I beg to move Amendment 24, in Clause 3, page 6, leave out lines 1 and 2 and insert—

“for a serious sexual offence committed against a child.”

This amendment would extend the provision of restricting parental responsibility where a parent is sentenced for a serious sexual offence committed against a child, regardless of whether it is their child or on the length of sentence handed down.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 17, in Clause 3, page 6, line 1, leave out

“of 4 years or more”

This amendment would ensure that where anyone is sent to prison because of a sexual offence the court would be under a duty to make a prohibited steps order.

Amendment 18, in clause 3, page 6, line 2, leave out

“for whom the offender has parental responsibility.”

This amendment would ensure the court was under a duty to make a prohibited steps order where anyone is sent to prison because of a sexual offence against a child, whether or not that child was one for which they had parental responsibility.

Amendment 8, in clause 3, page 6, line 43, at end insert—

“10CA Duty to consider make prohibited steps order where serious sexual offence committed against any child

(1) This section applies where the Crown Court sentences a person (‘the offender’) to a term of imprisonment or detention of less than 4 years, for a serious sexual offence committed against any child.

(2) The Crown Court must make a prohibited steps order with respect to each child for whom the offender has parental responsibility.

(3) A prohibited steps order must be made if the court is of the opinion that there is a significant risk to children of serious harm occasioned by the commission by the offender of further serious sexual offences.

(4) In making that assessment, the court—

(a) must take into account all the information that is available to it about the nature and circumstances of the offence,

(b) may take into account all the information that is available to it about the nature and circumstances of any other offences of which the offender has been convicted by a court anywhere in the world,

(c) may take into account any information which is before it about any pattern of behaviour of which any of the offences mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b) forms part, and

(d) may take into account any information about the offender which is before it.

(5) The reference in subsection (4)(b) to a conviction by a court includes a reference to—

(a) a conviction of an offence in—

(i) any proceedings under the army Act 1955, the Air Force Act 1955 or the Naval Discipline Act 1957 (whether before a court-martial or any other court or person authorised under any of those Acts to award a punishment in respect of any offence), or

(ii) any proceedings before a Standing Civilian Court; where ‘conviction’ includes the recording of a finding that a charge in respect of the offence has been proved), and

(b) a conviction of—

(i) a service offence within the meaning of the Armed Forces Act 2006, or

(ii) an SDA offence within the meaning of the Armed Forces Act 2006 (Transitional Provisions etc) Order 2009 (S.I. 2009/1059), where ‘conviction’ includes anything that under section 376(1) and (2) of the Armed Forces Act 2006 is to be treated as a conviction).

(6) The order must be made to have effect until the order is varied or discharged by the High Court or the family court.

(7) But the Crown Court must not make a prohibited steps order under this section if—

(a) making the order is prohibited by section 29(3) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002,

(b) a prohibited steps order is already in force that meets the requirements in subsection (3), or

(c) it appears to the Crown Court that it would not be in the interests of justice to do so.

(8) Further, the Crown Court must not make a prohibited steps order under this section if—in respect of any child in respect of whom the offender has parental responsibility—the Court is of the opinion that—

(a) the removal of parental responsibility is not in the best interests of that child; and

(b) there is no significant risk to that particular child of serious harm occasioned by the commission by the offender of further serious sexual offences.

(9) For the purposes of subsection (8), each child in respect of whom the offender has parental responsibility must be considered separately.

(10) A prohibited steps order made under this section does not cease to have effect if—

(a) the offender is acquitted of the offence on appeal, or

(b) the sentence is reduced, on appeal, so that it is no longer a life sentence or a term of imprisonment or detention of 4 years or more, but see section 10D.

(11) Sections 1, 10 and 16 do not apply where the Crown Court proceeds under this section.

(12) A prohibited steps order made under this section is to be treated for the purposes of section 31F(6) of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 (proceedings and decisions) as if it were made by the family court.

(13) The Crown Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain any proceedings in connection with the enforcement of a prohibited steps order made under this section.

