I beg to move amendment 5, in schedule 1, page 8, leave out lines 15 and 16 and insert—

“3  A relevant Parliamentary select committee will hold a pre-appointment hearing with the Secretary of State’s preferred candidate for Commissioner.

3A The select committee may hold a confirmatory vote on the Secretary of State’s preferred candidate for Commissioner.

3B Where a select committee has expressed a negative opinion on the appointment of the Secretary of State’s preferred candidate for Commissioner, the Secretary of State may not proceed with the appointment of that candidate without appearing before the select committee to address the concerns raised by the committee.

3C If the select committee maintains its negative opinion following the further appearance of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of State may not proceed with the appointment of that candidate.

3D Where a select committee has expressed a positive opinion on the appointment of the Secretary of State’s preferred candidate for Commissioner, including after a further appearance before the committee of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of State may recommend the appointment of the candidate to His Majesty.

3E The Commissioner is to be appointed by His Majesty on the recommendation of the Secretary of State.”

This amendment would mean that the Commissioner can only be appointed after appearing before a relevant select committee and obtaining its approval.

As numerous hon. Members have outlined, it is incredibly important that the role of the commissioner be completely independent and be scrutinised across the parties. We feel it is important for a parliamentary Select Committee to play a role in the commissioning process. It would allow cross-party consensus and would ensure that the commissioner, whoever they may be, is truly independent and can make the right decisions and examinations as appropriate.

I declare an interest: I served on the Defence Committee for about seven years. Over the years, there has been a debate about the extent to which the Defence Committee and other Select Committees should have power over appointments in the relevant Department.

If I can draw a quick analogy, the United States Congress has a slightly different constitutional settlement from ours, but its Committees tend to be much more powerful than ours. They and their Appropriations Committee counterparts have what the Americans call line-item power, so they can increase or decrease the spending on a particular defence programme. Would that for one moment the Defence Committee had had that power. I see the Minister grinning quizzically at that.

For Ajax?

The Minister mentions Ajax. I did not, but as he did, we will read that into the record.

There were times when the Defence Committee would have dearly loved that power. Had we had it, certain programmes might have suffered a different fate. In parallel, there is another important difference between the American Committee system and ours.

Will the right hon. Member give way?

If it is about Ajax, gladly.

The Committees are not comparable, are they? The American system of Select Committees is so different from ours that we are talking about apples and pears.

They are not directly comparable, but as I was coming on to say, the American Committees have a much stronger power over appointments. To illustrate my point, some debates in the American media are about whether the new Defence pick that Donald Trump is advocating may or may not come under some challenge during congressional appointment hearings. That issue only arises because the Committee has a stronger power. Here, there is an increasing trend that a Committee is allowed to interview people and express an opinion, but ultimately it cannot say no.

We all agree that the commissioner will be a very important appointment, for all the reasons that the Minister has outlined. Getting it right is really quite important. In extremis, if the Select Committee were to decide, for some good reason, that a particular candidate were not suitable for the role, would the Minister support the idea of its being allowed to veto the appointment? If not, how does the Minister envisage the Defence Committee playing a part in the appointment of this very important person?

Further to the intervention from my hon. Friend the Member for Colchester, I think the difference between the American system and the British system is stark, not least because of the level of parliamentary scrutiny in this place.

As the Minister has outlined, there is obviously a role for the Defence Committee to pass an opinion. That is our convention, and I think it works very well, in addition to the scrutiny we see from Members of all parties. If that became a problem, I am sure that both Opposition and Government Members would be tabling written questions, motions and whatever else. On Second Reading, the Chair of the Defence Committee, my hon. Friend Mr Dhesi, was clear that his Committee would look carefully at that. There is a strong difference between the American system and the British parliamentary system in that regard.

The full independent public process that will be followed for the appointment is another key difference. It is unlike the US system, which has a presidential appointment and under which there is no vetting; anyone can be appointed. We therefore have an additional stage of security, both for public and for parliamentary scrutiny. I feel that amendment 5, although well intentioned, is unnecessary.

I thank the hon. Member for Epsom and Ewell for her amendment 5. As with amendment 7, it is good to be able to place on the record our intention for how this process should work.

