Many Wireless Access Points are supplied unsecured, or inadequately secured by vendors and ISPs. Many users will not have the technical knowledge to secure their WAPs unassisted. There are too many models on the market for ISPs to include precise details for securing every model in the letters they send.
Furthermore, some Wireless authentication protocols (e.g. WEP) are not as secure as others (e.g. WPA2). Many WAPs do not implement the most secure authentication protocols. WEP can be almost trivially 'cracked' with contemporary (2010) computers without prior knowledge of the password.
Finally, many WAPs have security problems that vendors and ISPs refuse to fix (e.g. http://www.jibble.org/o2-broadband-fail/ ). Furthermore, all devices are eventually 'End-of-Lifed' (EOLed) by their vendors, at which point no further updates are released. Users, however, often continue to use devices as long as they are physically functioning.
Regarding public access, controls can only be enforced on unencrypted connections. As a result of legal challenges like this Bill, we can expect unauthorised transmission of copyright material to increasingly be via encrypted connections (e.g. https). Such encrypted connections also have entirely legitimate applications (e.g. online banking, interacting with HMRC, paying council tax) such that they cannot be blocked wholesale.
Alex Butcher
Posted on 8 Apr 2010 3:01 pm
Many Wireless Access Points are supplied unsecured, or inadequately secured by vendors and ISPs. Many users will not have the technical knowledge to secure their WAPs unassisted. There are too many models on the market for ISPs to include precise details for securing every model in the letters they send.
Furthermore, some Wireless authentication protocols (e.g. WEP) are not as secure as others (e.g. WPA2). Many WAPs do not implement the most secure authentication protocols. WEP can be almost trivially 'cracked' with contemporary (2010) computers without prior knowledge of the password.
Finally, many WAPs have security problems that vendors and ISPs refuse to fix (e.g. http://www.jibble.org/o2-broadband-fail/ ). Furthermore, all devices are eventually 'End-of-Lifed' (EOLed) by their vendors, at which point no further updates are released. Users, however, often continue to use devices as long as they are physically functioning.
Regarding public access, controls can only be enforced on unencrypted connections. As a result of legal challenges like this Bill, we can expect unauthorised transmission of copyright material to increasingly be via encrypted connections (e.g. https). Such encrypted connections also have entirely legitimate applications (e.g. online banking, interacting with HMRC, paying council tax) such that they cannot be blocked wholesale.