Nye Cominetti gave evidence.

We will now hear oral evidence from Nye Cominetti. We have until 1 pm for this panel. Could you briefly introduce yourself, Nye?

Nye Cominetti:

Hello, everyone. Thanks for inviting me along today. I am principal economist at the Resolution Foundation, a think-tank based just down the road. Our mission is to improve living standards for families on low to middle incomes. As part of that, we research and write about the labour market, along with various other issues. We have been interested in the employment reforms since they have been under way.

Q Good afternoon. May I come back to the question I put to the previous panel about the Regulatory Policy Committee’s verdict on the impact assessments for the Bill? I am confident—unless you shout me down instantly—that the Resolution Foundation will have looked at that and have done some research around it. Do you share the Regulatory Policy Committee’s assessments, including that eight of the impact assessments for the Bill are “not fit for purpose”?

Nye Cominetti:

Sorry, is the question whether the impact assessment is fit for purpose or whether the regulations themselves are fit for purpose?

Well, the Regulatory Policy Committee has said that eight of the impact assessments for this Bill—the separate columns—are not fit for purpose. Do you think the Bill had its tyres kicked hard enough before it went into Second Reading and Public Bill Committee?

Nye Cominetti:

It is very hard to assess the impact of the Bill, as many of the details are yet to be determined. The Government said that they wanted to do this within their first 100 days, and they managed to do so, but that meant that they had to leave many “fill in the blank later” bits in the Bill, so I do not particularly blame the civil servants in the Department for Business and Trade for having struggled to come up with clear numbers on the costings and the potential impact.

For example, on the right to a regular contract, the impact on business will depend on how “low” is defined, in terms of the qualifying threshold that workers will have to reach. It will depend on how businesses have to go about making the offer to workers. It will depend on how regularly those offers have to be made, which relates to the reference period. In the light of all those unknowns, it would be very difficult for the Department to have come up with firm numbers. I think in the end they said £5 billion, but it is hard to know whether that is a good or a bad number.

I would not be so negative as to say that they have failed in any sense; I just think that they were given a very difficult job. As more detail becomes available, it would be great if the civil servants who have already put a lot of thought into the process could come back and say, “Now that we know a bit more about what is actually going to be happening, here is our updated view on what the impact of the regulations might be.”

Q Has the Resolution Foundation attempted to put a number on the impact on the economy, positive or negative, of this Bill?

Nye Cominetti:

No. I can describe in general terms how we might think about the potential impact, but I think any researcher or economist who tried to put a number on it would be misleadingly specific or misleadingly accurate. Not only do we not know what the direction of the impact might be—it could be that there are small positive or negative impacts on the size of GDP—but it is very hard to get a sense of the scale of the impacts. If you want some kind of judgment, the impact on economic growth will probably be very low—very close to zero. My expectation is that it will possibly be negative, but that is an incredibly hard judgment to reach, because you can point to impacts in both directions.

It is very uncertain, but the important point to make is that that does not mean that we should not be going ahead with these reforms. We should not be pursuing only those reforms where we can say, “The impact on GDP will be x,” even if not very confidently. One of the first things that this Bill should do is improve working lives for workers. It may be that we cannot put a monetary value on that, or that there is no associated impact on GDP, but to me that is the main and the first reason why many of these reforms should be undertaken.

Q I appreciate that you will probably put caveats around this, given your previous answer, but do you have a view on whether the Bill will ultimately—ballpark—result in more jobs in the economy, the same number or fewer?

Nye Cominetti:

The same number, would be my best guess.

What do you base that on?

Nye Cominetti:

Internationally, we can draw scatter plots of the employment level in a country and the extent of employment regulation, and basically those lines come out flat. You have some countries with very high employment and very high levels of regulation, and some countries with lower employment and high regulation, so there is no clear relationship with the employment levels across countries. That is confirmed by the OECD, which has done lots of detailed work looking into the impact of periods when countries have either rowed back on reforms or expanded them.

What we do see in the employment data is that when you beef up the reforms around dismissals for individual or collective workers, you tend to see lower hiring rates. So the rate at which workers move around the economy will probably slow down if you make it significantly harder for employers to fire workers, and that gives rise to potential implications for productivity growth. Now, I still think those effects will be small. When the Office for Budget Responsibility, in one or two years’ time, starts putting the numbers into its forecasts, I expect them to be very small indeed. My expectation is that the employment level will be very, very narrowly lower if anything.

To give you some sense of scale, the OBR said it thinks that the employer national insurance contributions bill will be about £25 billion, and that that would lower the employment level in this country by 0.2%. The DBT said that it thinks the direct costs of the measures, including sick pay, are in the order of magnitude of £5 billion. If you compare those numbers, that starts to give you a sense of the scale of potential employment effects that we are talking about. I am sorry not to give you a more exciting answer, but my best guess is that the impact on employment levels will be small.

Q What is your assessment of the current landscape, in terms of security and income, for lower and middle-income earners?