Amendment 5 would insert a requirement for the House of Commons Defence Committee to conduct pre-appointment hearings and to state a positive or negative opinion on the appointment of the Secretary of State’s preferred candidate for commissioner. The Secretary of State would be able to recommend their preferred candidate to His Majesty only following a positive opinion from the Committee.

I draw hon. Members’ attention to the Second Reading debate, during which the Secretary of State confirmed that the Government are keen for the Committee to exercise rigorous pre-appointment scrutiny of candidates to ensure that we appoint the best person to be the independent champion for the armed forces and service families. The hon. Lady’s amendment would certainly set a precedent for wider Government discussion. I suggest that her argument might best be directed in the first instance to the Cabinet Office, given its cross-Government leanings, rather than to the Ministry of Defence.

The Government have said that the pre-appointment scrutiny by the House of Commons Defence Committee should be vigorous and thorough. We expect it to go above and beyond the current process, precisely because the commissioner will report their recommendations to Parliament via the national security scrub in the MOD, so their role is somewhat different from the role of other commissioners who might receive pre-appointment scrutiny from other Select Committees. Their powers are designed to be greater, so a more prominent role will be given to Parliament. We are confident that the existing practices and arrangements in Parliament are robust, that they can address any concerns that the Select Committee may have about a candidate, and that we will be able to take the Committee’s views fully into account before making a recommendation to His Majesty.

The mechanics are different from those for a preferred candidate in other Departments, in so far as the candidate will have to go through top-level security clearance and presumably enhanced developed vetting. If they do not pass enhanced developed vetting, will they still be put forward as the preferred candidate? How will the mechanics work?

The hon. Member asks a fair question. We will not put forward anyone who does not pass security vetting; it is important that we place that on the record. This is a significant and prominent role. The commissioner will have access to our military bases. We do not expect, require or want them to look at anything beyond general service welfare matters, but there may be locations or people adjacent to those welfare matters that are sensitive to UK national security. That is why we have put national security powers in the Bill and why the Secretary of State has made assurances, which I am happy to repeat, that the commissioner will be security vetted. That is what service personnel and our colleagues across Government will expect. Someone who cannot pass security vetting should not be able to take up such a serious appointment in the Ministry of Defence. I am happy to give the hon. Member that assurance; I hope it reassures him.

In his short few months here, my hon. Friend the Member for Dunfermline and Dollar has established himself as formidable and forensic in his tabling of parliamentary questions to the Ministry of Defence.

You think he’s being nice. He’s not really.

I am aware that there are other people in the room who table questions to us. I will choose some adjectives carefully in due course.

The point that my hon. Friend the Member for Dunfermline and Dollar made is a fair one. The senior appointments process is well established across Government. We enjoy good scrutiny of the process ourselves, as part of its oversight by the structures around the Cabinet Office. We and the previous Government have both focused on that to ensure that the process produces the right people.

I hope that the additional pre-appointment scrutiny by the House of Commons Defence Committee, as well as the seriousness with which the Government and the Committee take the matter, will provide even more robust scrutiny. I would be very happy, where appropriate, to respond to parliamentary questions throughout the process to reassure Members that it is being conducted in a manner that is not only timely but thorough, ahead of any pre-appointment scrutiny by the HCDC.

The spirit of the Bill is to engage Parliament more in the role of this commissioner and to ensure that parliamentarians can have just as much confidence in the role as I hope our armed forces can. The whole process is designed with that in mind. On that basis, I ask the hon. Member for Epsom and Ewell to withdraw her amendment.

I thank the Minister for providing the reassurances that I think the Committee needs in order to ensure that there is absolute scrutiny. It is good to hear that there will be pre-appointment scrutiny by the Defence Committee. We hope that that will ensure that the commissioner who is appointed is truly independent. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

I beg to move amendment 9, in schedule 1, page 9, line 34, at end insert—

“(1A) The Commissioner’s staff must include a King’s Counsel, with responsibility for providing the Commissioner with advice on legal issues arising in the course of the Commissioner’s work of promoting and investigating general service welfare.”

This amendment would require the Commissioner’s staff to include a KC to provide legal advice to the Commissioner on legal issues arising in the course of their work.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 10, in schedule 1, page 10, line 33, at end insert—

“(1A) Financial assistance provided to the Commissioner by the Secretary of State must increase annually by a measure determined by the increase in the Consumer Prices Index 12-month rate published by the Office for National Statistics.”

