I beg to move Amendment 45, in Clause 4, page 10, line 16, leave out “one or more of the offences is an offence” and insert “all of the offences are”.

This amendment would limit judge-only trials to situations where all of the offences are listed in Schedule 3ZA.

Clause 4 relates to the allocation to the Crown court bench Division of complex or lengthy cases. The amendment relates to how the mixture of cases presented on an indictment would affect the allocation decision. It addresses a clear overreach and would limit judge-only trials to situations where all the offences of which someone was accused are listed in new schedule 3ZA to the Criminal Justice Act 2003.

As it stands, a case may be directed to be judge-only where only one of the offences on the indictment falls within the schedule list, with only very limited exceptions in relation to murder and related offences, and sexual assault and related offences. It is important for Members to realise just how potentially expansive new schedule 3ZA is. If just one of these offences appears on someone’s list of charges, they will lose their access to a jury trial. They include conspiracy to defraud, cheating the public revenue, offences under the Taxes Management Act 1970, offences of false accounting under the Theft Act 1968, insider dealing, money laundering and bribery—a whole range of offences whereby, just one of which will remove access to a jury trial.

Someone could be accused at the same time of offences as serious as serious physical assault, grievous bodily harm, burglary or theft. Those offences may be many years apart; there may be a series of offences, dating over a number of years. That means that someone may lose a right that the Government otherwise accept they should have access to. Someone could have a serious offence of theft, with a likely sentence that, as we know, can be over the three-year benchmark. They could be facing a sentence of four years, which the Government otherwise agree should allow them to have a trial with a jury, and they will lose access to a trial by jury in relation to one of the other offences.

The test is not about the seriousness of the offences; it is a test of complexity. Someone may have a less serious but complex case, in the Government’s view, and lose access to a right to jury trial. I cannot see how the Government can possibly argue that that is fair. This is a matter of coherence and fairness. Our position is quite clear: only when all the offences, instead of just one of the offences, are those listed under proposed new schedule 3ZA should someone lose access to their right to a trial by jury on the basis of clause 4.

I thank the hon. Member for his Amendment, which would require cases to be eligible for an order under proposed new section 42A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 only where all offences listed are schedule offences. We consider that such a method would be overly rigid and would limit the application of Clause 4. In reality, most complex and lengthy cases involving fraud and financial crime often prosecute a mix of principal and ancillary offences, some of which would not appear on the schedule of eligible offences. For example, sometimes theft offences, which are not included in the schedule, are prosecuted alongside fraud or money laundering crimes.

Imagine a large-scale conspiracy to defraud and false accounting, perhaps involving multiple offenders operating through a network of shell companies. The prosecution case relies on hundred, perhaps thousands, of pages of electronic banking records, company accounts, internal emails, encrypted messaging data, and expert accounting evidence that traces the movement of funds through dozens of linked corporate entities across multiple jurisdictions. This is in every sense a highly technical and inherently complex case, which is likely to last several months. But there are counts of theft-adjacent offences of, say, handling stolen goods on the indictment. Those counts are not incidental: they are related to the fraud. They provide the fact finder with a holistic picture of the alleged offending. The judge considers the counts to be clearly related and properly joined for trial. If clause 4 were constrained in the way proposed by the amendment, that plainly suitable case—long and exceptionally complex—would be excluded even from consideration for judge-only trial, because those additional connected counts are not listed in the schedule.

Requiring every offence to fall within the schedule would exclude cases that meet the policy intent of clause 4, thereby preventing the court from applying the provision precisely where it is most needed, solely because of the presence of additional non-schedule counts.

As I mentioned, the Government have chosen to exclude all sexual offences. If that is the logic that the Government seek to apply, why have they chosen to not apply it to an adjoined offence that is a sexual offence?

The Government have deliberately drafted Clause 4 in a manner that focuses on the overall nature of the case, rather than applying an artificial count-by-count test. The necessary question that we are asking the court to apply is whether, taken as whole, it justifies an order for a judge-only trial, given the policy intent that lies behind clause 4, not whether every individual count meets a particular threshold. Such an approach also risks incentivising artificial charging decisions or indictment charges to determine the eligibility for mode-of-trial decisions, rather than focusing on the effective management and efficient conduct of the trial.

The Minister mentions charging decisions. As it stands, the Amendment would suggest absolutely nonsensical charging decisions. Prosecuting somebody for all the offences listed in part 1 of schedule 3ZA would fly in the face of common sense and go against the code for Crown prosecutors, which makes it clear that prosecutors should select charges to

“reflect the seriousness and extent of the offending…give the court adequate powers to sentence” and

“enable the case to be presented in a clear and simple way.”

Does the Minister agree that if all the charges listed in the schedule had to be included in a case, that would be completely contrary to the prosecutor’s obligation?

My hon. Friend is right. Flexibility is not a weaking of the safeguards; it is what actually allows the statutory test in Clause 4 to operate properly and in appropriate scenarios.

Judges will already be required to consider the technicality and length of the case when making an order as to whether to allocate to a judge-only trial. Cases including indictable-only homicide and sexual offences are excluded from the outset because we regard those as cases where a jury trial is in the public interest. For those reasons, I urge the Shadow Minister to withdraw his Amendment.

I want to pick up on the point made by the hon. Member for Amber Valley. She has engaged sincerely throughout this debate, so I do not think her comment was a deliberate. We are not saying that someone has to be charged with everything to be eligible; we are saying that anything that they are charged for on that basis that excludes them from a jury trial should only be those offences. We are saying that if someone is charged for insider dealing and the judge decides that the case is complex or lengthy, under the legislation they will get a single-judge trial. The proposed legislation says that if they were also charged with grievous bodily harm, then that case, which would ordinarily continue to have a jury trial, would be seen without a jury. That would mean that just because someone happens to be charged with one of those offences alongside another one, they lose their access to a jury trial on both offences.

The point that the Shadow Minister is making is that the Clause is a substantial expansion of what we understand the legislation to be doing in terms of a judge-only trial. Somebody could be charged with 10 offences. One of those could be related to a lengthy fraud case, but the rest of the offences would mean that they would still get a judge-only trial, which is a significant expansion of what we believe this Bill is trying to do.

Absolutely, and there is not even anything in the Bill about proportionality. There is nothing. If someone is charged with one of the offences and the trial will be complex and lengthy—which is different to it being serious—that is it. Whatever else someone is charged with, they have already lost their right to a jury trial. That is a huge expansion.

I intervened to ask the Minister to explain why they have chosen to exclude sexual assaults. If someone is charged with GBH, then they lose their right to a jury trial, but if they are charged with a sexual assault, which in the sentencing guidelines may lead to them having an even lower sentence than a serious GBH, they will continue to have a jury trial, and a fraud offence would continue to be seen by a jury instead of a judge. It is completely contradictory. There is no logic behind the Government’s position. If they had a throughline as to why sexual assault, which is an absolutely terrible offence, is being set to one side, but something as serious as GBH, which can carry a sentence of many years and is also terrible for victims, then there would be more logic to it. But the Government have crafted an approach that is simply unfair and, as the Lib Dem spokeswoman pointed out, represents a massive expansion in all the different types of offences and sentence lengths that could potentially lose access to a jury trial, just because they also happen to be charged with an ancillary offence related to complex fraud. I am afraid there is no rational basis to that at all.

In the last couple of weeks, there have been press reports about a particular case that was charged in 2019. I will not go into that because it is going to reopen, but Clause 4 would mean, for example, that somebody who has been abusing and defrauding the elderly—perhaps many different elderly people—over many years and has caused significant harm not of a sexual nature, and who is therefore charged with multiple offences, gets a judge-only trial and is not tried by a jury. If there was a sexual offence, they would get a jury, but if they had been harming multiple people and defrauding them, they would be tried by a judge alone. Does he agree that that feels quite perverse?

It is another example of what we have talked about: the move away from what we would consider to be natural justice. The scenario the hon. Member points to is not bizarre; there are offenders who target elderly women, for example, and will use all sorts of different methods to abuse them, from financial to sexual. I have seen cases of that nature. We see people who, at the same time as physically and sexually abusing a family member, were taking money from their bank account and falsely representing them to claim benefits, which again would be covered by the Clause. It covers a whole range of offences, in all sorts of patterns. The Government call our Amendment too rigid when, actually, the rigidity is quite clearly in the charging and allocation decisions; it is all on the Government’s side. They are being entirely rigid. If someone is subject to one of these cases and the judge thinks it is complex or lengthy, they will lose the right to a jury trial, end of story. I do not think that is a position that the Minister should feel comfortable advocating, and it is why we intend to press our amendment.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

The Committee divided: Ayes 6, Noes 9.

Question accordingly negatived.

Amendment 61 stands in the name of Mr Hussain, who is not a member of the Committee. Does anyone wish to speak to amendment 61? As nobody wishes to move the amendment, we come to amendment 29 in the name of Yasmin Qureshi, with which it will be convenient to debate amendment 46.

Could I have a little guidance, Ms Butler? Amendment 29 goes hand in hand with amendments 30 to 33. Can I cover those all in one go, instead of repeating the same speech in support of each amendment?

If the Committee is happy to debate amendments 30 to 33 then we can do that now, but they will be voted on later on, when we come to them in the Bill.

I understand that. It will just save me repeating the same thing again and again in support of each of the amendments, all of which concern Clause 4. I thank the Committee for enabling me to deal with them in one go.

I beg to move Amendment 29, in clause 4, page 10, line 34, at end insert—

“(d) the length of the trial is agreed by the defence and prosecution to be likely to exceed 5 months.”

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 46, in Clause 4, page 10, line 34, at end insert—

“(3A) A court may not make an order under this section if it considers that it is the interests of natural justice for the defendant to have a trial with a jury.”

This amendment prevents a judge-only trial in complex and lengthy cases where it would be in the interests of natural justice for the defendant to be tried with a jury.

Amendment 30, in clause 4, page 11, line 1, leave out “no” and insert “a”.

Amendment 31, in clause 4, page 11, line 38, at end insert—

“(k) an offence of causing death by careless or inconsiderate driving under section 2B of the Road Traffic Act 1988;

(n) health and safety offences resulting in a fatality or offences connected to a fatality; and

(o) offences under the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 where there has been a fatality.”

Amendment 32, in clause 4, page 11, line 41, at end insert—

“(c) any offence resulting in a person becoming subject to a notification requirement under Part 2 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.”

Amendment 33, in clause 4, page 12, line 9, at end insert—

“(e) an offence of causing serious injury by dangerous driving under section 1A of the Road Traffic Act 1988;

(f) an offence of causing serious injury by careless or inconsiderate driving under section 2C of the Road Traffic Act 1988;”.

Amendment 29 would insert into subsection (3) an additional ground for a lengthy or complex case to be tried without a jury in England or Wales, to require agreement by the defence and the prosecution that the trial is likely to exceed five months. Amendment 30 is almost self-explanatory: it would provide a right of appeal against a judge’s decision to prevent a case from going to a jury trial. We seek to give a right of appeal to the defence—and the prosecution—if the judge decides that the case fits the category of a complex case such as a fraud case. Amendments 31 to 33 would add additional offences to the list of offences that will be excluded from the provisions of Clause 4. Offences such as homicide, including under road traffic legislation, will be excluded, and amendments 31 to 33 would extend that list.

I want to speak both to clause 4 and to clause 5, which, as I understand it, will enable clause 4. Unlike the provisions in clauses 1 to 3, clauses 4 and 5 at least provide that the defence and the prosecution may make representations before a judge directs a trial without a jury. I acknowledge that that is a meaningful procedural difference, but the principle remains deeply troubling, and I want to explain why. It is a further restriction on the right to trial by jury; more cases could be caught by this provision, which means that people will not be able to have a trial by jury.

The central argument for clauses 4 and 5 is that certain cases—fraud cases, multi-handed cases or those involving extensive financial or digital evidence—are simply too complex or long for a jury to follow. I have to say directly that I find that argument unfair to ordinary members of the public. Trial by jury is not simply a procedural mechanism; it is a fundamental expression of the relationship between the citizen and the state. It says that, when the state seeks to deprive a person of their liberty, that judgment will not be made by the state alone but by 12 of that person’s fellow citizens. That is important, because it is embedded in our legal tradition.

Let me speak from direct experience: in my years of criminal practice, I never once saw a jury that looked confused, overwhelmed or unable to follow the case before them. One of the last cases I conducted at the Bar was a seven-handed trial at the central criminal court. It went on for a number of weeks and involved serious allegations, multiple defendants, CCTV evidence and complex factual issues. Some of the defendants were charged with murder and manslaughter, there were issues such as joinder—agreement by different groups of people about whether they were committing crimes or not—and all sorts of legal directives had to be given. As it happened, the jury followed the evidence, assessed it and reached its verdicts. That has been my experience across many cases, including complex fraud, multi-defendant drug conspiracies and cases involving technical or sensitive evidence.

One of the jobs I had as a prosecutor was as a specialist casework lawyer for London CPS, which meant dealing with some of the most complex cases. When I was in the CPS, I also worked on proceeds of crime cases. In fact, I was what they call a POCA—Proceeds of Crime Act 2002—specialist for my branch. We were looking at financial auditing and asset recovery, deciding what kind of charges to go by, dealing with the issues of undercover operations, surveillance evidence, what we call the RIPA—Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 —rules, and cases involving public officials. Across all of that experience, the issue was never whether the jury could follow the evidence; the issue was whether the case was properly presented.

Given the way trials work, what a prosecutor presents to a jury is exactly what they would present to a judge. They explain the evidence, they connect the facts and the dots, and they build a case. The process does not change, but the audience does. If the evidence is presented clearly, a jury can follow it. If it is not, that is a failure of advocacy, not a failure of the jury, and the judge will get as confused as anybody else.

For example, if a prosecutor is trying to prove certain things, they will say, “If you look at exhibit 25 on page 1,000 of the jury bundle, you will see that this phone belongs to the defendant,” and create a link. Then they will say that another page shows the evidence extracted from the phone and explain how that is linked. They would do that for a judge as well, because judges want the prosecution to explain things to them, too. They must do that and follow the continuity of the evidence.