Nye Cominetti:

It is a good question. One of the ways that I like to think about this package of reforms is that it extends to low-paid workers the kind of everyday flexibilities and dignities at work that people in professional jobs such as me and you take for granted. It is not the case that all low-paid workers hate their job or face the risk of losing their job every week, but it is the case that they experience a higher level of insecurity than higher-paid workers do.

You can look at that in various ways. In recessions, low-paid workers are more likely to lose their job, so they face a higher risk of losing their job in downturns. They are also more likely to rely on statutory sick pay if they fall ill, so for many low-paid workers, falling ill comes with an income shock. That is not the case for someone like me: if I fall ill, I go home and pick up an online meeting or two if I can, but if I cannot, I will get paid as normal. That is not the case for many low-paid workers, so that is a real insecurity.

Obviously, there are zero-hours contracts as well. For low-paid workers, I think roughly one in 10 is on a zero-hours contract. For higher-paid workers—the top fifth in the hourly pay distribution—it is a vanishingly small number and very uncommon indeed. I am sure that you have heard plenty of evidence about the kind of impact on security that zero-hours contracts can bring to some—not all—workers.

The most illuminating statistic is probably that 2 million workers say that they are fairly or very anxious about unexpected changes to their hours of work. You might think that that is because that comes with not just an impact on their life—“I do not know which days I’m going to be working next week, and I have to make it work alongside childcare”—but a potential income risk as well. In many respects, the working lives of low-paid workers are less secure than those of higher-paid workers. My hope is that some of these measures will go some way to redressing that balance.

Q I assume that it would be quite difficult to quantify in economic terms the impact of removing that anxiety for 2 million workers, but if you were able to have a go at that, I would be interested to hear it.

Nye Cominetti:

I would not want to try. It is not quite the same, but the closest that some studies have tried to get is saying to workers, “Would you consider this alternative job, which would improve your terms and conditions in these respects, but offer you lower pay?” That tries to get at the question of how much pay people would be willing to trade off for those other benefits, such as a more stable income or a better relationship with management.

It does not directly answer your question, but there was a study in America of Walmart workers which found that they would accept a 7% pay cut in exchange for being treated with better dignity by their managers, including things such as better advance notice of their shifts and not getting messed around late in the day to come in and pick up extra hours. I definitely cannot quantify it, but more ambitious researchers might be able to.

Q My constituency, Torbay, is sadly in the upper quartile of the most deprived constituencies. I would welcome your reflections on how the Bill could have an impact on constituencies such as mine where there are high levels of deprivation.

Nye Cominetti:

Well, I have a few caveats. First, overall employment rates are lower in high-deprivation areas, so we need to remember that all these measures will have an effect on workers, rather than those who are not working. If you want to improve income levels, this is not the place to do it. As I was just saying, however, we know that low-paid workers experience those issues of insecurity at higher rates than high-paid workers.

You also need to remember that there is not a one-for-one overlap between high pay and high income and low pay and low income. Some low-income households will have higher-paid individuals in them, but because of having a large family or having only one earner rather than two, they will still end up in that low-income category. That caveat aside, it is still the case that any measures that improve working lives for low-paid workers will have the biggest impact on lower-income households.

There are questions about what the knock-on effects are going to be. If you were really optimistic, you might say that some of these measures to improve job quality could even have a positive labour supply effect. We know that, in the 2010s, that was a big driver of improved income at the bottom and massively increased employment among low-income households. So an optimistic take on these measures might be that you could trigger some of those kinds of effects, but that is much more uncertain.

CouldQ you say more about the impact of the current system of zero-hours contracts on the individual and, more broadly, on the wider economy and the labour market? I am thinking about poor retention, disengagement and the impact on the benefits bill. How does that system affect the economy currently?

Nye Cominetti:

That is a tricky question. If measures to tackle zero-hours contracts are put in place effectively, I think that they will mainly smooth the income of those individuals rather than necessarily raise their level of pay. There might be a knock-on impact on the level of pay if workers have better outside options and can more readily bargain for pay increases or shop around for jobs, but the first effect that you would hope to achieve through these measures is smoothing pay—taking away the volatility from week to week. There is plenty of evidence that that is the element of those jobs that households struggle with most, not the level of hourly pay.

We know that, through minimum wage action, we have massively improved earnings for the lowest-paid workers, but it is the volatility that is most difficult to deal with, as I think anyone sitting here would readily agree. If someone is thinking, “Next week, my pay might go down by 20% or 50%, or maybe my hours will be zeroed down entirely,” it does not take much for us to imagine the impact of that not just on their wellbeing and psychology, but on their spending decisions. They might think, “I can’t afford to commit to that spending now, given that I’m uncertain about what my pay is going to be next week.”

If these measures are done well and genuinely smooth the incomes of those experiencing the worst volatility, I would expect improvements in individuals’ wellbeing. Potentially—again, more optimistically—you might see knock-on positive effects on the economy more broadly, if people feel more comfortable spending because they know what their pay is going to be in future. But as I have said a few times, that is definitely much more uncertain.

What about worker retention? That was the other question—

Order. Excuse me, but we are getting very tight for time.

