I beg to move Amendment 18, in Clause 25, page 43, line 23, leave out paragraph (a) and insert—

“(a) must require that, before a victim is asked to express a preference regarding jurisdiction—

(i) the victim is provided with a standardised explanation of the service justice system and the civilian justice system,

(ii) such information is presented in a clear, accessible and neutral manner,

(iii) the information includes an explanation of the key features, processes, available support and potential outcomes of each system, sufficient to enable the victim to make an informed decision, and

(iv) the victim is informed of the availability of any independent legal advice or advocacy and how it may be accessed,

(b) must require that—

(i) a written record is made of the information provided to the victim, and

(ii) where a victim expresses a preference, a record is made of the reasons for that preference, so far as provided by the victim,

(c) must not present information in a way that is misleading or lacking appropriate context.”.

This amendment creates requirements for the information victims receive regarding both justice systems.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 19, in Clause 25, page 44, line 33, at end insert—

““independent” means independent of—

(a) the chain of command, and

(b) any body responsible for the investigation or prosecution of the offence.”

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 18 and defines independence for the purposes of that amendment.

Clause stand part.

Clause 26 stand part.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship this afternoon, Mr Efford. I will speak in support of amendments 18 and 19 and, in doing so, will address Clause 25 more broadly.

At its heart, clause 25 concerns one of the most sensitive and important decisions in the entire service justice framework—the point at which a victim is asked to express a preference as to whether an allegation should proceed in the service justice system or the civilian justice system. For many victims, this is the first moment at which they are invited into a process that will shape not only the course of an investigation, but their experiences of justice itself. That is precisely why it is incumbent on us to get it right.

I think all of us would accept that asking a victim to make a jurisdictional choice without proper, balanced and comprehensible information risks placing an unfair burden upon them at a moment of deep vulnerability. It risks substituting clarity for confusion, and it risks turning what should be an informed decision into, in effect, an uninformed guess between systems they may not fully understand.

Amendment 18 seeks to address that concern directly, and it does so by placing clear statutory requirements on the nature, quality and neutrality of the information that must be provided before any preference is expressed. That principle is incredibly important because, if we are asking victims to make decisions that can affect the trajectory of an investigation, we have a duty—indeed, a moral obligation—to ensure that those decisions are properly informed.

Let me take a moment to set out the key elements of the amendment in turn. First, there is the requirement that victims are provided with a standardised explanation of both the service justice system and the civilian justice system, which is essential. One of the difficulties in this area is that these two systems are often described in abstract terms, or worse, in partial terms, depending on the perspective of the person explaining them. The service justice system is sometimes presented as highly specialised but perhaps opaque, and the civilian system as unfamiliar but distant. Neither of those descriptions is sufficient on its own. What is needed is a consistent, standardised explanation that ensures every victim receives the same baseline understanding, regardless of who they are speaking to, where the case arises or at what stage they are engaged.

Secondly, there is the requirement that information must be presented in a clear, accessible and neutral manner. Here, the word “neutral” matters because neutrality is not the natural condition of many institutions; it is something that must be actively constructed and carefully maintained. Without it, there is a risk, however unintended, of institutional bias shaping how options are presented. I do not suggest for a single moment that anyone in the service or civilian sector is acting in bad faith—that is not the point I seek to make. The point is that each system will, understandably and quite naturally, tend to see its own processes in a more favourable light. I think that is just a reflection of human nature. It is also why statutory neutrality requirements exist in other areas of public decision making.

Thirdly, the amendment requires that information includes an explanation of the key features, processes, available support and potential outcomes of each system. This is particularly important because victims are not just choosing a jurisdiction blindly; they are, in effect, engaging with two different procedural ecosystems, each with its own structures, timelines, safeguards and forms of support. It is therefore simply not enough to say, “You can choose either A or B.” The decision must be grounded in an understanding of what that choice actually means in practice.