(14) A reference in this Act to an order under this section includes, so far as the context permits, an order varying or discharging it.

(15) In this section ‘serious sexual offence’ shall have the same meaning as that in s.10C.

(16) The Secretary of State may by regulations amend the list of offences in Schedule ZA1.”

New clause 13—Restricting parental responsibility of certain offenders—

“After section 10B of the Children Act 1989 insert—

‘10CA Duty to make prohibited steps order where serious sexual or violent offence committed

(1) This section applies where the Crown Court sentences a person (“the offender”) to a life sentence, or a term of imprisonment or detention of 10 years or more, for a serious sexual offence or violent offence committed against someone with whom they share parental responsibility for a child.

(2) The Crown Court must make a prohibited steps order with respect to each child for whom the offender has parental responsibility.

(3) The order must—

(a) specify that no step of any kind which could be taken by a parent in meeting their parental responsibility for a child may be taken by the offender with respect to the child without the consent of the High Court or the family court, and

(b) be made to have effect until the order is varied or discharged by the High Court or the family court.

(4) But the Crown Court must not make a prohibited steps order under this section if—

(a) making the order is prohibited by section 29(3) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002,

(b) a prohibited steps order is already in force that meets the requirements in subsection (3), or

(c) it appears to the Crown Court that it would not be in the interests of justice to do so.

(5) A prohibited steps order made under this section does not cease to have effect if—

(a) the offender is acquitted of the offence on appeal, or

(b) the sentence is reduced, on appeal, so that it is no longer a life sentence or a term of imprisonment or detention of 4 years or more,

but see section 10D.

(6) Sections 1, 7 and 11 do not apply where the Crown Court proceeds under this section.

(7) A prohibited steps order made under this section is to be treated for the purposes of section 31F(6) of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 (proceedings and decisions) as if it were made by the family court.

(8) The Crown Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain any proceedings in connection with the enforcement of a prohibited steps order made under this section.

(9) A reference in this Act to an order under this section includes, so far as the context permits, an order varying or discharging it.

(10) In this section—

“life sentence” means a sentence of imprisonment, detention or custody for life, or during His Majesty’s pleasure;

“serious sexual offence” means an offence listed in Schedule ZA1;

“violent offence” means an offence of homicide, assault or robbery.

(11) The Secretary of State may by regulations amend the list of offences in Schedule ZA1.’”

It is very clear that a child of a sex offender is at risk, regardless of whether the sex offender has committed that offence against their own child or another child. The Amendment would seek to broaden the provisions for removing parental responsibility from children of sex offenders.

I would like to share some of my professional experience. I used to work in a domestic abuse charity, where I ran a women’s refuge and had safeguarding responsibility for the families that have fled violent and often sexual abuse. There were numerous occasions when we had to facilitate parental contact by enabling a mother and her children to meet the perpetrator of that abuse, which was court mandated, even though they had fled that abuse, supposedly to a position of safety. As a person with safeguarding responsibility, that puts professionals in an impossible situation, but that is nothing compared with the position in which it places the parents, who have to take their child to a position that is desperately unsafe.

We would seek to broaden the measures in Clause 3 so that somebody who is convicted of a serious sexual offence, regardless of the length of the sentence and of who that sexual offence was committed against, would not have parental responsibility for their children. If they have been convicted of a serious sexual offence against any child, their own child is at risk. At the moment, the children of sex offenders are at more risk than other children in society. We believe this is a very important measure, and it needs appropriate resource allocated to it.

I rise to speak in support of our amendments 17 and 18. As has been said, the Bill currently requires prohibited steps orders, which remove parental responsibility, only for those receiving custodial sentences of four years or more, and only if they have parental responsibility for the victims of those offences. In the evidence session earlier this week, the witnesses were absolutely clear that this provision, as currently drafted, is too narrow.

