I beg to move amendment 399, in clause 2, page 1, line 22, leave out “, disease or medical condition” and insert “or disease”.

This amendment ensures that a terminal illness under the Bill can only be an illness or a disease and not a medical condition.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 400, in clause 2, page 2, line 1, leave out “, disease or medical condition” and insert “or disease”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 399.

Amendment 401, in clause 2, page 2, line 5, leave out “, disease or medical condition” and insert “or disease”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 399.

Amendment 11, in clause 2, page 2, line 7, leave out from beginning to first “of” in line 8 and insert—

“(3) A person is not to be considered to be terminally ill by reason”.

This amendment amends clause 2 to say that a person cannot be considered terminally ill by reason of having mental illness or a disability.

Amendment 181, in clause 2, page 2, line 8, leave out from “ill” to end of line 10 and insert—

“only because they are a person with a disability or mental disorder (or both).

Nothing in this subsection results in a person not being regarded as terminally ill for the purposes of this Act if (disregarding this subsection) the person meets the conditions in paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection (1).”

This amendment clarifies that the purpose of subsection (3) is to emphasise that only having a disability or mental order does not make a person “terminally ill” and therefore eligible for assistance.

Amendment 283, in clause 2, page 2, line 10, at end insert—

“or one or more comorbidities alongside a mental disorder within the meaning of the Mental Health Act 1983”.

This amendment would set out that a person who has a co-morbidity with one or both of a mental disorder or a disability is not considered terminally ill by virtue of those comorbidities alone.

I said in the last debate that this is either a safeguarding Bill or an autonomy Bill. [Interruption.] Or that it is both, but the claim has been that it is a safeguarding Bill and that there are very strong safeguards. If so, and if we are going to stress the safeguards, as I think we should, that means being very clear about who is eligible. It means having proper, meaningful guardrails showing who is inside and who is outside the scope of the Bill. I suggest that the Bill’s guardrails are not strong, safe or impermeable; they are broken fences. We need to mend those fences in this Committee in order to make the Bill safe.

This group of amendments includes a set in my name that would restrict eligibility to people with terminal diseases or illnesses, and another set that would build stronger safeguards explicitly for disabled people and people with mental disorders. The purpose of the two sets of amendments is the same, but they approach the challenge from opposite ends. I will speak first to the amendments in my name.

Quite simply, I want to remove the words “medical condition” from the definition of terminal illness. The reason for that is straightforward: some medical conditions are likely to also amount to a disability. As Fazilet Hadi, the head of policy at Disability Rights UK, told the Committee in evidence, there is a “huge overlap” between disability and terminal illness. The distinction between the two is notoriously blurred, and there is a reason why no disability rights organisation backs this Bill: it is here in this innocuous phrase “medical condition”. Removing that phrase will provide an additional degree of protection for some disabled people, which I think is a good enough reason to do it.

There is another group of people whom we do not hear from much in these discussions, but about whom we should perhaps be most concerned, because there are so many of them—they are almost all of us. I am talking about the frail. Frailty is an important word in this debate. I refer hon. Members to the briefing submitted in recent days by the British Geriatrics Society; it is a powerful document that highlights an essential challenge for this Bill. What is frailty? Is it a disability? Is it a terminal illness? Is it both? Is it neither? It can be noted on a death certificate as a cause of death and, even if it is not listed as a cause of death—this is a crucial point—it is the most common dying trajectory for people in the UK. More people are frail as they approach the end of life than are not.

Frailty is a massive consideration for the Committee, especially when we consider that it is closely correlated with feeling a burden on others, which we all recognise is a concern. As we learned in the debate two weeks ago, feeling a burden is, I am afraid to say, an acceptable reason to seek an assisted death under this Bill—wanting to die to save your family money is acceptable and would be facilitated under this Bill.

Some 50% of people over 85 years of age live with frailty, and the number of people in the UK aged over 85 is going to double in the next 20 years. That is a lot of frail people and a lot of people potentially feeling a burden on their family. At the moment it is arguable—and if it is arguable, a lawyer will argue it, and a court may well agree with them—that the Bill allows people who are frail, but who are not suffering from a specific disease or illness, and certainly not from one that is widely accepted to be fatal, to seek an assisted death.

