343R Designation of defence drone offshore areas

(1) An authorised person may designate an area of sea and associated airspace as a defence drone offshore area for the purposes of authorised unmanned aircraft operations.

(2) For the purposes of this section, an “authorised person” means—

(a) a member of the Armed Forces who has been deemed authorised by the Secretary of State, or

(b) a civilian employee of the Ministry of Defence who has been deemed authorised by the Secretary of State.

(3) Before making an authorisation under subsection (1), the authorised person must consult—

(a) the Civil Aviation Authority,

(b) the Maritime and Coastguard Agency, and

(c) Any other maritime authorities as the authorised person considers appropriate.

(4) An authorised person may impose conditions regarding the operation of unmanned aircraft systems within a designated area.’”

This new clause allows authorised personnel to designate offshore areas for drone operations.

New clause 11—Review of Regulatory Framework for Uncrewed Systems—

“(1) Within 12 months of the passage of this Act and once every 12 months thereafter, the Secretary of State must conduct a review of the regulatory framework governing the testing and operation of uncrewed systems in the maritime and land domains.

(2) A review under subsection (1) must consider—

(a) the framework’s impact on the development, testing and deployment of uncrewed systems by small and medium-sized defence suppliers;

(b) the existence of any regulatory barriers to timely testing or operational deployment of uncrewed systems for defence purposes;

(c) developments in the regulatory frameworks of the United Kingdom’s military alliances;

(d) the framework’s impact on the competitiveness of the United Kingdom’s defence industry.

(3) A review under subsection (1) must be published as a report and laid before Parliament.”

This new clause requires the Secretary of State to annually publish and lay before Parliament a review of the regulatory framework for uncrewed systems.

New clause 14—Designation of Maritime Uncrewed Systems as Warships—

“(1) The Secretary of State may designate an uncrewed maritime system as a warship where the Secretary of State considers it appropriate.

(2) A designation under subsection (1) may be made only where the system—

(a) is operated by or on behalf of the armed forces, and

(b) is used, or intended to be used, for defensive purposes.

(3) An uncrewed maritime system designated under this section is to be treated as a warship for the purposes of domestic law.

(4) In this section, ‘uncrewed maritime system’ means any vessel or platform capable of operating at sea without a person on board.”

This new clause enables the Secretary of State to designate uncrewed maritime systems as warships for domestic law purposes.

New Clause 9 would provide a clear framework for an authorised person to approve the use of drones for routine testing, evaluation, training and capability development.

The Committee has already considered the counter-drone provisions in the Bill, and we have had a good debate on that. The powers to detect, deter and, where necessary, disable unmanned aircraft that threaten defence sites are welcome and they have our support, but there is an obvious counterpart that has not yet been addressed. If our forces are to counter hostile drone activity effectively, they must also be able to train with, test and refine their own systems without legal uncertainty.

That is the gap that the new clause would fill, and it would do so in a proportionate and practical way. It would establish a delegated authorisation process. The Secretary of State could designate authorised individuals within both the armed forces and the Ministry of Defence civilian workforce. Those individuals could then approve drone use for defined defence purposes, namely testing, evaluation, training and capability development. Authorisations would have to be set out in writing, except in urgent situations where verbal approval would have to be confirmed in writing as soon as possible.

Authorisations would be time limited to a maximum of six months and would be granted in line with the established principles of necessity and proportionality. That is a balanced approach. It would ensure accountability through a clear chain of authority and defined limits, without creating unnecessary bureaucracy or introducing sweeping new powers. It would provide a structured basis for activities that are, in reality, already a routine and essential part of modern defence.

As we all know, drone capability is no longer a niche area; we see it all around us. It sits at the centre of contemporary warfare. Recent operations in Ukraine have demonstrated how uncrewed systems now shape reconnaissance, strike capability, logistics and force protection. Our armed forces must be able to train continuously with those systems, adapt their tactics and develop their doctrine in step with rapid technological change. At present, the legal footing for such activity lacks clarity, but the new clause would address that.

There is also an important industrial dimension. On Second Reading, concerns were raised about limited access to testing environments for small and medium-sized defence enterprises operating in the field. Many of those firms are producing highly effective systems and are contributing directly to allied capability, yet some are questioning whether the United Kingdom offers the right environment to grow and scale.