Amendment 17 seeks to widen the court’s duty to protect children from those convicted of serious sexual offences. It would move the threshold and ensure that anyone imprisoned for a sexual offence triggers the court’s duty to protect children by considering a prohibited steps order. We believe that is a more appropriate line to draw for this measure, which is essentially when an offence reaches a level of seriousness that hits the custodial threshold.

Amendment 18 is of even more vital importance, and it was also strongly supported by the witnesses in their evidence. It would close a troubling loophole in Clause 3—although I am not sure whether “loophole” accurately describes it; it is an enormous omission. At present, the duty to make a prohibited steps order applies only when the child victim is someone for whom the offender has parental responsibility. That is an unacceptable narrowing of protection, and the logic of this measure is indefensible.

The Government believe that it is right to remove parental responsibility for someone who is convicted of a very serious sexual offence against a child, but only if it is against their own child or a child for whom they have parental responsibility. That makes no sense, and it is no surprise that the witnesses were universally against it. Amendment 18 would ensure that anyone convicted of a sexual offence against a child that is serious enough to warrant a custodial sentence is subject to a prohibited steps order, regardless. Again, I ask Members to think about how they might explain their position on this amendment to their constituents.

Amendment 24, tabled by the Liberal Democrats, is essentially aiming for the same outcome, but perhaps we have a slightly different interpretation of where we place the threshold. Amendment 24 specifies “serious sexual offence”, while we have used the custodial limit as the trigger in attempting to achieve the same outcome. It is something that we could commit to looking at in future stages of the Bill, if we can secure a better understanding of how we distinguish between serious and non-serious offences.

We are sympathetic to the Liberal Democrat aims, and I think we have a shared aim on not just the threshold, but particularly the fact that this measure will be enacted only when the child who has been the subject of the crime is one for whom the person has parental responsibility. I do not see the logic in drawing the line in the way that the Government have, separate to any questions about the level of severity.

It is a pleasure to speak to this group of amendments: Amendment 8, tabled by my hon. Friend Jess Asato; amendments 17 and 18, tabled by the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle; amendment 24, tabled by Josh Babarinde; and new Clause 13, tabled by the hon. Member for Bromsgrove.

Amendments 17 and 24 seek to remove the four-year custodial threshold for the automatic restriction of the exercise of parental responsibility. The restriction of the exercise of parental responsibility is a serious and far-reaching measure. It must be applied with care and in a manner that is a legally robust, while also protecting the most vulnerable. The requirement for a four-year custodial sentence provides a defined marker of seriousness.

This thresholds aligns with existing sentencing frameworks. Section 244ZA and schedule 15 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 specify a list of serious offences, including child sexual offences, that are considered serious enough to warrant that the offender must serve at least two thirds of their sentence in custody, rather than the standard half when they are sentenced. The amendment would lower this threshold and require the Crown court to make the prohibited steps order when the offender is sentenced for any period of imprisonment or detention.

I want to be clear that any offence against a child is unacceptable and one of the most heinous crimes in society. Restricting the exercise of parental responsibility is a serious step and not a decision to be taken lightly. That predetermined marker of seriousness ensures that any order made by the Crown court happens automatically only where the offender has committed serious and grave offences against a child who they are supposed to look after.

The Minister has a wealth of colleagues around her who are covering these issues, including—as I understand it—the Home Office Minister responsible for safeguarding, the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, Jess Phillips. What does this Minister say to the Home Office Minister about her previous position that a provision of the kind that the Government have drafted was too narrow? Has this Minister spoken to her colleague about that, and does her colleague personally agree with the measure as currently drafted by the Government?

The hon. Gentleman will know, having been in Government before the election, how Government collective responsibility and consultation with other Government Departments work. The safeguarding Minister and I are responsible for the Government’s strategy on violence against women and girls, which commits to halving it within a decade. Of course, the family courts are playing an integral role in that, and we seek to build on it. I will talk more about that shortly. Where we need to go further, this Government will.