Fourthly, and crucially, the amendment requires that victims are informed of the availability of independent legal advice or advocacy, and of how it can be accessed. That is one of the most important aspects of the entire amendment because, if we are serious about victim autonomy, we must also be serious about ensuring that that autonomy is meaningful. Autonomy without support is often not autonomy at all; it is simply exposure to complexity without guidance. Independent advice is the mechanism by which we ensure that victims are not left to navigate difficult procedural choices alone. It provides reassurance, context and the ability to test understanding before a decision is made.

Consequentially, amendment 19 goes on to define what “independent” means for these purposes: independent of the chain of command and independent of any body responsible for the investigation or prosecution. That strikes me as a sensible and necessary clarification because independence in this context is not just an afterthought; it is a structural safeguard. It ensures that advice is not merely formally independent but genuinely so, in perception and in practice.

I support the intention behind clause 25; it is right that victims should have a voice in decisions around jurisdiction—that reflects a modern understanding of victim engagement and consent within the criminal justice system—but with that empowerment comes a responsibility on us as legislators to ensure that the framework within which that choice has to be made is robust, transparent and fair. I gently suggest that, without the safeguards set out in amendment 18, there is a risk that the system may fall short of that standard.

There are three specific risks that I want to particularly highlight. The first is the risk of informational imbalance. If victims are not given standardised, comprehensive and neutral information, there is a danger that the quality of the advice that they receive will vary depending on their personal geography, the personnel who deliver it or institutional familiarity. That is not satisfactory—and is not a satisfactory basis on which to make what is, for many victims, a deeply consequential decision.

The second point is the risk of unconscious steering. I do not suggest for a moment that anyone intends to influence victims improperly, but where complex systems are explained verbally, often under pressure and in emotionally charged circumstances, small differences in emphasis can have large effects on perception. That is precisely why a structured, written and standardised set of information is so important.

The third risk is a lack of evidential clarity around the decision itself. The amendment’s requirement for a written record of the information provided, the victim’s stated preference and the reasons given should not be seen purely as a box-ticking exercise. It is an important safeguard that ensures transparency, accountability and the ability to review decisions if questions arise about how and why a jurisdictional choice was made.

Taken together, these provisions strengthen clause 25. They ensure that the discretion it provides is exercised in a framework of clarity rather than ambiguity. The service justice system, like any justice system, ultimately depends upon the confidence of its users. Confidence is not built on outcomes alone; it is built on the process that people go through. It is built on the perception that decisions are fair, that individuals are properly informed, and that the system itself is not tilted, intentionally or otherwise, in one direction or the other. If victims have a sense that they were not properly informed when making a jurisdictional choice, that will inevitably undermine confidence in the process that follows.

Conversely, if victims are confident that they were given clear, neutral and comprehensive information supported by access to independent advice, then the legitimacy of the process is strengthened even where the outcomes are difficult. That is the real value of amendment 18. It is not about adding a further level of complexity or detail for its own sake; it is about strengthening the integrity of consent within the justice process.

Amendment 19 ensures that the concept of independence is not left open for interpretation by others, but is clearly defined in a way that preserves both actual and perceived impartiality.

We should not be content with a system in which victims are merely asked for a preference; we should insist on a system in which that preference is informed, structured and supported by genuinely independent advice. If we can achieve that, I genuinely believe that we will not only improve clause 25 but strengthen confidence in the wider service justice system. In an area of such sensitivity, that should not be considered secondary—it is central to the legitimacy of the entire framework. For that reason, I hope that hon. Members will support these amendments.

My hon. Friend has again laid out the argument in an extremely comprehensive way, and it will be difficult to add anything new to the argument that he has put forward, but I will give it a go.

Ensuring that a victim is properly informed before being asked to state a preference on whether their case is heard in the service justice system or the civilian courts is essential, and I think we can all agree on that. The principle of concurrent jurisdiction allowing a victim to have a voice is a positive one.

However, a preference given without adequate understanding is not a meaningful choice; it becomes a procedural step rather than a genuine expression of agency. It is important to recognise that. The two systems differ in significant ways, and we have heard that in a lot of the evidence sessions and during our Committee trip down to Portsmouth.