I have seen Members from across the House of Commons raise that issue—namely Fred Thomas and my hon. Friend Rebecca Smith, whose constituencies cover the national centre for maritime autonomy. They work hard on these issues because they have engaged with cutting-edge companies that want to go to tests and want to provide for UK defence, our allies and the export market, but are being hampered by regulation on the ability to train their devices. I have experienced that myself in the air. As a former wingsuit skydiver who has seen things from an aerial perspective, I realise how constrained our aerial environment is and how difficult it is to test aerial drones.

There needs to be a clearer statutory framework for authorised drone use, which would support closer collaboration between industry and the armed forces. It would signal that the United Kingdom is serious about creating a regulatory environment that keeps pace with innovation and supports the development of advanced defence technologies. The new clause is deliberately focused. It would apply to routine activities such as training and testing.

It does not extend to wider operational use, nor does it seek to. There is an interesting point to add here about working with the Home Office and police departments, if the Ministry of Defence is not already. Having gone out recently with the Exeter drone units in Devon and Cornwall police, I see that they are going through the same operational issues we are trying to tackle in the defence space.

The purpose of new clause 9 is to ensure that the essential groundwork for capability development takes place on a clear and secure legal basis. There is a wider point: legislation must evolve alongside capability. The Bill recognises the changing nature of the threat, and the new clause recognises that our response must also adapt. Effective defence requires practice, experimentation and confidence, built through regular and lawful training. Without that foundation, operational effectiveness cannot be sustained.

New clause 10 would introduce a practical and long overdue measure. It would enable authorised defence personnel, whether members of the armed forces or civilian Ministry of Defence staff, designated by the Secretary of State, to designate areas of sea and associated airspace as defence drone offshore areas for authorised unmanned aircraft operations. It would also require that, before any such designation is made, the authorised person must consult the Civil Aviation Authority, the Maritime and Coastguard Agency and any other relevant maritime authority. In addition, it would allow conditions to be imposed on unmanned aircraft operations in those areas. That matters because the context is clear.

The Bill already addresses the threat posed by rogue drones to onshore defence sites, and that is welcome. We have seen the facts and figures throughout this Committee: reported incidents near military bases more than doubled last year, rising from 126 incidents in 2024 to 266 in 2025, which is a significant jump. That is a concerning trend, and the provisions in the Bill to allow authorised personnel to respond without waiting for police assistance are both sensible and necessary.

However, the threat does not end at the shoreline. Defence activity at sea faces growing exposure. Naval exercises, offshore patrols, protection of undersea infrastructure, amphibious operations and a wide range of authorised unmanned aircraft activities all take place in the maritime environment, where there is currently no equivalent legal mechanism for Defence to designate and manage operational airspace. That gap represents a real vulnerability. Legal uncertainty slows decision making, and delay in the operational environment carries risk. Commanders should not be left in any doubt about their authority to protect personnel and missions when operating offshore. New clause 10 would provide that clarity.

It is also important to be clear about safeguards. These are not broad or unchecked powers. Only individuals formally authorised by the Secretary of State may designate such areas. There is a clear requirement for consultation with the Civil Aviation Authority, the Maritime and Coastguard Agency and other relevant maritime bodies before any designation is made. I have spoken to a few of those agencies throughout the passage of this Bill, and they are fully aware that regulation needs to be tightened up. On a separate matter, it does not seem to be applied evenly across the space. I have done a small amount of paramotoring before coming into Parliament, and doing it in British airspace is almost unregulated, yet we seem to be in a really contested environment for drones, which definitely needs to be opened up.

To raise an extra point, I understand the limitations. We are bringing in autonomous systems, and we are not always completely sure how they will behave in the airspace. The current regulation deals with aircraft or maritime devices that are human-operated, so dealing with automation adds extra layers of complication, but it is one of those knotty problems we need to work out.

New clause 10 would ensure proper co-ordination and protect both aviation and maritime safety. The ability to impose conditions on operations in designated areas would add a further layer of control. It may be argued that existing maritime or airspace regulations already offer sufficient flexibility, but that is not the case—I refer back to my point about automation. The current framework was not designed with defence unmanned aircraft operations in mind, and the absence of a clear statutory basis creates a gap that could offer areas to be exploited. The Government have taken important steps to strengthen counter-drone capability and protect onshore sites through this Bill. New clause 10 is the logical offshore extension of that work.