Q I have a quick question. Do you think that some of the reforms in the Bill will genuinely help people who are disabled to go back into work in a more flexible and safer environment, and will therefore encourage them to take on employment where perhaps they are not doing that at the moment?

Nye Cominetti:

The bit of the Bill that most obviously addresses that is the right to request flexible work, which is being strengthened, as I am sure you know—employers now have to give a justification for saying no. When you look at surveys of workers with disabilities or elderly workers, flexibility is very often mentioned as something that might have helped them to stay in work.

If you will allow me to make a second point, surrounding all these measures and, in fact, our employment framework more generally, are questions of enforcement and worker power—they are sitting at the side, but they are absolutely crucial. There are many existing rights that workers have on paper, but because our enforcement systems are fairly weak, especially compared with other countries where the state does more of the job of enforcing these rights, people do not necessarily experience in reality the entitlements that the law says they should have.

Even in a world where workers gain that strengthened right to flexible work, that means little if they, for example, look at the employment tribunal system delays and think, “Well, that’s an impossibility. There’s no point fighting my employer over this. I’m never going to win that,” or, “I can’t spend the next two years waiting to win that.” So the answer is yes, but only if we also resolve some of the existing problems about people’s ability to enforce their own entitlements.

Q I was struck, in the impact assessments, by the statements that a number of the costs, but particularly more the benefits, or potential benefits, of these measures cannot currently be quantified. There are, of course, well-advertised problems with UK labour market statistics at the moment. Realistically, what more could the Government do in respect of future measures to better capture the full range of costs and benefits associated with employment law?

Nye Cominetti:

You are right: labour market statistics are not currently in a good place. The Office for National Statistics’ labour force survey is in the doldrums in terms of response rates; so if you wanted to increase the resources going into that, I would welcome that, as a researcher. Realistically, many of these knock-on benefits are incredibly hard to estimate. Personally, I think we have to accept a world where we say, we know that workers will benefit in terms of wellbeing from some of these measures. I do not think you need to put a monetary value on that to say it is worth doing, personally, but I know that is not necessarily the way that Government Departments think about these things.

In terms of the costs—businesses will be saying, “If you do this measure, I will have to reduce hiring by this much”—I think we could be moving from relying on what businesses say. I know that many businesses will be engaging with these processes in good faith, but the history, for example with the minimum wage, is for businesses to say, “If you raise this cost there will be dire consequences: job losses will look like x and y,” and in the end that does not turn out to happen because businesses find ways to adapt. That does not mean that will happen this time—there is no guarantee that you can keep pulling off the same trick of raising labour costs and not triggering an impact on employment—but looking for evidence on what has actually happened in response to similar changes in the past or in other countries, rather than relying on what businesses say, might be a better guide. But that might be controversial.

Q I am sure you welcome some of the proposed changes to statutory sick pay. One key problem with it is the level of sick pay. People still go to work ill because the level of sick pay is simply not enough: £116.75 averages 18% of the average weekly wage at the moment. That is half the equivalent percentage when it was introduced in the 1970s, and it is the lowest of all OECD countries. Would you like to see a threshold put into the Bill by which that is measured, so that we can get statutory sick pay that stops people going to work when they are ill?

Nye Cominetti:

Thank you for the question. I was hoping to get the chance to talk about sick pay specifically. That is one area where the Government have gone halfway to addressing an area of insecurity. Removing the lower earnings limit is great; the lowest earners, mainly women working few hours, all have access to SSP now, which is excellent.

Removing waiting days is an important change as well. It will no longer be the case that you have to wait four days to receive anything and, as you know, for most people who are off sick for a few days with a cold, that is a one or two-day situation, not a week. Those measures are good, but what they do is extend a very low level of coverage to more workers. As you say, we have not resolved the fundamental problem that if SSP is what you rely on, as is the case for a majority of low-paid workers, you will still face a very serious income shock if that is what your employer ends up paying you when you do that.

Raising the level of SSP comes with a much bigger cost. First, it would be employers that would pay it, and then the Government would face a decision about whether to reimburse, perhaps, smaller employers facing the largest cost, as has happened in the past. It is a more costly measure, which is why the Government have not done it, but I hope that they have it on their list to address it soon because, as you say, it remains the case that for our low-paid workers, falling sick means earning less and facing an income shock. I do not think that is right.

You can either look at high-paid workers who do not experience that shock, or you can look at the vast majority of rich countries who have set in place a statutory minimum much higher than we have in the UK. That is not the case in the US, but almost all European countries—not just the Scandinavian countries that we look to as the far end of the scale in terms of welfare state provision, but the vast majority of countries across Europe—have a sick pay system that is much more generous and offers much more protection to workers than does the system in the UK. So yes, I would agree that that remains a glaring unaddressed problem.

I am afraid that brings us to the end of the time allotted for the Committee to ask questions of this witness, and for this sitting. I thank you very much for coming along this afternoon and answering the Committee’s questions.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Anna McMorrin.)

Adjourned till this day at Two o’clock.