I support Amendment 31 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hain, and the other signatories to it. It concerns Operation Kenova—the multiple investigations being carried out by ex-Chief Constable Jon Boutcher into some 200 murders on both sides of the conflict in Northern Ireland. I last spoke on Kenova on
“which committed these murders and whether steps were, or were not taken by the security forces before these abductions and murders occurred to protect people”.—[
I am not an expert on Northern Ireland, but I bring before the House two aspects of my own professional experience which I believe are of relevance. First, I have investigated murders and I know how difficult it is to tell families of victims that the trail has run cold and the investigation is, at least for the time being, being closed. Secondly, I have led some very large and complex investigations and watched many others. Never have I seen such a comprehensive, transparent and outstanding investigation as Kenova. Mr Boutcher has meticulously worked to gain the trust of families and has submitted a number of files, as we heard during the debate, to the Northern Ireland prosecution services. The submissions await a decision and the families know that. To discontinue all those inquiries by an Act of Parliament in these Houses seems to me to be an extraordinary step.
Of course, like many others in the House, I am a great supporter of the truth and reconciliation process in South Africa, but that process took place instead of investigations, not after they had been completed. Moreover, entering into such an approach has to be a voluntary process; and, having come this far, from a position of deep cynicism to trust in Kenova’s approach, I doubt whether many families will wish the completed investigations into these deaths just to be put to one side. With respect to the Minister, he knows that the continuance of Kenova is supported by politicians of every stripe in Northern Ireland, a position which I believe is not a common occurrence on any topic, let alone one as explosive as this. Any suggestion that the Kenova model is too expensive is risible, given all the suffering and all the costs that have preceded it.
I hope that when the House returns to this subject next week, it will ask the Government to think again.
]]>In October, Jon Boutcher wrote this, which I want to read into the record:
“The Kenova interim report will address what was, and was not, happening between organisations; the Provisional IRA and its Internal Security Unit, the police, armed forces, intelligence services and their agents and informants. In particular it will focus on”
the Provisional IRA,
“which committed these murders and whether steps were, or were not taken by the security forces before these abductions and murders occurred to protect people, or subsequently to bring those responsible to justice. It will also comment on the state’s approach to investigating such cases and the nigh on impossible operating environment that confronted the security forces”.
He went on to say this about the Bill:
“My commitment to publishing the results of all of the Kenova investigations remains as strong as ever and this takes us a step closer to achieving this. While there is much discussion about the future of legacy following the Government proposed Bill, the Bill should not impact the release of Kenova’s findings”.
I simply could not agree more.
In a month’s time, it will be 48 years since the murder of a young man with whom I trained at the Peel Centre in Hendon. Stephen Tibble was five months younger than me and a month ahead in training; He was shot dead in west London by the IRA. For the first 15 years of my career, the world of Irish republican terrorism spread not only from Ireland to the rest of the UK but in particular to London. Quite a lot of Metropolitan Police officers also lost their lives in this struggle.
I join with those who have said that the Good Friday agreement was one of the great moments of our lives, because it is not for me to put myself forward in that way. The idea that the Bill will allow a way to end investigations into these terrible atrocities seems completely appalling. Personally, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, that if the Bill is not amended to be run on Kenova terms, we must in the end oppose and defeat it in this House.
]]>I served for four years as the Met commissioner, from 2005 to 2008, and always have some fellow feeling for each new commissioner as they arrive. I was in conversation with the noble Lord, Lord Grade, recently as the previous PM got herself into ever deeper trouble. He remarked that the most difficult jobs in British public life were those of the Prime Minister, the director-general of the BBC and the Met commissioner—and not always in that order. I should tell the House that in preparation for this debate I have spoken to Sir Mark Rowley. I speak with his assistance but not for him.
I cannot remember a commissioner coming into office in such inauspicious circumstances. He will need all the help that legislators can give to him. The dreadful murder of Sarah Everard by a serving Met officer has thrown up failures of vetting and intelligence but, above all, the new importance of social media, which allows individuals—apparently in a number of professions—to say disgusting things in private association which they would never dare say in a public arena. This is a really significant departure from even the recent past. Mark Rowley chooses to term this sort of behaviour as a corruption of the profession of policing, and I accept that. Police corruption, however, is not a question of occasional bad apples but a continuous threat.
