I beg to move Amendment 14, in Clause 17, page 30, line 10, at end insert—

“(3) The Lord Chancellor must, within six months of the commencement of this section, lay before both Houses of Parliament a report on the resources required to give full effect to the repeal of subsection 2A in Section 1 of the Children Act 1989.—

‘(1) The report under subsection (3) must include—

(a) an assessment of the level of legal aid provision necessary to ensure that parties in child arrangements proceedings are able to obtain timely and effective—

(i) advice, and

(ii) representation particularly where allegations of domestic abuse or safeguarding concerns are raised;

(b) an evaluation of the capacity of the family courts, including—

(i) the number of judges,

(ii) court staff, and

(iii) available hearing time, to undertake robust risk assessment and fact-finding processes in line with Practice Direction 12J;

(c) plans to address any shortfalls in judicial training, including—

(i) training relating to coercive control,

(ii) domestic abuse dynamics, and

(iii) child safeguarding.

(d) proposals for investment in the family court estate and technology to ensure—

(i) the repeal operates effectively, and

(ii) decisions are consistently grounded in the welfare and safety of the child.’”

This amendment requires the Government to set out how the family courts and legal aid system will be resourced to give full effect to the repeal of the presumption of parental involvement.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clause stand part.

New clause 16—Protective relocation and presumption of reasonableness—

“(1) This section applies to family proceedings in which—

(a) a parent (‘the relocating parent’) has relocated, or proposes to relocate, with a child; and

(b) it is alleged that such relocation has adversely affected, or is intended to affect, the child’s relationship with another party.

(2) Where the relocating parent demonstrates that the decision to relocate was made in consequence of domestic abuse, and this is supported by documented advice from a relevant authority or support service, there is a presumption that the relocation was reasonable and in the best interests of the child.

(3) For the purposes of subsection (2), ‘documented advice’ includes advice, guidance, or referral from—

(a) a police force;

(b) a local authority exercising social services functions;

(c) a Multi-Agency Risk Assessment Conference (MARAC); or

(d) an Independent Domestic Violence Adviser (IDVA) or equivalent specialist support service.

(4) The presumption in subsection (2) can be rebutted if the other party demonstrates, on the balance of probabilities, that the relocation is not reasonable or not in the best interests of the child.

(5) In determining whether the presumption has been rebutted, the court must have regard to—

(a) the nature and impact of the domestic abuse;

(b) the circumstances in which the advice or referral was given; and

(c) the welfare of the child as the court’s paramount consideration.

(6) The court may disapply the presumption in subsection (2) where it is satisfied that—

(a) the evidential basis for the documented advice is insufficient; or

(b) it is otherwise necessary to do so in order to safeguard and promote the welfare of the child.

(7) In this section—

(a) ‘domestic abuse’ has the same meaning as in section 1 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021;

(b) ‘child’ means a person under the age of 18;

(c) ‘family proceedings’ has the same meaning as in section 75(3) of the Courts Act 2003.”

This new clause introduces a rebuttable presumption that a parent’s relocation with a child, undertaken in reliance on documented advice from authorities or support services in the context of domestic abuse, is reasonable and in the child’s best interests, unless the contrary is shown.

New clause 20—Determination of domestic abuse allegations and related presumptions—

“This section applies in family proceedings in which—

(a) party A alleges that party B has perpetrated domestic abuse, and

(b) the court is invited to consider whether a party A has engaged in conduct intended, or having the effect of, undermining a child’s relationship with another party.

(1) Where this section applies, the court must determine, as a preliminary issue, any allegation of domestic abuse before considering any allegation falling within subsection (1)(b).

(2) The court must treat the determination of allegations of domestic abuse as a matter of priority and, so much as reasonably practicable, must not proceed to determine any issue relating to the child’s relationship with either party until such allegations have been determined.

(3) Where the court finds, on the balance of probabilities, that party B has perpetrated domestic abuse against another party or the child—

(a) there shall be a rebuttable presumption that any reluctance or refusal by the child to spend time with party B constitutes a reasonable and justified response to the domestic abuse; and

(b) the court must not consider any allegation that party A has engaged in conduct falling within subsection (1)(b) unless satisfied that the presumption in paragraph (a) has been rebutted.

(4) For the purposes of subsection (4)(b), the presumption may be rebutted only where party B demonstrates, on the balance of probabilities, that the child’s reluctance or refusal cannot be reasonably attributed to the domestic abuse.

(5) Subsections (2) to (5) apply only where the allegation of domestic abuse meets such minimum evidential threshold as may be prescribed by rules of court.

(6) Notwithstanding the above, the court may disapply the presumption in subsection (4)(a), or the requirement in subsection (2), where it is satisfied that to do so is necessary to secure the welfare of the child as its paramount consideration.

(7) In this section—

(a) ‘domestic abuse’ has the same meaning as in section 1 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021;

(b) references to a child are to a person under the age of 18;

(c) references to ‘family proceedings’ have the same meaning as in section 75(3) of the Courts Act 2003.”

This new clause requires courts to determine domestic abuse allegations before considering claims of parental alienation. If abuse is proven, a child’s reluctance to see the abusive parent is presumed a justified response. This presumption must be rebutted before the court can entertain allegations of alienating behaviour against the protective parent.

New clause 31—Determination of domestic abuse allegations and related presumptions—

“(1) There is a rebuttable presumption that any reluctance or refusal by a child to spend time with a party against whom the child, or a party representing the child, has made allegations of domestic abuse constitutes a reasonable and justified response to the domestic abuse.

(2) The presumption in subsection (1) may be rebutted only where the accused party demonstrates, on the balance of probabilities, that the child’s reluctance or refusal cannot be reasonably attributed to the domestic abuse.”

This new clause provides that, in family court, where a child refuses or is reluctant to spend time with one party as a result of an allegation against that party of domestic abuse against the child, the court must presume the reluctance or refusal is reasonable.

I remind hon. Members that any Divisions on new clauses will come later.

Amendment 14 would require the Government to set out how the family courts and legal aid system will be resourced to give full effect to the repeal of the presumption of parental involvement. It would necessitate a report being laid by the Government on the impact of repealing the presumption of parental responsibility. We are in favour of Clause 17, but the amendment focuses on the impact of the provisions on legal aid and the capacity of family courts, judicial training and investment in the family court estate. Repealing the presumption of parental responsibility will lead to a need for more legal advice, as well as changes in hearings and court practices. It is important that the Government report on those changes to the House. We hope that they accept the need for a report.

Clause 17 will repeal the presumption of parental involvement in the Children Act 1989. The presumption was originally introduced to ensure that both parents could maintain a relationship with their children after separation. However, there have been long-standing campaigns to repeal the presumption, with evidence emerging—I say emerging, but it is long-standing evidence—that children could be left at risk of harm. The change will mean that the courts will no longer start from the assumption that parental involvement is always in the child’s best interests.

A key campaigner for this change, working with Women’s Aid, is Claire Throssell, who the Committee had the opportunity to hear from during the evidence session. Claire’s children, Jack and Paul, were killed by their father, who locked them in the attic and set fire to the house. If there was any moment that we all will remember for a very long time, it was Claire holding the images of her children before the incident and afterwards. I commend her for her bravery and for the way that she was able to speak so clearly not just for herself, but for all the families who have experienced devastating bereavement in that way—fighting for the children who will come after.

A family court judge, guided by the presumption, decided to allow Claire’s ex-husband unsupervised access to their children, despite evidence that he had threatened to harm both her and them. Since Women’s Aid first reported on the issue in 2004, 67 children have been killed by perpetrators of domestic abuse through contact arrangements, with 19 further child deaths documented in the decade to September 2024 alone.