At the end of the day, whether the case involves insider dealing or financial accounting, people can see if the information is presented to them properly. The prosecutor might show them a document that says there was x amount of money in one account, but it went missing and has now been found in another person’s account. It is about making sure that all the dots are connected, and they would have to do that with a judge as well. The judge will not just flick through the papers and say, “Ms Prosecutor, you can just sit down and I’ll go through it.” The prosecutor, through their witnesses or their physical evidence or their section 9 statements or section 10 admissions, will have to prove each and every aspect of the case and the role each defendant played in it.

Although a number of people may be charged with one offence, we know that under our criminal law the sentence they can get if convicted varies depending on the role they played in the crime. Issues include who counselled it, procured it, aided and abetted it—who played what role—and people will be sentenced accordingly. Again, that is a matter on which a prosecutor or defence counsel would show everyone evidence and say, “This is what happened.” Therefore, it really makes no difference whether the case is being presented to jurors or a judge.

Does the hon. Lady agree with His Honour Geoffrey Rivlin KC, who argued that jury trials could actually impose discipline in complex fraud cases, whereas in a judge-only trial there is no incentive to get on and hear all the evidence? He also said that in such cases, juries decide issues of dishonesty and facts that are not necessarily technical, meaning that 12 jurors are in a much better position to reach a decision based on dishonesty.

I thank the hon. Lady for that Intervention. I could go on and on explaining how evidence is presented, but all I will say from my years of experience—not just in the CPS, but in the independent Bar as well—is that I have gone through thousands of pages of documents, and juries have reacted to that and been able to deal with the cases unfazed. The issue is how well the evidence is presented, and counsel would have the same duty to do that in front of a judge.

In some respects, a jury trial is better when legal issues or the admissibility of evidence have to be determined during a trial. In a jury trial, the judge can send the jury out and listen to everyone’s representations about whether something should be admitted or not, and then make a decision. That is helpful because juries then never know about all the debates that have taken place. Sometimes there is evidence that a party wants to be admitted that is inadmissible or would be prejudicial.

There was a time, when I first started practising in the criminal law, when defendants’ previous convictions were never allowed to come in unless they were “strikingly similar”. For example, if the defendant had been convicted of a rape in which they had grabbed a woman at night, dragged her through the streets and beaten her up, and they were then charged with a very similar type of offence, it could be argued that that previous conviction should be allowed in, but it was all done in the absence of the jury.

Since then, the rules have changed massively. Now, in a lot of cases, previous convictions can be brought in, which means that a lot of cases involve applications to do so. As the jury is separate from the judge, it is not prejudiced by other things. That is important because, at the end of the day, the fact that a person has a conviction does not mean that they committed the offence that is in front of the court. They may have been convicted in the past, but they could still be innocent of the offence in question.

There are countless applications that can be made; another example is an application to introduce certain evidence. Again, those arguments are made in front of the judge. The jury is unaffected, and the jurors will come back afresh and concentrate only on the evidence that is presented to them. I have described some of the reasons why we have so many procedural safeguards, and that is why the jury trial is so important in our criminal justice system.

The Government’s case is that judge-alone trials will be faster, but that claim has no reliable evidential foundation. The Criminal Bar Association highlighted that the estimate relied upon—that judge-only trials may be 20% quicker—was itself described as being subject to

“very high levels of uncertainty” and even characterised by a senior judge as having been reached on a “finger in the wind”. That is not a sound basis on which to dismantle a constitutional safeguard.

When we look at how trials actually operate, the argument becomes even weaker. It takes 20 to 30 minutes to swear in a jury—that is the headline saving. But while a jury deliberates, the judge is free to conduct other work. The system continues to function. A judge sitting alone does not have that flexibility. They must consider all the evidence, reach a decision and produce a detailed, reasoned judgment. That is not a quick process. It is, in many cases, a longer one. That judgment, quite properly, would be open to scrutiny and appeal in a way that jury verdicts are not, creating further pressure on the system. The claim that this will save time does not stand up to scrutiny.

There is also, of course, a human consequence to the proposals. At present, responsibility for a verdict is shared across 12 jurors; no single individual carries that burden alone. Under the Clause that we are discussing, the responsibility would fall entirely on the judge. That exposes judges to greater pressure, greater scrutiny and, potentially, greater risk. Senior members of the judiciary have already raised concerns about increasing threats and the need for enhanced security. To concentrate decision-making power in a single individual is to increase that exposure significantly.

Recently, we heard about a certain politician from a certain party naming immigration judges. That has led to one particular immigration judge being scared, and many others are terrified about what is happening. Again, if these things are left to the judge, we can imagine what might happen in a case where there is a lot of public sensitivity. The crimes that everyone understandably gets most concerned about are the sexual abuse of children or similar horrendous crimes. The sexual abuse of a child is not indictable—it is not that serious—so it does not have to go to the Crown court. If a child abuse case is heard in the Crown court, and the judge reaches a decision of not guilty, people might say, “Why are you bringing a verdict of not guilty?” Again, we are exposing our judiciary to more dangers than they already face. So, again, the amendments would allow our judges and our criminal justice system to operate properly.

We have discussed the issues with the backlog of cases, and I have maintained for the last week or so that it is not juries causing these problems. Members will be pleased to know that I will not go into the full list of cases and data I spoke to earlier, but if there is better triaging of cases, earlier and more effective management between prosecution and defence, improved use of technology, and earlier service and scrutiny of evidence, that will ensure that meaningful progress is made at every stage of proceedings. Those practical, workable solutions would address the real cause of delay, and none of them requires the removal of the jury.

Real operational failures are also contributing to delay. In one case at the Old Bailey, a trial that was expected to last three months went for five, largely because the defendants were not brought to court on time. Around 40 sitting days were lost waiting for prisoner transport, which is the equivalent of eight rape trials. That is not the failure of juries; it is a failure of basic system management. So let us fix the contracts, the logistics and the system.

Earlier we discussed the fact that other countries do not have a jury system, and that is correct. Scotland was referred to, and it was probably an inadvertent misunderstanding, but I understand that Scotland still has a jury system for certain offences; there are 15 jurors for criminal matters, and 12 for civil cases.

One also has to understand that comparing one country’s tradition to another is not the correct way. Continental systems, for example, operate on an entirely different foundation. They use panels rather than a single judge, and the panels will have three lawyers or judges and two lay people, or it could be a different combination. So there is group of people trying someone.

However—this is very important—most continental systems start from a different premise. As I said previously, our system is considered to be adversarial, but theirs are considered to be inquisitorial, which is about finding out what has gone wrong. One big difference in our system is that if a police officer arrests somebody, and that person makes an admission to the police officer, that admission is allowed as evidence, unless it was adduced by coercion, for example. A statement that a person makes to a policer officer can therefore be directly used in evidence in court proceedings. However, in many continental inquisitorial systems, where the relationship between state and the citizen is a bit harsher and more suspicious, any statement made to a police officer is not admissible in evidence unless and until the examining judge or investigating magistrate is dealing with the case and the person says, “Yes, I did make those admissions to the police.” Then the evidence can come in.

I am trying to explain that different countries have different philosophies and jurisprudence, and different systems and set-ups. In the system we have, the jury system is the best option available. It is not correct to say that we can just remove it because it may reduce the backlog by a few cases.

Finally, we have a presumption of innocence. Our system says, “You are innocent until proven guilty.” The defendant can sit there and do nothing, and it is for the state to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. That is very important, because although this debate has mainly been framed as being about long delays caused by juries, there has also been discussion about it being in the interests of the victim. However, to focus only on the victim is to risk presuming guilt. In our system, built on the presumption of innocence, the rights of defendants are not in Opposition to the rights of complainants—they are part of the same commitment to fairness. No victim would want the wrong person convicted.

Therefore, to present the removal of jury trials as a benefit to victims is a false choice. We should remember— I have seen this—that people who have been victims sometimes become defendants. I therefore always come back to the question I asked last week: if they were offered a jury trial, would Members say, hand on heart, “No, I’ll have a judge-only trial”? That is one of the fundamental things we are talking about here.

To conclude, the question is not whether juries can handle complex cases, but whether we are prepared to remove a fundamental safeguard instead of fixing the system. These clauses do not address the cause of delays or solve the backlog, but they do risk undermining confidence in our justice system, while offering at best uncertain and marginal gains. Therefore, I again ask the Government to reconsider this clause. Let us adopt some of the safeguards, as well as some of the ways we can reduce court delays, so that we can continue with our jury system, which is genuinely known as the best in the world.

I rise to speak in support of Opposition Amendment 46, which is in my name, as we debate elements of the Government’s proposals to remove jury trials and make use of the new Crown court bench Division in relation to potentially complex and lengthy trials.

To make sense of this debate, we must consider how the measures will apply. As we touched on earlier, the Government’s stated aim is to reduce the time taken to hear particularly lengthy and complex cases by permitting judge-alone trials and therefore—they say—freeing up additional Crown court capacity. The cases must involve at least one fraud or related financial offence listed in proposed new schedule 3ZA, which includes fraud by false representation, cheating the public revenue, money laundering and other offences, and would not involve an indictable-only homicide offence or sexual offence, including attempts or conspiracies to commit such offences.

We can already see, when considering the written evidence we have received, why there are rightly many questions about how the provisions will operate. In amendment 46, we therefore propose a requirement to ensure that defendants have a route in the law back to a jury trial. I draw the Committee’s attention to the evidence of Dr Natalie Hodgson, from the University of New South Wales, and Dr Matt Thomason, from the University of Nottingham, which was particularly helpful. They point out:

“Currently, the proposed s.42A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 does not define what is meant by “lengthy” or “complex”...Similarly, the proposed legislation provides no detail as to what judges can and should consider in determining whether ‘it is in the public interest’ for the trial to be conducted by judge alone. The Explanatory Note makes clear that ‘the court will retain full discretion’ as to whether it is appropriate to order a trial by judge alone.”

That is giving judges enormous power over these decisions.

Dr Thomason and Dr Hodgson also say:

“In contrast, we note that in New Zealand—which has a similar provision permitting judge-alone trials in cases ‘likely to be long and complex’—the relevant legislation sets out with greater specificity what a judge should consider in determining whether a case is likely to be long and complex…In particular, the New Zealand legislation specifies that a Court must not order a judge-alone trial unless all reasonable measures and arrangements have been taken to shorten the length of the trial, but the ‘duration of the trial still seems likely to exceed 20 sitting days.’”

So New Zealand was capable, in its legislation, of drawing a line in the sand as to what it considered to be a lengthy trial, but we do not seem to be doing the same.

The hon. Member is making a really interesting point about what we perceive to be lengthy or complex, as the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden tried to do with her Amendment. Amendment 29 seeks to define a lengthy trial as one going beyond the five-month point, but Geoffrey Rivlin KC collected data over six years from Southwark Crown court—the primary venue for complex financial crime trials—which showed that the vast Majority of fraud cases lasted less than three months, with only one or two typically lasting more than that, and only two cases in total lasting over six months. Does the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle agree that it would be helpful for the Minister to clarify what she believes “lengthy” or “complex” to be? The judiciary will also be asking that.

The hon. Lady is absolutely right. The Minister is always keen to draw lessons from other jurisdictions, and as I said we have a clear lesson from another jurisdiction that is specific. In our system, my understanding is that the practice directions for complex cases are that the prosecution and defence should do everything possible to make sure a trial does not last longer than six weeks. So that is another example where we might expect the Minister’s view.

Dr Hodgson and Dr Thomason go on to say:

“The New Zealand legislation also specifies that judges should consider the following factors in deciding whether the defendant’s right to trial by jury is outweighed by the likelihood that potential jurors will not be able to perform their duties effectively.”

Those include

“the number and nature of the offences with which the defendant is charged…the nature of the issues likely to be involved…the volume of evidence likely to be presented…the imposition on potential jurors of sitting” for a long time and

“any other matters the court considers relevant.”

Again, that is much more specific than the measures we have before us.

The written evidence continues:

“In New South Wales, Australia—where judge-alone trials can be ordered when a defendant elects a judge-alone trial and the judge considered that a judge-alone trial ‘is in the interests of justice’—the legislation specifies that, without limiting the factors a Court may consider, ‘the court may refuse to make an order…if it considers that the trial will involve a factual issue that requires the application of objective community standards’ such as an issue of reasonableness, negligence, or dangerousness.”

Again, that cuts to the heart of the difference in our approach. We have talked about matters of dishonesty and the different elements of an offence that we might seek to prove. Even if a trial is highly complex, if it comes down to a judgment about reasonableness, behaviour and the choices people make, that is where a jury trial comes in. The approach in the Bill has a comparative lack of clarity and specificity, and that is why I have tabled Amendment 46, which would weight things back towards the defendant, who at this stage is still innocent until proven guilty.

Even if the general right to elect for a jury trial is restricted for certain offences, defendants must be allowed to elect for one where they can demonstrate that a summary trial would violate the principles of natural justice. That is vital for individuals with a previously unblemished character or those whose livelihoods are directly imperilled by a conviction. The evidence from the Institute for Government and JUSTICE, and from recent parliamentary debates, is clear that a one-size-fits-all approach to efficiency risks compromising the integrity of the justice system it seeks to serve.

In relation to similar Opposition measures on previous clauses, the Government said that if they supported us, they would lose the court time they were seeking to secure. Let us remind ourselves of how questionable those claims are. The Institute for Government believes that the Government’s claims are highly uncertain, and others have questioned whether the claimed savings will ever actually be made; we will visit that later—for example, when we discuss the summing up the judge will need to make. The backlog is largely a product of longer-term issues related to, for example, judicial vacancies, prison transport, lack of early pleas and all sorts of other reasons not related to jury trials. So the efficiency gain is marginal, and we must ask whether it is worth the constitutional cost.

By forcing complex cases or those with high personal stakes into a bench Division, we are essentially prioritising a spreadsheet of data over citizens’ rights to be judged by their peers. A natural justice exception would act as a safety valve, ensuring that speed does not override the fundamental fairness of the proceedings. Why does it matter whether a judge or a jury hear a case? In many instances, the legal outcome might be the same. However, the process of reaching the outcome is where natural justice resides.