Particular rules about the terminally ill are not new in our law. One can get certain benefits if one is ill, and one can get a drawdown of one’s pension, so the Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992 and the Pensions Act 2004 both contain a definition of “terminally ill”, which is that

“a person is ‘terminally ill’ at any time if at that time the person suffers from a progressive disease and the person’s death in consequence of that disease can reasonably be expected” within six months for pensions and 12 months for benefits. That is very similar phrasing to that in this Bill. Illness appears as part of the terminally ill definition, and so does disease, but the term “medical condition” is nowhere to be found—and yet it appears in this Bill.

That has real legal consequences and I beg the Committee to consider them. According to the leading work on statutory interpretation—it is “Bennion on Statutory Interpretation”, whose current editors are employed by the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel, so I think we can take their word for it:

“Where a subject has been dealt with by a developing series of Acts, the courts often find it necessary, in construing the latest Act, to trace the course of this development. By seeing what changes have been made in the relevant provision, and why”,

the court can better assess the provision’s intended meaning. The presence of the phrase “medical condition” will be seen to be relevant by the court. The court, in interpreting clause 2, would likely conclude that Parliament intended for it to have a wider meaning than the existing definitions under the 1992 Act and the 2004 Act. Using that wider definition, a doctor and a court—or a panel, if that is what we are going to have—could conclude that frailty or disabilities are medical conditions and therefore that someone could seek an assisted death on that basis.

It is true that we have the six-month safeguard, although before the Bill is even law there have already been already efforts and amendments tabled to scrap that safeguard, or to extend it for certain conditions, and we will come on to that point in the next group of amendments. However, as we have discussed, the six-month safeguard has no logical basis; it would very likely be challenged on the grounds of discrimination, and a future Parliament might well shelve it altogether. That is why it is important that we consider this amendment.

With clause 2 allowing assisted suicide for medical conditions, if we end up scrapping the six-month restriction, we are in Canada. In Canada, one fifth of all assisted deaths are for conditions that can be described as symptoms of frailty. The “Fourth Annual Report on Medical Assistance in Dying in Canada 2022” shows that the primary reason for accessing MAID in 19.9% of cases was

“osteoarthritis, osteoporosis, fractures, vision and hearing loss, dysphagia and frequent falls”— all symptoms of frailty.

I am interested to know where the hon. Member has got the idea that someone is going to scrap the six-month prognosis from.

Well, if the hon. Lady will say that she will never, at any stage, support a proposal to extend it beyond six months, I will be very glad to hear it. My concern is that we already have amendments tabled to do exactly that, which we will be debating shortly. I hope they will be rejected, but my confident expectation, on the basis of other countries, including the Australians who gave evidence to this Committee, is that the six-month safeguard will soon be seen as a barrier to a human right, because there is indeed no logical basis for such an arbitrary date.

The people who currently deal with the six-month prognosis, in the context of benefits and pensions, campaign that it is arbitrary and unworkable—rightly, I think—so I am afraid that I confidently expect the six-month barrier to be challenged in due course. If the hon. Lady is prepared to say that she would never do that, however, I would be very reassured.

Would the hon. Member agree that the purpose of the Committee is to look at the Bill before us? That is why we are here. I understand his concerns, his reservations and his nervousness about what might happen in future, and that is an important conversation to have, but the purpose of the Committee is to look at the Bill as it stands today; that should be the focus of our deliberations.

Yes, but I simply state on the record that I believe that this is not the end, but the beginning of a wider Bill that would follow if we passed this one. I am encouraged by what the hon. Lady says, or implies: that she does not want to go further than this Bill.

My plea to the Committee is straightforward. Let us confine eligibility to the people who the campaigners talk about: those with diseases or illnesses that are genuinely terminal. We can do more to strengthen that definition with later amendments, but, first, we have to remove the gaping hole in the fence that is this term “medical condition”. Let us remove that term.

Marie Curie’s definition of a terminal illness is

“an illness or condition which cannot be cured and is likely to lead to someone’s death”.

It is obviously one of the best-known end of life charities, so how does the hon. Member reconcile the differences he has with its professional expertise?

I am very happy to use the word “condition”—we all use it quite casually, including me—but we are concerned about legislation here. As I explained, if we include the term “medical condition”, courts could interpret that as a development—an addition—to the existing law on terminal illness, which refers only to illness and disease. The courts would be right to conclude that Parliament meant more than illness or disease, which is why it is important to be explicit about what we are talking about: illness or disease.