The Lib Dems are in favour of the shift in law away from the presumption of parental involvement. Although the Bill seeks to repeal the presumption, there is a pro-contact culture in the family courts, as described by Farah Nazeer of Women’s Aid, who we also heard from in the evidence session. Will the Minister lay out what will be done to support the cultural reform of the family courts to ensure that this is a pivotal moment for victims of domestic abuse, who for so long have had their concerns around their children’s safety dismissed?

Claire spoke to that point in the evidence session. When I asked her what she believed the next steps should be, she said:

“What I would like to see moving forward is an understanding of what it looks like without presumption of contact; what good practice looks like; understanding trauma; understanding what coercive control is; understanding emotional abuse. We all understand physical abuse—it is there; we see it. What we do not understand is the emotional abuse and the scars that we carry. We must always look from the position of actually seeing a child, hearing a child, believing a child, protecting a child, and we must go from this basis.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 58, Q110.]

New clause 16, which I also tabled, is a probing amendment that I will not press to a vote, but I wish to discuss it further. It would introduce a rebuttal presumption that a parent’s relocation with a child in the context of domestic abuse, undertaken in reliance on and with documented advice from authorities or support services, is reasonable and in the child’s best interests, unless the contrary is known.

New clause 16 would allow a parent to relocate with a child if they have evidence or advice from a domestic abuse support service or authority. It would require the court to assume that the move is reasonable and place the burden on the other parent to prove that the move is not in the child’s best interest.

The new clause is aimed at making it easier for victims of domestic abuse to leave their situations safely, and to prevent them from being forced to remain near their abusive ex-partners. Currently, the legal framework does not adequately distinguish between a parent who removes a child to protect them and a parent who removes a child to punish the other party. Our new clause would not remove safeguards in respect of alienation, but would instead shift the dial towards believing and protecting victims of domestic abuse.

The new clause is supported by Fair Hearing, which shared multiple examples of its work with courts that failed to give proper weight to the relevance of domestic abuse in relocation decisions. In one such case, a mother who had experienced severe physical, sexual and psychological abuse had been forced by her partner, during the relationship, to move with their children to an isolated rural area. After leaving him, she sought permission to return to her home town, where she had family support and greater safety. The court none the less required her to remain in an isolated cottage near her abuser, failing to give proper weight to the impact of the abuse, or to her need for safety and support. Cases of that kind illustrate the consequences of a framework that, in its operation, too often treats a survivor seeking to relocate for safety no differently from any other parent seeking to move for lifestyle or preference reasons.

I make the point to the Minister that this could happen to any of us. So often, abuse does not start on day one, when the partner suggests that we move somewhere lovely and will be really happy there. I am a very long way removed from the version of myself who made the decision to follow a boy three hours away from my family in my early 20s. He turned out not to be the great guy I thought he was when I made that decision. I escaped from that situation, but had I stayed and ended up having children, the idea that I would have been trapped in a city that was not mine, away from my family, who were my support network, is too scary to bear. I remind the Minister that it could happen to literally any one of us.

Wider campaigns from Women’s Aid, SafeLives and Refuge have focused on ensuring that survivors can relocate to escape abuse. As subsection 2 of the new clause outlines:

“Where the relocating parent demonstrates that the decision to relocate was made in consequence of domestic abuse, and this is supported by documented advice from a relevant authority or support service, there is a presumption that the relocation was reasonable and in the best interests of the child.”

Under the new clause, the documented advice would include evidence from a police force, social services, a multi-agency risk assessment conference or an independent domestic violence adviser. We look to work closely with the Government on this issue, and I hope they recognise the need to go further, but I will not push new clause 16 to a vote.

I will speak briefly to new clause 20, also tabled in my name, which would introduce a statutory presumption that where domestic abuse is alleged, the court must make findings on the allegations before considering any claim that a parent has sought to undermine the child’s relationship with the other party. If one parent alleges domestic abuse and the other alleges alienating behaviour—that is, influencing the child against them—the court must decide the domestic abuse allegations first. The court cannot move on to contact issues until that is decided. If the court finds domestic abuse, a child’s reluctance to see that parent is presumed to be justified. That presumption can be overturned only with evidence. If abuse is proven, courts cannot consider claims of alienation until the alleged abusive parent proves the child’s resistance is not due to abuse.

Campaigners have long argued that the family courts have been used by abusers to retraumatise victims and have over-prioritised contact between parents and children. It is estimated that around 60% to 90% of child arrangement cases in the family court feature allegations of domestic abuse. In 2020, the report entitled “Assessing Risk of Harm to Children and Parents in Private Law Children Cases” highlighted serious issues with how the family court system addresses domestic abuse in child arrangement cases. It said that those issues were underpinned by a pro-contact culture, silo working, an adversarial system and resource constraints.

A 2023 report by the Domestic Abuse Commissioner stated:

“Victims and survivors and their advisors reported concerns that raising domestic abuse as an issue often risked the retaliatory use of so-called ‘parental’ alienation narratives by parties against whom domestic abuse had been alleged as a counter-claim, leading to worse outcomes for adult and child victims and survivors.”

Five years on from the harm report, the Domestic Abuse Commissioner found that despite overwhelming evidence of domestic abuse in most cases, a pro-contact culture and a failure to recognise abuse still contribute to decisions that may put children in harm’s way.

This can be considered a probing amendment; I will not press new clause 20 to a vote. We will be looking to work closely with the Government to make progress in this area. The new clause would tilt the dial slightly towards victims of domestic abuse by ensuring that courts properly examined cases before considering issues of alienation. It would prioritise the safety of victims of domestic abuse, whether partners or children, by requiring these allegations to be addressed first.

It is also sometimes argued that children resist contact with certain parents because of manipulation. Our proposal would ensure that courts did not assume that manipulation first, but it would also have safeguards. It would not allow domestic abuse organisations to submit evidence; instead, it would be the authorities, social services and an independent domestic violence adviser who would do that. A minimum evidential threshold would also have to be met.

I want to begin by acknowledging the gravity of what we heard in evidence in Committee. As the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, the hon. Member for Chichester, pointed to, the evidence from Claire in relation to her children will stay with all of us. It was so moving and so upsetting for anyone thinking about how they would feel in that scenario. There was also the testimony of other parents who have lost children, and survivors of domestic abuse, who felt let down by a system that prioritised contact over their safety. That testimony matters. The Committee has a duty to take it incredibly seriously and give it the maximum possible weight.

We also have a duty to legislate carefully, however, and when it comes to legislating I do not think there are many areas of human frailty and human complexity that are more complicated than this. As anyone with any experience of the family court—and of life generally and the interactions between families who split up—will agree, all these things are incredibly complicated. When we seek to be prescriptive about how exactly a court should or should not seek to do things, that is fraught with risk and potential unintended consequences, just as today we are discussing the unintended consequences of a measure that may have been brought in for good reasons.

We must think very carefully, therefore, when it comes to the repeal of section 1(2A) of the Children Act 1989, and particularly about whether we think that will achieve what it promises. I make no apologies for saying that I want to consider this in some detail and that we will want to follow the discussions on it in some detail as the Bill progresses. Although we are not seeking to oppose the repeal at this stage, it is certainly not something—as opposed to some other measures—that is without the need for further scrutiny.

I want to say plainly that the courts, social services and CAFCASS have made serious mistakes in the past—importantly, both before that provision was inserted in 2014 and since—and those serious mistakes have cost children their lives. However, the question before us today is whether repealing the presumption will fix the mistakes or whether it might distract from the need for much deeper reforms and more complex and difficult work than can be achieved by a simple measure in a Bill.