This amendment would require the financial assistance provided to the Commissioner to increase with inflation.

Amendment 3, in schedule 1, page 10, line 39, at end insert—

“(3) The Secretary of State must ensure that the financial and practical assistance provided to the Commissioner is appropriate and sufficient to allow the Commissioner to carry out their functions.”

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to provide adequate financial and practical assistance to the Commissioner to enable it to carry out their functions.

For the convenience of the Committee, I will take amendments 9 and 10 in reverse order.

Essentially, amendment 10 is intended to ensure that the office of the commissioner is sufficiently well resourced to undertake its role effectively, independently of the Ministry of Defence. The explanatory notes to the Bill intimate that once the office is up and running, it will start off with a budget of approximately £5 million, as the Minister confirmed on Second Reading.

The Bill does not mandate a specific number of staff to assist the commissioner; it is not that prescriptive. Given that the role has a wider remit than that of the Service Complaints Ombudsman, it seems likely that more staff will be required to carry out the expanded function—not least because it will now include visits to service establishments, some of which the commissioner could be empowered to conduct on an unannounced basis, subject to certain safeguards, if they thought that the issues that they were examining merited it.

The purpose of amendment 10 is to reinforce the idea that the office should be adequately resourced by mandating the financial assistance provided by the Secretary of State, which is effectively the commissioner’s budget, should increase by at least real terms each year, defined using the consumer prices index measure of inflation, which is published by the Office for National Statistics. I hope that amendment 10 is relatively uncontroversial and that the Minister might even be tempted to accept it. We can but try.

Amendment 9 would mandate that at least one member of the commissioner’s staff be a King’s counsel.

It is an honour to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Efford. Would the right hon. Gentleman be able to give the Committee an idea of the annual cost of a King’s counsel, so that we can have an idea of what percentage of the proposed budget that would be? Why he is choosing to be prescriptive about the need for this particular element of staffing? That seems to contradict earlier pushes in amendments to safeguard the independence of the commissioner. If we are appointing a commissioner, surely we should trust them to determine the configuration of their staff.

There are two questions there. On the first, the honest answer is that it depends on the KC. In my limited experience, different King’s counsels tend to charge different rates. One would hope that the commissioner would employ someone who was good at their job, so yes there would be a public expenditure cost.

If the hon. Gentleman will permit me, I am going to come in a moment to the exact rationale for why we have sought to mandate that at least one of the commissioner’s staff should be a qualified KC; he slightly pre-empts me. But I hope I can convince the Committee that there is a genuinely good reason for doing so and I am going to produce at least one real-world example. If that satisfies the hon. Gentleman, I will make some progress. Did the hon. Member for Portsmouth North, sitting next to him, also seek to intervene or have I inadvertently answered her question?

I will come to it afterwards.

Okay, thank you.

We live in an increasingly litigious world, including the wider prevalence of so-called lawfare issues on the modern battlefield. Therefore it seems important to us that the commissioner should have access to senior legal advice in carrying out their duties. We believe that could best be provided by a qualified King’s counsel, perhaps specialising in areas of employment law and other matters that would relate to the welfare of armed service personnel and their families.

There is a live issue in the armed forces community: if they take life, which sometimes they are required to do in the service of the country, what are the legal implications for them, maybe even decades later? The issue is generally referred to as lawfare. Let me give a specific example of why this matters, Mr Efford. I am going to refer to a case that has concluded; I reassure you and your Clerk that the sub judice rule does not apply, I believe, because the case is over.

On 10 December, the BBC reported, under the heading “Ex-lawyer spared jail over false Iraq War claims”, that

“Phil Shiner was given a two-year suspended sentence at Southwark Crown Court after pleading guilty to three counts of fraud relating to legal aid claims made in 2007.”

For background,

“The former boss of Public Interest Lawyers was struck off by the Solicitors Regulation Authority in 2017 for pursuing false torture and murder allegations against British troops.”

The article continues:

“A lengthy inquiry into wider allegations of abuse at the hands of British soldiers established ‘beyond doubt’ that all the most serious allegations had been found to be ‘wholly without foundation and entirely the product of deliberate lies’.”

According to the National Crime Agency, Mr Shiner received around £3 million towards the cost of legal aid for the cases in which he was involved.