I think we should remove that term, but if other Members do not, I would like to understand why. The hon. Members for Harrogate and Knaresborough or for Spen Valley might have some suggestions, but I would be grateful if somebody could clarify, explicitly, what is meant by “medical condition” that is not caught by the terms “illness” or “disease”. What are the meanings of the three terms, and why do we have to have “medical condition”? It might well be that there are conditions that would not be captured by “illness” or “disease” that would be appropriate.

On that point, I will quote directly from Chris Whitty’s evidence to the Committee:

“there are people who may not have a single disease that is going to lead to the path to death, but they have multiple diseases interacting, so they are highly frail; it is therefore not the one disease that is the cause, but the constellation that is clearly leading them on a path inexorably to…death”.––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 32, Q5.]

From my perspective, it is about that “constellation” where death is clearly going to happen as a result of a combination of different conditions, illnesses or diseases. That it is where that is very clear, and, because of the six-month eligibility in the Bill, we have that nailed down. That is the importance of including the term, because it is not one disease that leads to death; it is the constellation of diseases and illnesses that will inexorably lead to death.

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman. I thought that might be the case too, and I was wondering about that, but I am very concerned about some of the evidence that Professor Whitty gave. I regret that the hon. Member for Spen Valley has removed the role of the chief medical officer from the process that she is designing by introducing the new commissioner, but I will not be sorry to see that particular chief medical officer excluded from the process. He has made significant mistakes; he had to write to the Committee to explain that he had misrepresented the Mental Capacity Act, and, on his evidence, the Committee voted to reject certain amendments.

I am concerned about what Professor Whitty said, but if the reason for including “medical condition” is to reflect the fact that there might be multiple diseases or illnesses that, together, mean that somebody is terminally ill, that is what should be stated in the Bill. It could very well include “a combination of illnesses or diseases that amount to terminal illness”. My concern is about this new concept of a medical condition, which, as I have said, implies something different from a disease or illness.

The Bill would say “the person’s death in consequence of illness or disease”—if we remove “medical condition” —so that would be the qualification or eligibility. If there is a number of illnesses or diseases that amount to a fatal prognosis, that would be captured in the clause, even once we have excluded medical condition, because the singular “illness” or “disease” would, as I understand it from our guidance on statutory interpretation, include the plural. If it is about there being a number of illnesses or diseases that add up to a fatality, the Bill as I propose to amend it would be adequate to the scenario that the hon. Member for Sunderland Central described and that Professor Whitty accounted for. The question is, what is additional illness or disease, or illnesses or diseases, that are captured by the term “medical condition”?

Let me give a quick example. Amyotrophic lateral sclerosis is described as a condition rather than a disease or an illness. ALS is not dissimilar to motor neurone disease, but nevertheless people regard themselves as having a condition rather than a disease.

Again, I am interested in that, because I would be surprised if that condition were not adequately captured by the term “illness” or “disease”. If not, we should seek further clarification, because we need to be very specific. Illness or disease has been adequate; it is adequate in the current law on terminal illness for eligibility for benefits and pensions. I await clarification on what is added by the term “medical condition”, because my concern is that it opens the door to frailty. Going back to Chris Whitty’s evidence, I am concerned at his suggestion that frailty should be an eligible condition for an assisted death.

I will wrap up shortly so that hon. Members have time to speak to other amendments, but I will quickly refer to amendment 181 tabled by the hon. Member for Spen Valley and amendment 11 tabled by my hon. Friend Sarah Bool, which attempt to do the same thing as my amendments. They seek to protect disabled or mentally ill people, but they do so explicitly by disapplying the provisions of the Bill for those groups, or they attempt to do so. Only amendment 11 actually does, while amendment 181 fails to do so, in my view.

Let us look at subsection (3), which attempts to protect disabled people and those with mental disorders, but which, on closer inspection, is ineffective or even meaningless. In statutory interpretation, the first phrase,

“For the avoidance of doubt.” indicates that the subsection does not add anything to the Bill except clarity. It is intended not to change the law that is being enacted by the Bill, but to clarify the meaning of the Bill. My point is that it does not add anything—in fact, it signals that the clause can be disregarded. It is like an explanatory note and not actually relevant to the Bill. Its effect therefore negates the point that it tries to make. In including it, the hon. Lady protests too much and exposes the weakness that the clause fails to overcome. It invites a court to disregard the protection it pretends to offer by stating that that protection has no force except what is elsewhere in the Bill.

