“(1) The Lord Chancellor may, by order, designate specific Crown Court locations or individual court rooms as extended capacity courts.

(2) Proceedings in any court designated under subsection (1) must consist of—

(a) a morning session, commencing at 09:00 and concluding at 13:00; and

(b) an afternoon session, commencing at 14:00 and concluding at 18:00.

(3) Any court designated under subsection (1) will not have a limit on the number of cases that can be heard on the same day.”—

This new clause would restructure the court sitting day to introduce a morning and afternoon session, to allow two different cases to be heard in the same courtroom on a given day.

Brought up, read the First time, and Question proposed (this day), That the clause be read a Second time.

Question again proposed.

I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:

New clause 4—Review of the Feasibility of Two Court Sittings per day—

“(1) The Lord Chancellor must, within 12 months beginning on the day on which this Act comes into force, lay before Parliament an independent report into the feasibility of conducting two trials per day in designated court rooms (‘the Scheme’).

(2) The scheme would allow for proceedings in a Crown Court to consist of—

(a) a morning session, commencing at 09:00 and concluding at 13:00; and

(b) an afternoon session, commencing at 14:00 and concluding at 18:00.

(3) A report under subsection (1) must assess the impact of the scheme—

(a) on the efficiency and timeliness of court proceedings;

(b) on the availability of judges, legal practitioners, and court staff;

(c) the potential impact on defendants, victims, and witnesses; and

(d) the cost and resource implications of the scheme.

(4) The Lord Chancellor must, within three months of the laying of the report under subsection (1), publish a response.

(5) The response must include proposals for a pilot scheme based on the findings of the report including the proposed scope and duration of any such pilot.”

This new clause requires the Lord Chancellor to commission and lay before Parliament an independent report on the feasibility of introducing two court sittings per day in designated courtrooms, including an assessment of its impact on efficiency, resources, and court users, and to set out the Government’s intended next steps.

New clause 5—Targets for Backlog Reduction—

“(1) The Lord Chancellor must, within six months beginning on the day on which this Act is passed, set and publish annual targets for the reduction of the Crown Court backlog in England and Wales.

(2) There must be a target for the—

(a) overall reduction of the Crown Court backlog in England and Wales, and

(b) reduction of the backlog in each different HMCTS region.

(3) The Lord Chancellor must lay before Parliament an annual report on progress against these targets.

(4) Any report under subsection (3) must include any steps taken to address the failure to meet the targets.”

This new clause requires the Lord Chancellor to set and publish targets for reducing court backlogs and to report annually to Parliament on progress.

New clause 13—Report on the effect of the Act on public trust and participation in the criminal justice system—

“(1) The Lord Chancellor must commission a report on the effect of the provisions of the Act on public trust and participation in the judicial system.

(2) A report under this section must—

(a) include consideration of the effect of the provisions of the Act on—

(i) witness participation;

(ii) the effect of these reforms on public confidence and trust in the criminal justice system;

(iii) the effect of these provisions on BAME engagement with and trust of the criminal justice system;

(b) contain recommendations for further provision, or changes to delivery of provision under this Act, to increase the levels of each criterion set out in subparagraphs (2)(a)(i) to (2)(a)(iii).

(3) Within twelve months beginning on the day on which this Act is passed, the Lord Chancellor must lay before Parliament—

(a) a copy of a report under this section,

(b) the Lord Chancellor’s response to recommendations made by that report.”

This new clause would require the Lord Chancellor to commission, lay, and respond to a report on the effect of the Bill on public trust in the criminal justice system.

New clause 17—Review of Efficiencies in the Criminal Justice System—

“(1) The Lord Chancellor must, within 24 months beginning with the day on which this Act is passed, conduct a review on the impact of the provisions of this Act on the efficiency of the criminal justice system.

(2) The review under subsection (1) must, in particular, consider the impact on the efficiency of the criminal justice system of—

(a) the provisions of this Act;

(b) The wider criminal justice system;

(c) the standard of delivery by court contract providers, including PECS contractors;

(d) the condition of the courts estate; and

(e) the use of technology.

(3) In considering ‘efficiency’, the review must consider the impact on—

(a) delays,

(b) backlogs, and

(c) the experience of victims and witnesses.

(4) The Secretary of State must lay a report on the review before Parliament.

(5) The report under subsection (4) must include recommendations for further legislative or administrative changes to improve the efficiency of the criminal justice system.”

