I beg to move Amendment 22, in Clause 1, page 1, line 5, leave out

“must not have regard to a territorial consideration” and insert “must not act”.

This amendment would remove the reference to a “territorial consideration” in the legislation.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 31, in Clause 1, page 1, line 6, leave out from “that” to “influenced” in line 7, and insert “is”.

This amendment is to probe the use of a subjective, rather than an objective, test to establish whether a decision-maker has contravened clause 1.

Amendment 23, in clause 1, page 1, line 9, leave out subsection (3).

This amendment would remove the reference to a “territorial consideration” in the legislation.

Amendment 3, in clause 1, page 1, line 13, leave out “or territory”.

This amendment clarifies that considerations for the purposes of section 1 must relate to the foreign countries, rather than territories within foreign countries.

Amendment 32, in clause 1, page 1, leave out lines 20 to 22.

This amendment is to probe the impact of the legislation on individuals, such as those working within public authorities.

Clause stand part.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir George.

Antisemitism is on the rise across the UK and the globe. It is a disgusting stain on society, and something must be done to eradicate it completely. There must be strong and meaningful legislation to tackle it so that Jewish people feel and are safe. That is something that I and my SNP colleagues want to see, but frankly it is also something that people across the House want to see. Sadly, however, the Bill is not an appropriate approach.

Last week we heard from Yasmine Ahmed, the UK director of Human Rights Watch, who said:

“I have never read a piece of legislation that is as badly worded as this. It is ambiguous and runs a coach and horses completely through ESG responsibilities and business and human rights responsibilities. I think it is a very pernicious and worrying piece of legislation”.––[Official Report, Economic Activity of Public Bodies (Overseas Matters) Public Bill Committee, 7 September 2023; c. 86, Q124.]

The Bill is in need of significant Amendment to tackle some of the fundamental flaws in its current form. Some clauses need to be scrapped altogether. The language in Clause 1 creates ambiguities around the objectives of the Bill; it is so poorly drafted that it is difficult to determine what the Bill seeks to accomplish. Of particular concern is the phrasing relating to “a territorial consideration” in clause 1(2). As drafted, it could be interpreted in such a way as to focus the Bill solely on limiting disagreements among decision makers on territorial matters, rather than on the foreign and domestic actions of foreign states. That means that if a decision maker were to make an investment or procurement decision based solely on the domestic actions of the foreign state that did not relate to a territorial issue, the view could be taken that it was not covered by the Bill.

In written and oral evidence, Richard Hermer KC explained that if a decision maker refused to buy goods from China based only on its track record on human rights, they would not be covered by the Bill. If, however, the same person refused to buy goods from China because of its forced labour impacting cotton in Xinjiang, that decision would be covered by the scope of this Bill. That interpretation of clause 1 creates obvious issues around the Bill’s applicability. We therefore ask the Government to accept amendment 22.

Clause 1 also seeks fundamentally to reduce the autonomy of local councils and the devolved nations to take a stance on human rights matters. The measures that seek to remove the ability of local government to take a stance based on the political and moral actions of a foreign state mark a dangerous step in reducing autonomy to speak out in support of human rights. Political discourse in debates over foreign policy matters to everyone. It is legislated here in Westminster, but it enriches society when people are involved in the discussions. Central Government sit upon policy, legislation and agenda, but it is a cornerstone of democracy that people at a localised level be able to have discussion and debate around human rights, which is inevitably linked to foreign policy.

I am not calling for foreign policy to be set by local government, but as a society we benefit when local government makes decisions based on human rights. We saw that in the 1980s, as my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow South West and I brought up repeatedly last week. In 1981, Glasgow City Council stood up against apartheid in South Africa. Glasgow was the first city in the world to award Nelson Mandela the freedom of the city. Five years later, St George’s Place in the city centre was renamed Nelson Mandela Place. In 1993, Nelson Mandela visited Glasgow. In the city chambers, he proclaimed:

“While we were physically denied our freedom in the country of our birth, a city 6,000 miles away, and as renowned as Glasgow, refused to accept the legitimacy of the apartheid system, and declared us to be free.”

As a Scot, I am very proud of the actions of Labour-led Glasgow City Council in changing the name of St George’s Place and in being the first city to give Nelson Mandela freedom of the city. I have looked at the Bill, and I cannot see anything in it that would have prevented Glasgow City Council from doing that; I agree that there are things in it that have a chilling effect on local government and public institutions, but I am not quite clear how relevant the hon. Lady’s reference to the Bill is.

Essentially, I want to talk about the impact that a local government can have when people at a localised level can outline how they feel about human rights records. This Government should take heed of that, because at that time it was Thatcher’s Government who imposed sanctions on apartheid South Africa and maintained close links with political leaders in apartheid South Africa.

