Francis Hoar, Professor Andrew Tettenborn and Professor Adam Tomkins gave evidence.

We will now hear from Francis Hoar, of Field Court Chambers, Professor Andrew Tettenborn of the University of Swansea and Professor Adam Tomkins of Glasgow University, who joins us via Zoom. We have until 3.45 pm for this session. Can the witnesses please introduce themselves, for the record, starting with Mr Hoar?

Francis Hoar:

Good afternoon, I am Francis Hoar. I am a barrister from Field Court Chambers and specialise in public law.

Professor Tettenborn:

Good afternoon, I am Andrew Tettenborn. I am a professor of law at Swansea University and also a member of the Free Speech Union.

Professor Tomkins:

Good afternoon, I am Adam Tomkins. I hold the John Millar chair of public law at the University of Glasgow. I am a specialist in constitutional law with a longstanding interest in the issues of the Bill. I am also a former elected member of the Scottish Parliament.

I call the Minister to ask the first question.

Q One of the motivations for the Bill was to have one reserved foreign policy. Given that, do you agree that it is vital that this ban applies to the devolved Administrations and devolved public bodies? Adam, since you are sitting in Scotland, may I go to you first?

Professor Tomkins:

Yes, absolutely. I agree strongly that the Bill should have UK-wide extent and application and should apply to all public bodies throughout the United Kingdom, including devolved Administrations—arguably, perhaps especially devolved Administrations. The Bill has two fundamentally important policy motivations. One is with regard to community cohesion. Community cohesion is a responsibility of the United Kingdom Government and, indeed, of the United Kingdom Parliament throughout the whole of the United Kingdom. The other is of course to safeguard the integrity and singularity of the UK’s established foreign policy, which is set exclusively for the whole of the United Kingdom by the United Kingdom Government, accountable as it is to the United Kingdom Parliament. The devolution settlement sits on top of those constitutional fundamentals and is not an exception to those constitutional fundamentals. For all those reasons, it is vital that the Bill applies and extends to all four nations of the United Kingdom.

Andrew or Francis, do you want to come in?

Professor Tettenborn:

I certainly back what Adam Tomkins has said. If we put the boot on the other foot, imagine that we are negotiating with the State Department over something very delicate, and the answer comes back from the State Department, “We will give you support—we will put pressure on this country—but we can’t answer for California or Colorado, who might have a different official view.” I do not think we would be very happy about that. Again, we could ask the German Government and they could say, “We are of this view, but the Government of Bavaria or Baden-Württemberg think differently.” We owe it to our foreign partners to speak with one voice, in the same way as we might expect them to.

Francis Hoar:

In principle, I agree with that. I do have concerns about the Bill on which I shall extend later, but in principle yes, the United Kingdom should speak with one voice. I think it is fair for Her Majesty’s Government to deprecate and to attempt to restrict, within their powers and within the devolutionary settlement, as I think they are, the attempt by the Scottish Government in particular to have a separate and independent foreign policy through having missions abroad and making statements and, perhaps, investment decisions.

It is also appropriate to remember that there used to be a convention that when speaking abroad, Her Majesty’s Opposition would not contradict the foreign policy of the day. That is not to say that they did not, as they of course did, object to foreign policy in Parliament, when legislation was proposed and also in the sense of Government decisions. That was something that Clement Attlee and others were extremely keen on furthering. I regret that in the past 20 years in particular, and perhaps particularly since 2016, that has not been something with which Her Majesty’s Opposition have complied. They frequently negotiated with representatives of foreign states in the Brexit process, which I think is regrettable. That goes well beyond the scope of the Bill, but I think the policy objective of ensuring that the UK speaks with one voice is an appropriate one.

Q Do you agree that in order to ensure that the ban operates effectively, it needs to cover a wide range of public institutions, including universities?

Professor Tettenborn:

I am probably in the firing line here as I come from a university.

Yes, absolutely.

Professor Tettenborn:

I think it probably should, but perhaps for reasons different from those for other public authorities. The issue of free speech in universities is very much an issue of free speech for individual scholars within those universities. It seems to me rather inappropriate that a university should have a corporate view on a particular matter of foreign policy. It should, if you like, hold the ring between individual academics. So when it comes to universities I think there is a specific justification.