I agree with the hon. Member to some degree in terms of the legal drafting. I have been advised that the expression “for the avoidance of doubt” is not generally used in a Bill if the Bill is already clear, which this is—I have been reassured by parliamentary counsel about that—but I was keen, having met disabled people and disability rights activists, to have it very clearly in the Bill that by virtue of having a disability, a mental health condition or a mental disorder, someone would not be in scope of the Bill. It was a very clear drafting decision and I stand by that decision; I think it is the right thing to do so that we are clear who is not covered by the Bill.

I am grateful to the hon. Lady; it is helpful to understand her thinking. Her amendment is an attempt to further clarify her purpose, which is to communicate that we cannot have an assisted death only because of a mental disorder or a disability. I know that other colleagues will speak to that point more explicitly.

My point is that

“For the avoidance of doubt” is a massive signal to the courts that the subsection is meaningless. The advice was right that it is not usual to include that phrase, as it signals that nothing is being added. My concern is that it does not add anything, and the inclusion of the word “only” further demonstrates the hollowness of the protection that it purports to offer. The fact is that someone will still be able to get an assisted death because of a physical illness that derives from a mental disorder or disability. That is my concern with the later parts of the clause, but I will leave other Members to make that point.

There is a lot to talk about in this group and I thank you, Mr Efford, for calling me to speak. I would also like some confirmation about the term “medical condition”, and I agree with the hon. Member for East Wiltshire that we need to absolutely nail that. I am still to be convinced on the question of a condition that does not come under illness or disease but would come under “medical condition”, so I agree that we need to be very clear about what that means.

Frailty is very often diagnosed in older people and I fear that “medical condition” could be equated with that, which would open up the Bill. We need to decide whether we want to do that. Personally, I would not support that in any way. If this is an opening for that, we need to close it, so I agree with the hon. Member in that respect.

Some of the other amendments do not materially add anything to the Bill. On changing “an inevitably” to “a typically”, I do not think that would change the Bill—in fact, I think it would weaken it slightly, so I would not support amendment 123.

Both amendment 11 and amendment 181 talk about how we can exclude mental health issues as a cause for seeking assisted dying. My personal feeling is that the Bill is strong enough as introduced to exclude that. I point people to clause 2(3):

“For the avoidance of doubt, a person is not to be considered to be terminally ill by reason only of the person having one or both of—

(a) a mental disorder, within the meaning of the Mental Health Act 1983;

(b) a disability, within the meaning of section 6 of the Equality Act 2010.”

I think that is pretty tight; I do not think that people with anorexia could be given an assisted death under this legislation. That is my personal view, and I am happy to be persuaded otherwise if the whole Committee thinks we need to tighten up the measure significantly. It is important to make that very clear so that the Bill cannot be amended away from what we wish it to be. I think all of us would say that we do not want patients with anorexia to be able to access assisted dying—I have not spoken to anyone who does not agree—so the question is how we nail it down in the Bill.

I have great sympathy with amendment 11 in particular, which is clearly motivated by a desire to ensure that having a mental illness or disability alone does not qualify someone for an assisted death under the Bill. It is worth saying that clause 2(3) already does that and, therefore, the amendment is not necessary. However, the hon. Member for Spen Valley has tabled amendment 181, which further tightens that language. In my view, amendment 181 strengthens the Bill by simplifying the language to make it absolutely clear that a person is not considered to be terminally ill if they have a mental disorder or a disability alone. The chief medical officer, Professor Whitty, encouraged us to keep this simple, and that is precisely what amendment 181 does. Therefore, I support the amendment.

I rise to speak to amendment 11, which stands in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for South Northamptonshire. This is one of the areas of the Bill where we all agree on what we are trying to achieve, so it comes down to making sure that the drafting does exactly what we all intend in order to protect people.