I now move to new clause 11. The regulatory barriers facing uncrewed systems across the maritime and land domains are significant. They are already harming British industry and slowing the adoption of technologies that our armed forces urgently require. I recently travelled down to Plymouth to meet representatives of a company called MSubs. They have working for them really innovative people—very smart people. They are able to raise funding to grow their company, yet they cannot actually test the equipment that they are trying to build, so they are looking for opportunities to move abroad. I have now heard it said repeatedly that if you want to grow, you have to go. We should not be in that position. We have some of the smartest people in this country. We have brilliant research universities. We should be in a position to offer our defence industry access to those people and give them the opportunity to grow in that space.

This new clause is straightforward. It would simply require an annual review of the regulatory framework, with findings reported to Parliament. Given the speed at which the technology is advancing and the rate at which both our allies and potential adversaries are deploying it, that would be a reasonable and proportionate step. The need for such a review is clear. At present, regulation in this area is fragmented. Responsibility is spread across several Departments, including the Ministry of Defence, the Department for Transport and the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology. Oversight is further divided among bodies such as the Maritime and Coastguard Agency, the Civil Aviation Authority, the Military Aviation Authority and ofcom. Each operates within its own remit, but no single authority is responsible for ensuring that the overall framework supports the development and testing of systems required for defence. In practice, that creates a patchwork that acts as a brake on progress.

This issue has already been acknowledged by Ministers. For smaller firms, it is not a minor inconvenience. If a company cannot test its system, it cannot demonstrate its capability, and without that, it cannot secure contracts. The consequence is a loss of both innovation and industrial capacity. Small and medium-sized enterprises are at the forefront of innovation in this sector. They are agile, willing to take risks and often responsible for the most promising developments. However, they are also the most vulnerable to regulatory delay. Unlike larger firms, they do not have the extensive legal resources or the financial resilience to withstand prolonged uncertainty. When delays erode limited funding, companies fail. New clause 11 would recognise that reality by requiring any review to assess the impact on SMEs directly.

There is also a clear international dimension. Key allies are moving very quickly. The United States is integrating uncrewed systems across its armed forces at scale, supported by a regulatory environment that enables rather than restricts innovation. If we look at the geography and topology of the United States, it has much more airspace and access to a larger maritime area, and I understand that it would be an easier process for the United States to be able to designate an area and do testing. We need to find a similar way to do that here in the UK. NATO partners are developing standards that will shape future interoperability.

The United Kingdom has strong advantages, including a world-class defence technology base and a long maritime tradition, but those strengths will translate into success only if our regulatory framework keeps pace. If it does not, companies will either fall behind or choose to develop their technologies elsewhere. We refer back to the point that if you want to grow, you have to go. We need to get out of that mindset as quickly as possible and improve things in this country.

For that reason, a requirement to assess developments in allied regulatory frameworks would be particularly important. It would ensure transparency and enable meaningful comparison. Parliament would be able to see clearly whether the United Kingdom was keeping up with its partners, rather than relying on general assurances of progress. The Government have recognised the importance of this agenda, and the creation of a new uncrewed systems centre of excellence is a positive step. However, co-ordination alone is not sufficient. There must also be accountability.

New clause 11 would provide that by ensuring regular reporting to Parliament. If the current framework is effective, the review would confirm that. If it is not, Parliament would be informed and the Government would be expected to respond. That would be a realistic expectation and one that supported both our defence capability and our industrial base.

New clause 14 would give the Secretary of State the power to designate uncrewed maritime systems as warships under domestic law. This is a necessary and forward-looking measure, and one that reflects the pace of technological change and the realities of modern defence.

The Royal Navy has long been defined by its ability to adapt. From the wooden walls of a sailing ship to the silent deterrent of nuclear submarines, each generation has embraced innovation to protect our shores and project stability beyond them. We now stand at the threshold of another transformation. Being so close to Plymouth, with the history of that dockyard which has been there for more than 500 years, this new wave of automation coming in and bringing back that cultural heritage is fascinating to see.