Let me deal with the most important point: the presumption introduced in 2014 does not give any parent an automatic right to contact. It is important that we recognise that. It does not override the paramount principle in the law. I think we probably all remember the evidence given by one of the barristers in Committee, who was clear that while they thought the presumption could be repealed, the law as it stands does not allow the desire for a parent to have contact to override the welfare of a child. It also does not override the welfare checklist, or require courts to make an order that places children at risk.

The presumption establishes a starting point that, where it is safe to do so, children should generally benefit from the involvement of both parents. That starting point can be rebutted, but it expressly does not apply where a parent’s involvement would put the child at risk. In its written evidence, Both Parents Matter describe it as a “statutory benchmark”, not a straitjacket.

Article 9 of the UN convention on the rights of the child recognises the right of the child who is separated from a parent

“to maintain personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a regular basis, except if it is contrary to the child's best interests.”

The Family Services Foundation notes in its written evidence that removing the presumption risks placing the United Kingdom “outside” its obligations under that convention.

Let us also remember that in the criminal courts, there is a presumption that those who commit or are accused of committing the most heinous crimes—rape, murder and the abuse of children—are innocent. We start in that area of our legal system with a presumption that guilt must be proven, so the concept of presumption in the legal system, even where the very worst of humanity is judged, is not alien; it is a fundamental, long-standing and settled element of our judicial system.

In the family courts, and indeed in society at large, it should not be controversial to say, “Where a child has two parents, I think the involvement of both those parents in that child’s life would normally further the welfare of that child, unless shown to be to the contrary.” My point is that the presumption in itself is not necessarily an obstacle to justice, and I hope the Committee will keep that in mind.

I understand that since 2014, as we have heard, too many children have died—approximately 50—while subject to a court order granting contact with a parent. Each of those deaths is a tragedy, and many, if not all, could have been avoided. We must also recognise that, over the same period, more than 450 children died after being placed in care by the courts. That shows that, in multiple directions, the courts make mistakes that have profound consequences, and my concern is that it is the mistakes and decision making that require the greatest level of attention, and not the specific elements of the law.

I want to draw an instructive analogy. As I have said, the criminal courts operate on a presumption of innocence, and that goes wrong. We know that the criminal justice system fails people. Perpetrators are acquitted, and people who end up being convicted later of some of the most serious crimes and worst offences can be found not guilty or are acquitted at earlier points in the judicial process. We do not take that to mean that we should move to a different balance of probabilities or a change in the presumption.

Again, I ask the Committee not to necessarily agree with, but to keep in mind, some of these different elements at play. The safety valves within the existing framework are more accessible in the family court—a different court—because they are operating on a balance of probabilities, so to some extent there are even greater safeguards there.

We heard about the tragic cases of Jack and Paul. There have been too many horrific and devastating cases of children killed by parents or step-parents. Sadly, there are many cases that we do not hear about, but the cases that people are most familiar with include the cases of Victoria Climbié, Baby P and Daniel Pelka. Those all occurred before the introduction of parental responsibility in 2014, so we must keep that in mind. They were caused by failures of safeguarding and information sharing, institutional oversight, and in some cases, inadequate resources for the agencies that protect children. Those failures continue to this day, regardless of the change that has been made to the presumption.

Frances Carr, who also submitted written evidence to us, made that point clearly. She said that tragedies occurred before the 2014 presumption, such as Baby P and Daniel Pelka, and after, and gave other examples such as Star Hobson and Archie Spriggs. Changing the law does not fix poor social work or poor judicial practice.

In earlier sittings, I mentioned that my first encounter with this issue as an MP was an adopted mother who brought to my attention that she had been fostering a young girl, and she had concerns about the young girl going back to her birth family. Wider family members in the birth family and social services also had concerns about the girl and opposed her being returned to her birth family, but the judge overruled all their concerns collectively and sent the child back. That child, having previously been physically fit and healthy, is now in a wheelchair, severely disabled as a result of that decision. We know that the decisions are highly fraught in many of these cases.

The Government’s impact assessment acknowledges that

“the repeal alone is unlikely to materially change outcomes”.

We must give great weight to the evidence we have heard, but the Government’s own position is that it is unlikely to materially change outcomes; they are repealing a provision that their own assessment concedes will not make a material difference to what happens.

I must address some of the evidence that the Government relied on. The Ministry of Justice published its review on the presumption of parental involvement in October last year. Both Parents Matter, the charity that has been working for some 52 years on shared parenting and that helpfully sat on the advisory group for the review, identified some failings in the methodological approach. It pointed out that the quantitative analysis was based on only 245 court judgments, of which more than half were from a single magistrates bench. That was not a fantastic starting point for ensuring that the review was based on a fair and representative sample.

The qualitative analysis involved 29 parents. I am sure that each of those parents gave us helpful and useful information, but that is a relatively small number of people to create a sample from which to draw conclusions. The review said that it could not determine how often the presumption was applied in judgments nor how harm related to its application, so on that direct question, it accepts that it is not of enormous help to us. That is quite a limited evidential basis. The literature review examined only 55 studies and, for some reason, as argued by Both Parents Matter, it excluded major studies demonstrating positive outcomes for shared parenting.

Another example of important evidence is from Dr Warwick Dumas, who obtained email correspondence from Dr Anja Steinbach, whose research was cited in the Government’s review. Dr Steinbach stated explicitly:

“There is plenty of research showing that contact with both parents is beneficial.” and that her research warned only against 50:50 care under all circumstances. She was clear in her positioning but feels that the way in which it was reported in the Government’s review did not fairly reflect her ultimate conclusion. We received significant written evidence in support of maintaining presumption, but we did not get the opportunity to hear oral evidence from those arguing for its continuation.

We have heard about the need for judges to receive better training, but I observe that the CAFCASS officers and social workers who advise the courts are already trained. They are the professionals on whose expert reports judges rely. In every one of the cases we have talked about, those trained professionals were involved and their expert evidence was relied upon. In many cases, warning signs were missed not by judges acting on a presumption, but sadly, by social workers and CAFCASS officers, with those trained advisers failing to recognise, escalate or even reflect them in their reports.

If the answer to those failures is training and systemic reform—and I believe that absolutely has a role—that reform should be directed at the failing institutions. We do not necessarily need a statutory provision that cannot, as we have heard from the Government’s own admission, be consistently shown to be the cause of failures.

An issue that has received insufficient attention in this debate—it was covered by the hon. Member for Chichester—is parental alienation. I will speak to it as sensitively as I possibly can, recognising that parental alienation is real and damaging, but also that there are unsubstantiated accusations of parental alienation. From our own lives, I am sure we know that the raw interactions of families can be extremely complicated.

The harm caused to children by alienating behaviour is well documented. Children who are denied a relationship with a loving parent for reasons that have nothing to do with that parent’s conduct and everything to do with a conflict between two adults suffer real and lasting psychological harm. The Family Services Foundation’s written evidence describes how children without access to one parent can experience confusion about their identity, feelings of rejection, gaps in their family narrative and heritage, and long-term emotional and developmental consequences. It argues—I am not taking a firm view in either direction at this stage—that the presumption sends a signal to parents, solicitors, mediators and professionals working with families outside the courts that any attempt to exclude a parent without genuine safeguarding grounds would be frowned upon and be unlikely to succeed.

The Family Services Foundation notes that, in its view, the presumption provides a “neutral reference point” that professionals can use to challenge inappropriate gatekeeping. It and Both Parents Matter note in their written evidence that removing the presumption risks creating a perverse incentive where there is no clear statutory starting point. It would then become easier for a parent seeking to exclude the other to do so, and harder for the excluded parent and their children to resist that. I accept that some people would fiercely contest that conclusion, but it is not unreasonable for those with a genuine interest in the welfare of children —as I know we all have—to express that concern.