In his paper “For Mercy’s Sake”, Geoffrey Robertson KC emphasised the importance of jury equity—the ability of a jury to look beyond the strict letter of the law to the broader circumstances of a defendant’s life. He is right to argue that a jury possesses the unique capacity to dispense mercy where the law, in its rigidity, cannot. For a defendant of previous good character or one whose career hangs in the balance, the collective common sense of 12 citizens provides a bulwark against the mechanical application of statute, which may result in an outcome that is legally correct but morally disproportionate.

That is the essence of my argument: for a first-time offender, the move from a clean record to a criminal conviction is a life-altering transition. In some cases, the evidence may be nuanced or the impact of a guilty verdict may be uniquely devastating, such as the immediate loss of a professional license or employment. In previous debates, we referred to the fact that MPs might suffer those consequences, as would doctors, judges and all sorts of other people. When the defendant can show that the consequences of a trial are so profound that they require the ability to exercise their right to a jury, rather than just a professional bench, the law should accommodate that request.

When we speak of natural justice, we speak of the right to be heard in the manner that is fair. If the defendant can demonstrate that their case involves something that a professional bench might treat with case-hardened cynicism, the system must remain flexible. The Law Society highlights that public trust in the legal system is inextricably linked to the jury, and that the perception of fairness is as important as the reality. If defendants feel that they have been processed through an administrative division, rather than tried by their peers, the moral authority of the sentence is diminished.

Critics will argue that an exception for natural justice will lead to every defendant claiming they are a special case, thereby clogging the system further. That is a misplaced fear; we already have established legal tests for interests of justice in other areas of the law, such as the granting of legal aid or the admissibility of evidence. In fact, just yesterday, the Government accepted a reform to expand the eligibility to apply to the unduly lenient sentence scheme, when it is in the interests of justice to do so.

In an earlier sitting, the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden helpfully approached similar issues with an amendment that was more specific about the situations in which we might agree that natural justice should allow for a jury trial—for example, when the defendant is of good character, has not previously been convicted of an imprisonable offence, or will be treated as a rehabilitated person under section 1 of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974, or where being convicted of the offence or offences for which they are to be tried would likely result in significant reputational damage or their employment or professional qualifications being adversely affected. As I discussed in previous debates, those are all scenarios in which we think not having a jury trial would be against the interests of natural justice, and which our amendment seeks to curtail.

To conclude, the Bill in its current form is too blunt an instrument in relation to the decision to remove the jury. The tests set by the Government are not well defined and are too heavily weighted against the rights of the defendant. That is why our amendment introduces a stronger requirement to consider the matter from the perspective of the, until proven guilty, innocent defendant and what represents natural justice for them. By incorporating this safeguard, we preserve the mercy and common sense that Geoffrey Robertson KC so eloquently defends. Yes, justice must be efficient, but above all it must be fair. Let us not sacrifice the principles of natural justice on the altar of administrative expediency. Let us allow defendants who can show just cause to elect for a jury they deserve.

I will not press my Amendment to a vote. In fact, Ms Butler, I notify you and the Committee that I am not asking to vote on any of my amendments.

I will call the Minister, and then you can withdraw your Amendment.

To be clear, I intend to address Amendment 29, albeit that it is not being put to a vote, and amendment 46, which was grouped with it. My hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South and Walkden referred to other amendments further ahead, but it may be convenient to deal with those when we get to them, unless you want me to deal with them now, Ms Butler. I am in your hands; I am happy to deal with them either way.

The Committee agreed to discuss amendments 30 to 33 in this debate.

In that case I will deal with amendments 30 to 32 once I have addressed amendments 29 and 61, because they all touch on similar issues in relation to Clause 4.

Much has been said about the policy rationale behind this provision, and whether juries are somehow incapable of following complex trials involving fraud or financial matters. That is not the Government’s contention, although some of the cases that are routinely dealt with in Southwark Crown court, particularly in a modern environment with crypto and complex financial instruments, are indeed highly complex.

The primary issue is jury burden, which is a theme that emerged from the independent review of criminal courts, and it has long been identified as a significant issue. As long ago as 2001, Lord Justice Robin Auld said that the

“increase in the length of such trials over recent years has become a severe intrusion on jurors’ working and private lives. It cannot be good for them or for justice.”

Sir Brian Leveson picked up that theme in part 1 of his review, in which he said that

“the personal and financial burden placed on jurors, particularly those involved in lengthy trials, is significant.”

He also said that

“serious and complex fraud trials…place more significant burdens on court resources and jurors’ time.”

There is evidence of the financial strain on jurors who sit in lengthy trials, particularly those who are self-employed or who have caring responsibilities.

In addition, under the current system, the companies that jurors work for cannot claim back losses incurred while their employee is on jury service. As I have said before, we commend the participation in jury service of people from across society and from all backgrounds, which is why we are seeking to preserve jury trials for our most serious cases—those pertaining to matters that are not only serious for individuals but are in the public interest.

Will the Minister give way?

I will make a bit of progress.

We also need to be mindful of the burden that lengthy trials place on jurors. In this country, between January 2024 and December 2025, almost 3,000 jurors sat in trials that lasted more than six weeks. We should be mindful that trials for fraud and serious financial crime, which are within the purview of this Clause, are some of the longest and most demanding in the Crown courts. We also have to be mindful of our argument on the time savings of having judge-only trials for such cases.

Has the Ministry of Justice done any modelling on the benefits of introducing Maxwell hours for all lengthy fraud cases? Doing so would benefit jurors, as they would only be committed to sitting from 8 am until midday and could go on to fulfil their caring responsibilities and such. The same goes for judges when dealing with complex fraud cases.

I do not have any modelling to hand, but I can certainly take that away. If that work has been done, I will let the hon. Lady have it, but I do not have it to hand so I simply do not know.

I do not want to go over old ground, but we heard in oral evidence, particularly from the panel of experienced judges, about the time savings related to judge-only trials. Reference was made to other jurisdictions, and the data from New South Wales, which is a comparable common law jurisdiction, shows that when it introduced judge-only trials in complex cases, it saw a 29% reduction in the length of trials, so the Government are confident that Clause 4 will result in material time savings.

Amendment 29 would make parties’ agreement that a trial is likely to last more than five months a condition of judge-only trials under clause 4. Of course, I agree that five months is an exceptionally long time to expect any member of the public to serve on a jury, but we cannot ignore the fact that considerably shorter trials can be equally as disruptive to jurors’ lives, particularly if they are self-employed or have caring responsibilities.

We regard five months as an artificial and overly rigid threshold. We consider that the way in which the test is currently drafted affords the court greater discretion and flexibility. As Sir Brian rightly makes clear in his report, there can be no absolutely precise way of predicting, at the outset of a case, exactly how long a trial will run. The Government agree with his statement that

“problems can arise when trials unexpectedly go beyond their predicted trial time”.

Against that reality, I cannot see how a rigid threshold of five months could capture all the cases that would most appropriately benefit from the treatment this policy affords of having a judge-only trial in certain categories of offence prescribed under the Bill.

Placing control of eligibility for judge-only trials into the hands of the parties, rather than the judge, runs counter to the objectives of this reform package and fails to support fair and effective trial management. For those reasons, I urge my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South and Walkden not to press the amendment.

I also thank my hon. Friend for tabling amendment 30, which would introduce a new right of appeal against a decision to order a judge-only trial. The Government do not consider that to be either necessary or appropriate, for many of the same reasons that we do not afford a route of appeal in allocation decisions to the Crown court bench Division.

Mode of trial decisions of that kind are procedural in nature—they are case-management decisions—and are intended to ensure that cases are tried efficiently and fairly and managed proportionately. The absence of a route of appeal in that context is designed precisely to promote procedural finality and to avoid delay in a system in which we are seeking to root it out. For all the reasons I outlined in respect of earlier discussions on the right to appeal allocation decisions, I again urge my hon. Friend not to press the amendment.

Amendment 31 would add additional offences involving death to the list of homicide offences that are specifically excluded from the judge-alone framework for complex and lengthy cases under clause 4. I say at the outset that I understand the intent behind the amendment, and I certainly do not underestimate the impact of such offences on victims and their families, but this is a policy designed for technical and lengthy fraud and financial cases. How that test is interpreted and applied is a matter that this clause leaves to judicial discretion.

Clause 4 is deliberately drafted so that jury trial remains the default mode of trial. Judges will be required to apply the statutory test carefully and under the proper safeguards set out in the clause, considering suitability and the public interest in each individual case. I recognise the concerns raised by amendment 31, and I would welcome the opportunity to talk to my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South and Walkden outside the Committee about how the safeguards we have set out will operate in practice.

The Minister talks about the statutory test for complexity, among other things. I cannot identify the statutory test for complexity. Where is the test in the new legislation?

We consider it to be set out in Clause 4 as drafted. It is sufficiently flexible and will no doubt be subjected to interpretation. We think that, as drafted—with all the carefully prescribed exceptions to what could be included, in addition to the public interest exclusion—it is sufficiently clear, and that there is a clear understanding of the sorts of offences that would come within the provision.

I am also keen to work together constructively to ensure public confidence, particularly in cases involving loss of life, while still providing the courts with the flexibility they need for the clause to work appropriately. In the case of Amendment 31, given the high bar already set in the clause and the cautious way that we expect judges will exercise these powers, we consider the statutory exclusion of these additional offences unnecessary. Again, I urge my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South and Walkden not to press her amendment.

Finally, the placement of amendment 32 in proposed new section 42B(4) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 means that it would not, in fact, exclude any offences beyond the indictable-only sexual offences that are expressly excluded by proposed new section 42B(2)(b). As I have said previously, we set up the clause so that jury trial is the default. Judges apply the test, and there are safeguards for case suitability and public interest. It would be very rare for sexual offences to be tried alongside the kinds of complex or lengthy fraud and financial cases that clause 4 is designed to capture. For those reasons, once again, I urge my hon. Friend not to press the amendment.

I thank the Minister for her response. My amendments are short and easily identifiable. I think the offences I have suggested should be included within the categories of certain murders and homicides, but as I said earlier, I will not press the amendments to a vote.

rose—

Forgive me, Ms Butler, is it possible that I have not addressed the Amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle?

Amendment 46.

indicated assent.

Finally, let me address Amendment 46. As Members will get sick of hearing me say, the courts are facing an unprecedented challenge. Although relatively few in number, cases involving fraud and serious financial crime are some of the longest and most demanding trials in the Crown court. In that context, and in line with the recommendation of the independent review of the criminal courts, we have taken the decision to introduce judge-only trials for lengthy and complex cases. The policy is intended to create an additional, tightly defined and controlled discretion for a very small number of cases where the burden on jurors and court resources is excessive, ensuring that cases are dealt with efficiently while maintaining fairness and judicial rigour.

I am in danger of not knowing my figures, but I think the impact assessment suggests that 25% of cases in the list of offences will be included, so I am not sure whether it is reasonable to describe that as a small proportion—I do not know whether the Minister said “proportion” or “number”. How many cases does she think it will involve?

My understanding of the time saving—we measure it in the context of Crown court sitting days—is that we are looking at around 500 sitting days, which no one is suggesting is a huge number. As I said, the reality of how we expect judges to apply the provision in these cases is that jury trial is the default. The provision in Clause 4 is fairly narrowly drawn, so we do not expect that lots of cases will be captured by it, but we expect that lengthier fraud and financial crime cases that come within the provision will result in significant time savings—significant when every little helps, to put it that way. I hope that answers the hon. Gentleman’s question.

As I have said previously, the principles of natural justice—the way in which the Amendment is framed—are preserved in the framework provided by these reforms. We think that makes the introduction of an additional, open-ended safeguard unnecessary.

The right to a fair trial, protected under article 6 of the European convention, is preserved here. Judges will be required to apply the statutory test carefully and under the proper safeguards of clause 4, considering suitability and public interest on a case-by-case basis. It is not a category approach; it is based on the individual nature and facts of the case. Judges will also, in accordance with the established principles of fairness and open justice, have to give reasons for those allocation decisions, which we think will also ensure a level of accountability. We think that judges, in accordance with their judicial oath, will do this transparently, fairly and well. For those reasons, the amendment would not add to a procedural safeguard, and I urge the hon. Member not to press it.

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment proposed: 46, in clause 4, page 10, line 34, at end insert—

“(3A) A court may not make an order under this section if it considers that it is the interests of natural justice for the defendant to have a trial with a jury.”—

This amendment prevents a judge-only trial in complex and lengthy cases where it would be in the interests of natural justice for the defendant to be tried with a jury.

The Committee divided: Ayes 6, Noes 9.

Question accordingly negatived.

I beg to move Amendment 47, in Clause 4, page 11, line 1, leave out from “is” to end of line 2, and insert

“a right of appeal against a decision to make an order under this section on the grounds of natural justice.

(5A) where an appeal is made under subsection (5), it must not be heard by the judge who made the original determination.”

This amendment would add a right for defendants to appeal against the decision for a judge-only trial for lengthy and complex cases.

Much of our discourse has focused on whether judge-only trials should exist at all, but as with the previous amendments, we must also address the critical procedural omission in the drafting of this clause: the absence of a clear interlocutory right of appeal for a defendant against a decision to allocate them to a judge-only trial. The Government’s stated aim is efficiency, but efficiency without a safety valve of oversight often leads to systemic instability. By denying a defendant the right to appeal an allocation decision before the trial begins, we are not streamlining justice but creating a procedural blind spot.

We believe that providing an immediate right of appeal is not only a matter of fairness, but the most efficient path available to the court. As we debated in relation to clause 3, on the Crown court bench Division, the lack of such a mechanism risks baking in errors that can be rectified only through costly and time-consuming post-trial appeals.

The pursuit of headline-ready speed must not eclipse the logistical reality that a trial conducted in the wrong forum is a wasted trial. If an allocation decision is found to be flawed only after a conviction, the state incurs the double cost of the original judge-led hearing and a subsequent jury retrial. If a case is allocated incorrectly, the defendant currently has no immediate recourse, and they must undergo the entire trial in the bench division. If, on appeal against conviction, it is determined that their allocation was indeed improper, the entire proceeding is voided.

