“(1) This section applies to any provision made by or by virtue of this Act, the Illegal Migration Act 2023, the Immigration Acts, and any legislation relating to immigration, deportation, or asylum, including the Immigration Rules within the meaning of the Immigration Act 1971.

(2) The legislation identified in subsection (1), including in relation to the enforcement of immigration policy, deportation, the granting, removal, revocation or alteration of immigration status, or asylum, or other entitlements, must be read and given effect to disregarding the Human Rights Act 1998.

(3) In the Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993, omit section 2.

(4) In the Immigration Act 1971—

(a) in section 8AA—

(i) in subsection (2), omit ‘Subject to subsections (3) to (5)’; and

(ii) omit subsections (2)(a)(ii) and subsections (3) to (6);

(b) in section 8B, omit subsection (5A).

(5) In the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002—

(a) in section 84—

(i) in subsection (1), after ‘must’ insert ‘not’;

(ii) in subsection (2), after ‘must’ insert ‘not’;

(iii) in subsection (2), for ‘section 6’ substitute ‘any section’; and

(iv) in subsection (3) after ‘must’ insert ‘not’.

(6) Where the European Court of Human Rights indicates an interim measure relating to the exercise of any function under the legislation identified in subsection (1)—

(a) it is only for a Minister of the Crown to decide whether the United Kingdom will comply with the interim measure under this section; and

(b) an immigration officer or court or tribunal must not have regard to the interim measure.”—

This new clause would disapply the Human Rights Act and interim measures of the European Court of Human Rights in relation to this Bill and to other legislation about borders, asylum and immigration.

Brought up, and read the First time.

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

New clause 33 aims to help the Government by providing a way to put securing our borders above spurious human rights claims to frustrate removal. It would disapply the entire Human Rights Act 1998, as well as any interim measures of the Strasbourg court that prevent the effective operation of legislation relating to immigration and deportation. The result would be that those seeking to appeal deportation or other immigration decisions would not be able to make human rights claims under the Human Rights Act in British courts.

The new clause would apply that new power to all aspects of immigration control, including enforcement, deportation, the granting or removal of immigration and asylum status, and any other immigration entitlements. We would expect Parliament to legislate and the Home Office to decide immigration cases based on their reasonable interpretation of the European convention on human rights, but UK judges would be able to use only UK law passed by Parliament to decide appeals, and no longer make expansive and common-sense-defying interpretations of what they claim the ECHR means.

The Human Rights Act would still apply to non-immigration matters, so UK judges could continue to apply the ECHR directly to them. We would still be under the ECHR, so applicants would still be able to go to the Strasbourg court, but the new clause would stop UK judges expanding the definitions. In that scenario, it would be possible to deport people pending a Strasbourg appeal, and it would repeat the measure in the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024 to give Ministers the power to ignore an ECHR rule 39 interim order. We are not saying that the new clause provides the full answer to controlling our borders. Wider questions such as ECHR membership and wider immigration system reforms are to be addressed in longer-term pieces of work, but the new clause would be a step in the right direction.

The reason the new clause is necessary can be seen in recent decisions about immigration appeals. For example, an Iraqi drug dealer was saved from deportation from the UK after a judge ruled that he was too westernised to be returned to his home country. That man, who was jailed for more than five years after a conviction for dealing cocaine, had lived in Britain for 24 years and has a British-born daughter. Home Office officials attempted to have him deported, but a specialist judge in the asylum tribunal ruled that returning the man to Iraq would violate his human rights as he would be viewed with suspicion. The judge said that the man, who cannot be named, would face persecution in Iraq because he would be seen as westernised.

As we have already mentioned, an Albanian criminal was allowed to stay in Britain partly because his son would not eat foreign chicken nuggets. An immigration tribunal ruled that it would be unduly harsh for the 10-year-old boy to be forced to move to Albania with his father, owing to his sensitivity around food. The sole example provided to the court was his distaste for the type of chicken nuggets available abroad.

I wonder whether the hon. Gentleman could just assume that we are familiar with those two cases by now and either not bother citing them or think of some new examples to support his arguments.

I think they are relevant; they are things that both the public and I are bothered about. They show the failings of the system and why people are so concerned about the way that it is going.