One inquiry, the so-called al-Sweady inquiry, cost the taxpayer £24 million in total. I will not go into the whole history of the al-Sweady inquiry this morning, Mr Efford, because that would probably keep us here quite a long while. The point of principle here, however, is that British forces personnel—if we went to units and talked to them, whether in the NAAFI or the officers’ mess, we would hear this—are increasingly anxious about being legally second-guessed many years after performing their duties. In the Shiner case, this man Phil Shiner made a great deal of money out of the taxpayer in trying to do that. As the BBC report makes plain, some of his work was entirely the product of deliberate lies.

To address the hon. Member for North Durham’s question directly, the issue really worries armed forces personnel. It is one reason why a number of them are now leaving. It is not the only reason; the overwhelming reason, as the Minister correctly said, is the pressure of service life on families, but it is part of that pressure. We have sought to acknowledge that this morning. We believe that to address legal issues that service personnel or their families may confront, it would be a good idea if the commissioner had access to a senior lawyer to give them accomplished and respected legal advice.

I am not a lawyer myself, but if someone goes into court it is handy in certain circumstances to have a KC’s opinion. I hope that the hon. Member for North Durham and the Committee can follow the rationale of what we are seeking to do.

rose—

At this point, I give way—hopefully it will save the hon. Member for Dunfermline and Dollar the trouble of tabling multiple parliamentary questions.

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for giving way. Perhaps I can assist him by drawing his attention to schedule 1 on page 10 of the Bill. It specifically says:

“The Secretary of State may…provide staff in accordance with arrangements made with the Secretary of State by the Commissioner”.

My reading of that is that the commissioner, should they wish to, would be able to hire a King’s counsel for specific issues. At the same time, it would preserve the independence of the commissioner: we would not be putting anything into the Bill to make Parliament direct them, and we could make sure that independence was maintained.

I commend the hon. Gentleman for his accurate reading of the legislation. On Second Reading, the Minister made the point that the legislation is drafted to be facilitative. For instance—we will come to this later—it does not necessarily define exactly what are and are not “general service welfare matters”. It provides a broad remit. But for the reasons that I hope I have been able to articulate, we believe that although the schedule that the hon. Gentleman mentioned would facilitate the Armed Forces Commissioner in seeking to appoint a legal adviser, that would have a spending implication. It could be—it is not inconceivable—that some in the Ministry of Defence would baulk at that. The intention of putting the provision into the Bill is to include beyond peradventure the right of the commissioner to seek to appoint a senior legal adviser. In a sense, it does not compel the commissioner to do that, but it gives them that power very clearly.

You say that your amendment does not tell the commissioner that they should make the appointment, but it states:

“The Commissioner’s staff must include a King’s Counsel”.

Since there is a “must”, what you just said is not correct. If we agree to this amendment, we are saying that the commissioner, who we want to be independent, will not have the choice of who they include in their staff, as my hon. Friend the Member for North Durham mentioned. Your amendment says “must include”.

Order. Can I remind Members about the use of the word “you”?

Sorry.

“You” refers to me in the Chair, not to the person opposite. Just a gentle reminder about that.

The hon. Lady is right. The amendment says that the commissioner should make the appointment; I hope we have given the rationale for why we believe that is important. What sort of KC the commissioner employed, and how often they used them, would be a matter for the commissioner: they would still have some discretion and, as has been intimated, there are KCs and KCs.

But the principle of the amendment is that the commissioner should have access to senior legal advice because lawfare is becoming more and more of an issue for armed forces personnel. For the sake of brevity, I will not read into the record a very good article that appeared in The Spectator about why people are leaving the Special Air Service because of the issue. It is a problem for retention in the armed forces, particularly in certain units, and this is an attempt to acknowledge that.

To refer back to what my hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth North said, the amendment does say that the commissioner’s staff “must” include a King’s counsel. That would effectively tie the hands of the commissioner, firmly setting that budget. I would much rather that they had flexibility, so that they could choose who they wanted to serve within their staff; should they need a KC, they would be very welcome to get one. Including that they “must” would eat that budget, which could be used elsewhere if needed.