We have used the statutory framework because it reflects the Government’s view that the offences are exceptionally serious. It is therefore appropriate that the same threshold be used to determine when an automatic restriction on the exercise of parental responsibility should apply. I understand and appreciate the rationale but, because there are existing processes to seek the restriction of parental responsibility, it is essential that there is a threshold and a clear marker for it to happen automatically.

There are mechanisms in place, but they put undue onus on the non-offending parent. Does the Minister agree that the onus should be shifted to the offending parent?

I agree that the current situation in the family courts is difficult, and it can be traumatic for parents who are seeking to have a parental order removed. That is why we have taken the measure in the Bill. It is a new approach, through which we seek to remove parental responsibility on automatic conviction in the Crown court. As I said in oral evidence, this is not something we do lightly, but we feel that it is necessary in order to protect offenders’ and perpetrators’ own children from the most serious offences. I am happy to work with the hon. Member for North East Hampshire to consider what further work we can do to reform the family courts. The Department is working closely on that, and we know we need to get it right in order to protect all children from these crimes, whether or not restrictions to parental responsibility are sought via the family courts or automatically, with this measure, in the Crown court.

Amendments 18, 24 and 8 seek to expand the circumstances in which the Crown court should make a prohibited steps order to include cases in which the offences were committed against any child. Again, it is important to be clear that child sexual abuse is an abhorrent crime that leaves a lasting impact on victims and their families. Those affected have my deepest sympathies, and it is they who we must have in our minds when we debate the measure.

The current provision is carefully targeted. It ensures that automatic restrictions on the exercise of parental responsibility apply only when there is a direct and recognised relationship between the offender and the child victims. Our focus on offenders who have committed a serious child sexual abuse offence against a child for whom they hold parental responsibility is based on a desire to tackle the cases involving child sexual abuse with the highest direct harm to the perpetrator’s children. This is, as I have already said, a novel and untested change to the law, and the response from perpetrators is unpredictable. We know that perpetrators often seek to use the family courts, as we have already heard, to further traumatise victims, and they could therefore seek to appeal the removal of responsibility.

Does the Minister agree that somebody who has been convicted of a serious child sexual offence against a child for whom they do not have parental responsibility still poses a danger to their own child?

I agree with that point. It is important that we recognise, as I have stated, that there are other measures to remove a person’s parental responsibility for their own child through the family courts. I stress that this is a novel approach. We need to look at the justice system as a whole; we cannot consider our various courts in isolation. The measure being carried out in the Crown court could make an impact on the delays that exist in the family courts, thanks to the backlog that we inherited from the previous Government. I do not wish to exacerbate that, or to traumatise any other children and families who are going through the family courts, by further increasing that backlog. For that reason, we wish to keep the measure quite small and novel, as it is untested at present; however, once we have seen how it works, there is the possibility perhaps to go further in the future.

We all recognise that this is a novel measure. I do not think that anyone is suggesting introducing a blanket measure. For example, we have used the custodial threshold as a narrowing measure and the Liberal Democrats have used a serious sexual offence as a narrowing measure. The Minister is talking about the balance that needs to be struck, but surely the balance is not being struck correctly when the decision is that only a child for whom someone has parental responsibility brings this measure into scope. Surely that is not the right balance, despite the weighing exercise that I appreciate the Minister has to undertake.

It is important to note that a line does need to be drawn, as the hon. Member has recognised; there does have to be a balance. In the previous Government’s version of the Bill, there was a different threshold, which was child rape of any child. We have changed that.; in this version, the measure is any child sexual offence where there is four years or more in custody, but only of the offender’s own child. As a Government, we have determined that as the necessary threshold. That is different from the previous Government’s threshold, which was only child rape. I think that recognises the difficulty in drawing a balance here.

We need to take a more limited approach for the time being, especially initially, to ensure that, as I have already said, the family court is not overwhelmed by endless appeals from perpetrators causing even more traumatisation to victims, and especially children. This is essential so that other victims and families with cases in the family court are not detrimentally impacted.