These systems operate under distinct procedures, timelines and support arrangements and can lead to different outcomes. Many victims will have no prior experience of either system, and some may be asked to make this decision while in considerable distress. Without a clear, neutral explanation of what each system entails, the process does not empower victims but risks forcing them to make an uninformed decision or leaving them susceptible to undue influence. To reinforce that point, although it may be easy to make the decision when you have a clear head, if you have been the victim of a crime and your head is all over the place, having to make an informed decision when the information on the two systems is not clear and you have not encountered either system before makes the situation even more troubling.

The Amendment would establish a basic standard to require that victims are given a clear, accessible and impartial explanation of both systems before any preference is sought. That explanation would cover how each process works, what support is available and the potential outcomes, and inform victims of the availability of independent legal advice or advocacy and how to access it. Crucially, it would introduce a requirement for a written record detailing the information provided and, where preference is expressed, the reasons given.

I thank the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley for speaking to amendments 18 and 19. I acknowledge their sentiment, which is to ensure that the information provided to victims is appropriate and timely. The Government’s intention is to ensure that when a victim of an offence committed in the UK by a serviceperson is asked to indicate a preference on jurisdiction, they can do so in an informed way. The information provided must be accurate, helpful and, of course, objective, so I share the hon. Member’s objectives.

The Government have already begun work with the statutory consultees set out in Clause 25 to understand what information should be provided to the victim, how and when it should be provided, and who should provide it. That complex, detailed work involves stakeholders from across the criminal justice systems of England, Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland, including the Victims’ Commissioners, and has so far highlighted the importance of seeking an informed view from the victim and that that information should be provided in a factual and impartial way. It has also highlighted that where a victim indicates a preference as to whom they wish to discuss jurisdiction with, it should be acted on, and that a record of the discussion of the victim’s preferred jurisdiction, and the reason given for it, must be kept.

Our work with stakeholders has also highlighted the importance of taking into account the needs and circumstances of the victim, and the circumstances of the offence, so the guidance must allow for a flexible, case-by-case approach. In some cases—as offences take place in different times and contexts—it may not be appropriate to confront a victim who only shortly before experienced a rape offence with many pages of written information to digest. In those cases, a more trauma-informed, verbal approach, under the statutory guidance and supported by a shorter leaflet or booklet, may work better.

In other cases, a victim may have a strong view from the outset that their case should be dealt with in the civilian criminal justice system. Asking that victim to go back through lots of information about the service justice system when it is already known that they have a strongly held preference would be unwelcome, and may prove counterproductive, as the civilian police investigator risks coming across as questioning or disbelieving the victim’s preference, undermining future co-operation with the victim and, ultimately, the successful investigation of the case. I absolutely understand the hon. Member’s intent, and I hope that I have provided some reassurance that guidance will facilitate access to support that is independent of the chain of command, policing and prosecutors.

Amendment 19 is, in some ways, linked to amendment 18, and seeks to ensure that victims have access to independent support before indicating a preference on jurisdiction. We have already begun work with the statutory consultees set out in clause 25 to understand who can support victims to reach a preference on jurisdiction, which will vary across the UK and across the service justice system. Where the victim indicates a preference on whom they wish to discuss jurisdiction with, it should be acted on. For example, when initial contact is made with service police, victims of serious sexual offences may choose to seek support from the Victim Witness Care Unit, which is independent of the chain of command and of service policing. Alternatively, they might wish to discuss the matter with the lead service police investigator. Crucially, the guidance will facilitate access to alternative support in response to the wishes of the victim.

In February 2026, the Government announced that we would launch the independent legal advocacy support programme pilot, which will provide impartial legal support to anyone aged 18 or over, irrespective of whether they are a serviceperson or a civilian. Anyone who reports a sexual offence that has been committed by a serviceperson subject to service law, or a civilian subject to service discipline, when that is being investigated by the service justice system, will qualify for support under the scheme.

