(1) Section 67 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 is amended as follows.
(2) Leave out subsection (8) and insert—
“(8) Subject to section 67A and subsections (9) and (10), determinations, awards, orders and other decisions of the Tribunal (including decisions as to whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction and purported determinations, awards, orders and other decisions) shall be final and shall not be subject to appeal or be liable to be questioned in any court.
(9) In particular—
(a) the Tribunal is not to be regarded as having exceeded its powers by reason of any error of fact or law made in reaching any decision; and
(b) the supervisory jurisdiction of the courts does not extend to, and no application or petition for judicial review may be made or brought in relation to, any decision of the Tribunal.
(10) Subsections (8) and (9) do not apply so far as the decision involves or gives rise to any question as to whether the Tribunal—
(a) has a valid case before it;
(b) is or was properly constituted for the purpose of dealing with the case; and
(c) is acting or has acted in bad faith, with actual bias or corruption or in some other way that constitutes a fundamental procedural defect.
(11) No error of fact or law made by the Tribunal in reaching any decision is to be construed as relevant to the question.”
(3) The amendment made by subsection (2) applies to determinations, awards, orders and other decisions of the Tribunal (including purported determinations, awards, orders and other decisions) made before the day on which this section comes into force.”—
I beg to move that the clause be read a Second time.
The new clause addresses the issue of the courts’ role in curtailing the use of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 and more especially circumventing the role of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. It would restore Parliament’s choice in enacting section 67 of the Act so that the decisions of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal would not be subject to judicial review.
As Security Minister at the Home Office, I addressed these matters in an important piece of legislation that established the principle of a double lock in respect of the warranting of powers in the case of both suspected terrorists and serious and organised criminals. That is to say that tech companies are obliged to maintain a record of electronic communications that can be interrogated on application to the Home Secretary for a warrant. I introduced the double lock, so that as well as satisfying the Home Secretary of the validity of the case made by the police or the security services, a warrant must also pass the same test when put before a member of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal or a judge. That was a safeguard to ensure that those powers are used only when necessary and proportionate. It is that test of necessity and proportionality that lies at the heart of the exercise of powers in respect of security and related matters.
The problem—it is a challenge that we have considered on previous occasions in the scrutiny of the Bill: indeed, it has punctuated our consideration—is that the courts have taken it upon themselves to become involved in matters that should be the exclusive preserve of this House. It is very important to see the Bill in that context. The supremacy of Parliament is fundamental to protecting the interests of the people, and Parliament’s particular role in our constitutional settlement is not a matter—as was suggested by one of those who gave evidence to us—of mutuality.
Anybody who understands constitutional theory and practice will know of the work of A. V. Dicey. It is clear that parliamentary sovereignty, as Dicey argued, confers on Parliament a dominant characteristic. Parliament consists of Her Majesty the Queen, the House of Lords and the House of Commons acting together, and therefore:
“The principle of Parliamentary sovereignty means neither more nor less than this”.
In Dicey’s words, Parliament has
“the right to make or unmake any law whatever; and, further, that no person or body is recognised by the law of England as having the right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament.”
Those are the words of A. V. Dicey in affirming the principle of sovereignty. He goes on to say that parliamentary sovereignty must be thus described:
“Any Act of Parliament, or any part of an Act of Parliament, which makes a new law, or repeals or modifies existing law, will be obeyed by the courts…Some apparent exceptions to this rule no doubt suggest themselves. But these apparent exceptions, as where, for example, the Judges of the High Court of Justice make rules of court repealing Parliamentary enactments, are resolvable into cases in which Parliament either directly or indirectly sanctions subordinate legislation.”
Legally, sovereign power is assuredly maintained by Parliament. It is quite wrong for the courts to be used as a way to perpetuate debate. We heard that from the Minister in particular respect of the way that judicial review has metamorphosised over time to perpetuate debate in particular cases that have been settled previously. The Minister described it as having several bites of the cherry. That is not the role of judicial process, and the Bill goes a considerable way to addressing that, but it does not go far enough.
The purpose of the new clause is to probe and press the Minister—I will not put it more strongly than that—to go further in affirming the sovereign role of Parliament described by A. V. Dicey. The power of Parliament has been drawn into question, particularly in respect of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, as I said. The Supreme Court, in a perverse judgment, effectively set aside Parliament’s lawmaking choice in May 2019 in the landmark judgment of Privacy International v. Investigatory Powers Tribunal. Hon. Members will remember that the case was raised in the first oral evidence session by Professor Ekins, and addressed by him in his paper for Policy Exchange. I once again thank Policy Exchange for publishing that paper, which has added to our understanding of and insight into these matters.