An interlocutory appeal lasting perhaps one or two hours is a negligible investment compared with the risk of a three-week trial perhaps being overturned on a procedural technicality regarding allocation. By resolving the question of the right forum at the outset, we ensure that when a trial does proceed, its verdict is final and resistant to procedural challenge. That is the true meaning of efficiency.

Again, I draw the Committee’s attention to the written evidence submitted by Dr Natalie Hodgson and Dr Matt Thomason, who say this approach is

“opposite to the approach taken in other jurisdictions, where such a decision can be appealed.”

In their submission to the independent review of criminal courts itself, they identified that

“the ability to appeal a decision to order a judge-alone trial as an important procedural safeguard that ensures that judge-alone trials are only ordered in appropriate circumstances and in line with statutory criteria. A significant problem with not permitting appeals on decisions to order judge-alone trials is that it precludes any possibility of the appellate courts developing interpretations of key concepts used in the application of the legal tests which are used to order those trials.”

In the previous session, the Minister mentioned that she thought, for example, that the test of whether to allocate a trial would be subject to legal interpretation. That was an admission that the Minister made—which is probably self-evident.

Dr Hodgson and Dr Thomason go on to say:

“For example, without appeals, the ‘public interest’ test will be left to the discretion of individual judges, with no judicial guidance on relevant factors to consider and irrelevant factors to ignore. The same risks attach to the concepts of ‘lengthy’ and ‘complex’. There is a significant risk of inconsistent and arbitrary decision making on allocation of factfinder, which is a matter of substantial importance to both the defence and prosecution.”

The necessary case law will be built up much more quickly and efficiently if those cases are heard as appeals in the first instance, rather than over a lengthy period in relation to conviction after sentence. The witnesses I described therefore strongly recommend that decisions to order a judge-alone trial be appealable. That is in addition to our recommendations to provide guidance in the legislation for key terms, which we talked about in the previous amendment.

One of the most troubling aspects of the current Bill is the inconsistency it creates between the magistrates court and the Crown court. As we have covered to some extent, under our current system, when the magistrates court makes an allocation decision for an either-way offence, that decision is subject to judicial review if it is seen as irrational or procedurally unfair. However, the bench division is an element of the Crown court and decisions made by the Crown court regarding its own internal allocation are protected from judicial review. By moving the allocation decision to a bench division without a statutory right of appeal—though, as the Minister is right to say, there is not an appeal as such—the Bill effectively creates a legal vacuum where a defendant has fewer rights of challenge in the Crown court than they would in the magistrates.

The Minister agreed that in that scenario, there would be no obvious route to the judicial review—as she described it—that currently exists in the magistrates court. If we allow magistrates allocation to be challenged, it is logically inconsistent to deny a challenge to an allocation made by a Crown court judge—particularly when the consequences and stakes are potentially much higher in Crown court proceedings under the provisions in this legislation.

Without this availability of judicial review and a specific right of appeal, we are asking defendants to accept a decision that is functionally unreviewable until—from their perspective—it is much too late. This lack of parity undermines the principle of legal certainty. The necessity of appeal in clause 4 is even greater than in clause 3, because of the more nuanced and even more subjective element to the decisions to allocate in these types of cases. In the clause 3 undertakings it was based on sentencing guidelines and sentencing length of three years or less. We had a debate about the fact that that is not necessarily black and white and purely factual, but it is certainly considerably more established and laid out in terms of law than this provision, because complexity is an even more subjective metric.

As I have said, evidence was raised with the Committee about the inconsistency with which this might be approached across the region. A right of appeal ensures that a body of case law is developed by the Court of Appeal, providing clear guidance on when a case must remain with a jury. The perception of fairness is vital for public confidence in the law. If a defendant feels that they have been managed into a judge-only trial against their will, and without any way to challenge that choice on its own, their faith in the eventual verdict will be non-existent.

A right of appeal also acts as a check against case hardening. Although our judiciary has many positives, an appeal mechanism ensures that the pressure of the backlog does not subtly influence the application of the law in these circumstances. The right to challenge the forum of one’s trial is a fundamental safeguard against the professionalisation of the verdict. It ensures that the state cannot simply select the most efficient path to conviction without a transparent, reviewable process. Although our judiciary is independent of the executive, it is still an arm of the state.

In summary, the proposal for a Crown court bench division in complex and lengthy trials requires a robust mechanism for appeal on allocation if it is to be fair and effective. By including a right of appeal now, we would prevent the waste of resources associated with post-trial retrials, close the legal black hole created by the lack of judicial review for Crown court allocation, ensure consistency in how the test will be applied across the country and uphold the dignity of the defendant, acknowledging that the choice of forum is a decision of profound consequence. Let us ensure that the Bill includes the tools for that self-correction. We must not allow the pursuit of speed to strip away the procedural protections that ensure that our justice system remains of a high standard. Let us provide a right of appeal that is clear, immediate and fair.

I support the Amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Shadow Minister, which would ensure the right of appeal to a decision whether a trial should be heard by a jury. The Government’s reason for not accepting the amendment, as they have put forward on a number of previous amendments, is the principle of efficiency—that it would slow the system down and would not drive the efficiencies that they hope to secure through the Bill.

The principle of efficiency cannot be an untamed principle that runs roughshod over carefully fought legal principles of fairness and natural justice. Efficiency cannot simply trump everything. If efficiency has no limits, why have trials of more than a few days at all? The arguments have been well made by the shadow Minister, and I do not wish to repeat them, but it is not an inefficient process to allow a right of appeal. I assume that the decision made by the judge in the first instance on how to allocate the trial will not be a particularly lengthy process anyway, so an appeal of that decision will be no lengthier—indeed, less so.

I have never heard the argument that appeals are against efficiency in any other aspect of law. Indeed, appealing the substantive outcome of a case—a claim of wrongful conviction—has not one but many stages of appeal: appeal to the High Court, appeal to the Court of Appeal and appeal to the Supreme Court. I have never heard the argument that someone should not have the right to appeal the outcome of a trial because it is inefficient or might cause delays.

It seems that efficiency is being used to justify a fairly hastily put together Bill, and that the Government do not recognise the possibly unintended consequences of its provisions in order to get their business through. The best way of addressing those issues, and accepting that there might be loopholes and unintended consequences, is to give genuine due regard to amendments tabled in good faith, on this occasion by the shadow Minister, to improve the lawmaking process and the Bill.

The amendment does not seek to drive a coach and horses through what the Government are trying to achieve with the Bill, even though we disagree with some of it; it seeks to improve, to perfect and not to allow unfairness to creep into the Bill. I am sure that the Government do not intend the Bill to be unfair, but time and again they risk allowing it to be so.

The Amendment would effectively introduce a new right of appeal against a decision to order a judge-only trial. Once again the Government does not consider that to be necessary in the interests of fairness, or appropriate given the time saving this Bill seeks to achieve. We are seeking, by the process set out in Clause 4, to encourage procedural finality and to avoid delay rather than setting up additional procedural layers to add complexity and delay.

Of course, all that should not come at the expense of overall fairness. That guarantee of fairness is expressed in a number of ways: because we consider the different modes of trial that might be afforded to a case to be fair; because a judge sitting alone will be required to give reasons for the allocation itself and then for the substantive verdict, whether a conviction or an acquittal; and because that in itself can be subject to an appeal in the Crown court in the usual way. We regard that as an important safeguard in terms of fairness, but we do not want to encourage mode-of-trial allocations—which we think that judges will do well, transparently, efficiently and having heard from both sides—to be relitigated. For those reasons, I urge the hon. Member to withdraw his amendment.

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East for his remarks. I will paint a scenario for the Minister and ask whether she thinks it is one she will end up regretting if she does not accept at some point, if not at these stages, the idea that appeal is actually serving her own interests in reducing the backlogs. The scenario is that the Bill has passed, has been operating for a year or even two, and there have been multiple complex and lengthy cases heard without a jury under the schedules in this Clause—potentially saving, in the Government’s own arguments of its merits, many days of crown court time—but then one of those people appeals post-conviction and successfully argues there was some error of judgment in the judge’s decision to allocate them a trial without a jury.

My understanding of the law is that that would set a precedent and that anybody in those same circumstances allocated a trial without a jury would then be entitled to say that the law as then written by the Court of Appeal should apply to them. We could have a situation where dozens and dozens of cases were then ordered to be retried with a trial by jury. That would not only fail to have made the savings the Government wants to achieve, but make the situation even worse, leading to many more Crown court sitting days being taken up by these cases.

The Court of Appeal approach on allocation will allow the case law to be built up quickly, ahead of trials and convictions, to bring the clarity that judges will need to make sure their decisions are not successfully challenged in the Court of Appeal. We made that argument in relation to clause 3, but it is even stronger in relation to clause 4, because it is just so much more subjective and open to interpretation, and there is so much more room for judges to make decisions that the Court of Appeal find erred against what the Minister is intending through her legislation.

This Amendment is a genuine attempt to save trouble down the line. I hope—even if not at this stage—the Minister reconsiders her view that these appeals are necessary. We know that people are not allowed to make meritless appeals. They have to have legal advice from somebody, telling them, “Yes, you have a reasonable case to be made”, and so this will not become some frivolous thing. We have talked about the magistrates court and the Government seeking to restrict that, but even without that restriction, the vast Majority of people do not seek to exercise an appeal right—when they already have that right and exercising it comes at a low opportunity cost—even though the Government’s argument is that it can be used as appeal for appeal’s sake.

The idea that an appeal right would flood the courts with those types of cases does not stand up to much scrutiny. Even if that were the case initially, as the case law developed, it would become harder and harder for people to make appeals on this element of the process. On that basis, we will push the amendment to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

The Committee divided: Ayes 5, Noes 9.

Question accordingly negatived.

I beg to move Amendment 50, in Clause 4, page 12, line 27, leave out subsection (5)(a).

This amendment would prevent the court unilaterally overriding a reason to issue a revocation order so that a case allocated for judge-only trial under this section could be tried by jury.

With this it will be convenient to discuss Amendment 48, in Clause 4, page 13, line 11, at end insert—

“(g) the interests of natural justice for the defendant.”

This amendment would ensure that the interests of natural justice for the defendant are relevant to the decision to revoke an order for a judge-only trial for the offences listed in Schedule 1.

In earlier sittings, I spent some time testing the basis on which the Government are asking the Committee to accept the changes proposed in the Bill, particularly in relation to the claimed benefits and how the system will work in practice. That is particularly relevant in the context of Clause 4, where the justification for removing jury trials rests on the assessment of complexity and length, and therefore on how those judgments are made and revisited in practice. During evidence, I asked Sir Brian Leveson about the modelling underpinning the proposals. His report points to the need for further modelling, but when that modelling was discussed, it was clear that there is uncertainty about the figures and what the impact will be.

That is important context for these amendments; if there is uncertainty about how the system will operate and what it will deliver, it becomes even more important that the framework we are putting in place is clear on how decisions are to be made and what factors will be taken into account. Throughout our discussions, I have also tried to focus on how the provisions will operate and what they will mean for people going through the system, particularly those who are not legally represented and who may find it difficult to navigate more complex procedures. The amendments are aimed at those practical questions.

Amendment 50 relates to a point that is fundamental to how the framework will operate in practice. The Bill sets out conditions under which a judge-only trial order may be revoked, including where the case is no longer sufficiently complex or lengthy. That reflects the Government’s central argument that a jury trial is displaced only because certain features of the case justify it. However, the Bill then provides that, even when those conditions are met, the court may none the less decide not to revoke the order if it considers that

“it would not be appropriate to do so”.

I want to be clear about what that means in practice. If the justification for removing the jury is complexity or length, what is the position when that justification falls away? What is the court expected to do at that point? Is the expectation that the case should ordinarily return to a jury or that, once the decision has been made, it should remain judge-only unless something else actively pushes it back? The Bill does not answer that question, and that matters because, throughout our debates, I have tried to emphasise that it is about not just what is written in the Bill, but how its provisions will operate day to day in real cases.

As I set out in earlier debates, we have a whole range of factors here, and many of them must be weighed rather than applied as straightforward rules. That inevitably leaves a significant role for judicial interpretation. Judicial discretion in itself is not a problem, but when Parliament sets out a structured framework with specific conditions, it is important that those conditions actually do something and have a clear consequence. Otherwise, we risk creating a system in which the criteria exist on paper, but the outcome is ultimately determined by a broader and less clearly defined set of judgments, and that is precisely the concern here.

We are told that if a case is sufficiently complex or lengthy, it may be tried without a jury, but we are also told that if it is no longer sufficiently complex or lengthy, the court may nevertheless decide that it is still not appropriate to return it to a jury. The Committee is entitled to ask, “What weight are we really giving to those original criteria?” In earlier debates, I made the point that courts will look at the legislation, and indeed our debates, to understand what Parliament intends. If we leave this question too open, it is not clear what guidance the courts are expected to follow in practice. If a defendant is told that their case is no longer sufficiently complex to justify a judge-only trial, but that it will nevertheless continue without a jury because it is considered not appropriate to change it, the basis of that decision will not be clear to them.

This amendment is relatively modest but important. It seeks not to remove judicial discretion entirely or create an inflexible system, but to ensure that, where Parliament has set out the conditions for revocation, those conditions have a clear and meaningful effect. If the basis for removing the jury no longer exists, that should carry real weight in the decision that follows. Otherwise, we are in danger of creating a framework in which the justification for removing the jury and the decision to keep the jury become disconnected.

Amendment 48 relates to the factors that a court must consider when deciding whether to revoke a judge-only trial order. The Bill sets out a number of considerations, including delay, the interests of victims and the impact on court business. Those are clearly important issues. We have heard a great deal of evidence in Committee about the impact of delays, particularly on victims, and I do not think anyone would dispute that that is a serious concern.

In my role as Shadow Justice Minister, I have focused on the experience of victims in all different elements of the system, including the effect that long delays can have on them. Looking at the list of factors in the Bill, I am interested in what is not included. It is striking that, in the statutory list, there is no explicit reference to the interests of natural justice for the defendant. That omission matters.