Lord Condon, now retired from the House, commented that the Met was the cleanest big-city force in the world. Maybe, but police corruption never goes away. The first “trial of the detectives”, as it was known, involved Met officers in a horse-betting scandal in 1876. The Times inquiry of 1969 revealed the existence of networked corruption in the Met CID, encapsulated in the famous phrase, “I am a member of a little firm within a firm”. As the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, said, three years later Robert Mark embarked on a ruthless purge as soon as he was appointed. Hundreds of officers were sacked; many, including some senior officers, were jailed.
The noble Lord, Lord Stevens of Kirkwhelpington, followed Robert Mark’s example, as did I in the early 2000s, including with the creation of an entirely secret investigation unit. Corruption mutates: when I left office, the networked corruption had been broken but the sale of computerised information by individuals was beginning to become a threat. It needs ruthless attention; it needs to be a feature of career aspiration to be in an anti-corruption unit, and that task is not easy. One of the cases I took as an investigator to the Old Bailey, where we had arrested the briber as well as the receiver, had four juries dismissed and the case was opened five times. It needs leadership from the very top, which includes reassuring the vast proportion of decent officers that their honesty and professionalism is understood and valued.
I believe that Sir Mark Rowley will provide that, but he needs some help. In a classic example of the road to hell being paved with good intentions, the current Government took away from chief officers the final decision as to whether an officer should be sacked, except in the most egregious and obvious of cases. Discipline proceedings are now presided over by legally qualified chairs, who seem to have a propensity to reprimand rather than dismiss, to the despair of Sir Mark. As Sir Mark has noted in a recent letter to all London MPs:
“This has led to instances of the Met being forced to retain officers whom we cannot deploy and we believe should not be police officers”.
That this needs to change is a central conclusion of the recent interim report by the noble Baroness, Lady Casey. This will need a reform to primary legislation.
In the same letter, Sir Mark also refers to the Police (Performance) Regulations 2020, which deal with officers who are not in any way criminal but who are just proving to be unsuited to the job. These regulations require three different stages of review and, consequently, three stages of appeal. In a telephone call with me, Sir Mark noted that this means that the numbers dismissed for not being competent are simply vanishingly small. He also noted that even failing vetting does not lead to reasonably instant dismissal. I hope that, in closing this debate, the Minister will acknowledge these issues and agree to bring them to the attention of the Home Secretary.
]]>I am grateful to the Minister for a briefing on the Bill last week. This will not be a long speech because, as I told the Minister, in contrast to the noble Lords, Lord Coaker and Lord Paddick, I am very much in favour of the Bill’s provisions. There are three reasons for that. First and foremost, the current tactics of locking on and tunnelling are extremely hard to prevent and time-consuming to overcome. The current law is inadequate. Secondly, it is now apparent that many members of the public are becoming extremely irate and beginning to take the law into their own hands, which is almost never a good idea and puts the police in both an invidious position and a very bad light. Thirdly, as a citizen rather than an ex-police officer, I am concerned that this form of protest is so irritating that it will damage the fast-growing consensus over the need for action to tackle climate change.
I will follow the passage of the Bill carefully through your Lordships’ House, but I expect to be most interested in the provisions governing injunctions sought by Secretaries of State, over which I have some concern. I return to the building of the Newbury bypass to underline my concern about the need to protect the operational independence of the police. I am disappointed that the noble Lord, Lord Howard of Lympne, is not in his place; I have told him what I am about to say, as some of it is about him.
The site of the Newbury bypass was eight miles long. From Whitehall, the almost complete disruption caused by protesters at the start of the building operations, which lasted quite a few days, obviously looked like an ideal moment for the use of the newly legislated and excellently drafted offence of criminal trespass, which the noble Lord, then Home Secretary, had recently placed on the statute book. On day two, I was very clearly informed of the noble Lord’s dismay, no doubt expressed with his customary courtesy, that I was refusing to use his legislation. No less august a figure than an assistant inspector of constabulary was sent to convey the message in person. He was a bit less than courteous.
