“(1) The Housing Act 1988 is amended as follows.
(2) In Section 9 subsection (6)(a), after ‘Schedule 2 to this Act’ insert ‘, except for grounds 6A, 8 and 8A,’”.
This new clause would extend the discretion of the court to adjourn proceedings, and stay, suspend or postpone any orders made, to cases where possession is sought under grounds 6, 8, and 8A.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
In considering the replacement possession regime that the Bill will introduce, we have been at pains to convince the Government that the courts should be given a greater measure of discretion than the Bill currently provides for. Whether it is through allowing for a very limited amount of discretion in relation to mandatory grounds 1, 1A and 6A so that judges could consider whether the tenant would suffer greater hardship as a result of the possession order being granted, or through seeking to make new ground 8A entirely discretionary rather than mandatory, we believe in principle that we should be putting more trust in the judgment of the court to determine whether to make an award, taking into account all the circumstances that are pertinent in any given case.
In the Committee’s proceedings, we have deliberately not made the case for every possession ground to be discretionary. We take the view that there are some limited circumstances in which it is appropriate for landlords to have the certainty of a mandatory ground to regain possession of their property. However, as things stand, we do not believe that the Government have the balance right when it comes to the amount of discretion that the courts have been afforded in relation to the new possession regime.
New clause 56 is a final attempt to convince the Government to incorporate an additional element of discretion into the new system. It would extend the discretion of the court to adjourn proceedings and to stay, suspend or postpone any orders made to cases where possession is sought under grounds 6, 8 and 8A. In so doing, it would give the courts appropriate flexibility to cater for the circumstances where the ground is already made out, but either it is right to give the tenant more time or there is a way to resolve the dispute that does not involve the tenant losing his or her home.
Currently, for all mandatory grounds for possession, once the ground is made out, the court has no choice but to make an order, and it takes effect 14 days after the date on which it is made. Judges have a limited ability to postpone an order, but only up to six weeks from the date made and only where there would otherwise be exceptional hardship as a result. In short, the court has extremely limited flexibility.
Yet there might be extremely compelling circumstances in relation to individual ground 6 possession proceedings, where a judge might want to make an order that takes effect at a date later than six weeks thence. Take, for example, circumstances in which a landlord could not start to develop until two or three months after the hearing. A judge with the discretion provided for by new clause 56 could postpone the order until around the time at which the development could begin, giving the tenant more time to find a new home and providing the landlord with additional rent or income.
Similarly, in individual ground 8 and 8A possession proceedings, the courts currently have no flexibility to make an order suspended. Providing them with that discretion, as new clause 56 would, would allow judges to suspend an order upon terms that might allow for the outstanding arrears to be repaid under an agreed realistic payment plan, and within a timely manner.
The court could not make such a suspended order on a whim or with the mere hope of repayment without any evidence to provide reasonable reassurance that the rent would be repaid, as Liz Davies KC made plain in her evidence to the Committee on
New clause 56 would simply give the courts the opportunity to exercise a measure of discretion in circumstances in which they were convinced that that was the right course of action, rather than constraining them, as the Bill currently proposes, in relation to mandatory possession grounds. As James Prestwich of the Chartered Institute of Housing said in evidence to the Committee two weeks ago:
“It is important that we are able to trust judges to make informed decisions based on the evidence of the case”.––[Official Report, Renters (Reform) Public Bill Committee,
That is all that this new clause seeks, in relation to a discrete number of mandatory grounds for possession. I do not hold out much hope, but I hope that the Minister will consider accepting it.
I thank the hon. Member for moving new clause 56, which would allow the courts to adjourn a possession claim, stay or suspend enforcement of a possession order, or delay the enforcement of an order made under ground 6A, 8 or 8A.
Ground 6A covers situations in which evicting the tenants is the only way for the landlord to comply with enforcement measures such as banning orders; we have already discussed that issue at length earlier in our debates. Delaying enforcement action will therefore mean that the tenant continues to live in an unsafe or overcrowded property, or that the landlord fails to comply with the law. That is not an acceptable situation for either party.
Nor is it fair to ask landlords to bear significant arrears for longer, as applying the new clause to grounds 8 or 8A might. These mandatory grounds already set a high bar for eviction. Asking landlords to bear the cost of significant arrears for longer puts them under unsustainable financial pressure. The Government believe that the new clause strikes an unfair balance that will ultimately hurt tenants. I therefore ask the hon. Member to withdraw the motion.
I thank the Minister for his response. I do not intend to labour the point at any length, as we have discussed the matter on a number of occasions. I think that there is a clear difference of principle as to the amount of discretion that the courts are afforded regarding mandatory possession grounds. We think that they require a bit more flexibility to be able to exercise their judgment when there are compelling circumstances. The Government clearly do not, but I think we may return to the issue at a later stage. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.