The definition of “terminal illness” in the Bill has two components. The first is that the person has an inevitably progressive and irreversible condition; the second is that their prognosis is less than six months. An issue raised in our evidence sessions is that there is a risk that a person with a mental disorder or disability will meet that definition if they are suffering physical symptoms that mean that they satisfy both parts of the test; a possible example could be a young woman suffering with severe malnutrition as a consequence of anorexia. With respect to the point that the hon. Member for Stroud made, I agree that anorexia on its own would not qualify, but the issue arises when there is a physical manifestation from that disorder such as severe malnutrition or even diabetes, which can co-occur, as we heard in the evidence sessions.

It is clear that that is not the intention of the hon. Member for Spen Valley or anyone on the Committee, as evidenced by the inclusion of subsection (3). I thank the hon. Member for making that point; it is much welcomed. However, in oral evidence, Chelsea Roff said that

“we have case law in the UK where people with anorexia are being found to be terminal. We have to take that reality into account.” ––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 29 January 2025; c. 153, Q194.]

Before I get into amendment 11, which aims to address the issue, it is important to understand what clause 2(3) is trying to do. It reads as follows:

“For the avoidance of doubt, a person is not to be considered to be terminally ill by reason only of the person having one or both” of a mental disorder or a disability; it refers to the relevant bits of law. As my hon. Friend the Member for East Wiltshire has set out, the words “for the avoidance of doubt” make it clear that this is a clarifying subsection that does not make any change to the rest of clause 2. It appears to be clarifying that mental disorders and disabilities alone will never qualify someone for assisted dying—I think we all concur with that—unless they also have a physical condition that meets the terminal illness test, namely that it is inevitably progressive and irreversible and that the person has a prognosis of less than six months.

This is where the problem lies. If someone has a physical condition arising from their mental illness, such as severe malnutrition resulting from anorexia, and if the physical condition meets the definition of a terminal illness, they will qualify. As the Royal College of Psychiatrists said in its position statement:

“The wording of the Bill could also be interpreted to include those whose sole underlying medical condition is a mental disorder. While anorexia nervosa, for example, does not itself meet the criteria for terminal illness as it is not an ‘inevitably progressive illness, disease or medical condition which cannot be reversed by treatment,’ its physical effects (for example, malnutrition) in severe cases could be deemed by some as a terminal physical illness, even though eating disorders are treatable conditions and recovery is possible even after decades of illness.”

To remedy the issue, amendment 11 would remove the words “For the avoidance of doubt”, to make this a legally effective clause, rather than just a clarifying one. That means that it is providing an additional safeguard to those with mental disorders and/or disabilities. It would also remove the word “only”, to ensure that a physical condition resulting from a mental disorder or a disability will not make a person eligible for assisted dying. The amendment is further bolstered by amendment 283, tabled by the hon. Member for York Central, which would make it clear that comorbidities arising from a mental disorder do not qualify a patient for an assisted death.

I thank the hon. Member for Spen Valley for tabling amendment 181 to try to address the issue, but I do not believe that would quite solve the problem, which is quite a tricky one. “For the avoidance of doubt” would still be there, as would “only”. The sentence beginning with “Nothing in this subsection” makes it crystal clear that if a condition meets the six-month condition and the rest of the definition, it will be considered a terminal illness. There is therefore no exclusion for physical symptoms manifesting from mental illness or disability, which I think is what we are all trying to get to.

In my view, the only amendment that would address the issue is amendment 11, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for South Northamptonshire. It would remove both “For the avoidance of doubt” and “only”, and would therefore better ensure that a physical condition resulting from mental illness or a disability does not make a person eligible for assisted dying.

I rise to speak to amendments 10, 181 and 283. I will start with amendment 10, which is very significant: it would make a small but crucial change to clause 2.

Order. I think you are speaking to the wrong amendment.

Sorry, I mean amendment 11. Thank you, Mr Efford.

I think it will be helpful to spell out what the Bill currently says, and what it would say if amendment 11 were adopted. I will also set why the amendment would provide a much stronger safeguard than amendment 181, which was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley.

Clause 2(3) states:

“For the avoidance of doubt, a person is not to be considered to be terminally ill by reason only”

—I stress the word “only”—

“of the person having one or both of—

(a) a mental disorder, within the meaning of the Mental Health 1983;

(b) a disability, within the meaning of section 6 of the Equality Act 2010.”