When it comes to public authorities, I simply go back to the idea that public authorities should regard it as off limits—ultra vires, if you like—to have their own foreign policy and their own views on what individual foreign Governments should be doing. That is particularly because, as was mentioned earlier, if you have, for example, large numbers of people from India and Pakistan in a particular local authority area, there is nothing that is going to make dissension worse than a public authority that is seen to favour Pakistan, say, over Kashmir.

Francis or Adam, do you want to come in on that point?

Francis Hoar:

Maybe I will let Adam conclude on this, and I will be much more brief. I am ambivalent about universities, to be honest, for the reasons that Dr Harris, whose evidence I heard, set out. I appreciate your point, Minister, which is that the legislation applies only when the university is acting as a public body. I appreciate that distinction, which can perhaps be fine. That is the kind of issue that might be teased out in the courts, but I suppose that is part of the nature of such a Bill. I sympathise and agree, to a certain extent, with Professor Tettenborn’s point about it not really being appropriate for universities to have corporate identities, but whether that should be in public legislation is a different matter.

Professor Tomkins:

I agree with what Andrew Tettenborn just said. I should probably have said at the beginning that I am also a member of the Free Speech Union; indeed, I am on its Scotland advisory panel. I do not like disagreeing with Bryn Harris, but I am afraid I disagree with quite a lot of what he had to say about the Bill this afternoon, not only with regard to the universities question, but with regard to Clause 4 more generally.

In the law of the United Kingdom, we do not have a single definition of the public sector or the public sphere, but we do have a very workable template that has been used for more than 20 years now in the Human Rights Act, which is what the Bill validly seeks to borrow from. That brings within its scope hybrid authorities such as universities when they are acting in a public capacity. It is a way of understanding the scope of the public sphere or public sector that has not caused particularly difficult problems in litigation at the High Court or at a higher level in the more than 20 years during which the Human Rights Act has been in force. That is not to say that it has not been litigated at all—of course it has—but it has not caused particular problems.

I think it eminently sensible that the Bill seeks to use that template in this context. I am very relaxed about universities and other public authorities being captured within the scope of the Bill in the same way as local authorities and devolved Administrations. I do not have any issues or concerns in that regard.

Q So you are happy with how the Bill is drafted to apply only to public institutions, not to private individuals.

Professor Tomkins:

Absolutely, yes.

Q Does anyone on the panel have a view as to how the Bill compares with other examples of anti-BDS legislation in other jurisdictions across the world?

Professor Tomkins:

Perhaps I can address that question, Minister; I have done quite a lot of work on how the Bill would compare with the position in France and in a number of the states of the United States.

The Bill is very modest indeed in comparison with what has been happening in France and in the United States. French authorities, for example, are seeking to criminalise various forms of BDS activity, which the Bill emphatically does not. In the United States, where I think the states that have enacted anti-BDS legislation are now in the Majority, that legislation varies from state to state but its general tenor is that public authorities are prevented by force of law from contracting at all with American companies unless those American companies declare that they do not boycott either Israel or the occupied territories. Again, that is going much further than the Bill will go in the UK. When understood comparatively in terms of the way in which our closest friends and allies are taking legal action to clamp down on very counterproductive and unhelpful BDS campaigns, the Bill is very modest, but it is not without importance and is not ineffective.

It is worth remembering—I listened to the exchanges with other witnesses earlier—that of the boycott campaigns that have been targeted against a foreign power by public authorities in the United Kingdom, every single one has been targeted at Israel, so analogies with what happened 30 years ago or more with regard to South Africa are perhaps a little inapt. It is true that the Bill is of general application and is not specifically about Israel, but the facts on the ground are that, as matters stand, every single one of the publicly funded anti-BDS campaigns in the United Kingdom has been targeted at Israel.

The Bill is very important and I unqualifiedly support it, but in comparison with what our closest friends and allies are doing elsewhere in the world, it is a rather modest measure. It could—some would say should—have gone a lot further in clamping down on BDS activities, which have the effect not only of undermining the cohesion of UK foreign policy, but of significantly undermining community relations.

Q Does the rest of the panel want to come in, either on the comparative point or on the point about ECHR article 10?