Our intention with Clause 3 is to tackle the cases with the highest direct harm to the perpetrator’s children. That is why we have chosen to focus the measure in the way that we have. It is important that we properly understand the impact any additional family court proceedings will have on the children and families involved. The cohort in scope of this measure is at the highest risk of immediate harm from the perpetrator, which is why we have chosen to focus on that cohort. This does not prevent an application being made to the family court for parental responsibility to be restricted in other circumstances, as is already available.

Amendment 8 suggests using the Crown court to gather evidence on the best interests of the child and the level of risk the offender poses to the child. Doing so would place a significant new burden on the criminal court, meaning less capacity to hear criminal cases and even longer waiting times for those seeking justice. The proper forum for that consideration to happen is the family court, where the judge can hear from all relevant professionals and have access to any necessary reports before making a decision that will always be based on the best interests of the children involved.

We are already going further than the previous Government did with their Criminal Justice Bill. Those proposals were limited to child rape; our measure includes not only child rape, but a broader range of child sexual offences. Most important of all, the previous Government talked of change, but failed to deliver. We will deliver this change to protect children. We all have a huge amount of sympathy for families in these circumstances, and I want to do all we can to support them in getting the right outcome for their children.

New clause 13, tabled by the hon. Member for Bromsgrove, seeks to expand the instances where the Crown court will be under a duty to restrict the exercise of a perpetrator’s parental responsibility at the point they are sentenced to 10 years or more for a serious sexual offence or violent offence committed against someone with whom they share parental responsibility for the child.

I reassure the hon. Member that there are already clear powers in the family court to restrict parental responsibility where it would be in the best interests of the children involved. If a parent or other interested party wishes to make an application, they can do so. Where relevant, the family court is able to and will remove parental responsibility or restrict it to the point that it cannot be exercised in any meaningful way.

The existing law is clear that in every case, the court’s paramount consideration must be what will be in the best interests of the child. We cannot rule out that sometimes it may not be in the child’s best interests for parental responsibility to be removed or restricted, particularly where the child is not the direct victim of the offence. However, as the Lord Chancellor and I have said, we look forward to working constructively across the House on this measure. While we cannot support new clause 13, we remain committed to ensuring that the law robustly protects children. I reassure hon. Members that the Government will continue to work to strike the right balance on this issue.

For the reasons I have outlined, I urge hon. Members to withdraw their amendments so that we can continue to develop this important legislation in a way that is principled and practical and gets the balance right for children.

I thank the Minister for her comments. While I understand that this is a novel approach and I welcome the measures in the Bill as a first step, we believe that they do not go far enough and still leave children at risk.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

The Committee divided: Ayes 2, Noes 11.

Question accordingly negatived.

Amendment proposed: 17, in clause 3, page 6, line 1, leave out

“of 4 years or more”.—(Dr Mullan.)

This amendment would ensure that where anyone is sent to prison because of a sexual offence the court would be under a duty to make a prohibited steps order.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

The Committee divided: Ayes 5, Noes 11.

Question accordingly negatived.

Amendment proposed: 18, in clause 3, page 6, line 2, leave out

“for whom the offender has parental responsibility.”.—(Dr Mullan.)

This amendment would ensure the court was under a duty to make a prohibited steps order where anyone is sent to prison because of a sexual offence against a child, whether or not that child was one for which they had parental responsibility.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

The Committee divided: Ayes 5, Noes 11.

Question accordingly negatived.

I beg to move Amendment 25, in Clause 3, page 6, line 19, after “justice” insert—

“or of a child and the non-offending parent”.

This amendment would mean that a judge could have discretion to decide not to make a prohibited steps order when it was not deemed in the interest of a child and the non-offending parent.

This is a small amendment that would continue to put children at the heart of this Bill. There are times when a court should not make a prohibited steps order in relation to a child. In the evidence session, we heard from many charities that children are not sufficiently heard as victims of crimes, and that their voices are not carried forward. We would like to include a small amendment that would put children and the non-offending parent at the heart of that decision making in the courts.