If amendment 11 is agreed to, clause 2(3) will read:

“A person is not to be considered to be terminally ill by reason of the person having one or both of—

(a) a mental disorder, within the meaning of the Mental Health 1983;

(b) a disability, within the meaning of section 6 of the Equality Act 2010.”

That may seem a very small change, but it is an extremely important one.

The Bill, as presented to Parliament on Second Reading, would allow someone to qualify for assisted dying if they had a mental health condition such as anorexia nervosa and a physical condition such as malnutrition. To put it with absolute bluntness, that means that somebody with anorexia nervosa could stop eating until they suffered so badly from malnutrition that two doctors prognose that the patient is likely to die within six months. That person, under the Bill, would then qualify for assisted dying.

This is a really important discussion and I am so glad that we are having it—some brilliant points have been made. As someone who has worked with people with anorexia, I am very aware of the sensitivities of the condition and the issues around it. Would my hon. Friend agree that, as part of this discussion, we have to consider the capacity assessment of people with eating disorders? It is a very serious mental health condition; it would require a lot for somebody with anorexia to pass the capacity threshold for making a decision of this magnitude. It is certainly the sort of instance where I would be very surprised if a doctor did not refer to an eating disorder specialist. Does my hon. Friend agree that we have to look at the condition and how the patient should be cared for holistically?

Order. I remind hon. Members that there are a set of amendments in the next group about anorexia. Let us not go too far down this road.

I absolutely agree with my hon. Friend that there need to be specialists—we will come to that debate later. Let me bring our debate back to the amendment we are discussing. I understand that the Bill is drafted so that people who suffer mental disorders, such as anorexia nervosa, cannot qualify for assisted death—when my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley sets that out, I have absolutely no reason to doubt it—but that is not enough to safeguard people with such disorders. As we know, people with anorexia can and have stopped eating until they suffer advanced malnutrition, which is a physical disorder. In some cases, that malnutrition becomes so advanced that doctors will prognose death within six months.

If we wish to protect people with anorexia and other eating disorders, we must rewrite the Bill. We must ensure that people who have those disorders, and who also have a physical disorder, cannot qualify for assisted dying. I must underline that this is not a hypothetical point or some clever objection that has been dreamed up without reference to the real world. It has actually happened—not once, but dozens of times in countries that have assisted dying.

The Committee received written evidence from a group of eight specialists on eating disorders: Chelsea Roff, who also gave compelling evidence in person before the Committee, and seven medical doctors from the UK, Canada, the US and Australia. The written evidence number is TIAB54. The group surveyed existing statistics published by jurisdictions that have assisted dying laws. These jurisdictions publish some evidence on which conditions and disorders people were suffering from when they received an assisted death. I say “some” evidence, because what many of the jurisdictions publish is not very detailed or clear; instead, it is opaque. The research by Chelsea Roff and her associates found that in three US states—Oregon, California and Colorado—people had qualified for assisted dying through having anorexia or other eating disorders.

We cannot say how many people in Oregon received assisted death because they suffered anorexia, and that is because people with anorexia are not listed in a separate category in the Oregon statistics. Instead, they form part of the “other” category in the state’s statistics on the disorders or illnesses of assisted dying recipients. One witness asserted before the Committee that in Oregon there had been only “one or two” assisted deaths of people with anorexia. I think all members of the Committee found that attitude shocking—well, I certainly did. This issue was termed a “red herring”—“It’s only one or two.” For me, one death that should not happen is one too many. Beyond that, the claim is not verifiable, because Oregon’s data does not allow us to check how many people with anorexia have received an assisted death. We cannot say that there have been only one or two. Maybe there were that many, but maybe there were more.

Let us assume for the sake of argument that there were one or two assisted deaths of people with anorexia in Oregon. The population of England and Wales is more than 14 times that of Oregon, so we can expect many times more people with anorexia to seek an assisted death in England and Wales than in Oregon. I have heard it said that most of the cases of people with eating disorders receiving assisted dying were in the Netherlands or Belgium—indeed, my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley mentioned that to me last week—but we cannot say how many such cases there have been in jurisdictions around the world with any degree of accuracy. The data does not make it clear how many there have been.