This new clause requires the Secretary of State to review and report on whether the Act has improved the efficiency of the criminal justice system, including impacts on delays, backlogs, and the experience of victims and witnesses.

New clause 22—Remote Court Participation: Strategy—

“(1) The Lord Chancellor must, within 12 months of the passing of this Act, lay before Parliament a strategy for the use of remote proceedings to reduce the case backlog (‘the strategy’).

(2) The strategy must include—

(a) an assessment of the current use of remote proceedings;

(b) an evaluation of the impact of remote proceedings on the speed of case disposal and the overall reduction of the outstanding caseload;

(c) recommendations on how the principle of open justice can be upheld with the increased use of remote proceedings;

(d) criteria for determining the suitability of proceedings for different forms of remote participation; and

(e) provisions for the security, reliability, and resilience of digital systems used in remote proceedings.

(3) The Secretary of State must, at intervals of no more than 24 months following the laying of the strategy, lay before Parliament a report on progress made against the strategy.

(4) The progress report must consider—

(a) the extent to which the strategy has been implemented;

(b) the impact on the criminal case backlog, including any measures by which that impact has been assessed; and

(c) any further legislative or budgetary provisions to ensure the effectiveness of remote proceedings.

(5) For the purposes of this section, ‘remote proceedings’ means any proceedings in which one or more participants attend by way of live video or audio link.”

This new clause requires the Lord Chancellor to publish a formal strategy for the use of remote proceedings to reduce the case backload in the criminal justice system.

New clause 32—Commencement dependent on independent review of racial disproportionality—

“(1) This section applies in relation to the commencement of Clauses 1 to 7 of this Act.

(2) The provisions inserted by Clauses 1 to 7 of this Act may not be brought into force unless the conditions in subsections (3) to (6) have been met.

(3) The Secretary of State must commission an independent review into racial disproportionality arising from—

(a) the changes to jurisdiction powers and procedures in the Magistrates’ Courts under Part 1; and

(b) the operation of trial-allocation decisions under Part 1.

(4) As soon as reasonably practicable after completing a review under this section, the reviewer must send a report on its outcome to the Secretary of State.

(5) On receiving a report under subsection (4), the Secretary of State must lay a copy of it before both Houses of Parliament.

(6) As soon as reasonably practicable, the Secretary of State must—

(a) prepare and publish a strategy setting out the measures the Secretary of State intends to take in consequence of the review’s findings; and

(b) implement those measures in full before Clauses 1 to 7 may be brought into force.”

This new clause introduces a duty to commission an independent review into racial disproportionality arising from the changes to jurisdiction, powers and procedures in the magistrates’ courts, and from the operation of the new trial-allocation provisions in Clauses 1 to 7 of the Bill.

New clause 33—Commencement dependent on review of differential impact on classes of persons—

“(1) This section applies in relation to the commencement of Clauses 1 to 7 of this Act.

(2) The provisions inserted by Clauses 1 to 7 of this Act may not be brought into force unless the conditions in subsections (3) to (7) have been met.

(3) The Secretary of State must commission an independent review on whether, and the extent to which—

(a) the changes to jurisdiction powers and procedures in the Magistrates’ Courts under Part 1; and

(b) the operation of trial-allocation decisions under Part 1,

are likely to have a disproportionate impact on particular classes of persons.

(4) The review under subsection (3) must consider—

(a) the extent to which, as a result of the provisions in subsections (3)(a) and (b), defendants in criminal proceedings are eligible for legal aid;

(b) whether persons of limited financial means are likely to be affected differently from other defendants as a result of those provisions; and

(c) the projected number of defendants who, as a result of those provisions, are likely to be unrepresented.

(5) As soon as reasonably practicable after completing a review under this section, the reviewer must send a report on its findings to the Secretary of State.

(6) On receiving a report under subsection (5), the Secretary of State must lay a copy of it before both Houses of Parliament.

(7) As soon as reasonably practicable, the Secretary of State must—

(a) publish a strategy setting out the measures the Secretary of State intends to take in consequence of the review’s findings; and

(b) implement those measures in full before Clauses 1 to 7 may be brought into force.”

This new clause introduces a duty to conduct an independent review of whether Clause 1 to 7 of the Bill give rise to disproportionate impacts on particular classes of persons.