I understand the hon. Lady’s question, and I do not want to get into an “angels on a pinhead” argument, but that member of staff could be part-time. It could be that on the staff of the commissioner is a qualified KC, but only brought into action when there is a specific legal aspect to be examined—they would not necessarily have to sit in their office five days a week waiting for a case to come in. If there was no work, then they would not necessarily be employed.

I accept that perhaps we should have put the words “part or full-time” into the amendment, but the key thing is that the commissioner would have access to a King’s counsel, even on a part-time basis, to deal with complaints that have a specific legal aspect, including aspects of lawfare. We did not mandate in the amendment that it had to be a full-time role.

I appreciate the point that the right hon. Gentleman is making about whether the role would be full-time, part-time or maybe just a few hours a week. But the fundamental issue for me is that the more restrictions or stipulations we mandate, the more we fundamentally influence the independence of the role, which was part of our open discussion on Tuesday. The more amendments, rules and procedures that we dictate, the more we weaken independence. Does he recognise that concern?

I do, but I have a contrary concern. People are leaving the armed forces in greater numbers than are joining. The other day, the Minister said— he will correct me if I have this wrong—that for every 100 who join, 130 are leaving.

indicated assent.

The Minister is nodding. We have a problem: our armed forces are shrinking. That is not necessarily purely for budgetary reasons; we are not going to get into the 2.5% of GDP discussion—I would love to, but I do not think the Chair would thank me for it. More are leaving than are joining and there are a number of reasons why. As a former Armed Forces Minister, I was commissioned by a previous Prime Minister to write a report on why people leave. It was called “Stick or Twist?”, because that essentially encapsulated the dilemma that service personnel and their families face. By the way, the decision to leave is usually a family decision—it is a kind of kitchen table conversation.

The overwhelming reason why they leave, as we have said, is the pressure of service life on family life. One reason why quite a few personnel are leaving now, however, is that they are worried about the legal implications of the work that they do and, bluntly, whether the Government have their back. That is becoming a bigger and bigger issue. If the commissioner is there to ensure the welfare of service personnel and their families, along the lines that the Minister articulated very well in the debate on clause 1 stand part, they are going to need some kind of legal capability to investigate those sorts of issues.

I take the points made by Government Members, but we are seeking to ensure that, whether it be full time or part time, the commissioner has the necessary legal firepower, for want of a better word. This comes back to the whole debate about trust; the service personnel need to be convinced that, if they have a worry or issue about lawfare, the commissioner is equipped to deal with it effectively. That is the spirit of amendment 10. I hope that the Minister will acknowledge that the issue is becoming an increasing worry for service personnel. Again, for the sake of brevity do not get me going on Northern Ireland veterans this morning. But this is a problem, and that is why the amendment was drafted.

I do not want to try the Committee’s patience, so, to summarise, we believe there is a broader issue here about the whole effect of lawfare on modern warfare—the effect it is having on both the recruitment and the retention of His Majesty’s armed forces. Having tabled the amendment to provoke a debate on that issue, and how the commissioner might help, I am very interested to hear the Minister’s response to a genuinely well-meaning suggestion.

On amendment 3, we feel that the financial and practical assistance of the commissioner must be absolutely appropriate. It is crucial that there is this resource, and that the commissioner can carry out the dual role of both promoting the welfare of service personnel and their families and improving public awareness of these issues. If those ambitions are to be met, alongside the existing responsibilities of the ombudsman role that are to be assumed into the commissioner’s remit, the commissioner needs to be properly resourced. That is why we feel that amendment 3 needs to be included in the Bill.

I am grateful for the amendments as they give me the chance to speak about a number of issues. I first turn to amendment 9, tabled by the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford. He said that the purpose of the amendment was to require the commissioner’s staff to include a King’s counsel to provide legal advice to the commissioner. I agree that the provision of quality legal advice to the commissioner is essential, and having the facility in house may well be something that a commissioner will want to specify when setting up their own office. I think it is right, however, that the commissioner should be able to make their own judgment about what type and what level of legal support they may require.

It is worth reminding the right hon. Gentleman that the commissioner looks at general service welfare matters and not the conduct of military operations, which I realise he is familiar with. I will come on to the other points that he raised subsequently, but it is worth saying that welfare matters are the commissioner’s main remit.

