Clause 28 - Treasury power in relation to rules

Part of Financial Services and Markets Bill – in a Public Bill Committee at 2:00 pm on 27 October 2022.

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Photo of Stephen Hammond Stephen Hammond Conservative, Wimbledon 2:00, 27 October 2022

I beg to move amendment 48, in clause 28, page 40, line 39, at end insert—

“3RF Requirement to publish specified information

(1) The Treasury may at any time, by notice in writing, direct a regulator to measure its performance against specified metrics and to publish such information if—

(a) the regulator does not already publish such information, or

(b) the Treasury consider the information published is insufficient for the purposes of holding the regulator to account.

(2) A direction under subsection (1) may—

(a) specify the element of the regulator’s performance to be measured;

(b) specify the appropriate metrics to be used;

(c) specify the period for which performance must be measured; and

(d) specify the date by which the performance information must be published.

(3) As soon as practicable after giving the direction under subsection (1) the Treasury must—

(a) lay before Parliament a copy of the direction, and

(b) publish the direction in such manner as the Treasury considers appropriate.

(4) A direction under subsection (1) may be varied or revoked by the giving of a further direction.”

I again guide the Committee to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests. Clause 28 amends the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. It gives the Treasury the power to make or to direct rules. A key element of our discussions has been transparency and accountability, and the amendment is designed to make things a little clearer by ensuring that regulators report regularly and transparently on key metrics. The regulators are already mandated to report to His Majesty’s Treasury in their annual reports, which have to contain some performance metrics; the issue is that those metrics are selected by the regulator themselves. At the moment, an oversight body has the power to send for “persons, papers and records”, but it does not have the power to mandate regulators to report on specific performance metrics over time. I think that that leaves a hole in terms of both accountability to Parliament and transparency of regulators.

I accept the evidence that Martin Taylor gave the Committee that Parliament and the Government have a huge amount of influence. Equally, though, the chief executive of the Prudential Regulation Authority, when asked elsewhere for his thoughts on the competitiveness objective, described a lot of it as a “red herring”. When asked how he would report on the competitiveness objective, he said that he had “no convincing answer”. It is important that there is a convincing answer, and that is, in effect, what my proposed new section 3RF of the 2000 Act would provide.

As I have stated quite clearly, I do not believe that this is about a race to the bottom. We need a well-regulated, tough regulated, transparently regulated jurisdiction. Regular accountability on performance is in no way an infringement of a regulator’s independence; I think that it would enhance the regulator’s reputation. The amendment therefore sets out a number of metrics on which a regulator might be asked to report. That could work relatively easily. For instance, the Treasury could use its powers to set out more clearly the elements on which the regulator should measure and report its performance. It could also set out definitions that are relevant to the measures themselves. I think that the direction potentially should be able to be scrutinised by the public, and particularly by Parliament and the Treasury Committee, and that the information should be published, and published more frequently.

My amendment is designed to ensure that the regulator not only has the objective, but has to report on it on a very clear set of metrics, which would then allow us in Parliament and the public to ensure that it is meeting the objective.