I was glad to find that, on the inspector’s arrival, he changed his mind and agreed with me—otherwise, it would have been an inglorious end to my nascent career. I was forcing the contractors—the builders—much against their will to fence and put security personnel around whatever part of the eight miles they were going to start work on first, instead of selecting different sites simultaneously, and thereby leaving my officers to chase protesters all over many miles of Berkshire and Hampshire countryside. They very reluctantly did so. We then used the legislation and very useful it proved, much to the chagrin of one Swampy.
Policing protest is difficult; policing a banned protest is far more difficult, which is why police so rarely seek to have to do so. I think the provision on injunctions by Secretaries of State needs most careful consideration during Committee, because the distance from Whitehall to the ground where the action is happening can be very far.
]]>Finally, assisting another person’s suicide is an offence which carries a maximum penalty of 14 years in prison. If a suicide happens at home, that home becomes a crime scene, with a forensic tent and computers and last messages being seized. Even assisting someone getting on a plane to Dignitas opens people up to unavoidable police investigation. There can be a convention on no prosecution, but there cannot be a convention of no investigation. A good death is one of the last great liberal causes. I support the Bill.
]]>I am not sure whether the Minister is aware of a new strand of police research called evidence-based policing—EBP for short—the brainchild of Professor Larry Sherman, who was mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Bates, at the Institute of Criminology at Cambridge. Is he aware of the Cambridge Centre for Evidence-Based Policing? I draw attention to my registered interests, because I lecture on its behalf here and abroad.
Evidence-based policing is based on the use of randomised control trials modelled on medical research techniques. I am sure the Minister is aware that Check- point is an EBP randomised control trial, but is he aware that it is only one of a large number of such experiments in the UK influenced by, and part of, the Cambridge EBP centre’s master’s degree programme? Randomised control experiments have, for instance, proved that police body cameras reduce conflict, that specific patrol patterns can reduce crime in hot spots and that issuing tasers to whole shifts of police officers does not improve citizen or police safety. The biggest gain in knowledge so far is the Cambridge crime harm index, which proved that in Northamptonshire 80% of harm caused by crime was the work of 7% of offenders.
Is the Minister aware of the UK Society of Evidence Based Policing, which is now replicated in many countries? Is he aware that Peter Neyroud—formerly chief constable of Thames Valley Police and now Professor Sherman’s academic colleague—recently explained evidence-based policing to a meeting of chiefs of police in India, which was chaired by Prime Minister Modi, who directed that the technique be adopted on a pan-India basis?
Is the Minister aware of how much interest in or support for this work has been shown by Her Majesty’s Government? The answer is practically none—and there has been almost nothing from Her Majesty’s loyal Opposition either, with the honourable exception of David Lammy MP, who noted the effectiveness of the West Midlands scheme Turning Point, which has just been mentioned, with black and Asian victims. This technique proves what works to reduce crime and, equally importantly, what does not. I have never seen anything as exciting as this in my police career.
The Home Secretary has indicated this week that nationwide targets for crime reduction will be reintroduced. They had a detrimental and distorting effect when they were in place. The Home Office and the Ministry of Justice should be aware of what really does reduce crime before such targets re-emerge, so my last question to the Minister is: is he prepared to meet me, Professor Sherman and Peter Neyroud, preferably with the Police Minister, to see how this British invention can best be nurtured? Of course, I would be delighted if the noble Lord, Lord Bates, wished to join us.
]]>“‘the law is a ass’, said Mr Bumble.”
The release of Sudesh Amman was lawful and his further detention would have been illegal, but his release represents a failure by the British state. The law needs to be changed and I support the provisions of this Bill. However, I do so on the rather precarious grounds of an anonymous No. 10 briefing that the Government intend to undertake a “deep dive” into matters surrounding the release of convicted terrorists. Perhaps the Minister will be in a position to confirm that.
There is a lot of diving to do. We simply have not got this right. Some of the revisions to previous legislation introduced by the coalition Government need to be reversed. The most important reversal would be the replacement of the rather weak and little-used terrorism prevention and investigation measures—little used because they are not very good—by the more resilient control orders, particularly those with a provision requiring the suspect person to reside somewhere away from his or her previous contacts.