Professor Tettenborn:

I might have something to say about ECHR article 10. I am not as much of a human rights expert as the gentleman from Doughty Street Chambers—I give way to him pretty willingly—but I do not think that there is a strong article 10 right in public authorities speaking as public authorities. Public authorities are normally the people who get sued for breaking article 10, rather than the people who sue because somebody has stopped them saying what they want. As I read the Bill, it is very carefully drafted to say that if a councillor or a Scottish Minister says, “I think this is a rotten piece of legislation and I think Israel, in any decent society, ought to be made a pariah,” and makes it clear that they are speaking in a private capacity and not officially on behalf of the council, they are in no danger at all.

Francis Hoar:

I defer to Professor Tomkins on the international comparisons. In respect of article 10 of the ECHR, there are three stages: first, whether it is engaged; secondly, whether the Bill contravenes article 10, paragraph 1, which concerns whether or not it is a legally enforceable prohibition; and, thirdly, whether the Bill is proportionate.

In some respects, in my view, the Bill does not engage article 10. I do not believe that the power to make investment decisions is engaged by that. On the other hand, statements clearly are. Clearly, the Bill in itself would prohibit the conduct, and it is sufficiently clear for it to be very unlikely that the courts would be forced to interpret the legislation in such a way that was compatible, even if it strained the usual interpretative norms.

So article 10, paragraph 1 does not apply; the question is whether the Bill is proportionate. Dr Harris referred to one recent Strasbourg court decision, Baldassi, which concerned a non-public body. In that case, it was found that prohibitions by the French state on that non-public body were disproportionate. But in the earlier case of Willem v. France, which concerned a mayor, there was no violation. In other words, the criminalisation—the legislation went much further, as Professor Tomkins said, even back in 2009—was found to be proportionate because of the community cohesion point.

That said, I agree with Dr Harris about clause 4. I do not see the need for it. The mischief the Bill is designed to address is divestment, procurement decisions and so on. I do not see why it is necessary to prohibit councils from saying that they would like to divest if they were lawfully able to do so, and even that they intend to do so. As Dr Harris said, if a council passes a resolution that has effect, that is ultra vires. I agree, as I said at the outset, that it is desirable that the United Kingdom speaks with one voice and that public bodies that do not have foreign policy powers do not contravene that, but I do not see the necessity of clause 4.

I do not think the clause would necessarily be disproportionate. The Willem v. France decision in the Strasbourg court suggests that it would be found to be proportionate, and in any event the background fact speaks against disproportionality—if it were to come to a challenge, the background fact is that this is a public body that has no powers in respect of foreign policy—but I do not see the need for clause 4, and I would advise the House to reject it.

Q Do you not think it is needed for community cohesion? These statements can be very inflammatory.

Francis Hoar:

Yes, of course they can, but as Professor Tettenborn said, that does not stop councillors making them on the campaign stump, and it does not stop the Mayor making them in a personal capacity. I am afraid I do not find that a convincing argument at all.

Q I want to follow that point through, with all three panellists, if possible. You have all indicated support for the Bill in generality, and in particular for what Clause 1 tries to achieve. Do you think you have to have clause 4 for the Bill to be effective?

Francis Hoar:

I have answered that.

Yes, I think you have addressed that point, but what about the two professors?

Professor Tettenborn:

I must admit that I am a little more friendly to Clause 4. I will tell you why. It comes out in the old saying that a nod is as good as a wink to a blind horse. Sorry, that was a bit flippant, but if you have a statement by a large number of councillors, “We really don’t like it. We’re not saying that we might disinvest from it, and we’re not saying that this is going to influence what we do, but you realise what our views are,” that is going to come across to a lot of other people as being very much the same thing. I gather that that was what this particular clause was getting at. I confess that I am a little less happy about conditional statements, but if a person says, “We would like to do it—okay, it’s illegal, but we would like to do it—but we are not saying we are going to do it,” I think there is a strong case for saying that they should not say that.

One always has to remember that, as Professor Tomkins pointed out, this is not something that criminalises a statement. Basically, something can only happen to you when you make a statement once you have been warned—once you have received a notice: “Oi, don’t say that again.” Now, you might want to challenge the notice or whatever, but that is a relevant feature of the legislation. It is a feature that I find attractive, as against the rather fierce legislation that they have in quite a lot of American states.

Q Professor Tomkins, could you address that point?