In essence, the new clause, tabled in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich, and supported by other Committee members—I say that with some timidity and hesitation, because I cannot presuppose that support until I have persuaded them by the power of my oratory; none the less, I am confident that it has some sympathy of other Committee members—is an opportunity for the Government to do what the Attorney General recommended in her recent speech in Cambridge, in which she identified the problem I describe of the courts taking a more incursive role into the business of high politics than is their proper place to do. The new clause, in respect of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, attempts to do just that.
The new clause would reverse the Supreme Court’s judgment and reinstate the law that Parliament clearly made. Before the Privacy International case, the courts had taken section 67 of the 2000 Act to be a clear, unambiguous ouster clause that excludes the jurisdiction of the courts in relation to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. For 19 years, there has been no possibility of judicial review. In recent court judgments, including others such as the Adams case and the Miller case, we have seen the creeping role of the courts into those areas, with judicial review being used as the mechanism to allow that mission creep. It is important that the Government recognise that—from what the Minister has said, I think they do—and take effective action to address it.
I suppose what I am saying is that the Bill could have been a bigger piece of legislation. As you will know from your long experience in the House, Mr Rosindell, new clauses are sometimes a way of encouraging the Government during the further consideration of a Bill to listen to the arguments that have been made during scrutiny and to allow it to do more than was originally intended. The alternative would be to bring in another Bill, but it is always difficult to secure time in the legislative programme. The likelihood of another Bill in the same subject area is small, so this may be our chance. It is a rare and special chance for the Minister to become something of a star, if I might put it that way, in the battle to affirm the constitutional place and historic role of Parliament in relation to the courts.
The then Lord Chancellor, my right hon. and learned Friend
The constitutional problems with the Supreme Court’s reasoning in that case are set out in a previous Policy Exchange paper written by Professor Ekins and Professor Forsyth of the University of Cambridge. Their argument was strongly endorsed by Lord Hoffmann and Lord Brown, two of the country’s most senior judges, and by Lord Faulkes, who chaired the independent review of administrative law last year.
Speaking about that case, the then Lord Chancellor said:
“when enacting the provisions at issue in Privacy International and Evans Parliament did not believe that it was infringing the rule of law (and indeed the judges in the minority in both cases agreed). It was also perfectly clear, as the minority recognised, what Parliament actually intended. Provided Parliament’s assessment was not wholly unreasonable, it does not appear to me to be right to frustrate that intention”.
That is a powerful critique. Even if Parliament had been wrong to enact section 67(8) of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, it was a decision for Parliament to make.
A fundamental issue is at stake here. We are answerable to the people and our legitimacy is derived from the people. Although it is important that an independent judiciary plays its part in our constitutional settlement, it is not a matter of reciprocity or mutuality; it is not about alternative sources of power. This place is the source of legitimate democratic power because we, as I say, draw that authority from the people. We speak for the people and are answerable to the people. That is the point. It is not right for that mission creep to allow others to exercise power, who are not directly accountable in the way that I have described.
The new clause focuses on the important Privacy International case, but it also speaks to those other wider and deeper matters. By accepting the new clause, as I am confident the Minister will with good grace and alacrity when he rises to speak, the Government will be doing a great service not only in their own interests, because the new clause is entirely in keeping with the essence of the legislation’s intention, but in recognising that the Bill provides a special, unusual, perhaps even a unique opportunity to right these wrongs.
Without wishing to delay the Committee further, I say to my colleagues on the Conservative Benches and, by the way, to those across the House, that the Bill has been debated in good spirit, and with appropriate care. I paid tribute in an earlier session to the hon. Member for Hammersmith, but I do not want to do so again, else we will start getting the reputation of being too friendly with each other. I do not want to give the impression that I am in the thrall of the hon. Gentleman. The Bill has been debated in the right spirit and in a sensible and positive way. To Opposition Members, I say that it is important for all Members of the House to recognise the authority of this place, as I have described, for that is our mission and purpose. I am disturbed by the increasing judicial activism that has led through series of cases—I could talk about the Miller case, and I referred briefly to the Adams case—which is changing the balance of our constitution from this place to elsewhere.