The presumption does not only operate in disputes between separated parents; it also operates as a protection against overbearing state Intervention. I gave an example earlier of when someone, incorrectly in my view, was returned to their parents. That was the presumption operating in a way that I did not agree with; that does not mean that I do not think it cannot operate positively. It can operate against a social service system that is sometimes overly intrusive into family life. Family law practitioners—perhaps even members of this Committee—will have seen cases where the assumption was that a state agency would be better than the parents, but that assumption was wrong.

When we speak of the 450 children who have died in state care since 2014, we are also speaking of children—some of them at least—who were removed from their parents by a court order. We do not know if that was the case in every circumstance, but I would imagine it was for at least some, so we know that the state is not infallible. The presumption that parental involvement furthers the child’s welfare is not only a protection for non-resident parents in private law, but a protection for families against inappropriate state intervention.

Both Parents Matter also warned in its written evidence that repealing the presumption without a replacement framework risks

“increasing uncertainty, delay, inconsistency and conflict”.

As I understand it, we are removing a presumption; we are not, in law at least, seeking to put in something more nuanced and balanced. I will come on to talk about some of the suggestions that have been made to us in evidence about what we might do. If there is no clear statutory starting point, courts may need to gather more evidence, hold longer hearings and adjudicate more disputes that might otherwise have been resolved by mediation or negotiation.

As I said at the outset, I take seriously the concerns of survivors—I want to be clear about that again. We had written evidence, including from Arajpreet Kaur, setting out how the presumption can be experienced by survivors as a pressure to accept contact arrangements that feel unsafe. That concern is absolutely legitimate and must be addressed, but it could be argued that the best answer to those concerns is to ensure that CAFCASS, the courts and social services have the tools, training and resources to properly assess risk when it is raised, to conduct robust fact-finding hearings, and to take seriously allegations of domestic abuse. Those are the systemic failures that must be fixed, and repealing a statutory provision that has not necessarily been identified, at least in the evidence that we have received, as having a material impact on those outcomes might be focusing on the wrong area.

What is the alternative? It is important for those advocating against the change to put forward some alternatives. Both Parents Matter proposed in its written evidence a targeted Amendment to section 1(3) of the Children Act 1989—the welfare checklist. Rather than repeal the presumption, Parliament could instead require courts to set out explicitly in their judgments how they have applied each element of the welfare checklist. That would bring transparency without removing the starting principle.

Both Parents Matter also proposes what it calls a parental relationship test to be embedded in the welfare checklist, requiring the courts to consider the

“quality and sustainability of the child’s relationship with each parent… The nature of the relationship between the parents insofar as it affects the child” and

“Each parent’s willingness and capacity to support the child’s relationship with the other parent, where safe”.

It notes that those factors are already considered informally, but consistently codifying them would improve the quality of decision making without removing the principle of parental responsibility. On hearing those factors, I think all of us would say that, if a court went through that process properly, credibly and with the right information, and if that was done well, presumption or otherwise, we should not be left in a situation where a child is inappropriately continuing contact with one parent.

The suggested amendment wording that was submitted in evidence by Both Parents Matter would be a new paragraph (h) in section 1(3) of the Children Act 1989, reading:

“the quality and sustainability of his relationships with each parent, the nature of the relationship between the parents insofar as it affects him and the capacity and willingness of each parent to support his relationship with the other parent, insofar as this is likely to further his welfare now and in the future.”

I think it is a drafting habit to say “his”, and there is no pejorative element to that.

I hope that I have demonstrated to the Committee that I have a genuine interest in the suggestion that this element is causing an issue. We are open-minded to that. My instinct is that, at heart, this is about the courts, judges and other professional staff making bad decisions and bad judgments. That is at the heart of these issues, and I am cautious about us reaching for a statutory amendment to legislation that I do not think will necessarily result in the benefit that we are all seeking to achieve and that we all agree with, and that Claire so powerfully articulated to us in the evidence session.

I support this Clause quite strongly. We heard powerfully from Claire Throssell in oral evidence how important its impact could be.

Most Members will have experiences like mine through casework of cases where this clause could help. I have heard from parents and family members so distressed at how their cases have been determined, despite clear evidence, where this presumption was obviously given far too much weight in decisions. These words in legislation, which were added and have had an influence on decisions, need to go.

I want to read parts of correspondence I received after the announcement in October 2025 that this measure was going to be changed. My constituent described it as an enormous relief. They were very impatient to know exactly when this was going to come forward. I am very pleased that we are discussing this now before the end of the Session.

My constituent said:

“I have personal experience of the impact the current legal framework can have. I am unable to provide specific information as a very close family member is still going through Family Court hearings to protect a child in a case of domestic abuse. However, as recently as January this year”— this was in 2025—

“the aforementioned person was advised by two independent firms of solicitors to avoid the Family Court at all costs, due to the ‘presumption of involvement’, allied with the inconsistent and regionally patchy training and understanding by Family Court judges in domestic abuse (in spite of changes to the Domestic Abuse Act in 2021), referring to potential outcomes in Child Arrangements as ‘a lottery’.”

I really do support this clause. I also support the amendments in the name of the hon. Member for Chichester, which will help to tackle training gaps and which also reflect experiences that I can recall from casework. They are based on high-quality work and requests from organisations that work directly with victims and survivors, who have asked for these changes. I hope that the Minister will look at making changes that further strengthen the Bill in this way.

I begin by echoing the comments made by my hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle. I completely understand why the Government have brought this Clause forward. I welcome the debate. Similar to the hon. Member for Chichester, who spoke so eloquently, I was deeply moved by the evidence we heard from Claire Throssell. I cannot even imagine how she has coped. To do what she has done and to try to take something positive from that is an incredible thing.

The evidence this Committee has heard from those witnesses and other survivors of domestic abuse is that they feel that the family courts have not properly identified risk and believe that a pro-contact culture has, at times, overridden safety. That is extremely concerning, and it is absolutely right that we take it extremely seriously.

Child safety must come first. Where the present framework has contributed to poor outcomes, it is right that the Government act, but it is also incumbent on us today to make sure that the clause that is being repealed is indeed the cause of the harm to those children. I also make the point that, where Parliament removes an existing statutory principle, it has a duty to be clear about what will replace it.

My concern today is less with the Government’s objective than with whether repeal on its own is sufficiently precise, evidence based and thought through to achieve the Ministers’ intended objective. The Government’s own impact assessment, which has already been set out, says that

“repeal alone is unlikely to materially change outcomes”,

even though it is expected to

“change the process judges follow”.

That is an important starting point for this debate. It is really important that we do not make changes to law because everyone wants us to make those changes and thinks that will improve things when, in reality, we have the evidence and facts to know that it may not deliver those outcomes.

It is incumbent on all of us to make sure that we actually deliver the outcomes that we all desire; we all have the same ambition. I know this comes from a good place and we are all approaching this debate in the best way we can to protect children. My purpose this afternoon is to be constructive—I am not saying I have all the answers on this, and I hope my comments will be taken in that spirit. If the Government proceed with repeal, do they also need to do more to provide a principles replacement framework, clearer guidance and stronger supporting reforms?

It is important to start with the facts around the presumption. The current presumption does not give any parent an automatic right to contact, override the welfare checklist or override the paramountcy principle in section 1 of the Children Act 1989, and it certainly does not require courts to make orders that place children at risk. The Family Services Foundation is clear in its written evidence that current law already places the child’s welfare first, stating:

“Section 1(6)…expressly ensures the presumption applies” only where parental involvement

“does not put the child at risk of suffering harm”.