In earlier debates, we have been clear that these questions are, in part, about weighing exercises—balancing different factors—and that there are, in reality, more and less fair ways of doing things. We have also discussed that defendants are not all in the same position. The system already recognises that in other ways, whether through good character, prior convictions or the wider consequences that a conviction may have on someone’s life. We treat individuals differently, because fairness requires us to do so. That is why the framework matters.

If the court is directed to consider certain factors, those factors will shape how decisions are made in practice. If fairness to the defendant is not explicitly part of that framework, there is a risk that it will not be given the weight it should be. That is particularly important in this context, because we are dealing with decisions about whether a person should continue to be tried without a jury.

In debates on earlier clauses, I made the point that jury trial is, in some respects, a superior form of justice, even if we accept that it is not practical in every single case. That necessarily means that moving away from it is not a neutral step; it is a step that has consequences for fairness. When the court is deciding whether that position should continue and whether a case should remain judge-only or return to a jury, it seems entirely reasonable that fairness to the defendant should be part of that decision—not assumed or left to implication, but explicitly recognised.

Amendment 48 would not remove any of the existing factors. It would not prevent the court from taking into account delay, the interests of victims or the impact on the wider system, but it would ensure that, alongside those considerations, the court was also required to consider the interests of natural justice. Given the nature of the decision, that seems to be an essential part of a balanced framework.

These amendments are intended to clarify how this framework will operate in practice. They are about ensuring that the conditions set out in the Bill have a clear effect, and that the factors guiding courts’ decision making reflect the full range of relevant considerations.

I will address amendments 50 and 48 together. The cases that we are considering in the context of Clause 4, which involve fraud and serious financial crime, are, as I have said, among the longest and most demanding trials in the Crown court, routinely running for many weeks and often months. Cases can, and sometimes do, evolve as they progress through the courts—that is not unusual.

Like earlier clauses, clause 4 makes clear provision for orders for a judge-alone trial to be revoked where the circumstances of a case change. That is, again, an important safeguard. For example, a charge on the indictment may be dropped, suggesting that the case becomes less technical, but that is not always clear cut. Money laundering, tax evasion and fraud charges can fall, but cases may none the less remain complex and lengthy in nature due to the volume of digital material, financial accounts or, indeed, the number of defendants involved.

That is why the policy is intentionally designed in a discretionary manner and defines what is required for a judge-alone order, but ultimately a judge, seized of the facts of the case, is best placed to determine whether the conditions are met for each case. Judges must have discretion to determine whether an order is or no longer remains appropriate. In deciding whether to revoke an order, the court must also consider named factors such as delays to the proceedings and the impact on Crown court listings. I am pleased to hear that there is consensus, in this context, about the relevancy of the factors that are prescribed. I do not think that anybody here would disagree that we want judges to have regard to the efficiency of our system and the impact on individual cases.

For all cases under a judge-alone order, it is important to underscore that if an excluded offence is added or the court considers that it is in the public interest for the trial to be conducted with a jury, the order will always be revoked and the case sent to be dealt with in that way, with a jury. Where a jury trial has started already, an order can never be made. That would clearly cause disproportionate disruption within our courts.

In relation to the points around natural justice, the right to a fair hearing, the rules against bias and the duty to act fairly, we consider that those are already upheld within our reforms and therefore do not require the specific provision that is provided for in Amendment 48. As hon. Members have heard me say, the fact that a trial happens without a jury does not in itself offend the principles of natural justice.

We have also designed the test for revoking an order, as set out in clause 4, to ensure that relevant interests are properly balanced by the courts. Importantly, parties are given the opportunity to make representations on reallocation, meaning that the defence can draw the court’s attention to how the factors in the Bill intersect with a defendant’s interests, including the issue of delay. At the same time, as we have heard, clause 4 requires the court itself to have regard to the interests of victims when deciding whether reallocation would be appropriate. That ensures that interests are properly weighed by the court, alongside the other factors set out in the Bill. For those reasons, I urge the hon. Member to withdraw his amendment.

To reiterate, as in Clause 3, we risk creating an unfair dual standard for defendants. The Government accept that such defendants should have rights to a jury trial, but they will potentially be denied one unnecessarily because of the circumstances changing throughout their trial, rather than at the outset. Can we create two identical legal tests for the outset versus in the trial? No, but we can certainly make a better effort than we have.

This issue ties back into the question of appeals. If we do not make the process fairer, there is a greater likelihood that defendants who experience failure to reallocate when the circumstances change—who sit there knowing that, if they had been in those circumstances at the outset of the trial, they would have had access to a jury trial—will be encouraged to appeal, post conviction, against the decision not to allocate them to a jury trial. Therefore, again, on the Government’s own test in relation to efficiency, there is a benefit to having a more effective and more balanced test for reallocation during trials. On that basis, we will push our amendments to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

The Committee divided: Ayes 4, Noes 9.

Question accordingly negatived.

Amendment proposed: 48, in clause 4, page 13, line 11, at end insert—

“(g) the interests of natural justice for the defendant.”—

This amendment would ensure that the interests of natural justice for the defendant are relevant to the decision to revoke an order for a judge-only trial for the offences listed in Schedule 1.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

The Committee divided: Ayes 4, Noes 9.

Question accordingly negatived.

I beg to move Amendment 49, in Clause 4, page 13, line 30, leave out “trial beginning on or” and insert

“cases whose first hearing in the magistrates’ court takes place”.

This amendment prevents the provisions in section 4 coming into effect retrospectively.

We previously discussed the issue of retrospectivity in clause 3, and the exact same questions arise here. As drafted, the Bill provides that the new regime applies to trials listed to begin after a specified day, regardless of when earlier stages in the case have taken place. Subsection (6) makes it clear that this applies regardless of when the preparatory hearing was ordered, for example. That means that cases already in the system may be brought into the new regime before they are heard. We have already considered this issue in debates on earlier clauses, where I raised concerns about how changes to the procedural framework affect people who are already part way through the process.

Defendants do not approach their case in a vacuum. They make decisions at different stages about how to approach it, how to prepare and how to engage with the system, based on the entire framework that applies to them at the time. In this context, that includes the expectation that their case will be heard by a jury. Where a defendant has proceeded on that basis and the case has progressed through the system with that understanding, it is not a small matter to change that position part way through. To change the basis on which a case is to be tried part way through proceedings is not simply a technical or procedural adjustment; it alters the ground beneath the defendant’s feet, and that point goes directly to fairness.

The Government may argue that this is simply a procedural change, and that the case remains in the Crown court with the same offences and the same sentencing powers, but that does not fully address the issue. We have already discussed the meaningful distinction between a trial before a jury and a trial before a judge sitting alone. The Minister has accepted that there is “something special” about a jury trial. If that is the case, removing it cannot be treated as a neutral step. It follows that changing the mode of trial after a case has already entered the system is not simply a question of procedure, but a change that affects how the case is determined.

There is also a practical dimension to this. I have referred to the position of defendants who may have made decisions in expectation of a jury trial. That may affect whether they elect a particular route, how they prepare the defence and how they approach the proceedings as a whole. It has also been pointed out that defendants awaiting trial may be doing so on remand, expecting that their case will be heard in a particular way. Had they known that the framework would change, they may have taken different decisions at an earlier stage. That illustrates that this is not simply an abstract concern; it has real consequences for individuals.

There is also a broader question of how such changes will operate in practice. Applying a new regime to cases already in the system introduces an additional layer of complexity. It raises questions about how existing cases should be treated, how decisions already taken are to be revisited and how the courts should manage that situation practically. We have already heard concerns that this could lead to additional steps in the process, including further consideration of allocation and, potentially, challenge. That has implications for the efficiency of the system. If all the cases currently sat in the backlog to which this applies are subject to a further additional hearing in addition to the new cases coming in, that will create a burden on the courts.

On fairness, it is difficult to justify changing the basis on which a case should be tried after it has already progressed through the system. On practicality, it is not clear that retrospective application will achieve the objectives that the Government have set out—particularly if it introduces additional complexity. In debates on earlier clauses, I also made the point that retrospective measures require a particularly strong justification. We previously talked about the guidance to the House and how stringent those tests are. We have heard an unconvincing case, in my view, that such a justification exists here.

The amendment therefore takes a straightforward and proportionate approach. It would ensure that the new regime applies only prospectively to cases entering the system after the change, rather than to those already under way. That respects the position of defendants who are already part way through the process, avoids the fairness concerns that arise from changing the framework mid-stream, and provides greater clarity about how the system will operate. Given the nature of the change being made, that is a distinction that I think the Committee should take seriously.

This is a question about how changes to the system are applied in practice. The amendment is intended to provide clarity about that and to ensure that the framework is applied consistently to cases moving forward, but not retrospectively.

On Amendment 49, consistent with our approach to the allocation of cases within the existing caseload but where trials are not yet commenced in relation to allocation to a Crown court bench Division, we follow the same approach in relation to questions of allocation with the creation of a judge-only forum for cases of the nature we have been discussing in relation to Clause 4—namely those of a lengthy and complex nature. We follow the same rationale and principles that trials should be treated and heard in accordance with the law as it stands at the commencement of trial.

As I said earlier in the debate, applying the measures in the Bill to cases in the open caseload will enable us to bring forward and thereby accelerate caseload reduction, which is one of the main—if not the primary—objectives of the Bill. That approach to the application of the law to the existing caseload is consistent with precedent. For example, Parliament previously legislated in 2003 for judge-only trials in cases involving jury tampering and that applied to trials begun after commencement, regardless of when the case first entered the system. I grant that what we are seeking to do here is bolder and more extensive, but it is the principle of whether trials should be heard in accordance with the law as it stands when the Bill is brought into force.

That also means that we avoid a situation where there are two different procedures running in parallel in the Crown court as a result of arbitrary cut-off dates. Although I do not seek to overstate the impact that that application of the legislation will have on the relatively small number of cases that we are talking about in this context, it is important that we derive, in the delay reduction, every little benefit that we can from the measures that we are bringing forward as soon as we can, because of the extent of the delays. For those reasons, I urge the Shadow Minister to withdraw his amendment.

The only point I would add is that, as the Minister has accepted, this is a relatively small number of cases, so the test of what is justifiable is actually disproportionately weighted against the Minister in these cases, in comparison with the earlier cases on Clause 3. People’s rights and expectations remain the same, and from their perspective will be undermined by these measures, yet the benefit that the Government will actually secure from them is relatively minor, as the Minister accepts. I refer to the fact that 11% of Crown courts are sat empty today, and for a very minimal gain we are putting forward measures that make it difficult for people to exercise their rights in the legal system in a fair and reasonable way. On that basis, we will press the Amendment to a Division.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

The Committee divided: Ayes 5, Noes 9.

Question accordingly negatived.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 51, in schedule 1, page 38, line 3, leave out paragraph 20.

This amendment prevents the Lord Chancellor adding further offences to the list in Schedule 1 by regulations.

Schedule 1.

I thank the Shadow Minister for tabling Amendment 51. I will first set out the rationale for Clause 4 and schedule 1 and then address the amendment.

Clause 4 and schedule 1 will allow for particularly complex or lengthy fraud and financial offences to be tried by a judge sitting alone. Cases involving fraud and serious financial crime are some of the longest and most demanding trials in the Crown court. They routinely run for weeks or even months, and there are examples of the most complex cases running for over a year. That is an incredibly substantial burden for jurors—lay members going about their lives—to bear, particularly as the compensation for those they work for is non-existent and their own compensation covers expenses but no more.

Let me give a real-world example. A Crown court fraud trial was listed to run for 13 weeks—already a substantial commitment for any jury. Partial verdicts were returned by the jury four months later, with further verdicts provided the following month. The case finally concluded five months after it started. By that point the jury had dwindled from 12 to nine, worn down by delay after delay in such a long-running and complex trial. As I said, this is the primary rationale behind what we consider will also be a time-saving measure.

This is a significant challenge. In fraud cases, marathon trials can drag on for months—at times, well beyond the original estimate—as jurors fall away, delays compound and the system ends up bending around the logistics of keeping 12 ordinary men and women available for an extraordinary length of time. Sir Brian Leveson was clear, as was Lord Justice Auld, that trial by jury is not always the most sensible and proportionate approach to the resolution of these types of lengthy and complex cases.

The Minister has already said “particularly complex or lengthy”, and just then she said “complex and lengthy”. Having rejected an Amendment that would have set a limit of five months, will she think again about defining both complex and lengthy more rigorously in the Bill? The explanatory notes say “complex and lengthy”, but we do not have a definition of complex or a length limit. I think we need to hear more about that from her.

I thank the hon. Member for her point, which has been raised by others. Those terms are well understood in their ordinary meaning and can be applied in a clear and straightforward way by judges.

Will the Minister give way?

I am going to make some progress— I know the hon. Gentleman has raised this with me. Those responsible for drafting the legislation do not need to add further definitions of what we mean by “complex” and “lengthy”. That is well understood. As I said, given the other safeguards and considerations related to the kinds of cases that will be suitable, we think that the discretionary approach that judges will apply will suffice.

Will the Minister give way?

I will not; I am going to make some progress.

As Sir Brian’s report clearly outlines,

“this is a principled reform based on the need for cases to be resolved in a more timely manner, with a forum well suited to the demands of the case.”

He suggests that allowing a judge to hear these cases alone—in tightly defined circumstances, of course—can cut hearing time by at least 20%. As we have said already, we heard from various witnesses about how that time saving would be achieved. That is a gain for the system and for capacity in the Crown court that can be used to progress other sorts of cases. That is not an abstract assumption. There is not an absence of evidence here: we have heard from those with judicial experience, as well as from international comparators such as New South Wales, where complex cases have been found to be 29% quicker when tried by judge alone.

Let us be clear about what we mean in practice when we talk about long jury trials. Imagine someone being told they are required to serve on a jury in the Crown court, not for the typical two weeks’ jury service, but for at least several months. Imagine receiving that letter and that news. Although we are very grateful for people who do that—I know how willingly so many citizens participate in juries—I have, as the Minister for Courts, received lots of correspondence about the burden that lengthy trials can impose. If someone is self-employed or in insecure employment, the time away can mean a significant loss of income. If they are a carer, it can mean scrambling around to find, or having to pay for, alternative support for a loved one. Even for many in stable employment, it is not just inconvenient; it has a real impact on personal life and finances.