As a result, the judge allowed the father’s appeal against deportation as a breach of his right to family life under the European convention on human rights, citing the impact that his removal might have on his son. An attempt to deport a Sri Lankan paedophile, who was convicted of assaulting three teenage boys, was delayed over claims that deportation would breach his human rights.

Is the hon. Gentleman concerned more about the Human Rights Act or its application by judges?

I am concerned about the consequences of the Human Rights Act for cases such as this and its role therein.

I did not understand what the hon. Gentleman said. Is he concerned more about the judges’ application of the Human Rights Act or the Act itself?

I am concerned, in the context of this new clause, about what the Human Rights Act means for these immigration cases. That is why the new clause proposes to remove its impact and disapply it.

I am still not very clear—I apologise, maybe I ate too much at lunch. Does the hon. Gentleman have issues with the Human Rights Act such that he believes that we ought not to be applying it generally? Is this the first step towards its disapplication, or is he more concerned that, while the legislation is fine, we have in what seems a minority of cases judges who are not applying it correctly? Could he also tell me whether what he has here is a snapshot of cases that he is concerned about or the totality of cases that he is concerned about?

We have talked about the relevance of disapplying the Human Rights Act with regards to immigration and the impact that it is having on these cases. I think I have been clear, and the hon. Gentleman can read Hansard.

As I was saying, the man was jailed for five offences of sexual activity with a child but has been able to stay in Britain since 2011, owing to a protracted dispute over his asylum case. In 2012, the man, who cannot be named, was branded in court a “danger to the community” over his offences against boys aged between 13 and 15. He then applied for asylum by claiming that his life would be at risk were he to return to Sri Lanka, because he is gay. Since his initial application, his case has been through several court hearings, as judges have assessed whether deporting the 50-year-old would breach his human rights. Those are just three examples of how ever-expanding interpretations of the Human Rights Act have been increasingly frustrating the removal of those who objectively ought to be deported.

That was a helpful clarification to my earlier question about whether what the hon. Gentleman is citing represents a snapshot or the totality—he says that they are three of the total number. How many, in total, has he looked at that have caused him such alarm?

I think if we allowed first-tier tribunals to go public, we would see a lot more. These things undermine public confidence in the legal framework and the institutions that uphold them, and I think they are terribly wrong. One of these cases is one too many. They are happening in ever-increasing numbers; that is why we have tabled this new clause, and the hon. Gentleman will have the opportunity to vote for it or otherwise.

Our new clause represents a first step to restore some common sense to immigration appeals. New clause 33 steps up to wrest back control from a judiciary that has wandered far from the reservation, turning the Human Rights Act into a sprawling, open-ended blank cheque for immigration status, a carte blanche that has left us all scratching our heads at the sheer audacity of it.

That is also a helpful clarification, because the hon. Gentleman’s concern is with the judiciary and its behaviours. Can I clarify what he has just said, exactly as I heard it: his concern is purely about the judge’s application of the Human Rights Act, and he himself is absolutely fine with the Act?

We allow our domestic courts to use it. We have created the framework and put it in place, and they do what they can with what is in front of them. I am concerned about the way in which it is applied, and we need to change that if we want to impact the outcomes of those cases and appeals.

Last year alone, we saw far too many appeals built on article 8, the right to a family life, flooding courts with ridiculously broad pleas. This Parliament is elected to decide the laws of the land. Judges are there to uphold that law, yet they have morphed into border gatekeepers, perched on high and second-guessing Home Office decisions with interpretations so elastic they would snap any thread of reason, and family life ballooning to mean whatever they fancy on any given day. The new clause yanks that power back to where it belongs: with MPs, who are answerable to the people who elect them.

New clause 33 is not just a legal tweak; it is a turbocharge for a deportation system bogged down by endless appeals, with removals stalled by Human Rights Act challenges. Each case drags on, costing tens of thousands of pounds per detainee in legal fees and housing, and clogging up detention centres that are already at capacity. Disapplying the Human Rights Act for immigration would fix the logjam, letting Ministers and officials act fast, deporting those our domestic legislation was created to deport and freeing up resources for border patrols and visa processing, which actually keep us secure.