It says that practice direction 12J and the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 already provide an important framework for identifying and responding to abuse in family proceedings.

Equally, I recognise the contrary concern expressed by survivors who say that, in abuse cases, the presumption can place pressure on courts to prioritise parental contact even where there are serious safety concerns and can make it harder for victims to be properly heard and protected. The real question is therefore not whether safety matters more than contact—it plainly does—but whether removing the current presumption will improve how risk is identified and acted upon, or whether it risks creating new uncertainty while leaving the deeper operational problems untouched and discouraging parental involvement in cases where it would actually be beneficial.

There are already substantial protections in the current legal framework, although they clearly fail in the worst way on occasion. The Family Services Foundation points out that the Children Act 1989, practice direction 12J and the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 already equip the courts to restrict or refuse contact where “harm is shown”. It also reminds us that the UK is bound by the UN convention on the rights of the child, including article 9, which recognises that children should maintain regular contact with both parents unless that is

“contrary to the child’s best interests”.

Both Parents Matter makes a similar point, saying:

“The Presumption was introduced in 2014” to reflect the UNCRC and provide a statutory benchmark that the safe involvement of both parents generally furthers child welfare. I emphasise the word “safe”—no one has ever said that parents should be involved if it is not safe. I make those points not to argue that nothing should change. If the Government are minded to proceed, we need a clear understanding of how the replacement framework will continue to distinguish between safe parental involvement, which can be beneficial, and unsafe parental involvement, which must be stopped. At present, I am not sure the Bill by itself gives enough reassurance on that point, and I am worried that safe parental contact will be discouraged.

That leads to one of the most important points of all. The Government’s own documents suggest that repeal alone may not be the solution that they are hoping it will be. As mentioned earlier, the impact assessment says,

“repeal alone is unlikely to materially change outcomes”,

although it is expected to change the process that judges follow. That is a significant admission. It suggests that if the Government want safer and better outcomes in family proceedings, repeal can be only part of the picture, and perhaps not the decisive part.

We should keep in mind that many of the awful failures that have rightly horrified people seem to be failures of risk assessment, information sharing, institutional practice, professional judgment and resourcing. The Centre for Policy Research on Men and Boys puts it well:

“If abusive contact is being ordered or preserved inappropriately, then the concern lies with the quality of risk assessment, the speed and fairness of investigation, and the consistency with which courts and agencies apply the law.”

That is a useful and constructive way of putting the point. It does not deny the seriousness of the problem, but it does ask whether the solution is the right one. My concern is not that the Government want to strengthen protection; it is that repeal may be presented as more self-sufficient than, on the basis of the evidence, it really is.

I also think the Committee should be careful and candid about the strength of the evidence base behind repeal. Both Parents Matter says that the Government’s own review

“provided limited and inconclusive evidence of the impact of the Presumption. It could not determine how often the Presumption was applied in judgments, nor could it assess how harm…related to the application of the Presumption.”

It also criticises the underlying methodology:

“Quantitative analysis was based on only 245 court judgments, with over half from a single magistrates’ bench. Qualitative analysis involved only 29 parents.”

It added that the literature review

“examined only 55 studies, excluded all research published after April 2024,” and omitted

“major studies showing positive outcomes” from safe shared parenting and ongoing parental involvement.

Other evidence goes further, arguing that the Government review appears to have misunderstood or overstated the conclusions to be drawn from Professor Anja Steinbach’s work. I recall a striking line from Professor Steinbach, who said:

“There is plenty of research showing that contact with both parents is beneficial”,

and

“except for violence…contact with both parents is the baseline.”

I do not think that material should make the Committee cautious about treating the review as a fully settled or exhausted evidential platform for repeal.

Again, my point is not that that means that repeal must not happen; it is that we should not over-claim what the existing evidence can prove or support. I also think it is important to avoid turning this into a false choice between protecting children from abuse and supporting children to maintain safe relationships with both parents. The Centre for Policy Research on Men and Boys says that the public debate often frames the issue in that way. However, it says:

“A good family justice system must do both. It must protect children and adult victims from abusive parents. It must also protect children from the avoidable loss of safe, loving, and important parental relationships.”

I think that is right.

The Family Services Foundation similarly said:

“reform should focus on enhancing the protections available, rather than creating conditions that may inadvertently prevent children from maintaining safe, meaningful relationships with their parents.”

That is why I urge the Minister not to present clause 17 as though all principled concern about repeal is somehow concern for parental rights over child safety. It is perfectly possible to support the Government’s child safety objective while asking whether the law should continue to recognise some clear and carefully framed way, where there is no established risk of harm, of enabling children to benefit from stable and safe relationships with both parents.

Several of the written submissions that we received raise concerns about unintended consequences if repeal proceeds without a clear replacement framework. Both Parents Matter warns:

“Removing this important statutory benchmark, and relying instead on practice and non statutory frameworks” may increase uncertainty, inconsistency and conflict. The Family Services Foundation says something similar, warning that repeal may confuse frontline professionals, affect negotiations outside court, reduce the incentive for out-of-court resolution and, ultimately, increase strain on a family court system that is already under pressure. It notes that only a minority of separated families ever come before the courts, but many more families and professionals orient their expectations around the legal framework.

That is a serious point. Even if the court’s paramount consideration remains unchanged, removing a statutory starting point may still alter behaviour before a case ever reaches a final hearing. It may affect how solicitors advise, how CAFCASS frames disputes, how mediation is approached and how parents negotiate. With that point in mind, I hope that the Minister might be in a position to share some more detail on how she expects the changes to operate, and why she is confident that they will improve outcomes rather than simply shift conflict elsewhere.

Another point that deserves to be touched on is the human impact of any legal change in this area. I am concerned that repeal may be emotionally costly to non-resident parents. We have all read the written evidence citing very high levels of suicidal ideation among separated fathers who have lost meaningful contact with their children. The Family Services Foundation warns that removing the presumption may heighten mental health risks for already strained non-residents parents and may also affect children’s identity, sense of belonging and wider family connections when safe relationships are lost or weakened. I do not think it is in dispute that when a child loses meaningful contact with a safe and committed father or mother, the effects will often be long term and damaging.

I do not make that point to turn the debate away from victims of abuse, but we need to be mindful of the whole picture. As with most things, it is about trying to get the balance right. It will never be perfect, but we have to make sure that it does not go too far one way or the other. We should think about not only the cases we hope to prevent, but the families and children who may be affected when no abuse is established and the consequence of repeal may ultimately be the tragedy of an unjustified severing of the precious link between parent and child. We must also remember that it is not just about parents; there is an ongoing impact on broader family relationships—we hear from lots of grandparents that this issue can have a significant impact on them.

There is also a question of timing. The Family Services Foundation draws our attention to the Pathfinder pilot, which uses a more investigative and problem-solving model to identify risk early and to improve safety for children and parents who experience domestic abuse. It says that early stages appear to be showing positive outcomes, and warns that changing the law in such a fundamental way, so early in the development of Pathfinder, could reshape practice on the ground and risk destabilising improvements that are already being reported in pilot areas. If family justice reform is already under way through Pathfinder and related operational changes, it is reasonable for the Committee to ask how clause 17 interacts with the programme, what Ministers expect the combined effect to be and how success will be measured.

As the Minister is aware, Both Parents Matter and other groups not only object to repeal but advocate for a replacement approach. They propose a targeted Amendment to the welfare checklist, requiring courts to consider the quality and sustainability of the child’s relationship with each parent, the nature of the relationship between the parents in so far as it affects the child, and the capacity and willingness of each parent to support the child’s relationship with the other parent, where safe.