In summary, I was proud to take security legislation through the House that gave the Security Service and the police the powers that they need to protect us from those who seek to do us harm. We have put into place safeguards and protections in earlier security legislation and in the legislation that I took through myself. We are clear that there have to be those safeguards, and of course it is right that all the agencies on which we confer extensive powers are themselves accountable. But it is not right for the courts to frustrate the will of this House.
To that end, I am pleased and proud to propose the new clause in my name. Of course, needless to say, at this stage I will not say that I am going to push it to a vote; that would be quite wrong, because it would suggest that the Minister could just say anything. I do not want to let the Minister off the hook. He knows that I am a supportive and friendly member of the Committee; but none the less, I am expecting him to at very least say that he is minded to consider these matters, or the full power of the Back-Bench Members of the Committee could be felt and heard, to the distress of my great friend who sits on the Front Bench next to the Minister, namely my hon. Friend the Member for North Cornwall. As I said to him last week, were that to happen, he would have a grey mark against him, next to my black one.
I say to the Minister, persuade me otherwise, or agree at least to consider the matters addressed by the new clause because it is very much inspired by the message that he has broadcast to the Committee: the Government want to get things right in respect of the power of courts alongside the power of Parliament.
The right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings takes us back into the important constitutional territory with which he started his consideration of the Bill. He also, knowingly or not, revealed something about his taste in curry. For those who are looking slightly amiss about that, I refer to the opening paragraph of the article concerning the Bill that appeared in The Mail on Sunday, which said:
“The Justice Secretary, Dominic Raab, regards himself as a spicy ‘Vindaloo’ politician compared to the bland ‘korma’ represented by his predecessor, Robert Buckland, sources in his new ministry have told the Mail on Sunday.
The bizarre comparison was made in the context of the Judicial Review Bill, inherited by Mr Raab from Mr Buckland, which aims to clip the wings of the Judiciary over the extent to which they can rule on political decisions, such as Boris Johnson’s suspension of Parliament during Brexit negotiations in 2019.”
I will not go on, partly because the article contains some unparliamentary language, and in fairness to the Justice Secretary it ends with the immortal line:
“A source close to Mr Raab denied that he had ever compared himself to a vindaloo curry.”
The right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings puts himself more in the vindaloo than the korma camp with his comments, but I note that the new clauses that he has tabled are a subset of those in the Policy Exchange document, to which he referred, by Professor Ekins, who was one of the witnesses who gave evidence to the Committee. That document was a very powerful concoction indeed, because it contained 20 suggested new clauses or amendments, which were whittled down to seven on the amendment paper. After excluding those that were not in scope, we are down to two.
None the less, the import of what the right hon. Gentleman intends is still there, so I will respond to new clause 3 and, in due course, to new clause 5, and say to the Minister that it would be wrong to accept the new clauses, partly because of what they say and partly because of the way they are being introduced at this stage; they should really have come through the usual processes. That is to say nothing about the right of the right hon. Gentleman to table them now to raise the issue. Nevertheless, the provisions are being put to the Committee at a very late stage. The way in which they were tabled leaves no time for substantial parliamentary engagement or the required serious consideration of their merits.
Of course, Parliament is supreme, and there may be a case for looking at the propriety of certain Supreme Court decisions or changing the way that judicial review works, but this is not the proper way to enact measures of such constitutional significance. The bottom line is that if Parliament wishes to modify or overturn legal decisions as significant as those highlighted here, it should do so through a proper and full debate, with a full consultation beforehand, so that it can benefit from a wide range of expert views. Parliamentarians should be empowered to make proper, informed decisions. These rushed provisions undermine the parliamentary process and threaten ill-considered constitutional reforms, with unknown consequences.
On the timing, the hon. Gentleman makes a fair point. He will know how the House works; he has been in it a long time. Clearly there will be opportunities for further consideration of the matters that I have raised, both on Report and during the Bill’s passage in the other place, so we are at the beginning of a very long journey.
As I said, I have not decided whether to press the new clauses to a vote, but I am putting down a marker. The hon. Gentleman will have seen that happen many times; indeed, he has done the same during scrutiny of the Bill, and I hope that some of his arguments will be heard. On the character of the marker, the new clause respects new clause 2 in terms of exceptional cases where the tribunal has acted in a perverse way, so it allows legal consideration of any exceptional, ambiguous or improper decision by the tribunal.