Amendment 15, in clause 26, page 35, line 19, at end insert

“, subject to the provisions of subsection (3A).

(3A) The Lord Chancellor may not make regulations under subsection (3) relating to the following sections until he has published a response to the recommendation of Part II of Independent Review of the Criminal Courts—

(a) Section 1 (Removal of right to elect trial on indictment);

(b) Section 2 (Written indication of guilty plea: removal of right to object to venue);

(c) Section 3 (Trial on indictment without a jury: general rule for allocation);

(d) Section 4 (Trial on indictment without a jury: complex or lengthy cases);

(e) Section 5 (Consequential amendments relating to sections 3 and 4).

(f) Section 6 (Increase in maximum custodial sentence in magistrates’ courts)

(g) Section 7 (Appeals from magistrates’ courts)”.

This amendment would make the publication of the Government response to Part II of the Independent Review of the Criminal Courts a precondition of Clause 1 to 7 of this Bill coming into force.

Amendment 59, in clause 26, page 35, line 19, at end insert

“, subject to the provisions of subsection (3A).

(3A) The Lord Chancellor may not make regulations under subsection (3) relating to the sections set out under subsection (3B) until he has taken reasonable steps to increase Crown Court sitting capacity, including but not limited to—

(a) using buildings not currently in use as courts to hear cases where cells are not needed, and

(b) reducing lost sitting days as a result of late guilty pleas and prison transport delays.

(3B) The sections referenced in subsection (3A) are—

(a) Section 1 (Removal of right to elect trial on indictment);

(b) Section 2 (Written indication of guilty plea: removal of right to object to venue);

(c) Section 3 (Trial on indictment without a jury: general rule for allocation);

(d) Section 4 (Trial on indictment without a jury: complex or lengthy cases);

(e) Section 5 (Consequential amendments relating to sections 3 and 4).

(f) Section 6 (Increase in maximum custodial sentence in magistrates’ courts)

(g) Section 6 (Increase in maximum custodial sentence in magistrates’ courts)”.

This amendment would ensure that sections 1 to 7 of the Act could not be commenced until the Lord Chancellor has used alternative means to increase Crown Court sitting capacity.

Amendment 35, in clause 26, page 35, line 19, at end insert—

“(3A) The Lord Chancellor may not make a statutory instrument containing regulations under subsection (3) bringing sections 1 to 7 into force until the conditions in subsection (3B) are met.

(3B) The conditions are that—

(a) the Lord Chancellor has provided funding for at least 130,000 sitting days in the Crown Court in the financial year following the coming into force of this Act,

(b) HM Courts and Tribunals Service has made an assessment that the Crown Court has, so far as possible, used the allocation of sitting days provided under subsection (3B)(a), and

(c) the Lord Chancellor has made a statement to the House of Commons that the funding provided under subsection (3B)(a) has not reduced the number of cases pending trial in the Crown Court compared to the start of the financial year.”

This amendment prevents the provisions in sections 1 to 7 from coming into force until the Lord Chancellor has provided funding for 130,000 sittings days in the Crown Court; HMCTS has assessed that the Crown Court has used its allocation of sitting days; and the Lord Chancellor has made a statement to the House that this has not reduced the backlog.

Amendment 36, in clause 26, page 35, line 19, at end insert—

“(3A) The Lord Chancellor may not make a statutory instrument containing regulations under subsection (3) bringing sections 1 to 7 into force until he has—

(a) undertaken a consultation on the potential benefits of introducing extended sitting hours in the Crown Court, and

(b) laid before Parliament a report on the outcome of the consultation.

(3B) The consultation under subsection (3A) must consider—

(a) potential rates of fees and renumeration for legal professionals and court staff working extended hours, and

(b) the availability of HM Courts and Tribunal Service staff.”

This amendment would ensure that sections 1 to 7 of the Act did not come into force until the Lord Chancellor had reviewed how to increase sitting hours in the Crown Court.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Dr Huq. New clauses 32 and 33 can be considered almost part and parcel of each other. Our earlier discussion of new Clause 29 involved a similar issue, but these new clauses are much more specific.

New clause 32 would introduce a duty to commission an independent review of racial disproportionality arising from the changes to jurisdiction powers and procedures in the magistrates court, and from the operation of the new trial-allocation provisions in clauses 1 to 7. The Government’s equality impact assessment of the proposal to restrict access to jury trial refers many times to the lack of evidence that the proposals in the Bill have a racist or discriminatory outcome, but the impact assessment does not refer once the Secretary of State’s own 2017 review, which showed reduced racial disparities in jury trial outcomes. Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.