As the Bill provides, the Parole Board needs to be involved in the release of all terrorism offenders, whatever the length of their sentence. However, the Government need to look further to see what the Parole Board should do if it thinks that a person should not be released. They need to look, perhaps, at Australian post-sentence detention orders, which immediately fit this position. We now know much more about prison radicalisation and, as other noble Lords have said, the Government must fully implement the measures suggested by Ian Acheson on this phenomenon as soon as possible.
We must recognise that we have not yet reached the peak of UK returnees from the fighting in Syria—the problem will get worse before it gets better. Right-wing terrorism is also on the rise. This means that, while I am urging the Government to take a much more holistic approach to the problem than just enacting this Bill—I am sure they will, as it only postpones rather than solves the situation—it is also time for other political parties to get behind the Prevent programme, rather than proposing to abolish it, like one prospective leader of the Labour Party.
I accept that risk assessment is not easy. Usman Khan, who killed two people on London Bridge, pretended to have renounced violent extremism. However, the idea that the law allows the release of a man who is still openly threatening to kill invokes the spirit of Mr Bumble. I have pointed a police revolver at another human being. I have been present at briefings for armed operations and given many of those briefings myself. I very much doubt that the officers involved in the armed surveillance of Sudesh Amman thought about Charles Dickens, but they must have thought that the situation about which they were being briefed was simply mad. They are a precious and very limited resource. They will have been pulled off surveillance of another target suspected of planning a terrorist act, to follow a man who had just been let out of prison and had already committed terrorist offences and was now threatening more. Days later he was dead; two people were badly injured and two officers were left with the lifelong burden of having killed a fellow human being.
Amman’s release is a straightforward failure of policy and legislation. In summary, while I admire the optimism of those noble Lords who want men such as Amman to be given the opportunity of being supervised on licence by the probation service, that seems a rather inadequate proposition. In this case, he would have been followed to his meeting with the probation officer by armed surveillance officers. I support the Bill but I urge the Government to do much more.
]]>As far as I can see, I welcome the Bill in its entirety. We all remember with sadness the lives lost and the lives horrifyingly changed by the attacks in Britain in 2017. This Bill is part of our nation’s response to those events. I thought that the decision by the Government, MI5 and the police to put in train the operational improvement review—carried out by the then David Anderson QC, now my noble friend Lord Anderson of Ipswich—was wise and proportionate, and this Bill reflects that position.
In the same way as the noble Lord, Lord King, said, I appreciate the bipartisan approach taken by both Houses to this matter. It has not always been thus. As a rather famous namesake of mine once said, I have “scars on my back” from the times in which there was not a bipartisan approach to terrorism.
The Bill recognises that terrorist behaviour and terrorist threats are changing, particularly, as my noble friend Lady Manningham-Buller said, in the way in which terrorists are using less sophisticated methods, radicalising more quickly and more often acting alone. The Bill takes account of the increasing number of ungoverned spaces in the world and of the evolving nature of the internet, from downloading to streaming. In addition, the background to the Bill is that not all the changes in circumstance represent the new. We are seeing old threats returning, particularly the rise of the far right, which we should not underestimate, and the presence on British soil of state agents with malign intent.
Perhaps the most important feature of the Bill, however, is its implicit recognition, as the present Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police and the noble Baroness both said, that what is happening in the UK is not a spike in terrorist criminality but a shift to what appears to be a long-term, higher intensity of activity, with more than one arrest a day for terrorism occurring in the year to March 2018. Even with all the passion and doubts expressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Warsi, I welcome the way in which the Government, faced by this and by the speed with which individuals can move from being at risk of radicalisation to direct action, have continued to support the Prevent arm of the world-leading Contest strategy. I really look forward to the involvement of non-central parts of government in that endeavour. I thoroughly agree with that proposition and I will explain why.
I was involved at the very beginning of the discussions about what became Prevent. I passionately argued that it was inappropriate for the police to have fundamental responsibility outside government for making Prevent work. It seemed to me absurd that communities, especially at that time Muslim communities in the aftermath of 9/11 and 7/7, should be asked to report suspicious behaviour to an arm of the police when that might mean that another arm of the police—literally an armed unit of the police—might eventually respond to what they had said. I argued fiercely that local authorities and education authorities should be co-responsible for Prevent, and I am really glad to see that happening.