That is why, as policymakers, we need to be proportionate and, dare I say it, judicious about how we use this special resource. Yes, I use the word “special”, and I do not resile from it—sitting on a jury is a special thing. However, we have to use that resource where it is right, proportionate and appropriate to do so. Reducing the need for members of the public to sit as jurors on very long and intensive trials means that fewer people will face that disruption and loss of earnings.

The nature of crime and evidence has changed. It is no longer a couple of paper files and a handful of witnesses; Sir Brian Leveson is clear that modern cases of the sort we are talking about can involve vast volumes—terabytes—of digital material held on servers and hard drives, and highly complex financial records. All that complexity means that directing and explaining the evidence at the pace of the slowest juror, which is the pace that an advocate has to go at, presents additional delay. I am grateful to Sir Brian for making that point clearly in his report.

The scale of “The Crown Court Compendium”, which is the guide that judges use to direct juries in criminal trials, is such that it now runs to some 560 pages, demonstrating the extraordinary time and effort that judges now need to devote to guiding juries in these complex trials. That support is plainly valuable and shows the great effort the system has already made to account for the huge change over the last couple of decades in the complexity of such cases. It also powerfully illustrates the real impact on timeliness, and Sir Brian’s observations only reinforce why it is right that we address the challenge head on. If it was true when Lord Justice Auld talked about the rationale for a judge-only trial in these sorts of cases over 25 years ago, it is certainly even more true now.

As I have said, the crux of the legislation is not whether a judge or a jury is better at understanding evidence or ascertaining the honesty or dishonesty of a defendant; it is about being honest with ourselves about the time that we have, ensuring that trials run as efficiently and effectively as they can, and preserving jury trial for the cases where it makes most sense and matters most. It is important to remember that this is not wholly new territory. Our justice system already recognises limited exceptions to jury trial, most notably where there is a risk of jury tampering, and those trials are conducted fairly by a judge sitting alone.

The Clause does not bring about wholesale change to jury trials, which the Bill preserves for the most serious cases; it creates an additional, tightly defined and controlled, discretion for a small number of cases where the burden on jurors and court resources is excessive. It means that no case can be moved into the judge-alone route without a rigorous, transparent assessment against the statutory tests, with both the defence and prosecution having the opportunity to make representations, ensuring that decisions are fair and balanced. A case can only ever qualify if it involves a scheduled fraud or financial crime offence, and even then, a judge must first have ordered a preparatory hearing—something that happens only where a case is genuinely complex or lengthy.

We have also drawn hard lines. The gravest crimes can never be heard under this policy. That is why we have carved out all indictable-only sexual offences and homicide offences, such as rape, murder and manslaughter, which are all excluded. If any such offence is added to a case, the order must be revoked and the case must be sent for a jury trial, without exception. Where a jury trial would be in the public interest, a judge cannot hear the case alone.

The clause is about three crucial things. First, it is about making a reasonable ask of the public in respect of their important civic duties, and not asking them to bear a disproportionate burden on themselves, their jobs or their loved ones. Secondly, it is about taking every responsible option available to us to get the criminal justice system moving again, because justice delayed is justice denied. Thirdly, it is about modernisation. The world has changed, and the nature of these crimes and the evidence that is involved have changed. What made sense in 1971, or even 25 years ago, is not always what works best today. In that reforming spirit, the clause presents a modern, balanced and proportionate approach. It is exactly the sort of thing that is needed in the light of the current pressures on the system. For that reason, I commend clause 4 and schedule 1 to the Committee.

Amendment 51 would remove the power for the Secretary of State to amend the list of offences in proposed new schedule 3ZA to the Criminal Justice Act 2003 by order, and the Government cannot support it. A fixed and closed list would not reflect the reality of modern crime. Fraud and financial offending continue to evolve rapidly, and new forms of criminality and new legislative offences across all aspects of crime will inevitably emerge in the coming years. If Parliament were required to revisit primary legislation every time a new, appropriately relevant offence was created or identified as suitable, that would significantly reduce the agility and effectiveness of this framework. Criminal cases are increasingly shaped by technological change, new technical and digital instruments, and increasingly sophisticated ways of handling evidence. A system that cannot adapt risks becoming obsolete almost as soon as it is enacted.

I have heard concerns that this power amounts to Government overreach, and I want to be clear that it does not and that this is not an unconstrained Executive power. The schedule can be amended only via the affirmative procedure, which requires debate and approval by both Houses of Parliament. That ensures proper democratic oversight, while ensuring that the law can keep pace with the ever-changing nature of crime without unnecessary delay. This is not an unusual approach to criminal legislation. Parliament has adopted similar delegated powers elsewhere in criminal legislation, including provisions now consolidated in the Sentencing Act 2020.

For those reasons, the Government believe that this power strikes the right balance between keeping pace with modern crime and remaining firmly anchored in parliamentary oversight. I urge the Shadow Minister not to press his amendment to a vote.

I rise to speak in Opposition to Clause 4 and in support of Amendment 51 in my name. I remind the Committee that this is not a new debate. As the Minister touched on, it is an idea that has been postponed, debated and largely rejected several times over the last few decades. Each time, the conclusion has been that the jury is not the problem in fraud cases, but a vital component of the solution.

The Government’s current justification rests on two pillars: that fraud causes are too complex for ordinary citizens, and that removing the jury will create significant efficiencies to help clear the record-breaking court backlog. Although we all acknowledge the severity of the backlog, we must ask whether these specific measures are evidence-based or merely an attempt to appear tough on administrative delays at the expense of the right to trial by one’s peers. The Bill will allow a judge to order a trial to be conducted without a jury if they are satisfied that the complexity or length of that trial would make it a heavy burden on a jury. As the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion pointed out, it would be good to get clarity on whether a judge may make such a determination on the basis of complexity or of length individually, or whether they must do so on the basis of both complexity and length—that was a fair question.

Complexity is highly subjective. For one judge, a case involving intricate cryptocurrency ledgers might seem manageable for a jury, but for another, it may seem impenetrable. By making the right to a jury trial contingent on a judge’s personal assessment of what a typical citizen can understand, we introduce an element of judicial lottery. Furthermore, fraud is fundamentally about honesty and dishonesty, which are concepts that ordinary people are well placed to judge. When we professionalise the verdict in fraud causes, we move away from a community-based standard of morality towards a technical, legalistic one that may lack the public’s moral buy-in.

I draw the Committee’s attention to the evidence provided by the City of London Law Society, which points out:

“The government’s rationale for judge-only trials in ‘complex or lengthy cases’ rests on two assumptions: that juries struggle to understand complex fraud cases, and that judge-only trials will be significantly more efficient.

Neither assumption is adequately supported by evidence.

There is substantial research and practical experience demonstrating that juries, when properly directed and assisted with appropriate case management, are capable of understanding and deciding complex fraud cases. Modern trial techniques have been brought in to address issues that arose in the past, significantly enhancing jury comprehension.

Juries have been involved in many hundreds of fraud trials, following the evidence and reaching rational decisions. The Leveson Review noted that in the Jubilee Line case (one of the longest running in British legal history and one which pre-dated many of the changes that have been introduced to help improve the jury’s understanding), jurors reported ‘a very good understanding of the evidence’, with ‘some commenting that it was not all that difficult’.

More recently, in R v Hayes & Palombo, the Supreme Court opined that a properly directed jury would have no problem assessing dishonesty in the context of a complex financial service-related case.

The assumption that juries cannot cope with complexity is unproven and patronising. It fails to recognise that juries regularly include individuals with professional expertise, financial literacy and analytical capabilities, and that issues of intent and dishonesty are familiar and well understood by the jury.”

The society states that we should also note

“that the cases that have been preserved for jury trial under the Bill are also likely to include complex expert evidence (such as forensic medical or science-based expert evidence or statistical analysis), which undermines the argument that complex trials should be left to a judge alone.

The hypothesis that judge-only trials are more efficient also relies on the assumption that time will be saved by counsel not having to simplify evidence when presenting to a judge rather than a jury. However, this fails to take into account that, without the requirement to simplify charges and evidence, this is likely to encourage increased charging by the prosecution and increased applications for more complex evidence to be presented to judges.”

While judges are experts in the law and legal matters, there is nothing at all to say that they are any more or less expert in cryptocurrency or complex financial matters than a member of a jury. In total, the society continues:

“This will thereby increase the time spent in pre-trial hearings and evidence presentation, as well as the length of and time to produce written judgments.”

In total, this will thereby increase the time spent in pre-trial hearings and evidence presentation, as well as the length of time to produce written judgments.

Importantly, the City of London Law Society has put forward alternatives, which are something that the Minister often presses critics of her reforms for. It suggests that we go further on written direction and aide-mémoire, and improve visual presentations and timelines for juries and provide them with glossaries of technical terms. It advises that structured verdict documents and regular judicial summaries during the trial are just some examples of ways in which the situation could be improved.

The society also points to the City of London fraud court, which is due to open, and will likely have a positive impact on the case backlog, opening up more capacity in the system to hear economic and cyber-crime cases. It would be good to understand, considering the small volumes that the Minister has talked about and how we are moving forward with that specialist court, what proportion of cases she thinks will not sit within that specialist court, where a case might be made that the complexity is even greater. I hope that she would agree that the specialist City of London fraud court, with or without juries, is well placed to hear jury cases.

The Minister pointed to measures that made it on to the statute book under a previous Government. The Criminal Justice Act 2003 allowed for the prosecution to make an application for trial without jury in serious and complex fraud cases, although it is important to note that this was never enacted. There is obviously a world of difference between a specific and unique application on a case-by-case basis for a trial without jury and the broad, sweeping measures that are before us today.

A significant concern regarding this proposal, which we covered in the debate on an amendment that was not passed, is the lack of a robust mechanism for a defendant to challenge the allocation to a judge-only trial. As it stands, the decision of a Crown court judge to sit without a jury is an interlocutory decision with no immediate right to appeal. We have talked previously about how that creates a procedural cul-de-sac. If a defendant believes that the judge has applied the complexity test incorrectly or has ignored a vital natural justice consideration, such as the defendant’s previous good character, they have no way to seek a second opinion before the trial begins.

Without a right of appeal, the allocation decision is functionally unreviewable. That is particularly egregious when compared with the magistrates court, where allocation decisions are subject to judicial review. The Bill as drafted, particularly as the Government have rejected our amendments, creates a lower standard of procedural protection in the Crown courts for these even more serious cases. If an allocation error is identified only on appeal after conviction, the resulting retrial will cost the taxpayer hundreds of thousands of pounds and add further delays to the system.

If we are serious about efficiency, we should look at where the system is actually failing. The Bar Council’s paper points to the low-hanging fruit of court logistics. One of the single greatest causes of wasted court time is the failure of prison transport. When a defendant is not brought from prison to the dock on time, the judge, lawyers and jury sit idle. We are contemplating the erosion of a fundamental constitutional right to save hours while simultaneously losing thousands of hours every year because of failing prisoner escort contracts. If the Government want efficiency, they should fix the vans before they dismantle the juries. Improving the infrastructure of our courts—from reliable transport to functioning digital evidence portals—will provide a much greater return on investment for the taxpayer without requiring the surrender of a single liberty.

Perhaps the most constitutionally alarming part of these provisions is that they allow the Secretary of State to expand the list of offences that they consider to be fraud and that will lead to complex and potentially lengthy trials, which are thus eligible to be judge-only, through secondary legislation via statutory instruments. That is why we tabled amendment 51. Without it, a future Government could broaden the scope of non-jury trials to include other complex areas—potentially even health and safety and cyber-crime—without a full parliamentary debate or the ability of the Commons to amend the proposals.

In a previous sitting, it was argued that the right to a jury trial is too fundamental to be left to the whim of a Minister’s pen. If we accept that fraud can be tried without a jury via primary legislation today, we are setting a precedent that the rest of our other either-way offences could be moved to the bench Division via secondary legislation tomorrow. The boundaries of the jury system should be defined by Parliament in the most transparent and deliberate way possible. To relegate the future of the jury to the realm of secondary legislation is to treat a core constitutional right as a mere administrative detail.

In opposition to our amendment, the Minister argued that the Government need to remain nimble to the evolving nature of crime and offences. If the Government are creating new offences in primary legislation that respond to a need to change the law, they can use that opportunity, if they see fit, to amend schedule 1 through the same Bill they are using to create the new offences that the Government insist they need to be so nimble to—unless the Minister is suggesting that the Government plan to legislate for new offences through secondary legislation, which I very much doubt. We must resist this mission creep. Any expansion of judge-only trials, if it must happen at all, should require the highest level of democratic oversight, not a late-night Committee vote on a statutory instrument that is unamendable.

The proposal to remove juries from complex fraud trials is a solution in search of a problem. The Minister contested that the tests are legally defined, and then consistently used examples of trials of several months. It is fair to recognise that that is not typical; it is trials of weeks that are more likely to be caught up in this. The Minister thinks that it is well understood, but I have told her that “complexity” and other terms in the Bill are not already recognised in the courts with one understanding.

The tell, so to speak, that the Minister recognises that this is not quite as simple as she makes out is that she was unwilling to make any attempt to give some examples and define it more clearly. I think she knows that if she did so, she would probably become unstuck. The Minister also accepted that there will be a whole series of appeals and cases questioning how these measures are implemented, so to suggest that it is clear is not credible. I have highlighted that other jurisdictions were perfectly capable of more clearly defining what was meant in these circumstances than the Minister seeks to.

The Minister asked us to reflect on the fact that the Auld review also recommended similar measures around complex and lengthy cases, as the Leveson review has, but I remind the Committee that the Minister is in a pick-and-choose mode when it comes to listening to Leveson and Lord Justice Auld, because both recommended a judge with two magistrates, and the Government have rejected that proposal and are using just a judge. The Opposition are just as able to decide when we will or will not listen to the view of an expert as the Minister is.