Professor Tomkins:

I will make two quick points about Clause 4, if I may. First, in my career I suppose I have worn two hats: one as an academic lawyer and the second as a practising politician. What you have heard from the other two witnesses on this panel are legal responses to clause 4, and there is nothing wrong with that at all—I do not mean that as anything other than a compliment—but perhaps a political response to it would be to remind this room of politicians that, in these matters, it is not just what happens that matters: it is also about the optics of what happens, particularly with regard to the undermining of community cohesion.

The Jewish community in Scotland—which happens to be a community that I know rather well, for personal reasons—is a very small community. It is a community that is very easily frightened, not necessarily by things that are done, but by things that are said. If we are serious about protecting community cohesion, and I think the Government are serious about that, and they are right to be, and if we are also serious about maintaining the integrity of British foreign policy, we need to be careful about what is said by people in their official capacities—not as private citizens but in their official capacities. For those reasons I am much more enthusiastic about clause 4 than most of your other witnesses have been.

With my legal hat on, I am certain that there is not an article 10 problem here, because clause 4 is targeted at speech that is uttered only by officials in their official capacity and, moreover, is targeted only at a very narrow range of potential statements, which are statements with regard to procurement decisions and/or investment decisions, rather than, as we heard in earlier sessions, statements that are in their generality critical of Israeli policy or, indeed, of British policy with regard to the middle east. For all those reasons, there is not a legal problem with regard to clause 4, but there is a political imperative behind clause 4, and if I had a vote on the matter, which I do not, I would vote for it enthusiastically.

Q On multiple occasions on the face of the Bill, the Secretary of State has reserved powers to change provisions in the Bill by regulations. Do you think that approach has been used too liberally? Has it been used appropriately? Are you comfortable with that degree of ability for the Secretary of State to vary things later down the line?

Professor Tomkins:

I think I am. It is always a delicate balance between what goes into primary legislation—what goes on the face of the Bill, as we say—and what can be done after an enactment by Secretaries of State or Ministers, using the various powers that are crafted by the Bill. The balance that has been struck in the Bill is appropriate and reasonable—yes, I think it is.

Francis Hoar:

I think it goes too far in some respects. Generally speaking, Parliament has been too ready—this goes back over many decades and is certainly not just the case under this Government and in this Parliament—to give the Government powers to give devolved legislation, particularly with Henry VIII powers, which the Government accepts there are in this case. I think Mr Cragg KC mentioned the unlimited power of the Minister to order the maximum financial penalty, and there is good reason for the House of Commons to restrict that to a particular maximum.

The particular concern I had was that although, wisely, the Bill does require advance scrutiny of the regulations, there is an exception in Clause 3(2) and (5). The Government have given a good explanation as to why they may wish to add a country or territory to the list—the approved list or the disapproved list, whichever way you want to look at it—because, of course, Russia might invade Ukraine, and that is an obvious example. But they have not provided any explanation—certainly not a credible explanation—as to why we need clause 3(2), which includes adding, removing or amending a description of a type of consideration that can be taken into account by a local authority. There is absolutely no reason why that would ever be so urgent as to be needed without the advance scrutiny of the House of Commons. So clause 3(2), in my view, should not have an emergency provision. In clause 3(5), there is a very good reason for that; if the Bill is passed, one accepts the principle, and if one accepts the principle, these things should be able to happen.

Professor Tettenborn:

I am entirely with Francis on that one. Certainly, the power to add countries actually is, again, quite skilfully guarded. I think people around this table will have noticed that it is subject to affirmative resolution—that is, it cannot pass merely by everybody not noticing when it is placed on the Table and not objecting to it; it cannot pass by inertia. I think that is a very sound part of the Bill indeed.

Q Thank you to the panel for joining us today. I want to stick to Clause 4, because I was really interested in the discussions on it. Some stakeholders have called it a gagging clause. I am really interested to learn what other options the Government could bring forward to achieve the clause’s aims. It is my understanding that if a Scottish Government Minister, for example, wanted to speak out against it, they would be unable to do so. They would have to turn around and say, “I’m not speaking on behalf of the Scottish Government, I’m speaking as an individual,” even if they were stood in the Scottish Parliament.

Francis Hoar:

I have answered this fairly fully, but I think that that encapsulates why I am not convinced about Clause 4, although I agree with both my colleagues on the panel that it is not likely to be disproportionate, because it falls within the earlier Strasbourg/French authority. These are public bodies, and there is a good reason why it would be proportionate to restrict them, but you have encapsulated why the provision is pretty useless: because all the Minister needs to say is, “I’m not going to speak on behalf of the Scottish Government.”