I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman, who made several points there. I am coming on to deal with each of them. I suspect that his new clauses and comments are directed as much—if not more—to his own Front Benchers as to me in putting that marker down, but the Government must have taken some care with the long title of the Bill, which is tightly drawn.
Obviously, I do not question the wisdom of the Clerks, but the two new clauses we are debating this afternoon have squeaked through because the long title clearly identifies what is in clauses 1 and 2. With all respect to the other place, and there are more stages still to go, it is not just the deliberation in both Houses that is important when discussing constitutional matters.
We heard from some, but only some, of the experts in the field. I concede there was a significant consultation process; perhaps the Government did not get the responses they wanted the first time, so they went back and had another go. Nevertheless, they have had at least two bites of the cherry in the consultation.
That is enough, apparently—according to the Minister.
Having gone through that process, the Government decided to push forward with focused reforms to Cart judicial reviews to modify the nature of discretionary remedies only. This new clause, and indeed new clause 5 and the other new clauses that were not selected, would go much further. If these proposals were being taken seriously, they would be headline provisions in the Bill, not underdeveloped addendum clauses introduced without proper consideration and in their current form. It is inappropriate to being these measures into force as proposed.
The new clauses are not supported by, and in some cases go directly against, expert analysis or wider consultation. The measures being taken forward by the Government in this Bill were preceded by extensive consultation and engagement with experts and stakeholders. That includes the work of the independent review of administrative law and contributions from across the sector, including the judiciary.
The same cannot be said of these new clauses. In fact, the majority of experts and the Government themselves rejected some of the very measures they propose. For example, the changes to the disclosure duty in new clause 5 were considered but ultimately rejected by the independent review of administrative law. The Government agreed at the time that the reforms were unnecessary.
The new clauses try to address significant, complex areas of law in an overly simplistic way, and many of the apparent problems these new clauses seek to resolve are more complicated than the proposals seem to believe or understand. The rules on evidence disclosure, for example, have developed so that disclosure is tailored in each case to ensure that justice is done, whereas the new clauses take a blunt hammer to this sophisticated scheme. Unfairness is therefore inevitable.
The solutions are blunt and may lead to unintended consequences. Although several of the new clauses have been found to be out of scope, they amount to an attack on our constitutional balance. The result would be a great reduction in judicial protection, the disempowerment of aggrieved citizens and a Government who are unacceptably insulated from scrutiny.
The hon. Gentleman is talking about constitutional balance, as did my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings. The important question is: who is ultimately in charge of making the laws of the country? Parliament has the right, given by the electorate, to decide the law. The principle of the judgment said that should be limited by the judiciary in some cases, which throws up an important constitutional question that we need to look at.
Absolutely. Parliament is supreme and can will what it likes. That is very clear. Where the balance lies is what is in dispute here. The question is the appropriate role of the judiciary, which is exactly how the doctrine of judicial review has developed.
With respect, that point is not in debate. What Lord Carnwath said is:
“In all cases, regardless of the words used, it should remain ultimately a matter for the court to determine the extent to which such a clause should be upheld, having regard to its purpose and statutory context, and the nature and importance of the legal issue in question; and to determine the level of scrutiny required by the rule of law.”
What I understand is being said—the hon. Gentleman can correct me if I am wrong—is that in some cases the legislature does not have the right to pass particular laws.
No, and even the vindaloo version—the full Ekins version—does not attack the doctrine of judicial review. It is saying that the courts sometimes resolve matters procedurally and sometimes, in relation to specific judgments, the court has got it wrong and it is Parliament’s job to overrule, which Parliament is entitled to do. At the end of this legislative process, Parliament will have made those decisions. What we are debating now is what is or is not appropriate. Specifically, we are debating two discrete issues. The first is the decision in the Privacy International case against the Investigatory Powers Tribunal and whether an ouster should be imposed, and the second is about rather more widespread issues to do with disclosure and witness evidence. I am perfectly open to arguing those issues, but the point is that we happen to disagree: these measures are wrong, and that is what we are going to debate this afternoon.
Let me talk more specifically about new clause 3. The new clause would effectively overturn the decision in the Privacy International case by excluding judicial review of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal subject to a number of limited exceptions that broadly, although not exactly, mirror those in clause 2. That means that judicial review would be excluded except where the High Court must consider whether the tribunal had a valid case before it; was properly constituted to hear the case; or acted in bad faith, with actual bias, corruption or some other fundamental procedural defect.