The test for complexity is too subjective. The procedural safeguards are non-existent. The evidence for efficiency is weak, and the power to expand these measures through secondary legislation is constitutional overreach. If the Government are truly concerned about the backlog, let them invest in the mechanics of the court, fix prisoner transport, reform legal aid to ensure early guilty pleas and maintain the court estate. Those are the efficiencies that will actually work. Removing the jury from court fraud cases is an expensive, risky and ultimately ineffective distraction. We should maintain the jury as a permanent feature of the Crown court, not as an optional extra for the simple cases.

It will no doubt be a relief to Members to hear that I am not going to talk for quite as long as I did this morning. I oppose Clause 4 and schedule 1 standing part, and I support Amendment 51, tabled in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle.

As is becoming habit, I will begin with a very brief overview of what we are considering. Clause 4 and schedule 1 create a new framework for judge-only trials in certain complex or lengthy cases. The listed offences include fraud, tax evasion, false accounting, insider dealing, money laundering, terrorist funding, bribery and related offences. The court may order trial without a jury if it is satisfied that the likely complexity and/or length makes that appropriate, that it is not in the public interest for the trial to be conducted with a jury, and that there are no other reasons why it would be more appropriate for the trial to be with a jury. There would be no right of appeal against that decision.

That is a serious and constitutionally significant change in its own right, but what makes it even more troubling is that it has been justified on the strength of a paper-thin theoretical benefit. The House of Commons Library states that the Government estimate clause 4 will save 200 Crown court sitting days. That is around 0.18% of current Crown court capacity, which indicates just how small the potential gain is—if there is that gain at all.

That is the first and most obvious point I want to make. The Government are proposing a very serious encroachment on jury trials in return for a saving that amounts to just 200 sitting days. JUSTICE describes the change as “unnecessary,” says that it

“will not impact the backlog in any meaningful way” and warns that it risks opening the door to restricting jury trials in other categories of case too. The Law Society is similarly clear:

“Removing jury trials for serious fraud cases is unlikely to have a significant effect on the backlogs, but would significantly erode the fundamental principle of open justice.”

That should be the frame for the whole debate on clause 4. We are not being asked to approve some modest efficiency measure; we are being asked to displace the jury in some of the most important and contested criminal cases for an alleged benefit so small that, even in the Government’s own case, it barely registers against total Crown court demand. That trade-off is so poor that I refuse to believe the Minister, in her heart of hearts, believes it is the right way to proceed.

The second point is that the case against juries being used in serious fraud and related cases has never really been made. In written evidence, the Law Society tells us:

“Serious cases of any complexity, including serious allegations of fraud, must be presented by the prosecution in a way that is understandable, not only to the judge and jury…but also, in line with the principle of open justice, to the public.”

It goes on to say:

“They should be subject to effective case management to ensure they take only a reasonable length of time, if necessary, by reducing the number of charges”.

In other words, the answer to complexity is to manage it properly, not to remove the jury.

It is worth reminding ourselves that the issues juries decide on in fraud trials are factual, not technical—in particular, whether the defendant was dishonest. That is judged by reference to the standards of ordinary decent people. Twelve ordinary jurors are far better placed to decide that than a single judge alone. That goes to the very nature of fraud. Fraud is not merely an accounting or regulatory puzzle; it is an allegation of dishonesty, and dishonesty, by definition, is exactly the sort of question on which the community’s judgment matters. Who should decide dishonesty: a single professional judge, or 12 citizens applying the standards of ordinary life? In a democratic criminal justice system, the answer should remain: the jury.

The evidence that we have does not support the idea that juries are what make these cases collapse, drag on or miscarry. JUSTICE’s written evidence points to the Southwark Crown court data gathered by His Honour Geoffrey Rivlin KC, showing that the vast Majority of fraud cases lasted less than three months, with only one or two per year lasting over three months and only two cases in total lasting over six months. That is important, because it rather punches the myth that these are all endless epics that juries simply cannot understand or follow.

Rivlin’s evidence also says that jury trials compose a discipline that helps to keep fraud trials shorter. Without that discipline, judge-alone trials may end up running as long as, or even longer than, jury trials. More to the point, delays, collapses and miscarriages of justice in fraud are not caused by juries, as shown by R v. Hayes where convictions were quashed because of judicial misdirection, not because of anything the jury did wrong. That strongly refutes the suggestion that juries are the weak link in these cases.

The Government have two problems here: first, they have not shown that such cases are generally too long for juries; secondly, they have not shown that juries are what is causing the failures when these cases go wrong. Unfortunately, that leaves the Government looking rather like they are indulging in ideological hostility to jury trials rather than evidence-based reform.

There is also a wider constitutional point. The Law Society says, and I very much agree, that removing jury trials for serious fraud cases

“would significantly erode the fundamental principle of open justice.”

These are often cases involving major companies, financial institutions, public markets, public money, terrorism financing, bribery and corruption. They are exactly the sort of cases where the public must have confidence that justice has not simply been done inside a closed professional world by one member of that same world.

Fraud and related financial cases often concern the conduct of powerful, well-resourced and sophisticated defendants. In those cases, public confidence matters immensely. A verdict reached by a jury of citizens commands a kind of legitimacy that a judgment by a single judge does not carry in the same way. That is not a criticism of judges, but a recognition of why juries exist in the first place. They are there to not just decide facts but connect the administration of criminal justice to the public itself.

The Opposition support amendment 51. If the Government insist on retaining clause 4 and schedule 1, then there is a compelling case for removing the power of the Secretary of State to add further offences to the list by regulation. I am particularly concerned by that unconstrained power. If the Government have currently singled out fraud, money laundering and terrorist funding as the special class of lengthy and complex cases, there is no obvious stopping point. Terrorism, murder, rape and drug trials can also last many months and be highly complex, especially where there are multiple defendants or contested expert evidence.

If the schedule said complex and lengthy fraud cases, then the Minister might be able to argue that it is constrained, but the schedule is just “Trial on indictment without a jury: complex or lengthy cases”. It actually opens the door to any number of types of offence being added purely because they are complex and lengthy. I think of, for example, the Lucy Letby trial, which was clearly complex and lengthy, but something that clearly needed to have a jury in terms of public confidence. That could end up included by schedule 1.

I completely agree with my hon. Friend. What is considered complex and lengthy could be quite subjective. We all know that we are potentially going to end up in the courts over defining exactly what is complex and lengthy. It feels like the Bill is not written clearly enough for us to understand exactly how it will work in reality. Amendment 51 is an important safeguard against those risks.

In his written evidence, His Honour Geoffrey Rivlin KC notes that the schedule 1 list already

“appears to be arbitrary, perhaps the work of a moment; and it goes beyond anything suggested before. But even that is not the end of it.”

That is because part 2 of the schedule gives the Secretary of State the power by order to add or remove offences. He quotes the explanatory notes to show that offences not related to fraud or financial crime could easily be added in the future. He describes this as

“a mighty step along the way to the end of jury trials.”

That does not strike me as overstatement. The Secretary of State will indeed have this untrammelled power, and we should carefully heed this sober warning from a senior judge.

For similar reasons, the Opposition oppose schedule 1 standing part of the Bill. Schedule 1 is the list that gives Clause 4 its reach, and the list is already troubling. It is not confined to a tiny, tightly defined category of unusual mega-fraud; it covers a wider class of economic and financial offences, including money laundering and terrorist funding, and can then be expanded later. If we think the core principle of clause 4 is wrong, then the schedule that operationalises it is wrong too.

Rivlin’s description of the list as “arbitrary” is worth keeping in mind. One of the reasons that schedule 1 is objectionable is that once Parliament accepts the principle that a whole category of serious Crown court cases can be singled out for juryless trial on grounds of length and complexity, the argument for confining the list to that category becomes very hard to sustain. The logic of the thing pushes outward. That is why schedule 1 is dangerous: for not only what it contains now but what it invites later.

I am particularly concerned that there is an ideological push away from jury trials. My concern is that this is only the start, not the end of where the Government want to get to. I urge the Committee to think about this carefully. We are taking important decisions for the future.

As I have talked about in earlier debates, uniquely in this situation we already know what the Lord Chancellor wanted to do. From leaks, we know that five years was the test, in terms of these proposals. The Opposition are being fair in suggesting that this is potentially the thin end of the wedge.

I agree with my hon. Friend, as I normally do.

Finally, there is the obvious practical point that there are better answers available. The Law Society says that reform and investment must be strategic, not piecemeal, and warns against stand-alone measures such as changing from jury trials to judge-only trials without convincing evidence that they will significantly reduce the backlog. It says that Parliament should insist on “detailed modelling” and on understanding the Government’s intentions across the whole package of reform, not just on this isolated measure. The existence of pressure in the system does not prove that every proposed constitutional shortcut is justified. The question is whether the shortcut is necessary. With Clause 4, the answer is plainly no. For all those reasons, I oppose clause 4 and schedule 1, and I support Amendment 51.

Clause 4 offers a constitutionally serious reduction in jury trials for a tiny claimed benefit of 200 sitting days. The evidence does not show that juries are the cause of delay, collapse or miscarriage in these cases. Fraud cases are not too technical for juries. The key issue is dishonesty, and ordinary citizens are uniquely well placed to judge that. The removal of juries in these cases would damage open justice and public confidence. Schedule 1 gives effect to that flawed principle and then goes further by creating a route to ministerial expansion. Amendment 51 is therefore a sensible and necessary safeguard, but in truth, the better course is simpler still: clause 4 and schedule 1 should not be included in the Bill at all.

I will speak against the inclusion of Clause 4. It inserts part 6A in the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which will allow complex or lengthy cases to be tried without a jury. My main Opposition to the clause is that it is a pointless exercise by the Government that will in no way affect the backlog. The Government’s own impact assessment suggests that the savings will amount to just 200 sitting days per year, which is a tiny fraction—0.18% of the current sitting days. The Government argue that these cases can continue for many months, thereby wasting jurors’ time or putting additional pressure on those called for jury service. However, data from Southwark Crown court, where the Majority of fraud and other such cases are heard, shows that only one or two cases per year exceed three months, and only two between 2018 and 2024 went beyond six months.

His Honour Geoffrey Rivlin KC has argued that jury trials impose discipline, which helps to reduce the length of fraud trials. Without that incentive, judge-alone trials may be as long as or even longer than jury trials. I alluded to this earlier, but jurors decide on issues of dishonesty and fact in these cases, which are not necessarily technical. Twelve jurors are therefore in a much better position to reach a decision.

I also have grave concerns about the terminology of “complex” and “lengthy”. I know the Minister has said that the meaning of complex and lengthy are well understood in the judiciary. I would argue that a lot of people in the legal profession are pushing back against that assertion, and that the Bill does not provide clarity on what they should determine to be complex or lengthy.

The hon. Member is making a very good speech, but she is almost being generous. The wording in the Bill is not “complex”; it is “complexity”, which is a description, not even a value. The Bill is even vaguer than what the hon. Member is suggesting in her well-made point.

I thank the hon. Member for his point; he characterises me very well as being generous.

I would also argue that the scope is expanded significantly if one of the offences that a defendant is charged with is fraud, money laundering or any of the offences that sit in that category. There can be 10 charges against a defendant, and if one of them is fraud, money laundering or terrorism funding, that entire case could be heard in a judge-alone trial.

The Minister spoke very clearly about recognising the burden on jurors. She made a legitimate point, and it is certainly reflected in reality. Especially when jury trials do not run as we would expect them to run, the impact on jurors can be huge, especially for those who are self-employed or have caring responsibilities. As I mentioned earlier, I ask the Minister to go away and look at the Maxwell hours, which have been successful for longer cases. For a morning session, it means that those who are self-employed are able to commit to working in the afternoons. In some cases, it means that those with caring responsibilities know that they are going to get home at a reasonable hour. The Maxwell hours are used in lots of different areas, and could be the answer to retaining the key principle of jury trials in fraud cases, while still ensuring a better experience for jurors.

Amendment 51 would prevent

“the Lord Chancellor adding further offences to the list in Schedule 1 by regulations.”

The concern is that it would give unconstrained power over the list of offences that may be heard without a jury on the basis that cases are considered complex or burdensome for jurors. That rationale could easily be extended to lengthy murder, rape, or drug trials.

As the Shadow Minister mentioned, if the wording in schedule 1 specified fraud or that particular type of case, it would be a different matter. However, it does not; it just says “complex or lengthy”. The Minister makes the point that this is a complex area, and criminal offences are added all the time, but she also referred to the specific types of fraud cases. If she can include the provision of fraud in Clause 1, that would provide a reassurance that there would not be additionality of scope. That is not to suggest that the current Lord Chancellor would be inclined to increase the scope, but a future Lord Chancellor may be able to extend the provision far beyond the huge change that the Government are already proposing.

Trials for things like terrorism, murder, rape and drug offences can last many months. They can be as complex as fraud cases, and they can involve multiple defendants and expert evidence. On that basis, the arguments that the Minister has made do not stand. That is why I will be voting against clause 4.

How long is a piece of string? The unanswerable question. I could ask another question: is a 2-metre piece of string a long piece of string? If I asked you that question, Ms Butler, you would have a lot of questions for me before you gave your answer, yet the Minister thinks it is easy to answer the question, “Is a two-week trial a long trial?”. She thinks it is obvious and that a judge will be able to make a decision. She is not willing to put a definition on that, because she says it is evident in the way that the Bill is drafted.

I look at the words in the Bill—which is all that a judge will have to make that decision. On length, it says that the judge will have to decide if the

“likely length of the trial…makes it appropriate for the trial to be conducted without a jury.”

On complexity, they will have to decide whether

“the likely complexity of the trial” is

“appropriate for the trial to be conducted without a jury.”

It is even hard to decipher from that whether it means complex is good or bad for a jury. Complexity is just a description; it is not a value. This is incredibly unusual, novel and, I would say, badly worded legislation. Ordinarily, a provision of this sort would say something along the lines of: “If the court is satisfied that the length of trial is so long that it would make it unreasonable for a jury”. That would be more normal wording.