New clause 33 would restore public safety—a lifeline for a priority that has been fraying at the edges and unravelling thread by thread, as dangerous individuals exploit Human Rights Act loopholes to cling to our soil like barnacles on a ship. In 2024 alone, thousands of foreign national offenders—thieves, drug peddlers and worse—languished in UK prisons, costing taxpayers millions to house. Nowhere near enough were bundled on to planes and removed, leaving thousands to stroll out post their sentence, free to roam our streets, because of Human Rights Act claims tying our hands and deviating from Parliament’s intended outcomes.

New clause 33 would cut through that mess. It would mean swift, no-nonsense removal of those who have shattered our laws—not endless hand-wringing debates over some nebulous right to stay that keeps them loitering in our towns. Public opinion, or the view of British law-abiding taxpayers, is clear—nearly three quarters call for foreign criminals to be removed—yet here we are. The current set-up lets threats fester when they should be gone. As the months go by, more of these bizarre judgments emerge, undermining public confidence in the entire system and our legal institutions.

Let us take a tour beyond our shores, because other nations are not fumbling in the dark; they are lighting the way, showing us that this is not some wild, radical leap but a steady, proven path that we would be daft not to tread. For starters, France increased its deportations by 27%, and is also seen to be deftly side-stepping ECHR interim measures, with domestic law overrides. Twenty-seven per cent. sent home—no faffing about with Strasbourg rule 39 edicts; just a clear-eyed focus on keeping France’s borders taut and its streets secure.

Then there is Australia, where the Migration Act does not blink. Rights claims bow to border control, and many are whisked out yearly with minimal fuss. The law, created by those elected to do so, determines who stays and who goes. These are not rogue states; they are democracies—proud and pragmatic, balancing security with sovereignty. New clause 33 strides right into that company. Parliament would lay down the law, not Strasbourg’s fleeting winds, echoing what has clicked abroad, from Paris to Perth.

I would be interested in the Minister’s thoughts on this proposal—in particular, whether she thinks that some of the recent examples of failed deportations are acceptable. We are apparently very familiar with chicken nugget-gate. If she agrees that some of these outcomes are unacceptable but does not feel that this approach is the way forwards, how will the Government end these cases, which are making a mockery of our justice system and undermining public confidence in our legal institutions?

I am compelled again to rise in opposition to what is probably the most egregious of all the new clauses that we are having to consider in today’s marshalled groups. The hon. Gentleman has laid some competition before us, but this new clause is by far the most disgraceful and appalling. The Human Rights Act is an important guarantee. It is what makes us good world citizens and provides rights that are universal. It protects fundamental freedoms such as the right to life, the prohibition on torture and the right to a fair trial—and the Tories do not like it one bit. The right-wing nonsense that we heard from the hon. Gentleman is a fundamental departure from the principle that human rights apply universally, not just to those the Government deem worthy. It is a dangerous precedent that undermines the UK’s long-standing commitment to justice, fairness and the rule of law.

The Human Rights Act incorporates the ECHR into British law. The new clause would disapply the Act in immigration cases, effectively removing domestic judicial oversight and shifting the burden to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. I listened to the hon. Gentleman very carefully, and I still do not know whether he thinks that is a good thing or not. It is not taking back control; it is arguably outsourcing decision making to an international body, creating delays and legal uncertainty. Perhaps we will get some more from him when he sums up on the new clause, but this proposal would take decisions about immigration cases out of the hands of the judiciary and hand them to politicians. I cannot think of anything scarier than the hon. Gentleman being in charge of determining asylum cases, and I think that prospect would appal most ordinary people in this country.

The Leader of the Opposition argues that some foreign criminals and illegal migrants are using the Human Rights Act to avoid deportation. What we have just heard is that the Conservatives want to dismantle human rights because of chicken nuggets. The idea that the entire human rights framework should be dismantled to address a few egregious cases is quite simply absurd. The Conservatives left the asylum system in chaos, spent hundreds of millions of pounds on the failed Rwanda scheme and presided over record high small boat crossings, and now they want to strip basic rights from an already vulnerable group.