As I have said, this would insert a second ouster clause in the Bill and would be a concerning addition to the restriction of Cart judicial reviews. The new clause includes similar exceptions—bad faith, fundamental procedural defect and so forth—to the ouster in Cart, but crucially they are even narrower than those in clause 2, in that the exception of where the court has acted
“in fundamental breach of the principles of natural justice” has been removed. The more restrictive exception of where the court acts in a way
“that constitutes a fundamental procedural defect” has been added. The trend suggested is extremely concerning and risks having a serious impact on the ability of individuals to retain redress, not to be subject to unlawful exercise of power, and to hold the Executive to account.
The first thing to note is that there is immediate uncertainty around those exceptions and how they might operate. There is already a problem with the Cart ouster in the main section of the Bill, and I have spoken at length about that in previous sittings. That uncertainty would only be multiplied by this new clause.
Judicial review is an essential constitutional remedy, and attempts to introduce and proliferate ouster clauses, as this new clause seeks to do, risk undermining the UK’s constitutional framework and the protection against abuses of Executive power. Judicial review is generally available only where there is no other recourse to an alternative remedy. The effect of ouster clauses is therefore often to shut down all routes to challenge a decision, even if the decision has been based on a misinterpretation of the law.
Furthermore, judicial review is an integral part of the UK constitution based on parliamentary sovereignty, ensuring that there is a means to address injustices and abuses of power. It exists separately and in addition to the Executive’s political accountability to Parliament. Ouster clauses risk undermining the effectiveness of judicial review as a means of legal scrutiny of the Executive. No matter how unpopular the cause or the claimant, the rule of law still applies and the Executive should not be able to go beyond their legal limits without the potential for accountability in the courts. In fact, it is precisely for such claimants that judicial review is so crucial.
I rise to correct the hon. Gentleman but not in an antagonistic way. He will understand that this new clause—and, indeed, the Bill—do not supersede section 67A of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, which does indeed say that the tribunal can be challenged on a point of law. Contrary to his argument, there remains in existing legislation an additional safeguard if the tribunal acts in a way that is contrary to proper legal practice, and a point of law is the ground for an appeal.
In relation to the ouster in clause 2, I spoke about judicial review’s role in ensuring good and lawful administration, but as that issue has arisen again I wish to emphasise the point in this new context. Judicial review is an incentive to maintain high standards in public administration by public bodies, because the possibility of judicial review motivates decision makers to ensure that their decisions are lawful. Ouster clauses such as this one remove such motivation and, coupled with the removal of the means through with such decisions could be challenged, risk a decrease in the quality of Executive decision making.
Decisions and guidance from the courts can also help to improve policy development and decision making in Government. Judicial review provides the opportunity to bring to light legitimate concerns about a public body’s processes and decision making, and decision making in Government. Indeed, judicial review provides the opportunity to bring to light legitimate concerns about a public body’s processes and decision making and then also gives guidance on improving the processes in the future and encouraging good governance.
The same applies to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. The decisions of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal relate to potentially very significant Executive powers in the area of surveillance and privacy rights. In this context especially, the risk of a breach of the fundamental rights of individuals is high. It is therefore crucial that Parliament has sufficient time to carefully consider the consequences of restricting judicial review in this context, and this last-minute amendment does not afford that.
Fundamentally—regardless of what anyone thinks about the merits of the Privacy International case—this is not the way to go about amending it, or even thinking about amending it. Parliamentarians will be asked to vote on what is in effect a very significant legal change, without any real appreciation of the possible effects and consequences and, as above, without the benefit of expert input through consultation and parliamentary examination. A provision such as this should be the headline measure in any Bill; it should be considered and debated seriously and properly; and anyone voting on it should have a full understanding of the issues. It should not be introduced as a last-minute addendum to an otherwise unrelated set of measures concerning judicial review remedies. This new clause as drafted will generate serious uncertainty.
There is also a substantive argument here. In the Privacy International case, the Supreme Court essentially held that it is very difficult for the Government to completely close off judicial review—in this case, concerning decisions of the IPT. The Government should be very careful about reversing that decision: the immediate consequence would be to close off judicial review. If it is thought that the Privacy International decision should be revisited in the future, it should be ensured that parliamentarians are fully aware of any consequences of doing that, and perhaps some middle-ground solution that preserves access to justice could be tried.