Now, I can absolutely see the logical reason why it is a good prohibition, because it is right, on the view of the Bill on this panel—although not among all your other witnesses—which is that the general objective is a sound objective. If that is right, it is fair enough to prevent Ministers in Scotland or Wales from making those sorts of pronouncements. But, in reality, what is it going to do? It is just going to mean that, basically, I will say that I am going to speak in a personal capacity.

Incidentally, on the drafting of the Bill, I am not entirely clear—I agree, again, with Mr Cragg on this—as to the relationship between clauses 4 and 1. Purely from a drafting point of view, that needs to be made clear. If the Government are suggesting that that should not apply to an individual speaking in an individual capacity, there is no reason why the Bill cannot say so. I am just not clear. The wording of clause 4(1) is that

“the person intends to act in a way that would contravene section 1”.

I am not convinced that it applies only if that person has been given a notice. As Andrew said, I do not read that from the Bill. I am not entirely clear what that means. It needs to be clarified as a matter of drafting if clause 4 is to stay.

Professor Tettenborn:

I would like a clarification there as well, I must admit. It seems to me that there may be quite an important difference between someone who makes a pronouncement and someone who says something and adds, “but I am speaking personally.” That concerns how we are viewed abroad. It is very good for the conduct of the foreign relations of this country that people abroad know that they can deal with the UK Government as a UK Government. They obviously know that there will be people who disagree with the Government’s foreign policy, but I see nothing wrong in saying that if an official is going to do that, it might be a good idea if they said, “I am speaking in a private capacity.”

Professor Tomkins, do you want to come in?

Professor Tomkins:

Yes, thank you. First, this is not a gagging Clause. Anybody who thinks it is does not know what a gagging clause looks like. Nothing in clause 4 prevents the current First Minister of Scotland, or any Minister or councillor, from saying whatever they want about the appropriateness of foreign policy, or indeed the appropriateness of policy in a foreign state. The prohibition is simply and narrowly focused on making statements that proclaim that a Minister or a councillor would have decided to do something unlawful if they had been able to do so, which they cannot do anyway. The idea that this is a gagging clause needs to be firmly scotched, if I can put it that way.

Beyond that, I do not have much more to say, except to repeat a point that was made in an earlier session. Councillors should not be wasting their time opining about foreign policy, because it is not their job. Neither should Ministers of devolved Administrations, because it is not theirs either.

Q Thank you so much for that, Professor Tomkins. I have a couple more questions. We are under time pressure, so if you could all stick to short contributions, that would be appreciated.

The people of Scotland have a strong history of being at the forefront of political campaigns. As was said earlier, Glasgow proudly stood against South Africa’s apartheid in the 1980s. In 2014, the University of Glasgow became the first university in Europe to divest from the fossil fuel industry. Given that public bodies such as universities would now be prevented from taking such a stance, is the Bill compatible with the free speech protections in the European convention on human rights?

Professor Tettenborn:

I am sorry; I did not hear what Glasgow University had divested from.

The fossil fuel industry.

Professor Tettenborn:

Well, that would not be affected. That is not what the Bill is about. It is far worse, if I may say so, for a public authority in this country to have a foreign policy than for it to have an environmental policy. I know that it probably will not go down very well north of the border in Shotts, but I do not think it is the business either of the Scottish devolved Government or of Scottish local authorities to engage in foreign policy. I have no enormous objection to any public body saying, “We will not invest in fossil fuels.”

Q Does anybody else want to come in? If not, I will move on to my last question.

Okay. Professor Tomkins, you have spoken about the fact that you were a Member of the Scottish Parliament, and I understand that you are a former adviser to a Secretary of State for Scotland. Constitutional law is your area of expertise, and you have said that you are keen to see this legislation implemented across all four nations of the UK. I am interested in learning a little bit more about what impact the Bill will have on the independence of Scotland’s Parliament and, by extension, our Government in Holyrood.

Professor Tomkins:

I do not think that it will have any impact on that at all. The Scottish Parliament is democratically elected to pursue policy objectives within its legislative competence. That legislative competence is set by the United Kingdom Parliament in the Scotland Acts, as amended. It is absolutely clear that that legislative competence does not extend to foreign policy. The Bill has no impact at all on the powers and competences of the democratically elected Scottish Parliament—none at all.