Amendment 25 was tabled by the hon. Member for Eastbourne, for whom I have much respect, and seeks to amend Clause 3 to allow the Crown court discretion not to make a prohibited steps order in cases where it considers such an order not to be in the best interests of the child or the non-offending parent. Let me begin by acknowledging the intent behind this amendment. It is of course right that we consider the welfare of children and the rights of non-offending parents in all decisions made by the court. However, the Government cannot support this amendment for several reasons.

The clause as drafted already strikes a careful and considered balance between protecting children and respecting judicial oversight. We have included a narrowly defined exemption to allow the Crown court the flexibility not to make a prohibited steps order, which is a section 8 order under the Children Act 1989, where it would not be in the interests of justice to do so. That provision is intended to cover exceptional circumstances where the Crown court does not consider it to be in the interests of justice, which may arise from unusual facts or a case that is particularly complex. It ensures a degree of flexibility without undermining the core safeguarding purpose of the provision in the Bill.

The family court is the appropriate forum for determining what would be in the best interests of children and navigating the complexities of individual family circumstances. It is uniquely equipped to consider the full facts of each individual case, drawing on the expertise of all relevant professionals and supported by any necessary reports. That enables the judge to make a fully informed decision, one that is always guided by the paramount principle of the child’s best interests. The Crown court simply is not equipped to carry out that detailed consideration.

Legislation already provides a route for family members to bring an application to the family court, so it can consider whether the order should be varied or discharged and whether a more tailored order or other family court orders are required, and ensure that any order is consistent with the best interests of the child or children involved in the individual circumstances. This avenue is still open for families where the Crown court has made an order under the provisions of clause 4.

Alongside that existing route into the family court, we are also providing a clear new route in certain circumstances. If the offender is acquitted of the relevant offence, or their sentence is reduced to less than four years—I am grateful for the opportunity to clarify this point, because it was raised when I gave evidence to the Committee—the local authority is under a duty to bring the matter back before the family court. This ensures that decisions remain responsive to the best interests of the child, without compromising the initial safeguarding intent of the judge. The Government are committed to ensuring that the justice system protects children from further harm from such offenders. The provisions in clause 3 are a vital part of that commitment.

I also place on record the Government’s commitment to consulting on a new victims’ code, specifically with the intention of addressing concerns, raised by the hon. Member for North East Hampshire, regarding how we can ensure that child victims are at the centre of the justice system. As she has said, for the first time ever, children are considered victims in their own right for crimes such as domestic abuse, in law; but, as we know, in practice that sadly is not the reality for many child victims. Therefore this Government are determined to go further. Under our new consultation on the victims’ code, which we are hoping to launch later this year, we will make it a key focus to ensure that the code works for all victims, with a particular focus on children in mind.

I understand the reasons why the hon. Member for Eastbourne has tabled this amendment, but I hope that he and the hon. Member for North East Hampshire are reassured that there are already strong provisions in place to ensure that the family court can consider the interests of the children involved in these types of cases, and their families. As such, I urge the hon. Member to withdraw amendment 25.

I thank the Minister for her assurances. As with our previous Amendment, I look forward to working with her on improving the family court. However, the Domestic Abuse Commissioner, women’s and children’s charities, and victims strongly urged us all to ensure that children and non-offending parents are at the heart of the criminal justice system, so I believe that this is an important amendment.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

The Committee divided: Ayes 2, Noes 11.

Question accordingly negatived.

I beg to move Amendment 19, in Clause 3, page 6, line 20, leave out from “not” to end of line 25 and insert

“ceases to have effect if the offender is acquitted of the offence on appeal.

(5A) A prohibited steps order made under this section does not cease to have effect if the sentence is reduced, on appeal, so that it is no longer a life sentence or a term of imprisonment or detention of 4 years or more.”

This amendment would ensure that a prohibited steps order would cease to have effect if the offender is acquitted of the offence on appeal. It would also require that a prohibited steps order remain in effect where a sentence is reduced on appeal so that it is no longer a life sentence or a term of imprisonment or detention of four years or more.