The amendment takes a sledgehammer to what should be a carefully crafted and sensitively considered issue. That, in my submission, is not the appropriate way to do good law making.
I will keep my remarks fairly brief; I see myself very much as a secondary signatory to these amendments from my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings: my much wiser, senior colleague. However, at one point last week I did think that I would be spearheading these particular amendments myself. Fate has meant that I have assumed a less significant role today.
Most of the comments that I would like to make are in relation to new clause 5, so I will hold off from making those comments now. All I will say is this. I take the point that new clause 3 is significant and Parliament needs more time to look at it. That was not the case when the change occurred after the Privacy International case. Actually, something very significant happened there. There was a major change in relation to the powers tribunal, its role and the role of judicial review in reviewing its decisions, and Parliament had no say at all in supervising that or debating it. I would be grateful if the hon. Member for Hammersmith let me know whether he agrees with my view on that. If he is concerned that Parliament might not have more time to debate the significant change suggested now, surely he would consider it inappropriate for Parliament not to have had a role back when the role of judicial review in relation to that tribunal changed so significantly.
I think that there are two debates here. If we are asking our intelligence services to carry out incredibly unique and peculiar work and we have to have a tribunal that is very specialist in reviewing and taking into account work that they do, there is one debate there, but there is a second debate. Even if someone does not agree with that and they think that there should be a right of review, surely it is only right and proper that Parliament should be in a place to debate and decide on that. It should not just happen; the court should not just decide for itself that this is the right thing to do.
As I said, I am keeping my comments brief. I will return on new clause 5, on which I have more points to make.
I will be brief. Basically, I agree with the hon. Member for Hammersmith and share the concerns about this being the second ouster clause in the Bill. I feel it is a bit early to use the legal framework to oust Cart already.
I hope the Government will wait for the Bill to be enacted before trying that. I agree that the new clause is not the way to go about amending this. Such a provision should be a headline measure in a Bill; I think the right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings—that is a lovely constituency name—said himself that this would ordinarily be in a new Bill. I understand the argument that there is not an awful lot of time for new legislation, but I think this measure needs to be debated seriously and properly. Parliament needs a full understanding of the issues, following a full consultation.
I would argue an awful lot harder and longer than that, first, if I thought the Government were about to support the new clause, and secondly, if I thought anybody would listen. [Interruption.] I do not mean if they would listen to me; I mean if I thought we would ever win a vote in this place. The Government should be very careful in reversing that decision and should think about the consequences of it. I agree with everything that the hon. Member for Hammersmith has said.
I am grateful to the hon. Lady for being so kind to me and my constituency, and my constituents by extension. It is clear that the Attorney General supports the new clause because she drew particular attention to the character of the Privacy International case in her recent speech on these matters. Inasmuch as she is the most senior Law Officer of the Government, whatever the Minister might say today—I appreciate that he may want to hold fire, to some degree—it is clear that the Attorney General understands and supports my argument.
I am not sure whether the right hon. Gentleman’s intervention was aimed at me or the Minister. If he was aiming it at me, all I will say is that it would not be the first, second, third, fourth or fifth way in which I disagreed with the Attorney General in her reckoning. I will sit down and allow others to speak.
This has been a good debate on the new clause, which is interesting in many ways from a constitutional point of view, both theoretically and practically. My hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich does not have a secondary role. I am his constituency neighbour. He has a fantastic role that he is fulfilling as a brilliant constituency MP. It was a great honour to campaign with him in the general election, and I see a return on that investment, as he is a vocal spokesman for people of all political shades in the fine county town of Suffolk.
The hon. Member for Glasgow North East may have, shall we say, come here through the use of a crutch, but she should not downplay the role that her speeches could play. Of course we listen. We listen to all sides. Indeed, I have listened intently to the debate on the new clause. I will say one thing to the hon. Member for Hammersmith: although I completely understand where he was coming from, and his points made political sense, he appeared at one point to suggest that it almost was not necessarily relevant to debate the new clause. The new clause is about judicial review, and we know the first two words of the Bill’s title. In fact, we just agreed to the clause on the short title, which includes the phrase “judicial review”; I think my speech on that was the shortest I have ever made, by the way.