However, in addition to that, our past comes back to haunt us as previously convicted terrorists are now being released, having served prison sentences for which too short a maximum sentence had been prescribed in earlier legislation. I welcome the increasing length of sentences for preparatory behaviour short of actual action. I am not normally in favour of lengthening maximum sentences for anything, but I am when we talk about terrorism. Beyond that, I still believe that the terrorist prevention and investigation measures, TPIMs, remain of too short a duration, and I hope that the Government will look again at that issue during the passage of the Bill through the House.
I congratulate the Government on their decision to keep this important legislation coming through both Houses in the middle of the tensions of Brexit, and I hope that the Bill completes its full legislative passage as soon as possible. I also hope that, by the time its provisions come into effect, they do not do so in a Europe in which Britain has lost most of its ability to co-operate effectively with EU countries on security and policing, particularly on the European arrest warrant, Schengen and the Prüm arrangements—but that is probably for another day.
]]>This is not an ad hominem speech; I am sure that most police and crime commissioners are decent people doing a decent job, and I certainly think that the noble Lord, Lord Bach, will be one of those. However, the creation of PCCs has had presumably unintended but certainly unfortunate consequences. It was an unnecessary reform; no one really knows why they were created, and certainly no one is claiming credit for their creation. The reform Act, which introduced PCCs, allows central government to wash their hands of controversial police investigations, as the noble Lord, Lord Armstrong, has repeatedly said in this Chamber. Equally repeatedly, the Minister has said that the question raised by the noble Lord—whether an investigation should be inquired into—is a matter for the local PCC. The local PCC has equally often stated that they are not going to do anything about it. Apparently, that is okay by the Government, but it used not to be okay.
At one stage in my career I was principal staff officer to Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary. In the past, HMCICs would have intervened after consultation with the Home Secretary, as they did in the Stalker inquiry in Northern Ireland and the Soham murder inquiry. Equally importantly, HMCICs had the power to call out failures of governance. The noble Lord, Lord Dear, then an inspector of constabulary, three times in the 1990s declared Derbyshire constabulary to be inefficient—a finding not used against any force for many decades. This led to legislation replacing the then police committees with police authorities with a new class of independent members. This was a Conservative Party reform in the face of the failure of a Labour county council, based on the idea that police and politics—especially local politics—is an unhealthy mixture. The successors to the noble Lord, Lord Dear, do not have any authority over PCCs, whereas they could inspect police authorities.
The main job of the principal staff officer to HMCIC was to co-ordinate selection for chief officers. In the 1990s that job was managing down shortlists to five or six. Now the shortlists are two at most, even in great forces, because the PCC has almost untrammelled power to sack a chief constable by press release. With the advent of PCCs all centralised planning for career progression has ceased, as the Minister knows well because I have talked to her about it. The reason given for the introduction of police and crime commissioners was that police authorities were invisible to the public. Do you think that people living in Slough feel any more represented by a single PCC based north of Oxford than they did by a police authority that was based in the same place but which had Berkshire councillors on it? I do not think so.
A bit like the Brexit bus, the reform was partially also sold on a false prospectus that independent members of the public would become PCCs. Not any longer. Worst of all, leaders of local authorities—of all parties—are complaining loudly that their services are on the point of collapse. Where are the PCCs saying exactly the same thing? What was offered was supposed to be an exercise in the delegation of central government power, but it has turned out to represent an abrogation by the Government of national responsibility for a vital public service.
Every couple of years there is a defence review. Every few years there is a health service review. The last strategic review of policing reported in 1962. This is a total failure of strategic oversight by the Home Office. It simply has no overarching central and coherent strategy for the future of policing and, apart from some rather curious statistics about police numbers, Labour does not seem to have any voice in this matter either. This represents political failure of a serious degree for the public, the victims of crime and the men and women of the police service. The case for a royal commission on the future of the police has never been clearer or more compelling.
]]>