I beg to move amendment 461, in clause 11, page 7, line 15, leave out “or otherwise”.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 310, in clause 11, page 7, line 23, at end insert

“and

(c) to ensure the High Court is notified of the substitution of the coordinating doctor and the reason for the substitution.”

This amendment would include ensuring the High Court is notified of substitutions of the coordinating doctor in the list of matters the Secretary of State may by regulations make provision for.

Amendment 309, in clause 11, page 7, line 23, at end insert—

“(3) Regulations under subsection (1) must include provision to require the reassessment of the patient under section 7.”

This amendment would require a regulations covering the replacement of the coordinating doctor to include a reassessment of the person by the new coordinating doctor.

Clause stand part.

The amendment would remove the phrase “or otherwise” in the clause. All I am proposing is for the wording to be consistent with amendment 205 to clause 10, which has just been agreed. It does not specify “or otherwise”, but simply uses the words,

“the practitioner dies or through illness is unable or unwilling”.

What might “otherwise” incorporate? It indicates that there might be a range of reasons beyond death or illness why the co-ordinating doctor would drop out. In many ways, I am trying to probe what the other reasons might be. If there are no other reasons, and consistent with amendment 205 that we have just agreed, we should drop the phrase “or otherwise”.

I want to speak briefly in support of the hon. Lady’s amendment and also in support of amendment 310, tabled by the hon. Member for York Central. The hon. Member for Richmond Park is absolutely right. I will not rehearse her argument, which is very straightforward. The question is: what other reason could there be to justify a co-ordinating doctor transferring the case? The Committee might reject that amendment, in which case I hope they will accept the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for York Central, which specifies that whatever the reason, particularly if it is other than death or illness, it is important for the High Court or the panel to be notified of the substitution and the reason why.

Maternity leave is one reason and retirement might be another.

Those might be appropriate reasons; I hope that can be specified. The crucial thing is that if there is an unwillingness—not an incapacity but an unwillingness—to proceed, that is of some concern. It is not that they are no longer able to do it—possibly for the reasons that the hon. Lady suggested—but if there is an actual unwillingness to proceed, what is the reason?

On amendment 309, if the first doctor is replaced for whatever reason, surely it is imperative that the new doctor conduct their own assessment, rather than taking the previous doctor’s word for it. A doctor is legally responsible, obliged under all medical regulation and law for their actions, and they cannot rely on a previous assessment. If the first doctor gave up the case because of some kind of incapacity—an illness, or, indeed, their demise—it might be that their own judgment was impaired at the time. I would have thought it was obvious that the new doctor should take responsibility for conducting an assessment and proceeding with full responsibility for the case.

I rise to speak to amendment 309 tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for York Central. The amendment proposes that if a doctor changes, there should be a reassessment of the patient. My understanding is that that is in line with current practice: if a doctor is changed, the new doctor has to assess a patient to their own satisfaction because they cannot rely on just looking at notes. It is a sensitive issue where a doctor is required to make objective and subjective assessments, as has been agreed by the Committee to date, in clinical decision making. A clinician does not inherit the risk of another clinician without being satisfied themselves that the conclusion of another clinician aligns with their own.

For instance, the clinician has a responsibility to fulfil their own professional standards and their own duty of care. In the light of the significant impact of the decision, it is important that the doctor can be satisfied as they will need to consent to a patient having capacity and not being coerced. They cannot just take the word of another clinician who has managed the case before them. They themselves need to be satisfied. If a doctor does not do that and something goes wrong, and it comes to light that the patient did not have capacity, the clinician who is the new co-ordinating doctor would carry liability. It does not stand up if they say, “But someone else assessed that the patient had capacity” or, “Someone else said that the patient had not been coerced” if it comes to light later that they have.

This measure would therefore protect the clinician and ensure that the patient understood that a further assessment would need to take place. Having this measure in law would hopefully dissuade doctors from transferring their patients unless absolutely necessary for the continuity of care. It would also dissuade the clinician from taking on a new case if they were aware that continuity of care would be disrupted, due to, for example, a move.

This set of amendments relates to the Secretary of State’s ability to make provision, by regulations, for the replacement of the co-ordinating doctor if they are unable to continue to carry out the functions of the co-ordinating doctor.

I will turn first to amendment 461. Clause 11, as currently drafted, provides the Secretary of State with a discretionary power to make regulations that provide for cases

“where, after a first declaration has been witnessed by the coordinating doctor, that doctor dies or through illness or otherwise is unable or unwilling to continue”.

Amendment 461 removes the “or otherwise”. The effect could be to limit scenarios in which the Secretary of State could make provision via regulations for the replacement of the co-ordinating doctor. The Secretary of State could not provide for replacing the co-ordinating doctor in circumstances other than a doctor’s death or illness, which could include family issues or retirement. That would mean that the person seeking an assisted death may need to begin the process again.

Amendment 310 expands the list of matters that regulations made under subsection (1) may cover. That includes notifying the High Court of substitutions of the co-ordinating doctor, where the co-ordinating doctor is unable to continue to carry out their functions. It should be noted that clause 11 confers only a power, not a duty, on the Secretary of State to make regulations about replacing the co-ordinating doctor. It is not certain that the matter of a substitution of the doctor would be covered in those regulations.

The explanatory statement for amendment 309 suggests that the amendment aims to ensure that a replacement co-ordinating doctor is required to carry out a new assessment of the patient—in other words, to repeat the first assessment made under clause 7. The amendment requires that the regulations that may be made by the Secretary of State under subsection (1) make provision for such cases. Although the Secretary of State has a power to make regulations to provide that the co-ordinating doctor be replaced by another doctor, that is not a requirement. The amendment assumes that there will be a replacement co-ordinating doctor, which is not a specific requirement of the legislation.

I will speak briefly about amendment 461. A co-ordinating doctor is central to the whole process set out in the Bill, from start to finish. If a co-ordinating doctor becomes unavailable, a replacement would need to be found. There may be a number of reasons, not restricted to the doctor’s own death or illness, why that could happen. We have already heard a few examples—it could be retirement, maternity leave or anything going on in that doctor’s personal life. A close family member might fall ill or die, or something else might happen in the doctor’s life that forces them to withdraw. We have talked a lot about patient autonomy, quite rightly, but we need to think about the autonomy of the doctors involved in the process as well. It is therefore important that they have the ability to step away, as set out in clause 11. Additionally, I associate myself with the Minister’s comments about amendments 309 and 310. It feels as though those amendments do not necessarily do what was intended.

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment made: 206, in clause 11, page 7, line 24, leave out subsection (3).—(Kim Leadbeater.)

See the statement for Amendment 188.

Clause 11, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Sitting suspended.

On resuming—

[Carolyn Harris in the Chair]