilson, Andrew
Division number 5
For: Canavan, Dennis, Sheridan, Tommy
Against: Aitken, Bill, Alexander, Ms Wendy, Baillie, Jackie, Barrie, Scott, Boyack, Sarah, Brankin, Rhona, Brown, Robert, Chisholm, Malcolm, Craigie, Cathie, Curran, Ms Margaret, Deacon, Susan, Dewar, Donald, Douglas-Hamilton, Lord James, Eadie, Helen, Galbraith, Mr Sam, Gillon, Karen, Godman, Trish, Goldie, Miss Annabel, Gorrie, Donald, Grant, Rhoda, Gray, Iain, Harding, Mr Keith, Harper, Robin, Henry, Hugh, Home Robertson, Mr John, Hughes, Janis, Jackson, Dr Sylvia, Jackson, Gordon, Jamieson, Cathy, Jamieson, Margaret, Jenkins, Ian, Johnston, Mr Nick, Johnstone, Alex, Kerr, Mr Andy, Lamont, Johann, Livingstone, Marilyn, Lyon, George, Macdonald, Lewis, MacKay, Angus, MacLean, Kate, Macmillan, Maureen, Martin, Paul, McAveety, Mr Frank, McCabe, Mr Tom, McConnell, Mr Jack, McGrigor, Mr Jamie, McIntosh, Mrs Lyndsay, McMahon, Mr Michael, McNeil, Mr Duncan, McNeill, Pauline, Monteith, Mr Brian, Morgan, Alasdair, Morrison, Mr Alasdair, Muldoon, Bristow, Mulligan, Mrs Mary, Mundell, David, Munro, Mr John, Murray, Dr Elaine, Oldfather, Ms Irene, Peacock, Peter, Peattie, Cathy, Radcliffe, Nora, Robson, Euan, Rumbles, Mr Mike, Scanlon, Mary, Scott, Tavish, Simpson, Dr Richard, Smith, Elaine, Smith, Iain, Smith, Margaret, Stephen, Nicol, Stone, Mr Jamie, Tosh, Mr Murray, Wallace, Mr Jim, Watson, Mike, Welsh, Ian, Whitefield, Karen, Wilson, Allan, Young, John
Abstentions: Campbell, Colin, Crawford, Bruce, Cunningham, Roseanna, Elder, Dorothy-Grace, Ewing, Dr Winnie, Ewing, Mrs Margaret, Gibson, Mr Kenneth, Grahame, Christine, Hamilton, Mr Duncan, Ingram, Mr Adam, Lochhead, Richard, MacDonald, Ms Margo, Marwick, Tricia, Matheson, Michael, McGugan, Irene, McLeod, Fiona, Paterson, Mr Gil, Quinan, Mr Lloyd, Reid, Mr George, Russell, Michael, Salmond, Mr Alex, Sturgeon, Nicola, Ullrich, Kay, White, Ms Sandra, Wilson, Andrew