Where initial contact has been made with service police, the scheme will be available, should a victim want it, to help them reach a preference on jurisdiction. We are therefore working to provide an early, non-statutory version of the guidance to independent legal advocates, which will provide an invaluable opportunity to get in-practice feedback on the guidance and help us to better tailor it to meet the needs of victims before the first version of the statutory guidance is published.

I hope that I have reassured the Committee that the clause as drafted allows us to deal with the points that the hon. Member raises, but in a way that provides practitioners with the flexibility to meet the needs of the victim, as they vary from case to case.

I move on to clauses 25 and 26. Investigations, prosecutions and victim support have all significantly improved in the service justice system in recent years. The defence serious crime command, launched in December 2022, delivers investigations into serious offences and sexual offences consistent with national civilian policing standards. The Victim Witness Care Unit provides independent, trauma-informed and end-to-end support.

We have independent verification of the progress made. His Majesty’s Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate found in a November 2024 report on the Service Prosecuting Authority that timelines and victim support in the service justice system are at a level it

“would like to see afforded to all victims in all jurisdictions.”

The civilian criminal justice system in England and Wales faces challenges. Sir Brian Leveson’s July 2025 report said that it “is in crisis”. Part 2 of his report in February 2026 states that the open caseload in the Crown court is in the order of 80,000 cases, with trials listed as far ahead as 2030 in the most seriously affected courts. The court martial has no backlog and cases progress without delay. Noting the procedural difference between the two systems, 2024 administrative data bears this out. Following charge, adult rape-flagged cases reach an outcome in the Crown court in 358 days, with 19% of victims withdrawing from proceedings. In contrast, this takes 199 days in the court martial, with no victims withdrawing.

Government administrative data also suggests that the conviction rate for adult rape-flagged cases in the court martial, excluding guilty pleas, is 51% from 2022 to 2024, and 36% in the Crown court in the financial years 2022-23 to 2024-25. This calls into question claims that the conviction rate in the court martial is three times lower than in the Crown court. We maintain that reliable comparisons of conviction rates are difficult to make, because of differences in volume, victim withdrawal rates, procedures and case profile between the two systems.

We want to go further than the progress made so far, and that is why measures in this Bill strengthen the support given to victims to help them to indicate their preferred jurisdiction. We have a system of concurrent jurisdiction. Under this system, prosecutors make a decision on a case-by-case basis whether to deal with an offence committed in the UK by a serviceperson in one of its criminal justice systems or, instead, the service justice system. This is underpinned by prosecutors’ protocols set out in sections 320A to 320C of the Armed Forces Act 2006.

Under those protocols, prosecutors take into account the views of the victim. Clause 25 strengthens the support available to victims when that view is sought. The protocols are kept under review, and we have identified some opportunities for improvement. For example, when civilian or service police ask the victim for their view on jurisdiction, too little information is provided about the similarities and differences between the systems. Furthermore, civilian police do not always seek the victim’s view or might do so too late. This is understandable, as civilian police are not often aware of concurrent jurisdiction or the service justice system.

Under clause 25, the Secretary of State for Defence must issue guidance to those, such as civilian or service police, who seek the victim’s view on jurisdiction. This guidance will describe the similarities and differences between the systems as well as information on when and how the discussion with the victim should take place. Before issuing the guidance, the Secretary of State must consult the devolved Administrations, the Victims’ Commissioners, prosecutors and police to ensure that the guidance is victim-focused—that is critical—and works in practice across all parts of the United Kingdom.

Clause 26 is a minor amendment to the processes of reissuing the prosecutors’ protocols under sections 320A to 320C of the Armed Forces Act 2006. This allows the Lord Advocate and the directors of the various prosecution agencies to make insubstantial changes to the protocols without consulting statutory consultees.

I therefore ask that the amendment be withdrawn, and commend clauses 25 and 26 to the Committee.

On the basis of the Minister’s clarification and reassurances, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clauses 25 and 26 ordered to stand part of the Bill.