Professor Tomkins, you talked about the different comparisons out there. Which country has the best example of this type of legislation and whyQ ?

Professor Tomkins:

The states in the United States that have pursued anti-BDS legislation have probably gone further than anybody else I am aware of, although perhaps there are jurisdictions that I am not aware of; my research has been restricted to the United States, France and the UK. There would be, I think, significant human rights implications for the United Kingdom, given its commitments under the ECHR, were the UK to pursue the sort of anti-BDS policy that we see in some of those states. I think some significant article 10 issues would arise in relation to that sort of policy. I cannot speak for the Government, but that might very well be why the UK Government have elected not to proceed with that sort of policy.

The approach that the French authorities have been taking is very different, again, from what the present Bill envisages. The French seem to have seen the issue much more as one of public order and freedom of assembly, and are going directly after those who engage in anti-BDS demonstrations and protests in France. What we have in front of us is a Bill that is much more carefully—certainly much more narrowly—targeted on the two specific areas where public authorities in the UK, unfortunately in my view, have engaged in anti-BDS campaigning targeted at Israel and the occupied territories with regard to investment and procurement decisions.

This is not a general “Let’s ban BDS” Bill, or even a specific one with regard to public authorities. It is specifically and carefully targeted at the two core areas where, historically in the UK, public bodies have engaged in anti-BDS activities with regard to Israel when it comes to procurement and investment. Because it is carefully targeted for the UK, my answer to your question is that for the UK this is the best Bill.

Q That is very useful. Thank you.

I have a wider question for the whole panel. This is written in the negative, in the sense that it indicates political or moral disapproval for foreign states. Do the panel have any thoughts about writing it neutrally, so that neither the pro nor the anti side fit in? In other words, a public body should not get involved in these kinds of arguments at all. Is that a position you agree with, Professor Tettenborn?

Professor Tettenborn:

That is a very good question. Speaking as a professor in an ivory tower, I would immediately agree with you; speaking as a practical man, I would say that you are making a rod for your back if you start imposing abstract legal obligations of neutrality. I think it makes enforcement far easier and life far more difficult for clever lawyers if you do what is done in this Bill: “Thou shalt not say that you disapprove of a particular regime.” I do not think there is a problem of local authorities saying, “We think Venezuela is the best thing since sliced bread, and we will do whatever.” The Bill does answer the mischief.

Q That is very useful. Mr Hoar, what do you think? The civil servant is supposed to be neutral, for example. We have already discussed the realms of where this body goes and who is actually in charge. All the panellists stated that they were not sure where the role of Ministers went. For the likes of the NHS or the police, is there not an argument for saying that there should be neutrality when it comes to foreign policy that deals with issues such as those in front of us?

Francis Hoar:

There is an argument, and you have made it, but I do not think that it is a good enough argument for legislating, because you need to be very careful when you are legislating in respect of what is enforceable. Adam has given some examples of quite extreme—I think very extreme—classically American approaches that go very far down the line in terms of enforcement in another direction, in respect of companies that have or do not have dealings with Israel. To require and enforce neutrality would go far further than is needed. The mischief that the Bill addresses is the divestment campaign, based on political objectives that are potentially contrary to UK foreign policy, and that is where it should lie.

I just want to put down a marker that—if you will allow me, Dame Caroline—I have something to say about legal professional privilege.

Yes, but do keep an eye on the clock, because there are two more Members who have indicated that they want to ask a question, and we have only 10 more minutes.

Francis Hoar:

Thank you. On legal professional privilege, the answer is not quite as straightforward as has perhaps been represented. I think that the Government’s line is that the answer is in Clause 7(9), which is to defer to the data protection legislation. The Data Protection Act 2018 has various provisions that restrict the requirement to provide legally professionally privileged information. For example, schedule 11 has a tailor-made restrictive provision:

“The listed provisions do not apply to personal data that consists of…information in respect of which a claim to legal professional privilege…could be maintained”.

I think legal professional privilege is extremely important; I entirely agree with Mr Norris about that. Obviously local authorities and other public bodies will be receiving advice on what could be quite complicated circumstances. I think it would be far more straightforward, though, to mirror that legislation in clause 7: you could just add a provision copied straight from paragraph 9 of schedule 11 to the 2018 Act. That is what I suggest that Parliament should do.