The ECHR was established right after the end of world war two to promote human rights, freedom and democracy. One of its driving forces was Winston Churchill, the wartime statesman revered by Conservatives and Brexit supporters as a symbol of British independence and self-reliance. The UK was the first nation to ratify the convention, drafted in 1950 and enacted in 1953, and it formed a broader set of commitments agreed by signatories to the 46-member Council of Europe, of which the UK remains a member despite its departure from the EU.

I do not often agree with former Tory chairmen, but I agree with Lord Patten when he gave a clear condemnation of the move to leave the ECHR, calling it “absolute drivel”. In the Conservative party’s obsession with the ECHR, and their “will they, won’t they?” about leaving it, we have never yet heard clarity on this. It is little more than a political distraction, designed to scapegoat supranational institutions instead of taking responsibility. It is dangerous territory, and I urge colleagues to make sure that this is thoroughly rejected right out of hand.

In November 2024, a Congolese paedophile who sexually assaulted his own stepdaughter was allowed to remain in the UK despite the Government’s attempts to deport him, out of concern that forcing him to leave the country would interfere with his right to a family life. In December 2024, a Turkish heroin peddler was allowed to stay in the UK because it was ruled that deporting him would interfere unduly with his family life, despite the fact that he had returned to Turkey eight times since coming to Britain.

In February of this year, a Nigerian woman who was refused asylum eight times was allowed to remain in the UK because it was decided that her membership of a terrorist organisation might make her subject to persecution in her home country. Earlier this month, a Nigerian drug dealer escaped deportation because he believed that he was suffering from “demonic forces”. Meanwhile, Samuel Frimpong, a Ghanaian fraudster, has been allowed to return to the UK, having being deported 12 years ago, after claiming that he is depressed in his home country.

The list goes on and on. Absurd asylum rulings from our tribunal system seem to emerge on an almost daily basis. What do these cases have in common? In each one, a potentially dangerous person was spared deportation because of our membership of the European convention on human rights, and, crucially, the domestic legislation that enshrines the convention in British law—the Human Rights Act. This legislation is clearly not fit for purpose when it comes to managing and securing the border. It is enabling dangerous foreign criminals to remain in the UK, and putting the British public at risk.

It is time we recognised that decisions about asylum and immigration should be made by politically accountable Ministers, rather than by unaccountable judges and tribunals. That is the purpose of our new clause, which seeks to disapply the Human Rights Act and interim measures of the European Court of Human Rights in relation to the Bill and other legislation about borders, asylum and immigration.

Just to clarify, I think the hon. Lady is saying clearly that what she intends to do is to take decisions about immigration out of the hands of judges, and leave them in the hands of politicians. Is that her intention?

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his question—yes, I think it is fundamentally important that decisions about who can be and remain in our country are made by people who are accountable to the public.

Will the hon. Lady give way?

I will make a little progress.

The concept of universal rights is clearly a good one. It is one of the great gifts to humanity of the Judeo-Christian tradition to recognise that every human life has inherent worth, and every human being should be treated with the dignity that that inherent worth confers. But any set of rules that people might write over time can be distorted or abused, or exploited to take advantage of our society, our kindness and the British impulse and instinct towards trust, tolerance and generosity. Our rules and laws on human rights, and the organisations to which we belong that were created in the name of human rights, should be subject to scrutiny and debate no less than any other rules and laws. Lord Jonathan Sumption, the former Supreme Court judge, said that the United Kingdom’s adherence to the European convention on human rights

“raises a major constitutional issue which ought to concern people all across the political spectrum.”

It is right for us to interrogate our rules. Indeed, that is arguably our main job and the fundamental reason we have been sent here by our constituents. None of our laws should be above repeal, replacement or disapplication, and that must include the Human Rights Act. We are among the luckiest people in the world in that we live in a democracy, and one that I believe has the world’s greatest people as its voters. When the British people see repeated activity that contravenes our national common sense, politicians in Westminster must acknowledge that and do something about it.

If the Government do not wish to disapply the Human Rights Act and interim measures of the European Court of Human Rights in matters of asylum and immigration in order to control the border and put a stop to the perverse cases and decisions we are seeing relentlessly arise in the courts, what is their solution? How will they restore common sense, fairness and the primacy of public safety to the security of the border?