The new clause would mandate a full review of racial disproportionality before the changes are made. At a time when trust in the justice system among the black, Asian and minority ethnic community is already low, why rush through these changes before we have the full picture?

New clause 33 would introduce a duty to conduct an independent review of whether clauses 1 to 7 give rise to disproportionate impacts on particular classes of person. It is welcome that, in December last year, the Government announced a £92 million investment in criminal legal aid, after years of neglect. However, it will take a while for that investment to have an impact on the disproportionate outcomes across the criminal justice system for working-class defendants, young males and, in particular, vulnerable people.

Juries are hailed as the fairest component of the legal system, and are widely accepted as more likely to provide an equitable outcome than the judiciary, who are still overwhelmingly privately educated and from particular backgrounds. One of the big issues—this applies to new clause 32 as well as to new clause 33—is that joint enterprise is often used as a dragnet for marginalised and vulnerable communities, impacting not just black people but neurodivergent and working-class communities.

For those who may not be fully aware, a 2016 Supreme Court decision recognised that joint enterprise had been used wrongly for the past three decades. Despite that, little has changed. Very few appeals have been accepted, and there is significant evidence of the continued misuse of joint enterprise. This fills prisons with people of no risk to the public, who are labelled as murderers when they have not killed anyone—an expensive travesty of justice. They are often sent to jail or given longer sentences than they should have received on the basis of assisting or encouraging a crime. They are found guilty by association.

In our criminal justice system, joint enterprise essentially means that if someone has aided, abetted, counselled or procured the commission of an offence, they can be found guilty of an offence committed by someone else. However, the role they have played may vary, and the sentencing powers often reflect that. In reality, a lot of bystanders or people watching, or people who may have known one of the parties but did not take part in the crime, will also end up getting convicted. There has been an attempt to rectify that with a private Member’s Bill, but so far nothing has happened.

Some miscarriages of justice have been challenged, and some cases have received further examination. Dr Nisha Waller of the Centre for Crime and Justice Studies states that

“joint enterprise Laws are vague and wide in scope, causing systemic injustice, including overcriminalisation, overpunishment, discriminatory outcomes, and convictions where there is no compelling evidence of intent” or even

“a defendant’s physical contribution”.

Dr Waller’s research shows that the current law is flawed and that it

“encourages…the police and Crown Prosecution Service to charge suspects based on poor-quality evidence…highly speculative prosecution case theory to take precedence over…evidentiary foundations…the use of gang narratives and vague concepts such as ‘in it together’ to construct collective intent.”

She says it allows for a lot of young people to be stereotyped and criminalised, and recommends that

“the scope of secondary liability law needs to be narrowed in favour of a clearer and safer legal framework.”

One reason why it is important to address this issue, in conjunction with new clauses 32 and 33, is that the very people who would be affected by the new clauses are the people who are affected by the law on joint enterprise. I pay tribute to Joint Enterprise Not Guilty by Association, which has been doing tremendous work in this area for many years.

The most recent research by Appeal, which has been monitoring joint enterprise in court cases, concluded:

“There is a clear departure from what the law of complicity should be” and that:

“Secondary liability is often diluted to little more than association, suspicion, and story.”

It says:

“Prosecution narrative strategy has replaced evidential clarity…meaning joint enterprise trials are often not a truth-seeking process.”

It concludes that the way joint enterprise laws are currently used is

“producing injustice at scale” and that:

“Public money is being used to stage justice, rather than deliver it.”

Research by Becky Clarke and Patrick Williams at Manchester Metropolitan University shows that nearly £250 million is spent on prosecuting defendants in joint enterprise cases every year. The total future punishment of the 1,088 people convicted under joint enterprise cases each year costs the taxpayer £1.2 billion.

Finally, the report “In Their Own Words”, which is based on a series of family listening days organised by JENGbA, detailed the devastating impact of joint enterprise convictions on families and friends—

Order. The Clerk advises me that you are going a little out of scope.

I take your ruling and guidance, Dr Huq. I was trying to explain it because the disparities are important and the issue does affect people. I ask the Government to think about new clauses 32 and 33, because they will hopefully have an impact on joint enterprise. I will not press them to a vote.