I have tabled a number of amendments to Clause 1. I have spoken at length about Amendment 22. Amendment 31 is intended to probe the use of a subjective rather than objective test to establish whether a decision maker has contravened clause 1. In reality, there are so many amendments that could be made to clause 1. That is not just my view; we heard it from numerous witnesses during our evidence sessions last week and from multiple organisations that have submitted written evidence. The Minister should really go back and start from scratch.

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Sir George, and to speak to Amendment 3, which stands in my name.

We have now moved to the short but important process of line-by-line scrutiny of the Bill, which is itself short but important, with just 17 clauses and a schedule. In the high-quality Second Reading debate, we saw the significant strength of feeling among Members across the House. Frankly, there was not an even party political divide, which always makes things a bit more interesting. I suspect that colleagues’ mailbags, like mine, have been full of strong views from their constituents.

On Second Reading, the Opposition tabled a reasoned amendment setting out our significant concerns about the Bill, which very much start with Clause 1. It is a long-standing Opposition position that we do not support boycott, divestment and sanctions-type activity against the state of Israel. As my hon. Friend the Member for Caerphilly said on Thursday, we are implacably imposed to it. I cannot improve upon that sentiment, which is also the view of the Government. It should not have been hard, if that was what the Government wanted, to build consensus around a proportionate set of regulations that would tackle the issue. Instead, clause 1 and the Bill generally are needlessly broad, with sweeping powers and far-reaching effects. Whether consciously or not, that has created an undesirable degree of Division.

The Opposition do not think it wrong, in itself, for public bodies to take ethical investment and procurement decisions, given that there is a long history of councils, universities and others taking a stance in defence of freedom and human rights. After all, it is local ratepayers’ money, and it is reasonable for them to want a say in how to spend or invest it. Similarly, the money in a pension fund belongs not to the Secretary of State but to its members, so it is reasonable for members of funds, through their trustees, to wish to express their views on how the money is invested. We know that that is also the Government’s view, because they have carved out a wide range of exceptions in the schedule. It is clearly not in debate that there ought to be a degree of local say on such activity.

However, it is important to say, at the start of our line-by-line scrutiny, that there is a significant difference between legitimate criticism of a foreign state’s Government and what some have sought to do in recent years. There are those who have sought to target Israel alone, hold it to different standards than others and create hostility towards Jewish people in the UK. That is completely wrong, and we fully support efforts to tackle antisemitism in this country. However, this solution is not sufficient. In its unamended form, clause 1 will go far beyond what we are seeking to resolve and will create a series of problems along the way.

My amendment 3 seeks to clarify the ambiguous wording that a public body may not have regard to a “territorial consideration” when making procurement and investment decisions. As the then Shadow Secretary of State—my hon. Friend Lisa Nandy—and I asked on Second Reading, is that supposed to mean that public bodies may refuse goods from a nation state such as China because of a general disregard for human rights, but may not refuse cotton goods from a territory such as Xinjiang state because of concerns about genocide of the Uyghur population? Or does it mean, as I suspect it may, that all actions of all foreign Governments are beyond the scope of local decision makers unless excepted in the schedule? Perhaps it is illustrative of where we are in the process of reviewing the Bill that that remains in doubt. We have seen doubt in the written evidence, and obviously doubt was felt at Second Reading, too. We need greater clarity in the Bill.

My amendment 3 is a probing amendment. I will not seek to divide the Committee on it, but I hope that it will provide an opportunity for the Minister to give clarity. I think we know that the Government mean that it is not territory-only boycotts that are out of scope, but rather that all boycott-type activity, where it disapproves of foreign conduct, is out of scope. I hope to hear that from the Minister.

I turn to the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Airdrie and Shotts. My amendment 3 would have the same effect as her amendment 23 and is similar to amendment 22, so the same arguments stand.

I am interested to hear what the Minister has to say about amendment 31. It relates to the important debates we had in our evidence sessions about the reasonable observer test, which I struggled with a little. When I asked the witness panel about that, we heard slightly mixed evidence. I was willing to accept it as a term of art which would be well known to the courts and therefore not likely to provide another issue for litigation, but that point seems to be in doubt. I hope that the Minister can be clear about why this approach has been chosen.

I have no doubt that this legislation is heading straight for the courts. That was obvious from written and oral evidence and the Second Reading debate, and it will be obvious throughout our line-by-line discussions. Our debates in Committee will be germane to court proceedings as well, so it is important to have the greatest possible clarity in the Bill and in our discussions.

Finally, amendment 30 relates to a matter that I shall address in detail when we debate clause 4 stand part.