Moreover, a court would be required to set out in its judgment how it has applied each part of the welfare checklist in determining the child’s best interests. Both Parents Matter says that approach would provide a clearer framework, improve transparency and support more structured, child-centred decision making. I am not here to argue for that exact wording, but the broader point is worth considering. If we are going to remove an existing statutory benchmark, we should consider whether some replacement discipline should be built into the framework, whether that be strengthening the welfare checklist, improving transparency in judgments or clarifying how courts should reason their way through these difficult cases. To my mind, that is a more constructive route than a simple argument of repeal versus no repeal.

Finally, I want to be very clear that none of these points should be read as minimising the concerns of survivors. As I have said, it is about getting the right balance. Both sides are important, and at the end of the day, it is all about safety. We need to keep children as safe as we possibly can.

I am finding it difficult to listen to the hon. Member’s speech. I do not believe that we can talk about balance when 68 children have lost their lives because of the presumption. I feel that we have to take forward this Clause; it is so important. I want to understand the hon. Member’s terminology and whether she can reflect on the fact that 68 children have already lost their lives because of this presumption.

I am sure people saw me during evidence. I get really upset about the loss of any child’s life. We have to remember that we all want to keep children safe—[Interruption.]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

No, I’m okay.

I would gently say to the hon. Member for North West Leicestershire that I hope she has heard—and even seen—enough from me to know that I am here to protect children. Of course I am horrified by any loss of a child, but my point is that I am trying to step back, be objective and say, “What is the reason that those children lost their lives?”. I am not convinced that it was the parental presumption—I am not saying that I am right on that; I am just open-minded to it.

I have seen a particular case quite closely—I should declare that I am a serving county councillor in Surrey—and that is the case of Sara Sharif. I have gone through the safeguarding reviews in a huge amount of detail; it affected all of us councillors in Surrey greatly. It was an absolutely awful case. So many things went wrong throughout her life. From the family courts to social services, her GP and the school, there was just a barrage of failure that led to that poor little girl being murdered, and that absolutely could have been prevented.

People might argue, “Well, if we had removed the parental presumption, that would have saved her.” Having gone through all that, I can tell the hon. Member that, in that case, it would not have done anything. It was safeguarding failures. People just made mistakes. They got things wrong. They were too worried about offending people to take the right actions.

What I am saying today is just that it is really important, when we look at these things, that we diagnose what went wrong. We have to do that quite objectively. That is difficult when we are hearing from lots of different people who have gone through awful things, but our job is to try to not be emotional—I say that having got emotional myself—and to look at it logically. At the end of the day, we all just want to deliver the outcome that protects children. That is what all of us on this Committee want to do. But it is important that we can talk about that without the hon. Member suggesting that I somehow do not care about children, because what I am trying to do is to have that objectivity, because it matters to me so much that we do protect those children that I want us to have that proper debate and to say, “Is this really the right way or are there other things we can be doing? Do we need to do multiple things? Maybe this isn’t enough.” I am not saying that we should not do it; I am saying that we just need to make sure that we have thought this through.

I will be really keen to hear from the Minister; I know this really matters to her as well, and she will have done that thinking, so I look forward to hearing her thoughts on the challenges I have brought up today. But, as I say, I keep an open mind, and we all share the same objectives.

Am I right in thinking that the hon. Member agrees with me that, when we are trying to legislate for what the most complex part of our justice system—families—that is an incredibly hard job? We all know from personal experience that the one thing that binds us all is that we have a family; we might disagree on whether they are good ones or bad ones, and whether we get on with them or not, but we all came from somewhere, and they are complicated things.

Across the House, we all share the desire to ensure that we recognise the complexity of family relationships and protect those most vulnerable in our society by making sure that people do not have the right to still have contact with their children when they have done things that mean that they absolutely should not. However, we also recognise that systems are abused, and we see that in all directions; people will always find ways of getting around systems, or of using the criminal justice system to retraumatise or to hold on to some form of control. Does the hon. Member therefore agree with me that, while what we are trying to do here is really complex, we are all doing it for the right reasons?

I completely agree with the hon. Member. I appreciate the fact that she has tabled these amendments and that she recognises that it is not easy to strike this balance, particularly when we are trying to address abuse and alienation cases and it is sometimes hard to know what situation we are dealing with.

We are trying to come up with a system that protects as many people as we possibly can, but I think we also have to acknowledge that it will never be perfect. If anyone thinks that we can change one bit of law and then all of a sudden nothing horrible will ever happen again, I am afraid to say that these awful things will always happen, and things will always go wrong. It is about trying our best to have a framework that gets the balance right.

I will stop there—I have probably made my point. This has been a really good debate, and I look forward to hearing from the Minister about some of the points I have raised.

I thank all hon. Members for their contributions. I will set out the rationale for Clause 17 and then address the central argument presented by Opposition Members about the repeal of the presumption —the Government do not overclaim for it; is not a silver bullet for the problems and challenges of child protection in this country and will not solve all the challenges in our family court—and why we nevertheless think that it is the right thing to do. I will then address the Amendment and new clauses.

The Government’s intention through clause 17 is to repeal the presumption of parental involvement from the Children Act 1989. The child’s welfare must always be the court’s paramount concern when making decisions about a child’s life, and that principle is enshrined in the 1989 Act. The Children and Families Act 2014 amended the 1989 Act to introduce a presumption that, in certain private law proceedings, the child’s welfare will be furthered by each parent’s involvement, unless evidence shows otherwise.

We know that, in most families, both parents play a vital role in a child’s life. However, although the legislation clearly states that the presumption is rebuttable and does not apply where a parent poses a risk of harm to the child, it has none the less faced serious and sustained criticism. To echo what others have said about the testimony and campaigning work of Claire Throssell, ably supported by her MP, my hon. Friend Dr Tidball, Women’s Aid and a whole host of survivors of domestic abuse and those who represent them, the presumption contributes to a pro-contact culture in the family courts that too often prioritises parental involvement over child welfare.

We published our review of the presumption in full last October, and its conclusion was that unsupervised and face-to-face contact was the most common outcome in child arrangements cases, even where there were allegations or findings of domestic abuse. To give some context, the Domestic Abuse Commissioner has presented evidence of her own that proven allegations of domestic abuse arise in 80% of those cases. This is prevalent. Those cases come to the court in the way they do because, by definition, family relationships have broken down and there is conflict—that is the nature of these cases, and domestic abuse is already an issue in so many of them. The review demonstrates that, although the presumption is not the sole driver, it can be a contributory factor to a culture in family courts that prioritises parental involvement, even in cases of abuse, which means that, too often, decisions are putting children in harm’s way.

I want to be really clear about that, because we are not overclaiming that the repeal of the presumption will change everything overnight, and we are certainly not saying that it will keep everybody safe. There has been a lot of criticism of the family court, but one thing I do know is that those tasked with making these decisions are trying, through their professionalism, empathy and training, to keep children safe. I do not doubt their good faith. I struggle to imagine the burden of having to make those decisions. We are talking about the devastation of loved ones who have lost children—but imagine being the judge who made that decision, and living with that. I do not think for one second that they would have intended that consequence, and I suspect that, where a child is harmed or even killed as a result of a child arrangement, they regret those decisions every single day.

Through clause 17, we are seeking to ensure that judges approach the application of the law and the welfare checklist, which we regard as really important, with an open mind. The danger with the presumption is that they start with just that: a weighted approach to the consideration of the child’s best interests. We do not think that repealing the presumption is a silver bullet, but it will send a signal to the system—to the leadership of the family court and to everybody who sits within it— that the way to approach this is purely with an open mind, focused on the child.