This group contains a number of new clauses, and I want to make sure that I address all the principal themes.

New Clause 5, tabled by the hon. Member for Chichester, relates to publishing targets for reducing court backlogs. It would require the Lord Chancellor to set and publish targets for reducing court backlogs, and to report annually to Parliament on progress. It is important to note that the Ministry of Justice and His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service are downstream Departments, by which I mean that we are subject to demand pressures that are not fully within our control as they are driven by additional arrests and charging decisions. We have published our central demand forecasts, on which the Department’s impact assessment and modelling is based, but the fluctuation and uncertainty in demand makes it particularly challenging for us to set a fixed, specific target.

In the absence of credible reforms, targets will not achieve much. I can tell the hon. Member for Chichester in general terms that we want to get back to a sustainable position. Some Members have referred to reverting to our position before the covid pandemic, which was when we saw the exponential rise in the backlogs. However, I do not want to put a figure on it, because that would simply not be achievable, and having targets that we know we cannot achieve is setting ourselves up to fail, and it lacks credibility.

In the independent review of the criminal courts, Sir Brian Leveson made a series of recommendations related to how performance management and accountability across the criminal justice system could be strengthened. We are looking carefully at those recommendations, particularly in respect of whether we ought to establish a performance oversight board, in addition to the governance forum that already exists. Sir Brian recommends that such a board should monitor and report on the performance of local criminal justice boards and publish a shared set of performance measures. As I have said, we will be publishing our response to the second part of Sir Brian’s review shortly.

Performance management, and monitoring our success in reducing the court backlogs, is essential. Within Parliament, we have the scrutiny provided not only by Shadow Justice Ministers, as well as all parliamentarians, but by the Justice Committee, which provides rigorous scrutiny on a cross-party basis. Of course, we also have the regular, frequent publication of Crown court data. Although those targets are not specified, no one is pushing at them harder than the Ministry of Justice and myself, and that is what the Bill primarily targets. However, we do not think that it is necessary to publish specific targets in the legislation, and I ask the hon. Member for Chichester not to press new clause 5 to a vote.

New clause 17, and to some extent new clause 13, touches on efficiencies. It suggests that we ought to review efficiencies before we embark on reform. Indeed, the hon. Member for Reigate and others have made this argument during the debate: do the efficiency first, and see whether it works, before engaging in reform. I want to address that argument head on. We have been clear from the start that there is no silver bullet or simple panacea to the backlog. The insight of the independent review of the criminal courts is that we need investment, efficiencies and reform, and we are not ducking the need to drive efficiencies. One of the areas where I think we all agree is the fact that the system is incredibly inefficient, and the backlog itself compounds that inefficiency, but we are not waiting for legislation to drive at that efficiency reform.

A number of other Members and I have mentioned relevant measures, and I want to touch on a few. For example, the blitz courts have been in operation in London since April, and I am going to visit one in a couple of weeks. That highly effective model of very aggressive listing has had success in the past, and it is being used to drive down certain case types in the backlog, such as assault against an emergency worker. We also need a consistent and clear approach to national listing, such as using the AI listing assistant that I referred to earlier.

We are gripping the issue of prisoner delivery right across the country. Lord Timpson and I have established an oversight board, bringing together representatives of His Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service, His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service, and the prisoner escort and custody service. It is a year-long project—a sprint, as it were—to look at how we can drive improved performance under the existing contract, and how we can imbed digital solutions to make that run much more efficiently.

I appreciate the work the Minister is doing with the Prisons Minister. Can she explore something that has been reflected to me by court staff and judges working in the system? The PECS contract will say that it is delivering 99% of prisoners on time, and refer to the data that shows how many times PECS has delayed a case. But, because of the way we record the data in HMCTS, if a judge knows that the prisoner is not going to arrive until 11 am, they will make a decision not to sit until 12 pm. That is recorded as a judge’s decision, rather than reflecting that the reason for the delay is that the defendant has not been delivered to the court on time. Will the Minister take that away and work out whether there is a way of analysing and scrutinising the data slightly differently from how the PECS contract will try to explain it?

The hon. Lady makes a fair point. There is a mismatch between the performance data that PECS has recorded and the qualitative evidence that one hears from barristers and the judicial office as to the time that is being lost because prisoners are not being produced on time. One of the things we discussed in the first meeting of the oversight board was that we need to have a shared understanding of the data and how we capture it.