Conceptually, the Bill stands up and is easy enough to understand when we think about public bodies as entities in their own right. However, it swiftly starts to disintegrate when we consider that those entities are made up of a person or persons. I thought that there were some admirable logical gymnastics on that point from the Minister during our evidence sessions. She said that on one day a person might be a councillor, a trustee or a Mayor, and thus the decision maker, but that on another day, in another context, they might no longer be and would therefore not have their freedom of expression fettered. I am not sure that that is credible, but I suspect that the Minister will want to speak to that point, so I hope to hear some greater clarity on it.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir George, with other hon. Members from all parties. The Bill is an important piece of legislation that has been brought to this place to fulfil a manifesto commitment to ensure that the UK speaks with one voice internationally, and to promote community cohesion within the United Kingdom. We have 17 clauses and one schedule to discuss in four sittings.

Amendments 22 and 23 would remove the references to “territorial consideration” from the Bill. I am not sure that this is what the hon. Member for Airdrie and Shotts intended, but the amendments would broaden the scope of the Bill. In its current form, the Bill will prohibit only territorial considerations

“that would cause a reasonable observer of the decision-making process to conclude that the decision was influenced by political or moral disapproval of foreign state conduct”,

but the amendments would mean that when a public authority is making a procurement or investment decision, all considerations influenced by political or moral disapproval of foreign state conduct would be captured, not just territorial considerations—unless, of course, they were also excluded in the schedule.

The condition of “territorial consideration” in the ban means that the Bill only bans certain boycotts or divestments that “specifically or mainly” have regard to a country or territory. It does not currently, for example, prohibit public authorities that have an environmental policy for their procurement or investment decisions that is universal rather than country-specific. The amendments would arguably prohibit such policies, which is not the intention of the Bill.

Does my hon. Friend accept that if the amendments are agreed to—obviously colleagues have proposed them on a sensible basis to probe the intention of the Bill—one of the risks, given that there are all sorts of territorial claims all over the world, is that countries that are occupying territories might be brought into scope if this change is made? The reality is that it should be the foreign policy of the Government that determines whether such decisions are taken, not individual authorities.

I completely agree that foreign policy should be determined by Government. I would like to point out the definition of a territorial consideration in Clause 1(3):

“A ‘territorial consideration’ is a consideration that relates specifically or mainly to a particular foreign territory.”

Foreign territory is defined in clause 1(5) as

“a country or territory outside the United Kingdom.”

For the avoidance of any doubt, “territorial” does not apply simply to territories; it also applies to countries.

Amendment 3 would exclude “territory” from the Bill’s definition of a foreign territory. In his evidence to the Committee, Richard Hermer KC raised a concern about the term “territorial consideration”, and I understand that the hon. Member for Nottingham North has tabled the amendment to address that concern. I have already explained the importance and purpose of territorial consideration, so I will not repeat it. I understand that Mr Hermer’s concern is that the terminology indicates that the clause applies only where there is a territorial dispute, but that is not the case. As Jonathan Turner noted in evidence to the Committee, there is nothing in this wording that suggests that the clause will apply only where there is a territorial dispute. If that is the reasoning behind the amendment, it is unnecessary.

Unless I am mistaken in my understanding of the reason for the amendment, it seems to be intended to attempt to reduce the scope of “territorial considerations” in the ban. In other words, it appears to intend for public authorities to be permitted to have regard to considerations relating to a territory when making an investment or procurement decision, even if that decision is influenced by the moral or political disapproval of foreign state conduct.

Going back to clause 1(5), the phrase “country or territory” is standard legal drafting to include areas in the world that do not have the status of “country”. Excluding territories will narrow the scope of the Bill, but the change in scope appears arbitrary. The Bill will apply to considerations relating to countries and territories equally, unless they are exempted for a specific reason. As I have expressed to the Committee many times, and as my hon. Friend the Member for Harrow East has just alluded to, foreign policy is a UK Government matter and not the responsibility of public authorities. To ensure a consistent approach to foreign policy, it is vital that the ban applies to all countries and territories, except where the Government choose to exempt a country or territory from the ban.

Amendment 31 would remove the reasonable observer test from decisions about whether a public authority has breached the ban in the Bill on boycotts and divestments. As the Committee heard during the evidence sessions, the point of the test is to bring an objective measure to the consideration of whether the ban has been breached. Without the test, a public authority might claim that it did not in fact have political or moral disapproval of foreign state conduct in mind when making the decision, despite convincing evidence to the contrary in the decision-making process. Equally, a third party might claim in court that a decision maker with a reputation for Opposition to a particular foreign state had such disapproval in mind, despite a lack of evidence from the decision-making process.