Professor Tettenborn:

You will get exactly the same answer from me—he has taken the words out of my mouth.

I have no further questions.

Q Almost reluctantly, I return to Clause 4. I have been thinking about the practical repercussions of the Bill, and I have to say that my feeling this afternoon is that this is going to be pretty messy. If we are asking elected officials in council chambers up and down the country to say, “Now I am speaking in a personal capacity, and now I am speaking in my capacity as an elected official,” it feels like that would be very messy. Surely, as advocates of freedom of speech—as a number of members of the panel have said—that can only have a worrying effect in shutting down debate and discussion. That can only have an undemocratic outcome.

Professor Tettenborn:

That is a very interesting point, if I may say so. There might be a simple way around it: we could have an extra subsection in Clause 4 that said, “Nothing in this Act affects the right of any member of a public authority to speak in a private capacity.” Just saying it out loud provides a safe harbour; it means that people do not have to go to a lawyer to look up a law, or at least they do not have to go to so many lawyers. I think that might be helpful.

Professor Tomkins:

I share everybody’s concern that we must take freedom of speech very seriously—I think that that is a very important set of concerns to raise—but there are two things to say.

First, what Professor Tettenborn has just described is already the state of the law. The way in which we approach rights under the Human Rights Act is that rights are stated generally, and any exceptions to those rights must be narrowly tailored and stated specifically. If there is doubt or ambiguity, it falls on the side of the right, not on the side of the exception. That is already, in broad terms, the legal position through the United Kingdom—as it should be, in my view. Adding extra words to Clause 4 to deliver that effect will not have any effect, because it is already the legal position.

I remind the Committee that clause 4 is very narrow in scope: all it says is that somebody who is subject to section 1 may not say that they would have made a procurement decision or an investment decision different from the procurement decision or investment decision that they have made, by force of this legislation. It seems to me that all the members of this panel are of the view that that is perfectly compatible with article 10 of the ECHR, for all the reasons that we have rehearsed; and if it is compatible with article 10 of the ECHR, it is also compatible, I think, with our domestic standards with regard to free speech. For all those reasons, and notwithstanding the fact that I take free speech incredibly seriously, I genuinely do not think that there is a free speech issue with regard to this Bill.

Q Partly because our two professors are from Wales and Scotland, I want to ask about devolution. Most of would agree, I think, that foreign policy is exclusively a reserved matter, but we are not just talking about foreign policy now; we are talking about procurement responsibilities and public service pension schemes, the responsibility for which is, to a large extent, in different ways, devolved to the devolved Governments. I am mindful of a statement in the House of Commons Library brief that the Bill as it stands will modify

“the executive competence of devolved ministers”,

and because of that the devolved institutions will need to pass a legislative consent motion. That might be politically contentious; therefore, the Act might not automatically apply to the three parts of the United Kingdom we are talking about. Also, in Northern Ireland, public services pension schemes are exclusively in the hands of the Northern Ireland Assembly, which is not currently meeting. How will it agree a legislative competence order? Presumably, unless the Secretary of State takes powers that are not prescribed in the Bill, this legislation will not apply to Northern Ireland. Would you care to comment on that?

Professor Tomkins:

With your permission, I will jump in on that. First, I have to say that the question of legislative consent has got a long way out of control. By that I mean this: absolutely, the United Kingdom Parliament should seek and obtain the legislative consent of the devolved Administrations and devolved Parliaments if the United Kingdom is seeking to legislate on matters which it has chosen to devolve to democratically elected legislatures away from Westminster, but that is not what is happening here—

Q The House of Commons Library disagrees with you.

Professor Tomkins:

No it doesn’t.

I just read it out.

Professor Tomkins:

No, what you said is that this legislation trespasses on executive competence of Ministers, not on legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament. There is not a single aspect of devolved competence on which this legislation touches or trespasses. I do not think there is any question of legislative consent—but it is an unfashionable view these days that this has got out of control in that the United Kingdom Parliament now thinks it needs to seek legislative consent on a whole range of issues that are not actually devolved to Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland. In my view, on a proper understanding of the scope of the Sewel convention—that is to say, as Lord Sewel would have understood it when he introduced the convention in the House of Lords back in 1999—there is no question of legislative consent on this legislation.

We do not have time for another question in the time allotted for this panel. Let me say on behalf of the Committee that we are grateful to our witnesses for their evidence.