Another important theme, which we will come to in respect of another new Clause, is remote hearings. Clearly, while we absolutely need to improve and speed up the operation of prisoner transport, and initiatives like opening up bus lanes are all to the good, we also have a demand issue. If we want to reduce the demand for prisoner transport, unless it is needed to further the interests of justice, one way to alleviate some of the pressure is to make greater use of remote hearings. This kind of cross-agency working and grip, with ministerial attention, as well as taking soundings and engaging with the Bar, which sees the effects every day, is going to be really important.

We are expanding case-progression functions and case co-ordinators to every Crown court; introducing staff with delegated judicial powers to focus on progressing cases; and sorting out problems that would otherwise take up judges’ time and reduce the hearing time that we spoke about earlier. All those things are under way and will drive at the problem. But I want to be honest with the hon. Member for Reigate, and others who maintain the argument that we should make the efficiencies and have the uncapped sitting days and the investment before we trouble ourselves with reform.

I am a realist, and when I look right across Government, questions of efficiency and productivity challenge our public services all the time. Of course we want our systems to be more efficient, and so we should—the taxpayer deserves nothing less—but we have the insight of the independent review, and our own modelling, which assumes that we have maximalist investment coupled with 5% efficiency gains year on year, and those two things together will not reduce the backlog. They temper it and dampen it down, but they do not cut into it. Assuming efficiency gains above 5% year on year would be optimistic for the system. If it were easy to do, previous Governments would no doubt have achieved it. I am not going to assume more than a 5% efficiency gain, because to do so would be setting ourselves up to fail.

This is probably the area where I take issue with the Institute for Government, because although it accepts, in broad terms, the time savings that can be made through our reform package—I understand that Members will say, “The assumptions are highly uncertain” and all the rest of it—it assumes that we can revert to the efficiency levels that existed pre-pandemic. It essentially assumes an efficiency gain of between 18% and 20% practically overnight, and I simply do not think that that is achievable.

Of course we want to drive improvements in prisoner transfer. Of course we hope that case co-ordinators will get the systems going through, and that blitz courts will work, particularly in London, where things are most acute. But I am not prepared to assume that all that will cumulatively amount to efficiency gains of more than 5% year on year, because we have all seen the lessons, not just from the criminal justice system but right across public services, in respect of how difficult efficiencies are to achieve.

That is why we are pulling every lever—not just the investment or the efficiency drive but the structural reforms—so that the investment is going into a reformed, modernised system that takes the decision to reallocate work to the magistrates court, where we know that cases are dealt with in a more timely and proportionate fashion, and out of the Crown court. That is what all these reforms amount to.

I know the establishment of the Crown court bench Division keeps being cited because it will make a 2% saving, but we estimate that the package of measures taken together will make a 20% saving, because of the combined effect of the changes to magistrates courts’ sentencing powers and the magistrates retaining more work. We are pulling every lever because, when we combine all three levers, that will get the backlog down in the timeframe that the Deputy prime minister has set out in his various statements.

It is wonderful to hear the Minister’s enthusiasm for the changes, but if she is so confident that they will deliver that benefit, why was she not willing to start with a pilot, or even agree to a Sunset clause?

I do have confidence in the changes. Look at the levers in the Government’s gift: we can get more money for the system—tick. We can try to drive performance and govern the system to be more efficient—we are doing everything we can, but I refuse to be over-optimistic about that. The other lever I can pull is reform, based on the recommendations we have had. The hon. Lady asks me why we are not piloting, being more cautious or waiting for the efficiencies to work themselves through the system rather than running all these things in parallel, and I simply say: look at the crisis we are in, and look at the extent of the problem.

If I were to wait for that 5% to play out year on year, even with maximalist investment, I cannot say that we would get the backlog down in 20 or 30 years. I do not know if we would ever get it back down, because our modelling shows that it is insufficient. That is the conclusion that Sir Brian Leveson drew and it is supported by our impact assessment. It is why we have to act for the people stuck in the system now, with their cases being listed until 2030.

I have drawn on healthcare analogies a number of times in this debate, as have others. The NHS, for example, is an institution that always needs more funding—we are all living longer, and some of the conditions we are facing are more and more complex—but we do not keep pouring money into an unreformed system. Here, we are saying, “Let’s reform the system, get it working better and more efficiently, and give it a chance to succeed by equipping it not just with the investment in terms of sitting days, but with the capital investment, too.”