I will keep my remarks brief. As we have said, these measures require balance and consideration for all parties concerned. We were surprised that the Government’s proposed measure would not cause a prohibited steps orders to automatically fall away if someone is acquitted of an offence. It might seem obvious to say this, but if someone is acquitted of an offence, they are innocent. They have not done anything in the eyes of the law, so I struggle to see why we would continue to insist that, if they are subject to a prohibited steps order, the onus is on them to get it removed.

On the other side of things, if a prohibited steps order is in place and has not been challenged, and someone remains guilty but is on a lesser sentence, the balance falls in the other direction and it should remain in place. Although she may tell me that this was our position in government too, I am interested in hearing from the Minister why the Government do not feel that it is appropriate for such an order to be removed if someone is acquitted.

The Amendment seeks to amend the process in Clause 3 if an offender has been acquitted or had their sentence reduced on appeal. The Bill provides a clear route for considering a prohibited steps order following an appeal that has resulted in an acquittal or a reduction in the offender’s sentence. In such cases, the relevant local authority will be under a duty to bring an application to the family court to consider whether the original order should be upheld, varied or discharged.

The drafting of the amendment is deficient and risks creating confusion. It would provide that any prohibited steps order made under proposed new section 10C of the Children Act 1989 would cease to have effect where a person is acquitted, effectively discharging the order. In practice, there would be no order in place to discharge the original prohibited steps order, and therefore no documentary evidence that the order had been discharged. Compounding that, the amendment would retain an obligation for the relevant local authority to make an application to the family court to consider the prohibited steps order, under proposed new section 10D(2), and yet there would be no order for the family court to consider, because it would have ceased to have effect.

In short, the amendment would not make sense in practice and would risk creating confusion in a context where clarity is particularly important.

I thank the Minister for that feedback. Perhaps we need to consider how the Amendment is drafted, but does she accept the principle? There is no other example I can think of where someone is acquitted of an offence, because they are innocent, but they remain subject to any provisions whatever that were related to the conviction. Perhaps the amendment needs to be redrafted, but surely the Minister agrees in principle that someone should not be subjected to a consequence of a conviction that has been overturned.

We need to remember that for a criminal case to have been brought, the child or another party will have made an allegation of serious sexual abuse committed against that child, and that will have been followed by criminal proceedings and an initial guilty verdict. The relationship between the child and the accused parent may have completely broken down during that process. When the family court reviews the case, the judge will undertake a holistic review of all the circumstances, including the acquittal, before deciding what is in the best interests of the child.

We must also remember that the prohibited steps order does not form part of the sentence when it is made by the Crown court. The order is not part of the punishment, or an additional punishment, for an offender; it is a tool to protect children who have been the victims of a dreadful crime, and their families. Even where the individual is acquitted—I have huge sympathy for those who are found innocent and acquitted—it is likely that the case will have gone through lengthy proceedings, and complex family dynamics will be involved. We must keep in mind the overarching aim of protecting children and doing what is best for them. That is why the order will not be automatically discharged following a successful appeal.

I think it is important that if there is a successful appeal, there is a clearly defined process during which the best interests of the children involved are considered, which is why we have put that measure in place. We understand that following a successful appeal, it is important that decisions about a prohibited steps order are made quickly. That is why the process already included in Clause 3 requires the local authority to make the application within 30 days of the acquittal. By placing the duty to make the application on the local authority, we are reducing the burden on the families involved, at what will already be a difficult and potentially traumatic time. Moving the proceedings to the family court centres deliberations in the correct forum. The family court will consider whether varying, discharging or, indeed, upholding the order will be in the best interests of the children involved, which I am sure we can agree is what we all want.

I am struggling to understand either the legal or the ethical distinction that says that someone who is acquitted at trial should be in a fundamentally different position from someone who is acquitted following an appeal and has their conviction overturned. Surely the practical results should be the same. In every other part of the criminal justice process that I have encountered, they are.