The increasing use of autonomous and remotely operated maritime systems marks a profound shift in how naval power is developed and deployed. Those systems are not theoretical; they are already in use. Our allies are investing heavily in them and so, too, are our adversaries. The systems offer new ways to gather intelligence, to monitor hostile activity and to operate in environments that would place human life at unacceptable risk. In short, they are becoming an integral part of our naval capability. It follows that our legal framework must keep pace.

At present, there is a gap between the operational reality of those systems and their recognition in law. It is very promising to hear the First Sea Lord talking about that step and moving our Royal Navy in a more autonomous way. We can do it far more cheaply, but it is all irrelevant if we cannot get the regulatory framework to marry up with those procurements. New clause 14 addresses that gap in a clear and practical way, by allowing uncrewed maritime systems, when operated by or on behalf of our armed forces, to be designated as warships. It would provide them with defined legal status.

That clarity matters, because designation brings with it both rights and responsibilities. It would ensure that such systems can benefit from sovereign immunity, just as crewed naval vessels do. It would support their recognition under established principles of international maritime law, and provide certainty to those who operate them, to those who design and build them, and to those who must interact with them in an increasingly complex maritime environment. This is not just a simple technical adjustment; it is about ensuring that our legal structures remain credible and coherent in the face of rapid change. Without this step, we risk ambiguity at precisely the moment when clarity is needed most.

I also welcome the safeguards in new clause 14. The power to designate is limited to systems used for defensive purposes. That is an important and deliberate choice, which reflects a commitment to responsible innovation and to the rule of law. It signals that even when we embrace new capabilities, we do so in a way that is consistent with our values and our international obligations.

Understandably, there is concern in some quarters about the role of autonomy. Different points have already been made about that in this debate, but it is right that such questions are asked. New clause 14, however, does not remove human judgment from the equation. It does not hand decision making over to machines. What it does is enable the armed forces to make better use of technology while retaining clear lines of accountability and control.

Uncrewed systems extend our reach. They enhance our situational awareness. They allow us to operate in dangerous waters without placing sailors directly in harm’s way. In doing so, they strengthen our ability to deter threats and to respond effectively when required. Ultimately, this measure is about alignment. It aligns modern capability with legal authority. It aligns innovation with responsibility, and it would ensure that the United Kingdom remains both secure and principled in an increasingly contested maritime domain.

I thank the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford for tabling the new clauses. The development, testing and use of uncrewed systems is vital to the UK’s defence. Not only have we seen uncrewed systems cause a significant number of casualties on the frontline in Ukraine, but we have seen their use in the Iranian conflict. To let hon. Members into a little secret, in 2017 I proposed the building of an indoor drone-testing range. Since then, or before then and continuing through, we saw ISIS’s use of drones. Now we have seen the revolution in military affairs in Ukraine. I am an individual who hon. Members will not be able to out-drone on drones, but I will say that the revolution is here to stay, and we are not going to have an option to fight differently.

After my recent visit to Ukraine, I have a couple of random statistics. At the moment, one drone equates to 22 artillery rounds in lethality and accuracy. That in itself, if we think about the height of the counteroffensive in 2023, is 900 tonnes of ammunition to the frontline. Dividing that into trucks, it is about 57 15-tonne trucks; dividing it into drones, it is two trucks to deliver the same lethality. Whatever the maths—there are lots of “circa” stats in there—the point is that drones do not just change the frontline of the battlefield. They change everything, down to logistical changes: shipping, trucks, movements, industrial pipelines and the supply chain. That is significant.

Although the Government recognise the importance of regulatory reform to the uncrewed systems sector in the UK, we are satisfied that the current law and regulations allow defence to develop, test and train uncrewed systems without the need for the new clauses. The defence uncrewed systems centre, which is coming in the future, will lead the development of testing and training for uncrewed systems, using the freedoms that the defence safety regulators already enjoy. It is not lost on me that there is a requirement for better education and communication as drones proliferate across defence. There is a lack of capacity and coherence among the different regulators. The uncrewed centre should bring them together and reduce bureaucracy, increasing a systematic approach to dealing with regulatory requirements that delivers more testing and trialling across more of the defence space.

Ongoing work by the Department for Transport and the Maritime and Coastguard Agency is further supporting the testing and training of non-defence uses of maritime uncrewed systems. There lies the critical point: defence systems have a lot of freedoms to test and trial. When companies are developing capabilities that are not defence systems, and that have not been brought into a trial as part of a procurement process, those are in the civilian space. That is where we need to make the changes, and that is why we are in discussion with the Department and the agency to do so and make things easier.