This is not, I hope, an enthusiastic strategy. I call it the kitchen-sink strategy, because I am trying to throw everything at it to achieve the real-time goal of bringing down these backlogs. When we announced these plans and the timeframe for when we expected to see the backlogs come down, even with these bold and radical plans, the argument I was met with was, “My goodness, you’re not getting the backlog down until 2035,” and we are pushing to see if we can make that date sooner and pulling at every lever we have.

I understand that this Department is going to be judged on whether we turn the corner on the backlog in this Parliament, and whether we see it start to come down in enough time, so that victims of crime and defendants on remand can start to feel it in this Parliament and certainly early into the next. That is the essay question I set myself, and we asked for a comprehensive, evidence-based answer from an independent review. It told us that we could not pick and choose our levers; we need to use all three, and that is what these measures are designed to drive at. That is the best explanation I can give for why we say that, while efficiency and investment are hugely important and necessary, they alone are not sufficient. We need the reforms in clauses 1 to 10.

New clauses 32 and 33, which were tabled by my hon. Friends the Members for Liverpool Riverside (Kim Johnson) and for Bolton South and Walkden, rightly highlight the disparities in outcomes that we see across our criminal justice system, and the questions about the trust and confidence that many minoritised communities have in the system. We had a constructive debate on this issue last week, generated by new Clause 29, which was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington.

As I said then, the Government are listening carefully, not only to the Committee but to stakeholders that represent those communities impacted every day by questions of racial inequality in the criminal justice system. We remain committed, during a later stage of the Bill’s passage, to tabling a Government Amendment on a review that will cover all the things that we believe are necessary, including consideration of the impacts of our criminal justice system not just on black and minority ethnic groups but on those from working-class backgrounds. Given that commitment, I urge my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South and Walkden not to press the new clauses to a vote.

New clause 13 touches on efficiencies, on which I have already set out my arguments, and also addresses questions of public trust in the system. A theme of our debates has been the importance of public trust in our criminal justice system. Even those who do not directly interface with the criminal justice system need to know that it works and is there if they need it.

There are two essential elements to sustaining public trust, the first of which is transparency. We have spoken about this a lot, and I know the hon. Member for Chichester has tabled further new clauses on transcripts. We have spoken a lot about transcripts and the recordings of proceedings in both the magistrates court and the Crown court. I think that opening up the process and making it intelligible to the public is so important, as well as the provision of reasons by judges in the Crown court bench Division. Those are all ways in which transparency can play an important part in maintaining public trust.

However, there is another element of public trust: people trust systems that work. If a system ceases to work and breaks down—if someone who reports an assault that they experienced on their way home from the underground station is told that they will receive a court date that is one or two years away—that is the sort of thing that corrodes trust. We can think of myriad ways in which it can happen, but I would suggest that a state failing to deliver the very basics of timely justice is corrosive of trust.

That is why what I am trying to do is not just about efficacy, or being able to say that we now have a properly run criminal justice system; it is about trust and legitimacy. Those questions of trust are true, irrespective of someone’s social background. We say again that the new clause is not necessary, but those questions around public trust in our system are writ large through the Government’s mission, not just in our approach to this legislation, but in our entire approach to restoring our criminal justice system to the state it needs to be in.

I thank the hon. Member for Chichester for tabling new clause 22 and amendment 15, regarding remote participation. They essentially call for a formal strategy for the use of remote proceedings. I thank her sincerely, because I totally agree with the sentiment behind them.

I am a massive advocate for how we harness technology. Video hearings can be a vital tool in the efficient administration of justice. I have seen that in operation: I was at Wood Green Crown court recently and could see the way the judge, hearing certain types of application, was able to rattle through a number of hearings. I could see counsel making representations on behalf of their clients from chambers and then, no doubt, carrying on with other work or even undertaking other hearings. The live link to the defendant again obviated the need for prisoner transfer. This is really good.

If we think about where we were pre-covid, I remember—before coming to this place—when the courts suddenly started using video technology for remote hearings. People said it could not be done and that it was antithetical to fairness. When we went into lockdown, the trial that I had listed was done by video the next week—so it can be done. In that context, the strategic approach that the hon. Member for Chichester calls for is one that we are working on developing with the judiciary. The thrust behind what she is asking for is something that I really agree with.