We think that changing the structure of the decision-making process such that it does not start with that presumption will lead to improvements in outcomes. It is not the only thing; of course it is not. The hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle made an interesting suggestion about structured reasoning through the welfare checklist. The welfare checklist is thorough and detailed, and it contains all the sorts of considerations that one would expect to try to ascertain that the child is going to be kept safe.

One a real step forward, which touches on some of the other themes we have talked about today, is greater transparency in our family courts. For good reason, lots of family proceedings are held in private to protect the identities of those participating in them, but we are seeing more and more transparency in our family courts—I am a keen driver of it—with the publication of the judgments. Publishing the judgments will give people a better understanding of how decisions are being made and, critically, it means that judges must show their reasoning and explain how they got to their answer. That structured decision making—working through a welfare checklist and stating how each point has been taken it into account—can help to produce better outcomes. Another aspect, which I will come on to, is training, and the ability to spot domestic abuse and take it into account to ensure that children are protected. All those aspects, and more, will be fleshed out in the family justice strategy, which the Ministry of Justice is due to publish in July.

As Claire observed in front of the Committee, and I think it is a view that is shared by all the members of this Committee, keeping children safe, and the improvements that we need to drive in the family court, do not end with the repeal of this presumption. We think it is important; we think it will send an important direction to the family judges about what we as parliamentarians want them to prioritise; but it cannot end there and it needs to be scaffolded with other measures.

The Minister was absolutely right to point to the enormous burden on those judges. I should have made a similar observation, and I am happy to do so now. Although I have been critical of some of their decisions, I cannot imagine the weight that sits with some of those people all the time, so I want to put on the record my thanks to those judges—on the whole, they do a very good job.

However, we still come back to the issue of accountability. We can preload the system to ensure that judges are more likely to make suitable decisions but, if there are no accountability mechanisms at the other end, we will not necessarily get the results that we want. What thought has the Minister given as to how we better ensure accountability for decision making? In my practice as a doctor, for example, there are so many mechanisms in place to ensure that the decisions I make are not just technically justifiable, but good. The point my constituent made when she visited me was that there are no such mechanisms for judges. If they make a strict error in law, that can be tackled through the Court of Appeal, but outside of that, how can the judiciary better hold itself to account for poor-quality, even if legally defendable, decision making? I am not talking about the Government interfering with the judiciary.

The hon. Gentleman makes a good point. Obviously, we have appeal systems and, in some family proceedings, the nature of them can be iterative; as family circumstances and the facts change, it might be that there are provisions in directions to come back and relitigate some of those child arrangements. In other cases, they are final. Accountability is really important to us as a ministerial team, and the Secretary of State does not shy away from it. While of course respecting separation of powers, the judicial complaints process must be important as well, not just in family courts, but right across the piece. Where judges fall short of the standards we require of them, they should be held accountable.

I want to make a point about transparency and the publication of family court judgments. That is happening more and more, and it is important because it holds it up and says, “That is what a good judgment looks like”. It also exposes where there is decision making that is either faulty, poorly reasoned or simply not justified, so that that cannot happen.

The other thing happening is not just the publication of those judgments, with all the support that transcription allows, but also opening up—again, where appropriate—to journalists and the public to come and see how those hearings operate.

The Minister has pointed to complaints, and that is an important element, but there is something in between complaints and legal appeal. Again, from my own experience, working extensively on trying to make quality improvements in healthcare, these are incredibly complex things that we expect experts to do. Someone might not have done the wrong thing but, when we look at their practice as a whole, it does not compare favourably with that of other clinicians. That is what we recognise as the manner in which we drive improvement.

Some of the high-profile statisticians who I have worked with in that regard and who speak publicly on these matters have looked at court decisions say that they can find similar patterns of what we might call outliers—for example, regarding how likely people are to grant parental custody. Any one of those decisions might not be a decision that would be legally wrong or warrant a complaint—but we might see that they are 10 times more likely than all the other judges to award custody. Again, that is not to say that they are wrong to do so; but, just as clinicians are forced to do, we should at the very least be forcing them to reflect on that internally within the judiciary, and say, “Why is it that you are awarding custody to both parents in so many more circumstances than all your peers?”. It is not about complaints or legally wrong actions, but someone’s practice as a whole.

As the Minister has said, there is a very important separation: it should not be the Minister responsible saying to that person, “I don’t like your rate of referral”, but there should be something else within the judiciary—something that is not complaints and is not legal challenge, but that just says, “You all have to be a bit more accountable for the decisions you take”. To give another example in sentencing, if we could consistently see that a judge’s sentencing was consistently very far away from their peers’, that is not something that we should just accept as a society. This is not a Government issue, but a society issue.

The hon. Gentleman is making a fair point. I have no doubt that, not just in the context of this Clause—where we are talking about family law—but more generally in other conversations that we have had around the criminal justice system, the Judicial Office and judicial leadership will be following these proceedings quite closely and will be hearing these exchanges. That is why—in a different context—the discussion that we had regarding the Amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington is so important, with that specific mischief in mind. Judicial performance is something that the judicial leadership ought to want to scrutinise and evaluate, and—where it falls short of the high standards that our judiciary so often deliver— remedy.

This measure, not in and of itself, but through clause 17 and alongside our wider reforms, such as the national roll-out of child-focused courts—the new name for what some hon. Members might know as Pathfinder—over the next three years will signal a step change in putting children’s safety and welfare back where it belongs, at the heart of every family court decision.

I do not want to digress, and this is not in the script but, for those unfamiliar with the Pathfinder programme—I am now told that I have to call them child-focused courts, and that is quite right, because that name describes exactly what they are—having been to observe those courts and spoken to judges, practitioners, social workers and families who have been through them, they are a really good model. They require the production up front of all the expert reports and all the assessments of the children, and there is much less conflict in the way that they operate. Judges like them; practitioners like them; families like them. They also go a whole lot faster. Of course, we must get to the bottom of things and make sure children are protected—but, if they are in an unsafe situation, we want them out of that unsafe situation sooner rather than later. We think that Pathfinder, coupled with the effects of clause 17, will be really important and I commend the clause to the Committee.

Amendment 14, tabled by the hon. Member for Chichester, would require the Lord Chancellor to lay a report before Parliament within six months setting out the level of legal aid provision, judicial capacity, specialist training and investment in the family court estate and in the technology needed to support the repeal of the presumption. Although all those things are essential, fundamental blocks of a well-functioning family court—the availability of legal aid, the judicial training, the specialism and the quality of the estate are all going to be important to producing better decisions and supporting families through an inherently difficult process—the Government do not consider the amendment necessary because the repeal of the presumption does not, in and of itself, alter what is going on within the courtroom. It alters the weighting that a judge gives in his or her decision making, but our endeavours to ensure that family courts are adequately resourced to make sure that children and victims are protected have to happen regardless. We do not need the amendment to achieve that.

As I said, we are already taking forward significant reforms to ensure that the family court system supports survivors of domestic abuse and delivers the right outcomes for survivors and their children. We have existing processes in place to monitor family court resourcing. All that work is led by my colleague Baroness Levitt.

I recognise that the Amendment is limited in scope because the Bill is limited in scope, especially when it comes to the family court. Perhaps rather cheekily, I was trying to get a report on the general health of the family court system because so many organisations tell Members across the House that they are really concerned about a lot of the systems sitting in the family court, not just the parental responsibility piece. I remain hopeful that we will see family court legislation introduced, as the Minister will be aware that I have requested in multiple oral questions in the Chamber.