That goes to the heart of why we have kept these measures as niche and tight as possible—because they are quite novel. We are restricting parental responsibility where an offender has been found guilty in a Crown court, with a jury and a judge, of any sexual offence against their own child for which they will be sentenced to four years or more in prison. That is incredibly traumatic for the child and family involved. The person will have already been found guilty. This is not similar to cases in which someone is acquitted and a prohibited steps order can be removed immediately. We have to consider the impact on the child. These are offences that the perpetrator will have been found guilty of, in a court of law, against their own child.

As the Minister will be aware, where the Court of Appeal overturns a criminal conviction for a serious offence such as this, it will generally be because there was a serious flaw in the original trial that has left it invalid. Even in those circumstances, the Court of Appeal may grant a retrial rather than overturning the conviction. I understand the point the Minister is making about the trauma to the family and child, but would that not apply equally to someone who is acquitted at the original trial, in which case should the court not also be considering it in the event of a not guilty verdict? I really am struggling to understand why a conviction being overturned on appeal is substantively different from a not guilty verdict.

I will happily answer that point. We are not saying that we would not remove the prohibited steps order; of course there will be a route to remove it. If the offender or alleged perpetrator is then acquitted through the Court of Appeal, there should always be a route to do that, and there will be within 30 days. However, the correct route for doing that is the family court, which will have all the reports available to determine the best interests of that child’s welfare, given everything they have been through, rather than the Crown court, which is not equipped to make that assessment.

Can the Minister give me any other example in our legal system where someone who has suffered a consequence directly as a result of a conviction that is then overturned is required to take further steps to unpick a consequence that flows from that overturned conviction? I cannot think of any. If someone is exonerated, everything falls away. This measure is specifically linked to someone being found guilty; if they are then essentially found not guilty, they will have to take further steps. Nobody else who is essentially found innocent has to do other things to get things removed from them.

The Shadow Minister cannot think of any and, off the top of my head, stood here right now, I cannot think of any either, but that goes to the heart of the reason why we need to keep these novel measures quite tight—it is because of their potential impact. Primarily, my interest, and the interest of the Government, is to protect children and child victims, and I put my faith in the family court system to do what is in the best interest of the child following an acquittal, given everything that that child—that victim—has been through. We must remember that if the perpetrator is acquitted in the Court of Appeal, there is still a child victim and a crime that has been committed against that child.

With respect, there is not a victim. The person has been acquitted, and there is not a child that has suffered anything, any more than if the person was found not guilty in the first place. I respect the Minister’s comments on how the Amendment might be better drafted, but the Government have to accept that they are introducing an extremely unusual interpretation of what happens to someone when they are found not guilty, compared with every other bit of the justice system that I am aware of. Someone who is found not guilty is innocent; the court has decided that the accusation made did not transpire.

That is exactly why we have included a route to remove the prohibited steps order, and we feel the appropriate route for that is the family court. That is the measure in the Bill, and it still stands that that is the safest route to protect the welfare of the child in the circumstances, given what—I was going to say, “I can only imagine”, but I cannot even imagine it—will be an immensely traumatising and awful experience for everyone involved. For that reason, I urge the hon. Member to withdraw the Amendment.

The Minister made heroic efforts to explain the logic and context of how we ordinarily deal with these matters. We think the prohibited steps orders are an important enhancement for the safeguarding of children, but I cannot imagine a scenario, even in circumstances in which the offence has not been found proven, in which the children the Minister talks about will not have had the involvement of social services and other steps taken to ensure their wellbeing more generally.

This measure is specifically about parental responsibility, and I find it difficult to understand why the Government are setting a precedent that an innocent party should be required to take further steps to unpick a consequence that flows specifically from their conviction. I appreciate the feedback on the drafting of the Amendment, and I will not press it to a vote, but the Government need to think very carefully about the precedent they are setting in relation to what happens to innocent people. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Samantha Dixon.)

Adjourned till this day at Two o’clock.