There are two things the Government can do. One is to provide impetus and strategic oversight. The other is to provide the kit—the capital investment necessary to enable remote participation to its fullest. We have begun to make that capital investment. We have invested more than £22.5 million in the glamorously named DAVE system—digital audio-visual evolution—so look out for DAVE coming to a Crown court near you. There is a further £14 million allocated this financial year, with at least a further £9 million as we roll this out.

I saw the system in the newly reopened Harrow Crown court last week—it is great. It will deal with some of the concerns raised by the hon. Member for Chichester about reliability and how it looks and appears in the Crown court setting, so that we can preserve reliable, high-quality evidence and its integrity to ensure it is effective. We can see how it allows the judge to switch between witnesses and the jury view; it is really good.

We must obviously ensure that all our Crown courts are kitted out with this system. We have 150 core Crown courtrooms that have it so far. We are on track to do an additional 150 courtrooms in 2026-27. It is all part of the strategy. We do not need to legislate for it, but the hon. Member for Chichester is right: we must crack on with it. We are also currently reviewing Sir Brian’s remaining recommendations in relation to that.

If judges are watching at home, I urge them to lean into the usage of DAVE and to be progressive when it comes to the take-up of remote participation. Obviously, there are some trials and applications that must happen in person, and judicial discretion around what those should be is really important. However, I am hopeful that the forthcoming guidance that we expect to see from the judiciary on the use of remote participation, coupled with the investment we have made in the kit, will mean that we have a really good take-up of remote participation in our courts.

I hope the hon. Member for Chichester can hear from what I have just said that we are on the case. We do not need to legislate for that strategy, but I am grateful for the opportunity to share some of the ways in which we are working at pace to deliver the sorts of changes that will modernise our court system and make it more timely and efficient for everyone involved.

I thank the Minister for her comprehensive response to this group of amendments. We have talked heavily about efficiencies: the Shadow Opposition and the Liberal Democrats have put forward alternative measures to improve efficiencies that were not explored in Leveson’s report. I asked Sir Brian if he had explored the concept of doing two trials a day. He said, “No, that wasn’t really something that I looked at.” But he was quite open to it. We had the same conversation that it seems the Minister had with him, where he said, “I used to be able to get through two trials in a day.” We know that that world does not exist any more.

Interestingly, we have been told all along that this is about the complexity of cases, yet the evidence is that the number of hours that things have been looked at has shrunk. To me, that is a much bigger issue. If we have fewer hours in a day to operate, of course it is going to take longer to get through complex cases.

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. It is a worrying trend that the number of hours that are being used efficiently in Crown courts every day seems to be decreasing year on year.

The Minister spoke about not wanting to necessarily set a target. I agree with her: sometimes putting an arbitrary number on something does not actually reflect the situation. The previous Government attempted to do that, setting a target in 2019 to get the backlog down to a certain number. That does not always reflect the fact that the backlog could be a caseload 30,000 of the most complex cases that will take an incredibly long time to get to. Instead, we should look at the average time that it takes to get from charge to trial, and monitor whether we can bring that number down.

When I have talked about bringing that report to Parliament in new Clause 5, it is not necessarily to say, “It was 80,000 and now it is 79,500,” because that does not reflect how long people are going to actually wait to have their cases heard. It is far more about the experiences of all of those people going through the system.

With regard to having reports established every year, the Minister spoke passionately, as she always does, about wanting to make sure that the reforms genuinely make a difference. But the Deputy prime minister has said that, even with all the reforms coming in together, he does not expect to see the backlog fall before the end of the Parliament. We need to be able to look at where the data is taking us every year, track what the backlog is doing, track the sorts of cases that are getting stuck in the backlog, and then scrutinise that, so that if there are other levers that can be pulled—whether they are things that have been suggested by me or by the Shadow Minister—we have the opportunity to come back and review those things.

I am glad that the Minister recognises that trust in the criminal justice system is low anyway. It is not where it should be. I have said it before: the justice system is inextricably linked with how people view democracy. When trust in democracy is low, there is distrust in institutions, policing and the way our courts work. As cross-party parliamentarians, we have a duty to improve trust in all those systems. I worry that the measures in clauses 1 to 7 will not do that, but will erode trust.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

The Committee divided: Ayes 5, Noes 9.

Question accordingly negatived.