If you were one of the service personnel who was put through hell by Phil Shiner, that would be a welfare matter for you and your family. I could read into the record stories of stress, worry and angst that armed forces personnel have had to go through, sometimes for years, at the hands of Phil Shiner and his law firm, so let us not be over-semantic about it, Minister. For many personnel and their families, this was agonising. It jolly well is a matter of service welfare, because of the effect that it had on many people, many of whom subsequently left the armed forces, effectively in disgust. It really is a matter of welfare, and that is why we tabled the amendment.

Order. May I just say that interventions should be short?

I did say to the right hon. Gentleman that I would come back to those points, and I will do so, rather than responding immediately to his intervention.

A particular commissioner may wish to undertake an inquiry that involves many issues requiring regular and suitably senior legal input. In other circumstances, however, where a commissioner’s work is more routine in nature, it seema unnecessary to compel them to keep a costly KC on their books when other options may be more appropriate.

I should say to the right hon. Gentleman, as someone who is new to opposition—sadly, I was not new to opposition for some time—that making spending commitments is a dangerous sport. As a quick bit of maths, let us assume that the KC is full-time, that they are reasonably priced at £5,000 a day, and that they bill only for working days. Now, 260 working days a year at £5,000 a day is £1.3 million of billable time a year, or 24% of the estimated budget of the Armed Forces Commissioner, which, as we have set out in the explanatory notes, is £6.5 million, the commitment for an entire Parliament.

It is incumbent on us, in the spirit of creating an independent Armed Forces Commissioner’s office, to give the decisions on what staffing should look like to the commissioner so that they can undertake the staffing structure that is appropriate for what they have to say. However, I reassure the right hon. Gentleman that nothing in the Bill will prevent the commissioner from agreeing with the Secretary of State a policy for staffing the office that could include a legal adviser. Indeed, I suspect staffing policy would not necessarily need to go into that level of detail; it would be more about the overall numbers, costs and specific terms of service.

Agreement of staffing policy with the Secretary of State is essential to ensure that the commissioner does not set out a staffing requirement that is disproportionate to the nature of the work being undertaken. It is not a way of preventing the commissioner from accessing the advice that they need.

If the commissioner were to come to the Secretary of State and say that they would like members of the armed forces seconded permanently to their staff, what would the Secretary of State’s reaction be?

The hon. Gentleman raises a fair question. As part of establishing the Armed Forces Commissioner’s office, it may be appropriate for the commissioner to say that they would like a certain level of military expertise, be it serving or in a veteran capacity. The commissioner could have that conversation with the Secretary of State. I do not think that we would immediately volunteer or immediately deny—that would be based on the recommendations of the commissioner and the dialogue about where that sits—but I refer the hon. Gentleman to the amendment that we are making in the Bill to remove the requirement for an officer to make a decision. In one respect, we are seeking to remove military roles from the SCOAF function that can be done by a civilian. It is appropriate to ensure that if any military support is given to any part of the wider MOD family, we make the correct decision about whether it should be a military or civilian role, so we can ensure that we use the military in roles where they have the biggest impact in respect of our national security. However, I totally understand the hon. Gentleman’s point.

The right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford raised the issue of lawfare. The Government recognise that the large proportion of allegations targeted at our service personnel in Iraq were without foundation, and we acknowledge the importance of protecting our people from improper and vexatious accusations of the type perpetrated by Phil Shiner. The judgment by the court shows that Phil Shiner spread falsehoods against our brave armed forces, and the Ministry of Defence submitted evidence of his abuse to the legal system, which contributed to his being struck off. The Government are renewing the contract with those who serve and have served, and that includes protecting our personnel from improper and vexatious accusations of the type perpetrated by Phil Shiner.

The right hon. Gentleman will also be aware of the ongoing inquiry in the High Court into matters that are either the ones related or near to the ones related. He will appreciate that I cannot comment on them now, but I entirely understand the right hon. Gentleman’s passion, which he knows I share, for ensuring we look after our people better than they have been looked after to date.

I turn to amendment 3, tabled by the hon. Member for Epsom and Ewell. I share her intention of ensuring adequate provision in the budget for the Armed Forces Commissioner. The Secretary of State will have an obligation under proposed new section 340IA(7) to

“co-operate with the Commissioner so far as is reasonable” and to give them any “reasonable assistance” that they require. That will ensure that they have the necessary assistance from the Secretary of State to conduct their work effectively.