The Minister has a great deal of experience in this space, and defence is working hard to unblock some of these issues. The point I raised in my speech was that it is almost impossible to work through the split responsibilities across so many different Departments and regulatory bodies. As we have had regulations built on top of one another, we end up in a quagmire. Across all these different Departments and agencies, who is the accountable head who co-ordinates to make sure that regulation is fit for purpose?

The hon. Gentleman asks an impossible question. For example, there are sub-surface uncrewed systems, surface uncrewed systems, airborne uncrewed systems, airborne uncrewed systems that come off surface systems, and surface systems that deploy uncrewed below-surface systems. Trying to find an individual or body that will deal with all of those—across the totality of airspace, sub-surface and surface regulation—is exceptionally difficult. I can assure him that we are taking all our different defence regulators and putting them together—hopefully, over time, in one location—with the experts who know the good, the bad and the ugly when it comes to drones and uncrewed systems. That will make defence far more effective in articulating the requirement, procuring the systems and then pushing those systems into the army, Navy and Air Force. That will come in due course.

I will confine the rest of my remarks to the effect of the new clauses. New Clause 9, as set out in the explanatory statement, would enable an authorised person to approve the use of drones for routine testing, evaluation and training. I draw the Committee’s attention to the fact that the Defence Maritime Regulator and Military Aviation Authority can already authorise the use of uncrewed systems for routine testing, evaluation and training, and that more than 30 maritime systems are already approved for routine testing, evaluation and training. In addition, the Defence Maritime Regulator is bringing forward proposals to establish regulatory sandboxes for the testing and training of uncrewed maritime systems, in line with recommendation 39 of the strategic defence review. I think that that is due at the end of the month, but I will come back to the Committee on that.

New clause 10 would create a new authorisation regime to designate offshore areas for drone operations. In bringing forward proposals in line with the SDR recommendation, the Defence Maritime Regulator will also increase access to areas for testing and training for non-sponsored systems. The proposals therefore do not require changes to primary legislation, and are under way already.

New clause 11 would place a statutory duty on the Secretary of State to publish and lay before Parliament annually a review of the regulatory framework for uncrewed systems. Again, primary legislation is not required for such a review. The defence industrial strategy team within the MOD recently conducted a review of the regulatory system governing uncrewed systems. In addition, the Defence Safety Authority regularly conducts reviews of all defence regulations to ensure that they remain fit for purpose for new and emerging technologies.

I turn to new clause 14. The explanatory statement sets out that this new clause would enable the Secretary of State to designate uncrewed maritime systems as warships for domestic law purposes. However, the Defence Maritime Regulator already has the authority to disapply elements of civilian regulation for defence purposes.

I will just make a couple of extra points. If there is no need for regulatory change, why are certain parts of industry unhappy? The Government are already engaging extensively with industry to understand the variety of constraints that exist and we have conducted multiple reviews within the Department, as well as with civilian organisations.

I would argue that the Government are actually going faster and further to enable autonomy than ever before, and that is only going to increase. We are establishing the uncrewed centre of excellence to ensure that there is coherence. We are maximising the freedoms enjoyed by defence regulators to allow for more testing and training, and, over time, increasing capacity. Importantly, we are also exploring with the Department for Transport and the Maritime and Coastguard Agency how they can further support civilian applications in the maritime domain.

I hope that I have reassured the Committee on why new clauses 9, 10, 11 and 14 are not needed. I ask the hon. Member for Exmouth and Exeter East not to press them to a Division.

I thank the Minister for his response. He has a great deal of experience in this area, and I know that there will be no one else in Parliament who is pushing for progress in it as hard as him. However, there is a systemic issue across the Government that they need to sort out. Having spent a lot of time with the defence industry, which is producing these technologies, and knowing the rate of change that companies in the industry are going through, we need to send a strong demand signal to them that we are trying to change regulation so that we can actually allow them to develop in this country, and to grow, scale up and export.

Despite those answers from the Minister, I want to try and push the new clauses as much as possible, so I will seek Divisions on them.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

The Committee divided: Ayes 3, Noes 7.

Question accordingly negatived.