My hon. Friend is making a powerful point. Does she agree that the reporting and data around assisted dying are fundamental? That is why it is important that, if the law is to change in this country, we get that absolutely right. What we propose in the Bill is closest to the laws in Australia, and in my understanding there have been no assisted deaths of people with anorexia in Australia. However, my hon. Friend makes a valid point about the accuracy of reporting; we do not know whether those examples were people with anorexia who happened to have cancer as well. We just do not know, and that is not good enough.

I absolutely agree that if the Bill is to get through Parliament, it has to have those mechanisms and safeguards in place, but I am sure we will come to those later. If we do not know with any reasonable degree of accuracy how many cases there have been worldwide, we cannot say where the majority of such cases have occurred. When we are told that there have been zero assisted deaths of people with anorexia in Australia, I would err on the side of caution—another witness said that there were zero deaths involving coercion.

I understand that my hon. Friend’s amendment 181 also attempts to change clause 2, but the change would still allow people to qualify for an assisted death if they had a mental disorder alongside a physical disorder. I have no doubt that this stems from a compassionate desire not to exclude—for example, someone who has mild depression and a major physical illness—but its effect is to create a major risk for people suffering from both a mental health disorder that affects their eating and a physical disorder caused by not eating. To avoid that risk, the Bill must be much more tightly worded than it was when presented to the House on Second Reading, and it must be much more tightly worded than amendment 181 would make it.

We must make it much harder in the Bill for people to qualify for assisted death by way of having malnutrition caused by an eating disorder. It is a complex problem, and I believe no one amendment will solve it completely. I have submitted two amendments with the aim of making a contribution. Amendment 11 would also make a significant contribution to solving the problem, and I urge all Members to support it.

I turn to amendment 181, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley. Although the Acts mentioned in clause 2 define mental illness and disability as being taken from the clear medical model, it is not clear if she is further suggesting that a new definition should be used—for instance, the social model. Someone could have a significant impairment under a social model of disability, and for the purposes of the Bill, not consider themselves to be a disabled person. Therefore, they could qualify for an assisted death, thus rendering the provision of no worth.

It is therefore unclear what my hon. Friend is similarly proposing with regard to mental illness. Amendment 11 is needed to provide assurance that if someone does have a mental illness, then it is tightly defined and would preclude them from being able to access an assisted suicide, in case the reason they are seeking it is the mental illness and not the terminal diagnosis. I will speak further on that later.

If amendment 181 was agreed to, the clause would read that a person is not to be considered terminally ill

“only because they are a person with a disability”.

There are two obvious problems with the amendment. First, the amendment removes references to the Equality Act 2010 and the Mental Health Act, which previously defined who did and did not have a disability or a mental health disorder, but having removed those definitions, it does not then define disability or mental disorder in the Bill. What definition will medical practitioners, and indeed applicants, use to determine who does or does not have a disability or mental disorder?

In terms of the removal of references to the Equality Act, I was not aware when the Bill was initially drafted that cancer is actually classed as a disability. Given the fact that in some countries 70% of assisted deaths are for cancer patients, it would seem ridiculous to exclude cancer patients from having the option of assisted death. I hope that goes some way towards explaining that point.

I thank my hon. Friend for clarifying that—that is really helpful. But where does the amendment leave us in terms of disabled people? I am just trying to understand.

The concepts of a mental disorder and a disability are well understood, and those terms are well used. In the eyes of the law, we would not need to provide a definition of those in the Bill, but the removal of the reference that would include people with cancer is an important thing to do.

I appreciate that cancer does come under disability, and that people with cancer can identify as a disabled person, but my initial thought is that that weakens the Bill.

The fact that cancer is included in the Equality Act definition does expose a concern about the Bill. It suggests that there is a real connection there, which is of concern. I think the solution is to accept the amendment 11 and ensure that disabled people and those with mental health conditions would not be eligible for assisted dying, and then to introduce a further amendment—either now, as a manuscript amendment, or later—to exclude cancer from the definition. That is a tidying-up exercise that could be done in light of the point that the hon. Member for Spen Valley made about the reference in the Equality Act. The most important thing is that we tighten the clause to protect disabled people.

I wonder whether my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley has considered whether she would tighten the clause. Have any options been explored, and what have the Government said about her removal of the Equality Act—

Order.

The Chair adjourned the Committee without Question put (Standing Order No. 88).

Adjourned till this day at Two o’clock.