Should the commissioner feel that their funding is insufficient to carry out their functions effectively, they will have the opportunity to raise the matter in their annual reports, which are presented to Parliament. The Secretary of State is accountable to Parliament, and this mechanism will provide the ability to scrutinise and challenge any funding decisions. However, it will be for the commissioner to determine the shape and structure of any staffing or budget spend.

As the shadow Minister has confirmed, we estimate in the explanatory notes that the budget for the Armed Forces Commissioner, based on careful scrutiny of the work of our friends in the German armed forces commissioner’s office, will be approximately £4.5 million to £5.5 million a year. That is a significant increase on the funding for the Service Complaints Ombudsman, which at present is roughly £1.8 million a year.

While being wholly independent of the MOD, the commissioner will be required to abide by the financial rules, regulations and procedures laid down by both the Treasury and the MOD in the commitment to financial resources—something I think we would expect de minimis on a cross-party basis. We heard from the current Service Complaints Ombudsman on Tuesday that this is a common model and works well, so including a commitment to ensure sufficient funding and practical assistance, per amendment 3, or increasing it in line with inflation, per amendment 10, is not necessary. Amendment 3 in particular may introduce a level of subjectivity into the legislation that would be difficult to measure.

I welcome—I think—the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford’s rejection of austerity budgets and the commitment to increase public funding in line with inflation. I suspect that he has not quite thought through the full implications of that across all areas of Government spending. None the less, the slow process of rejecting the austerity politics that I so know him for is interesting. I welcome that movement.

What is certain is that the functions in the Bill provide a format for the Secretary of State and the commissioner to have a reasonable conversation about the budget. The budget that we are setting represents a considerable increase and is modelled to deliver a service that involves not only a continuation of the SCOAF functions, but the investigations and the wider visits portfolio that has been mentioned. We feel that that is sufficient, but I suspect that any Member of Parliament who feels that the budget is insufficient, based on the reports tabled by the Armed Forces Commissioner in their annual reports as opposed to thematic reports, will be able to ask suitably challenging questions of the Government of the day about ensuring that staffing levels and financial support are right, just as we would expect for access and the implementation of recommendations. On that basis, I ask the right hon. Gentleman to withdraw his amendment.

I will respond in kind to what the Minister says. As he will recall, his calculation was that even if the KC that we have been debating conceptually were full-time—we can argue about the rate—it might cost about £1.3 million a year. We never stipulated that it would be a full-time post; I think the Committee has explored. The essence of amendment 9 is that the commissioner would have access to high-level legal advice. Even if it were £1.3 million, given that our policy going into the election was to increase defence spending to 2.5% of GDP by 2030, I think we could have found £1.3 million within that number. The Minister is the one with the challenge, because he does not have a date for 2.5%. If he ever gets one, we would all like to hear it. I think we could have afforded the post, even if it had been full-time—and we did not mandate that it had to be.

My understanding is that the last time that the defence budget was at 2.5% was under a Labour Government, and that in the 14 years under the Conservatives there was not a 2.5% budget.

That is correct, and under the Tories in the mid-1990s it was well over 3%. The problem is that a lot happened in the 14 years, including a war in Ukraine. That is why we probably need to spend 2.5% as quickly as possible.

Even if the Minister’s calculation is correct, by the time a senior NCO in the British Army gets to the rank of WO2, the King—or the Queen, before him—will probably have spent the best part of £1 million on training them. If they then leave, perhaps because they have had a very bad experience at the hands of the likes of Mr Shiner, that is £1 million of investment that has just walked out the door.

To be fair, the Minister understands the pressure. According to some figures that I received in answer to a recent parliamentary question, the strength of the British Regular Army is 71,300. This was in October. The establishment strength—the book strength, or what it is meant to be on paper—is 73,000. It was 72,500, but then there was an add-back of another 500, partly for the two Rangers Battalions. The British Regular Army is now nearly 2,000 soldiers short of what it should be, even on paper. Unfortunately, the trend is that more people are leaving than joining.

I am not highlighting that point in order to say that the whole lawfare issue is the only reason that people are leaving the British armed forces. That is not my argument, but it is one reason, and it is likely to get worse unless the Government do something about it. That includes doing something about the so-called Northern Ireland legacy Act.