Before I call the Minister, I will just point out that Erskine May urges us not to be critical of judges in UK superior courts. I am sure hon. and right hon. Members will wish to be circumspect in their remarks.

I am not sure how much of the debate we could have heard, Dr Murrison, had you made that observation at the beginning of it.

I do not think this Government wish to join Belarus and Russia among those who are not signed up to the European Court of Human Rights. The Government are fully committed to the protection of human rights. When we talk about human rights, that means all people who are human: everybody, applied universally.

As the Prime Minister has made clear, the United Kingdom is unequivocally committed to the European convention on human rights. The Human Rights Act is an important part of our constitutional arrangements and fundamental to human rights protections in the UK. To start taking those away on a bit-by-bit basis, particularly beginning with people who are very unpopular and have done difficult or bad things, could be the start of a very slippery slope if we are not careful. That is why I am proud that our Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill has printed on its front cover that it is compatible with convention rights. This Government will always do things that are compatible with convention rights.

The paradox of some of what has been said in the debate we have just had is that it politicises decisions. That is a very different approach to judicial issues from the one we have seen for very many years, where, in effect, a lot of the powers on particular issues that used to sit with the Home Secretary have been taken by judges who are publicly accountable for their decisions. I do not think that this Government would want to see that reversed. The paradox of new clause 33 is that all those who potentially had a human rights claim, whatever their circumstances, could go straight to the Strasbourg court, which would clog up that court. As the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire pointed out, that is not taking back control, it is abrogating it, and would flood the Strasbourg court with decisions that could have sensibly been taken here.

That is not to say that any one of us would not be frustrated by particular individual decisions, but I caution against using decisions that have been only partially covered or talked about on the front pages of The Daily Telegraph, which often takes decisions in cases out of context. We have talked a lot about chicken nuggets, and I would just put on the record that that case is being appealed, and judicial activities on that case have not yet finished.

With that commitment to human rights and European convention rights, I hope that Opposition Members will think about some of the potential consequences of what they are suggesting in chopping up human rights and wanting to put us in the same company as Belarus and Russia; about the way convention rights were developed; and about the benefits that adhering to human rights frameworks has given us as a democracy over the years.

I am sure that the Minister must disagree with some of the examples that we have seen, and agree that they undermine public trust in the judiciary, legal institutions and the frameworks we have. What is the solution? Must we grin and bear the appalling outcomes of those cases or is there a solution? How does she propose to stop such things happening?

I would respectfully say that the hon. Gentleman’s party had many, many years to think of a solution, and most of the cases that Opposition Members have raised today had their genesis in the years that they were in power. Close to the very end, as they became more and more frustrated, they started coming up with more and more outlandish approaches.

Obviously, one wants the entire judicial process to be used, as speedily as possible, and if the Home Office wishes to appeal a particular case, it will do so. We keep a constant eye on the issues and we think about reforms that we could make. Obviously the hon. Gentleman will be the first to hear if we decide to make changes, but we do not wish to abrogate from the Human Rights Act, the ECHR and the human rights framework. That is where we and other Opposition parties differ from him and his party. That is why I do not accept new clause 33 and I hope that the Committee will vote against it if it is pressed to a vote.

I hope it was clear in my remarks, but for the avoidance of doubt or ambiguity I want to say that the Opposition do not criticise our judges. Indeed, as my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton West said, they are doing the best they can with the rules and precedents under which they operate. That is why the new clause seeks to change those rules—

With the greatest respect, a reading of the Hansard report of what the hon. Member for Stockton West said would be contrary to what the hon. Lady has just asserted. What the hon. Gentleman said could in no way, shape or form be described as complimentary to or supportive of judges. In fact, it was very undermining of judges.

My hon. Friend clearly said that judges are doing the best they can with the rules and precedents that they have been set. I have described our judges as unaccountable to the public. That is not a criticism: it is a fact.

The public are appalled by these cases. The hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire does not want us to change legal frameworks over chicken nuggets: if the Human Rights Act creates a situation in which criminals, rapists and paedophiles are able to stay against domestic law and the intentions of the people charged with making that law, it is unacceptable. We feel strongly about this and wish to divide on the matter.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

The Committee divided: Ayes 2, Noes 14.

Question accordingly negatived.