The test therefore clarifies that enforcement authorities and the courts should focus on the evidence of the decision-making process, rather than otherwise trying to determine the subjective motivations of the decision maker. I hope that the Committee was reassured on this point by the evidence from Jonathan Turner and Steven Barrett. Both are highly experienced practising barristers and explained that the test is standard in legislation and that the courts will readily understand it.

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way, but there are difficulties with the drafting of the Clause, and one criticism is that it seeks to apply a subjective rather than an objective test. However, will she clarify the point made by the hon. Member for Nottingham North? The disapproval of foreign state conduct, which the Bill refers to, includes disapproval by individuals and by public organisations collectively, but it would also apply to individuals in such organisations. Will the Minister therefore outline the Government’s intent, because there is some confusion about the way the Bill is drafted?

I will go on to address that, but to give the hon. Gentleman a simple answer now, if an individual is talking on behalf of a local authority, that is captured by the Bill. If a council leader makes a statement on behalf of the local authority, that is captured. If a councillor, or indeed a council leader, makes a statement but is not representing the local authority, that is not captured. The issue is whether it is “on behalf of”.

The Minister is being very generous in giving way. Let us be clear: a council leader or any councillor who is being interviewed by a journalist or on television would have to say, “This is my personal opinion. I am not speaking on behalf of the local authority,” and would have to hope that that was not edited out before the interview hit the newspapers or the television. There is a bit of difficulty around this issue. Given the Minister’s answer, I wonder whether the Government could go away and look at the Clause, because I think they will find themselves in great difficulty on this issue.

I was going to explain that, but I will give the condensed version: we will put it into the explanatory notes. We will give further clarity in those notes.

Amendment 32 could cause confusion about whether the ban may or may not be breached as a result of the political and moral disapproval of individuals who make decisions on behalf of a public authority. The drafting of the Bill clarifies the position: where an individual makes a decision on behalf of a public authority, that will be seen as the public authority’s decision, so the public authority will be subject to enforcement action, not the individual.

The Bill needs to be clear that decisions that involve disapproval by individuals who make a decision on behalf of a public authority are in scope; otherwise, it would bring into doubt situations such as a council voting for a local authority to conduct a boycott or indeed any decision taken by a group that makes decisions for a public authority, such as a board or committee. The ban would be ineffective and easy to circumvent if such decisions were not covered.

It might also be helpful if I explain how the ban affects individuals. Anyone acting in an individual capacity is not caught by the ban in Clause 4 on making a statement of intent to boycott or divest, unless the individual is making that statement on behalf of the public authority. I gave the example of the councillor. I know that that has been a point of confusion for members of the Committee so, as I said, I will clarify the point in the Bill’s explanatory notes.

In addition, when an individual or groups of individuals make a decision that is caught by clause 1, or a statement on behalf of a public authority caught by clause 4, the individuals are not personally liable: the public authority is. The public authority would be the subject of any enforcement or court action. In evidence to the Committee, Dr Alan Mendoza confirmed that that position is laid out clearly in the legislation and that the European Court of Human Rights would agree. The Government remain strongly committed to the UK’s long and proud tradition of free speech and to article 10 of the European convention on human rights.

I hope that that reassures the Committee, especially in the light of the additions to the Bill’s explanatory notes. The scope of the Bill is strictly limited to the actions of public authorities, and only affects individuals when they make statements or take action on behalf of public authorities. Therefore, for the reasons that I have set out, I respectfully request that the amendments be withdrawn.

Amendments 22, 31, 23 and 32, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow South West and me, include probing elements, as well as changes to the legislation, because on the face of it the Bill simply does not make sense. As I said in my opening statement, that is not just my opinion, but the opinion of various different organisations in written and oral evidence. The Bill is so poorly drafted.

The Minister took a lot of time to talk about Clause 4, but at this point I want to concentrate on clause 1; we will come to clause 4 later. The Bill will have an impact on the autonomy of local authorities. For years, indeed for decades, local authorities and local councillors at the very local level—I keep using “local”, because that is vital—have played a role in the protection and promotion of human rights. It is important for that to be protected.

The Bill, if passed, will have an impact not only on local authorities but on universities, which is vital because they play an essential role: they gather knowledge, free from interference, to educate people in skills and in thinking critically and independently. Some of my amendments to later provisions in the Bill come back to the importance of universities and how the Bill contradicts previous legislation introduced by the UK Government.

The Bill is, as I say, drafted poorly. I still do not understand the part of the Bill that talks about “a reasonable observer”. That is why we tabled the probing Amendment 31. These are subjective, not objective tests. The Minister essentially needs to go back to the drawing board. The SNP is looking to divide the Committee on amendment 22.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

The Committee divided: Ayes 2, Noes 10.

Question accordingly negatived.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

The Committee divided: Ayes 10, Noes 2.

Question accordingly agreed to.

Clause 1 ordered to stand part of the Bill.