I hope I have made the point sufficiently this morning; I am grateful for the way in which the Minister has acknowledged it and dealt with it. As I think the point has been made, I will not press amendment 9 or 10. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the schedule be the First schedule to the Bill.

Schedule 1, by inserting proposed new schedule 14ZA into the Armed Forces Act 2006, primarily outlines the procedural aspects of the commissioner’s role and functions, including their legal status and terms of appointment, as well as disqualification and the delegation of functions. It encompasses the commissioner’s length of term, staffing arrangements and funding.

It is important that we set the parameters for the Armed Forces Commissioner while ensuring sufficient the impartiality and independence of their role. There are several provisions in place to ensure that this is the case, including paragraph 1 of proposed new schedule 14ZA, which establishes the commissioner as a corporation sole, setting them up to be legally separate from the MOD.

Although paragraph 3 of proposed new schedule 14ZA outlines that the commissioner is to be appointed by His Majesty on the recommendation of the Secretary of State, it should be noted that, as mentioned earlier, on Second Reading the Defence Secretary stated that he was keen for the House of Commons Defence Committee to exercise the toughest pre-appointment scrutiny as well, and I think he genuinely means that. We expect that to be robust, and I look forward to witnessing those sessions in due course. We need to appoint somebody who can do the job as a fearless, independent champion, and the Secretary of State will certainly take close note of the Select Committee’s views in any pre-appointment hearing.

Paragraph 4 of the proposed new schedule disqualifies a civil servant or member of the regular or reserve forces from being the commissioner. This is to ensure a fresh and independent perspective.

Under paragraph 5 of the proposed new schedule, to ensure both ministerial and parliamentary oversight, the commissioner must provide written notice to the Secretary of State should they wish to resign. Although the Secretary of State may dismiss the commissioner if specific criteria are fulfilled, they must specify their reasons for doing so via a statement to the relevant House of Parliament. For the benefit of new Members, that means that if the Defence Secretary is a Commons Minister, it would go to the Commons, and if they are a Lords Minister, it would go to the Lords. None the less, it would be accountable to Parliament.

Under paragraphs 6 to 9 of proposed new schedule 14ZA, the commissioner will retain sufficient independence and autonomy to make arrangements for their own office, including their staff and the delegation of their functions. Importantly, this includes sensible arrangements to provide oversight and continuity if the commissioner’s office is vacant. In those circumstances the Secretary of State may appoint a deputy commissioner or such person as they think fit—something the current Service Complaints Ombudsman, Mariette Hughes, mentioned in her evidence on Tuesday as a real strength of the new Bill. The commissioner is able to delegate their functions to their deputies or staff, as we heard that this will make a difference.

Paragraph 11 of the new schedule specifies that the funding for the commissioner will be met by the MOD. The funds will come from the MOD’s agreed budget, and it will be crucial to ensure the appropriate oversight and processes are in place to approve them. That role will be formed by the Secretary of State. This is a common funding model for offices of this kind, and I reassure the Committee that although funding for the commissioner’s office will be provided via the MOD budget and agreed annually, the commissioner will have sufficient discretion over how funds are used.

Paragraphs 2 to 6 of schedule 1 make amendments to other legislation in connection with establishing the commissioner. The amendments ensure that the commissioner’s documents will constitute public records for the purpose of the Public Records Act 1958; that the commissioner will be a public authority for the purposes of the Freedom of Information Act 2000; and that the public sector equality duty under the Equality Act 2010 will apply to them.

I hope there is no doubt that our intention is that the commissioner will act as an independent champion for the armed forces, and hold this and future Governments to account.

I seek clarification on one of the points the Minister made about clearances, as I have not heard it in what he has said. Which level of clearance will the Armed Forces Commissioner be required to hold, and will the role be contingent on them holding it? If they cannot maintain clearance, will they lose their job?

I am happy to write to the hon. Member with our expectation of which specific clearance type would be required, but on the second part of his question about what happens if someone loses their clearance, it will be a condition of the role that they would be subject to the Official Secrets Act 1989 and require the necessary clearance, and in such circumstances they would not be fulfilling the terms and conditions of their role. I hope that gives the hon. Member suitable assurance.

Question put and agreed to.

Schedule 1 accordingly agreed to.