I am aware that the report required by the amendment would be specifically about the repeal, but we need a health check of our family court system because a lot of people are sounding the alarm about the concerns they have with that system.

The family justice strategy, which will be forthcoming in July, will address a lot of what the hon. Member asks for. It will set out where the Government think reform is needed, and it will bring together what we are already doing with our child-focused courts programme, which is accompanied by a £17 million investment. We believe in that model, which we think has huge merit. It will be available to people regardless of where in the country they live.

More generally, we are introducing the funding that the Lord Chancellor has allocated to sitting days for family hearings, the targeted recruitment of more judges, more fee-paid judges, the greater use of virtual hearings—which can be a supportive measure for people giving evidence, not just an efficiency measure—and training.

The hon. Member for Chichester will know that the Domestic Abuse Commissioner has also undertaken detailed work in this area through her “Everyday business” report, which talks to some of the resourcing constraints faced by the family court. That work forms part of the commissioner’s report on a family court reporting mechanism, which is designed to provide ongoing evidence-based scrutiny of the family court’s response to domestic abuse in particular, and to highlight where systemic improvements are needed, so we have other accountability measures shining that light. If the hon. Member for Chichester awaits the strategy—she will no doubt want to take a look and critique parts of it—I think a lot of it will address some of the concerns she raises.

As I said, before proposing the repeal of the presumption, we carefully assessed the impact it would have. We do not overstate it, but it is important because the change affects the judicial process, not the underlying reasons why families come to court. Because we do not expect it to increase case volumes, case length or demand for legal aid, we think that the current arrangements can meet it, but there are so many other improvements that we want to drive.

A number of Members raised the issue of specialist training, which is so important. We have talked about it in the context of criminal justice, and it is equally important in this context. While it is right that judicial training is the responsibility of the independent judiciary, campaigners and parliamentarians have been calling for some time for improvements in the training to cover things like coercive control, domestic abuse dynamics and child safeguarding. Much of that is now part of the mandatory induction and continuing training that judges undergo, which will also drive improvements. It may be that, decades ago, they were not getting training in that area. As a society and as a judiciary, we now have a much more sophisticated understanding of how these things operate. For those reasons, I urge the hon. Member for Chichester to withdraw the Amendment.

New Clause 20 seeks to establish a presumption that, where domestic abuse is found, the court should not consider allegations by the perpetrator that the victim parent has undermined their relationship with the child. This new clause has a very noble aim. The Government agree that the court must take into account a child’s wishes and feelings about contact with a parent, not least when that parent is a perpetrator of domestic abuse. However, our view is that further legislation is not the way to achieve that.

The welfare of children must always be the family courts’ paramount concern when they make decisions about a child’s life. That principle is enshrined in the Children Act 1989. The Family Justice Council has published guidance on this issue, which has been endorsed by the president of the family Division. That guidance recognises that there are various justified reasons why a child may reject a parent in addition to domestic abuse, such as harmful parenting, a parent’s limited involvement in their life or poor parenting. The guidance already provides a clear framework for cases of this nature and makes clear that alienating behaviours will not be found in cases where findings of domestic abuse are made that have resulted in a child’s appropriate, justified rejection of the perpetrator parent.

Recent case law demonstrates that the family courts are already grappling with these considerations. In the case of Re Y, the president of the family division made it clear that the court should establish the facts of a case, particularly regarding whether domestic abuse has occurred, prior to considering any expert opinion on alienating behaviours. There is already clear guidance and case law on this issue, and I therefore urge the hon. Member for Chichester not to press the new clause.

New clause 16 seeks to introduce a rebuttable presumption that a parent’s relocation with a child, when based on documented evidence from a relevant authority or support service in the context of domestic abuse, is reasonable and in the child’s best interests unless the contrary is shown. I thank the hon. Member for Chichester for raising that issue and for speaking to her personal experience, which is never easy.

The Government fully recognise the intention behind the new clause, as well as the desire to support survivors to relocate safely with their children. However, we cannot accept this amendment. Children do not need such a statutory presumption to keep them safe. What they need is a rigorous, case-by-case approach in which courts examine the specific circumstances of each child and family. That approach is firmly grounded in the Children Act and in the protections afforded by article 8 of the European convention on human rights.

The family courts already operate within a strong statutory framework in which a child’s welfare is the paramount consideration. Judges are equipped with the training to consider domestic abuse, the nature and severity of harm, and the reasons behind any relocation, without needing a presumption that may constrain that decision making and elevate one factor of a case above the rest. We fear that the new clause risks oversimplifying complex and sensitive safeguarding decisions, and the advice we have received from police, local authorities and independent domestic violence advisers, who provide invaluable support, is that it is not needed.

Our wider reforms, including the national roll-out of child-focused courts, are designed precisely to ensure that courts identify and respond to harm effectively in cases of domestic abuse, including cases where a parent has already relocated or is considering relocation. Under this model, specialist domestic abuse support is introduced alongside early risk assessment to help courts better understand and respond to harm.

Importantly, this reformed model places the child’s voice at the centre of proceedings. One feature is that, at the very beginning of the case, the court orders a child impact report that incorporates information from relevant agencies and, where appropriate, direct engagement with the child. In cases involving relocation and domestic abuse, this ensures that the court can clearly understand how the move, and the circumstances surrounding it, is affecting or would affect the child. Once again, for those reasons, I urge the hon. Member for Chichester not to press the new clause.

I will touch briefly on parental alienation, which is a concern raised in a number of speeches. The Government do not recognise parental alienation as a syndrome capable of diagnosis—sometimes it is talked about in those terms. I think we can all agree that the family court should consider a child’s wishes and feelings about contact with a parent, particularly when there are allegations of domestic abuse involving that parent.

As I have said, the Children Act firmly enshrines the principle that the welfare of children must always be the family courts’ paramount concern when making a decision about a child’s life, so there is a slight concern about how we go about legislating in this area. Additionally, the Family Justice Council has published guidance on this issue, which has been endorsed by the president of the family division. This guidance makes it clear that there are various justified reasons why a child may reject a parent, including and in addition to domestic abuse. Those might include harmful or poor parenting. We do not want to curtail that.

That is why I come back to the merits of the welfare checklist, in the context of clause 17, which removes the presumption. It is important that we refocus on the welfare of the child and listen intently to what they may be trying to say, informed through the lens of how trauma-informed evidence is given and a clear-eyed understanding of how domestic abuse can manifest. The Government are working through the recommendations from the Domestic Abuse Commissioner’s report, which contains lots that can usefully guide us.

The decision making will not be perfect and will not prevent every death, which goes to some of our earlier exchanges. Unfortunately, although it is the job of state institutions to keep children safe, there are some pretty evil people out there; the very people who should be keeping these children safe can do some awful things—the worst sorts of things—to children. Our job is to create the frameworks to enable those with the very difficult task of keeping children safe, intervening and taking some of the most draconian decisions imaginable—taking children away from their parents’ care—to do so in a way that is careful and considered, so that they feel supported to make those decisions transparently.

We always say that the loss of one life is one too many. If any of these changes saves one life, they will have been worth making. With that in mind, I commend clause 17 to the Committee.

This has been a robust and important debate, and there are strong feelings on both sides of the argument. As I said earlier, we are legislating in a complex area. I think the shared opinion is that the intention is correct. Some of the questions that have been asked are legitimate, but I know the Minister is keen to work collaboratively. I will not press my two new clauses to a vote—they are probing amendments to open up the conversation—but Amendment 14, which would require a report as a health check for the family courts, is important, so I will press it to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

The Committee divided: Ayes 3, Noes 9.

Question accordingly negatived.

Clause 17 ordered to stand part of the Bill.