The principle of reasonableness, while giving discretion and, some might argue, a vague term in the English language, is a well-tested word in criminal law and the English legal system. We know what reasonableness means; it is an objective test—“What would an ordinary person think is reasonable?” What about appropriateness? Does that mean appropriate to that judge on that day? Does it mean appropriate to a particular, theoretical juror? There is absolutely no guidance in Bill about how this novel word, “appropriate”, should be interpreted. Even when there are words in legislation such as “reasonableness”, which are backed by decades or even centuries of case law, the judge is very often given guidance in the legislation as to what is and is not reasonable.

My hon. Friend is making some powerful points. Hearing him read out what the law says brings home to me just how terrible this Bill is. Surely everyone can see that there is no clarity how it would work. Rather than there being any clear guidance, it essentially feels as though any judge can have their own view on complexity and length. We will end up with inconsistency and disputes and arguments about the approach. Surely, that could do the opposite of address the backlog by adding additional complexity and confusion to our justice system.

I agree with my hon. Friend. Indeed, the Bill will basically lead to a complete lottery in decision making, depending on the judge a person gets on the day. I suspect that judges ordinarily do not like vague law or having to provide their own interpretation. They are usually more comfortable if the statute is more precise, or if it is backed by caselaw, but there is no caselaw here.

On the issue of length, we know what the Minister thinks because she has told us in this Bill Committee. I do not criticise her for this opinion, but she thinks a case is long if it is disruptive to the personal or professional life of a juror or their wellbeing. That is her view as to what will make a case lengthy, and I do not criticise her for that, but there is no guidance here for the judge to consider those things—[Interruption.] I paraphrase her—she is welcome to intervene if she disagrees about how I characterise her views on what is lengthy for a juror.

I talked before about how judges will look to what Ministers have said around a measure in trying to interpret it, so if a judge is not clear what was meant by this, and pulls up Hansard to read what the Minister has said, surely they will take from the fact that the Minister has talked about the disruption to a juror’s life that they should have that as the test. What is disruptive to one person’s life is very different from what is disruptive to another’s.

I agree with my hon. Friend; he actually pre-empts the point I am about to get on to. I thank him for taking me on to that. It should be fairly obvious to most people that there will be a wide range of views as to how much time a person can take out of their ordinary life, bearing in mind that people are not called for jury service at the drop of a hat. They are not told, “You must cancel all your plans next week”; there is a degree of warning.

Most people take quite a wide view on how much time they can afford to give, depending on what is going on in their life. For some people, taking two weeks or even a week out is very disruptive. This theoretical person that the judge has to imagine would make an argument that it is appropriate that the trial should not take place with a jury, because they do not have a week in their busy life to just hand over.

Alternatively, others may say that they see it as a civic duty and a fundamental contribution they make to society to be available for jury trial if called. Perhaps they have never been called and they have reached a ripe old age, and they are happy and prepared to take a month or two out of their life to devote to making a decision on whether someone is guilty.

Currently, when a person sits on a jury, it is understood that, outside of the most extreme circumstances, they will be there for as long as the case takes. However, if the public get the sense that they can debate what asks are reasonable or unreasonable, I would not be surprised if jury members, in trials that go on a little bit, start sending notes to the judge to complain. They might say, “This has gone on for a week, and I didn’t think I’d be here for that long. I understand that if a trial goes on for too long, it shouldn’t be heard by a jury. This is going on too long. Judge, will you look at that?” That will open a whole can of worms about something that at the minute is extremely constricted in people’s minds.

Indeed. Might a judge, halfway through a trial, decide that it has suddenly become inappropriate, having heard whatever formal or informal representations are made on that point? Even if there is some objective consensus about how long an ordinary person in this country should be prepared to set aside to serve on a jury, does that in itself make it appropriate that a case should not be heard by a jury?

Even if we could agree, for example, that devoting any more than a month to a jury trial is disruptive to a person’s life, does that automatically make it inappropriate for a case to be heard in a jury trial? No, not at all. If it is inconvenient for someone to sit on a jury for a particular length of time, that does not mean the case is inappropriate for a jury trial. Even the Government are not willing to put a specific time value on that.

As my hon. Friend was speaking, it suddenly occurred to me that under our current system, jurors can already make that argument—that if sitting on a jury would be particularly disruptive, they should not have to do so. How does that interact with this measure? It feels like this does not make sense.

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. There are a number of personal and professional circumstances that can enable people to make that argument and get exempted from jury trial or, indeed, not have to sit on the jury in the original case but have it deferred to a more convenient time. She is absolutely right that flexibility for ordinary people in this country is already built into the way that juries are selected.

“Length” is probably the easiest of these three difficult terms; “complexity” is even harder to nail down. How is a judge supposed to decide what level of complexity makes it appropriate to have a jury? I would argue that the more complex a case, in certain circumstances, the more it should be heard by a jury, especially if the complexity relates to what is in the mind of the defendant, rather than, for example, complex financial papers.

Does the involvement of complex financial papers, on its own, necessarily make a trial more complex, if the real issue in the case is whether the defendant intended to be dishonest? As we have already heard with fraud cases, as well as most of the cases in schedule 1, the real issue is not whether something happened; it is the mindset—the legal term would be mens rea—of the person who did that thing. If they did something by accident or unintentionally, depending on the crime, that would often be enough for them to be acquitted. If they did something knowingly, dishonestly or recklessly, also depending on the crime, that would normally be enough for them to be convicted.

My hon. Friend the Member for Reigate has given one example, but another, with which I expect people will be familiar, is the LIBOR trials. They were very complicated and sophisticated, and the appeals were successful because of a judge. It was the judge’s misdirection to the jury that led to the LIBOR trials becoming another example of cases collapsing. If anything, the evidence shows that it is the judges who are the issue here, not the juries.

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. Obviously judges are not infallible. That is not a criticism of judges—judges know that they can make mistakes. On the mindset of the person, I am unclear as to whether the Government or indeed anyone on the Committee, regardless of party, thinks that there is anything more complex than what is in a person’s mind—a mind that cannot be unlocked or opened. We can ask this person what was in their mind, but they want to be acquitted, so we must take a value judgment on whether they are telling the truth or not. Surely the most complex thing there can possibly be is what is in the mind of a human being. A very complex set of spreadsheets or cryptocurrency that only half of us understand is complicated, but there is perhaps nothing more complicated than the motivation and mindset of a human being.

That is specifically what juries are for—to make that sort of judgment on whether it was reasonable for someone to do something. That is why we have 12 members, so that they must come to a view unanimously, or certainly as a large Majority. A judge is not in a more privileged position—no one would argue that they are—to decide what is and is not reasonable. They are in a more privileged position to make decisions about the law, and indeed they do make decisions about the law in jury trials and direct the jury on matters of law.

It is incredibly uncertain what “complexity” means. I know what the Minister thinks it means, and I do not criticise her. It is a perfectly reasonable view of what it means. My point is that it is not the only view. She thinks—I paraphrase; I do not seek to put words in her mouth—that it is complex financial evidence, presumably written evidence in many cases, in a fraud trial or crimes related to money. It is perfectly possible to have a great volume of evidence but, as the case unfolds, a detailed understanding of that paperwork may no longer be the issue on which the case turns. Does having a large volume of written evidence and a long list of witnesses make a case complex, or does it depend on what the witnesses might say or exactly what is in those papers?

The Minister has spoken about juries moving at the pace of the slowest member. Is her test for complexity the mindset of the slowest member of a random 12 selected from the British public, or is it the average—one might say reasonable—person? She could help judges making this decision by setting that out in the legislation.

This is not merely a theoretical, academic discussion on the criminal law of this country. I can point to another country. The Minister has taken pleasure in using other countries as examples to justify many provisions in the Bill, as though England and Wales can learn from other jurisdictions. I do not disagree with that premise. I will give her the example of New Zealand, another common-law jurisdiction. It has a similar provision, whereby a judge has to exercise a similar sort of decision making about whether a trial is likely to be “long and complex”, rather than its likely complexity. Set out in its legislation is a legal test. The Minister says that there is a test of complexity in the Bill. I tried to intervene on her to say that there is not.

This is what a test looks like. The law of New Zealand directs a judge to consider, in determining whether a case is likely to be long and complex,

“the number and nature of offences with which the defendant is charged”.

We understand what that means. It also directs them to consider

“the nature of the issues likely to be involved…the volume of the evidence likely to be presented” and

“the imposition on potential jurors of sitting for the likely duration of the trial”.

It has a catch-all, which is not unusual in legal drafting:

“any other matters the court considers relevant.”

The judge in New Zealand has a test to apply: whether the case is likely to be long and complex. There is absolutely no reason why the Government could not have included a test in the Bill—it does not have to be the same test—to assist the court and give certainty, which would help defendants and victims and would improve efficiency.

The Government and Labour Back Benchers have spoken about the experience of victims and have said that part of the reason for cutting the backlog is to reduce stress on them. There is nothing in this Clause to say that the judge might want to consider the impact on victims or complainants when deciding whether to allocate a trial for a jury. Does that go to the heart of “complexity”? I think most people would say probably not. The Government could have included a provision to allow cases that would have a significant impact on the wellbeing of a complainant or victim not to be heard by a jury, given their view that jury trials are often longer, more unpredictable and more stressful. The Minister might like to address why the impact on the victim is not one of the considerations that a judge is invited to take into account when deciding allocation.

Amendment 51 seeks to curtail the extension of this clause. I have already spoken about how wide-ranging it is and the wide discretion that it gives judges in making allocation decisions with insufficient legal test, guidance or case law. At least let us leave that as the problem; let us not introduce the potential for a future Secretary of State to extend the provision to a whole range of other offences too. That would make the things that I have spoken about even more uncertain.

The Minister said that she effectively, although not exclusively, considers the issue to be lengthy financial documents. If the provision were expanded across sexual offences and others in future, with powers that a theoretical future Secretary of State might want to apply, that untested, unclear issue of complexity would become even more uncertain. Indeed, length would become even more uncertain if we are talking about a judgment about whether vulnerable or distressed witnesses should give oral evidence, with or without a jury.

It rather looks as though yet again we have a clause that, in the interests of trying to rush through legislation, has not been properly thought out. I cannot believe that the Government intend to introduce such vagueness into law. It is perfectly clear that they are trying to tackle the backlog—I do not criticise them for that—and that we simply disagree with the ways they are trying to achieve that, but I cannot believe that they intend this Bill to have so many loopholes and unintended consequences. By calling them unintended consequences, I am trying to be generous to the Minister and to the Government. I look forward, I hope, to hearing her try to deal with rather a lot of issues in the clause.

Several points have been raised in this debate. First, on the definition and the application of the eligibility test, when I was explaining the rationale behind the provision for judge-only trials in complex and lengthy cases—a realisation of one of the key recommendations of the independent review—I was talking about the importance of considering not just efficiency, but jury burden. While it is of course a relevant policy factor, I was not suggesting that that in itself is the test to be applied.

The terms used in the legislation have been the subject of criticism from a number of hon. Members. I consider that those terms are straightforward and well understood. The notion of a complex case is used in other contexts. Currently, for example, the Crown Prosecution Service and the Serious Fraud Office can send serious and complex fraud cases to the Crown court, subject to section 51B of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, so there is existing practice. Those are terms with which the judiciary are familiar. If it proves in due course that guiding factors and the Criminal Procedure Rules would be of assistance, that can be looked at. However, I do not think that the definition itself presents the cataclysmic problems that hon. Members suggest.

To make it really clear, what is the minimum length that the Minister thinks would constitute a lengthy case?

I am not going to second-guess how the judges will apply this. As I say, that is for the judiciary and the courts. I am not going to put an arbitrary time length on it; I do not think that is needed.

The second point that hon. Members made was that the provision risks becoming too wide-ranging if a future Parliament or Secretary of State wishes to add to the offences. I addressed that point in my earlier remarks. I do not think that that is a real risk.

Another point that has been made is that none of this will have much of an impact, because we are talking only about a narrowly defined set of cases. I fully anticipate that while the system gets to grips with the use of this legislation, there will be a very small number of cases to begin with, but these are by definition the lengthiest cases and they take up a large amount of the courts’ time. The savings that we are talking about, which are set out in the impact assessment, may sound modest, but in a system under extreme pressure those small shifts matter. Every case heard by a judge sitting alone—as was deemed appropriate in these sorts of case not just by Sir Brian but by Lord Justice Auld and others—saves valuable Crown Court and jury time that can be deployed to serious cases that need a jury. In the context of the emergency in which we find ourselves, I make no apologies for seeking every little impact. For all those reasons, I commend the Clause to the Committee.

I just want to pick up on some points. The point about the scale of the issue was well made by my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate, who pointed to 200 sitting days. She highlighted the criticism from others suggesting that the list of offences was “the work of a moment”, which is probably a fair description of what is going on.

As we have heard, trying to understand what “complex and lengthy” means has proved difficult. A telling point was the Minister’s insistence that it will be obvious to judges. Other jurisdictions have set out a minimum in legislation, but as the person legislating she is not able or willing to give a sense of how long she has in mind. On her suggestion that judges are better placed to understand this stuff, I say with no disrespect that over 70% of judges are aged over 50. I think some apprentices I have met at IT firms in my Constituency might have a better understanding of the issues relating to cyber-crime than some of our judges.

The Lib Dem spokesperson, the hon. Member for Chichester, made it clear that it is not a supposition, nor does it take extensive reasoning, to suggest that future Governments will be able to make use of these powers in exactly the way that we have described. That is not a matter for debate; it is about the statutory framework that has been put in place, which will definitely be available to future Governments on the basis of the maximalist, expansive approach that this Government have chosen. My hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East has explained how other jurisdictions have done a better job.

We are looking into the details of the Bill here, but goodness knows what will happen when a Minister has to defend these proposals in the Lords, with the expertise and experience of its Members, who include retired judges. Given Clause 4’s lack of appeal, its illogical approach to how fraud and non-fraud offences interact, the minimal savings, the flimsy evidence and the lack of definition, which we have covered extensively, the Minister in the other place will have a very difficult time if the Government do not start being a bit more open to the non-wrecking but sensible amendments that Opposition Members put forward.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

The Committee divided: Ayes 9, Noes 5.

Question accordingly agreed to.

Clause 4 ordered to stand part of the Bill.