My right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings made some important contributions, which I am grateful for. I hope he received the letter we sent him, which I believe has been circulated to other Committee members, containing the response on the important matter of the most vulnerable children—those in care. I hope that reassures him on the safeguards. Secondly, on the make-up of the coronial stakeholder group in administrative justice, which introduces a broad umbrella because of the nature of the engagement, I hope that the letter has persuaded my right hon. Friend. I am therefore tempted to eke out the general thread of my argument and hope to encourage him that I am someone who is generally able to persuade people of things. The sword of Damocles that he holds over this speech with the threat to vote can be dealt with.
I should pay tribute to my right hon. Friend for his former role as Security Minister, which he referred to. He was involved in important proceedings when our country, as was proudly illustrated this morning, faced great threats, not least terrorist threats. He was also a Transport Minister, and I met him to discuss roads in my constituency. The essence of his argument was that the Bill does not go far enough, so he wants to debate important probing amendments. I will come back to that wider point.
On the specifics, as has been explained, new clause 3 would amend section 67 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 by replacing the wording in subsection (8) and adding three additional subsections. Subsection (8) was originally drafted as an ouster clause—we have already debated ouster clauses in relation to clause 2— to ensure that certain decisions of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal would not be subject to judicial review by the High Court. A right of appeal on a point of law was later introduced by the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 and is set out in what is now section 67A.
The tribunal was intended to be the highest authority concerning matters such as the conduct of intelligence services. However, a 2019 judgment of the UK Supreme Court rendered the ouster clause of limited effect in what we have all referred to today as the Privacy International case. The Supreme Court found that while subsection (8) was effective at excluding judicial review of IPT decisions on their merits or jurisdictional decisions involving issues of fact, it did not have the effect of wholly ousting the High Court’s supervisory jurisdiction.
The new clause would amend the ouster clause in section 67 by clarifying and adding to the text in that section so as to meet the objection of the Supreme Court in Privacy International. That is an interesting idea, and I am sure my right hon. Friend is aware that the Government’s consultation, published in March, expressed concern around the uncertainty that exists as to whether, or in what circumstances, ouster clauses will be upheld by the courts. We therefore consulted on options to try to add some clarity with a broad framework for the interpretation of ouster clauses, but, having reflected on the many useful responses we received, we concluded that although our intention was to add clarity, the effect may in fact be to muddy the waters yet further.
As an alternative approach, we are pursuing the ouster clause in clause 2, which is designed to overturn Cart, seeks to learn the lessons from unsuccessful ouster clauses of the past, and is drafted in a clear and explicit way. We have been open in saying that if that approach is successful, we may consider whether it can be used as a model for ousters in other areas, where it is appropriate to do so. At least conceptually, I see the link between ousting the High Court from reviewing permission to appeal decisions of the upper tribunal and ousting the High Court from reviewing decisions of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. They are both essentially concerned with which court ultimately should have the final say on an issue.
I am going to give the Committee the benefit of my further wisdom in a few moments, but on that particular issue, the point about the Investigatory Powers Tribunal is that it is a specialist court, and the intention of the House in establishing that court—the Minister made reference to the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 and the Investigatory Powers Act 2016; the 2016 Act was the one that I took through the House, as he knows—was to indicate that had Parliament decided that the tribunal’s important work, which essentially gives authority as well as supervision to the security services, should not be questioned in an ordinary court. The Supreme Court countered Parliament’s will in that respect. That is why this is so significant. It draws into question whether the Supreme Court might do the same in respect of other primary legislation that has ouster clauses in it, which is why it is important to act now in this Bill.
I pay tribute to my right hon. Friend’s legislative prowess in taking that Bill through the House at the time. It is precisely because of his point that in paragraph 55 of our consultation response document, published in July, the example we give of a case where we may look at using a Cart-like model of ouster clause in future is exactly this one—the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. We have made clear that we are looking at that. The Government are not closed-minded to the possibility of going further on judicial review. In a recent interview with The Sunday Telegraph, the Deputy Prime Minister spoke of the importance of restoring power to Parliament, while recognising the need for reform of judicial review to be an iterative process. I am sure he will have heard today’s debate and the many forceful points made, but the Government will keep an open mind on whether that tribunal might be a candidate for an ouster clause in future.
Our focus in the Bill is to tackle the two particular issues identified by the independent review of administrative law: the efficiency of Cart JRs and the lack of remedial flexibility in judicial review. I know my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings is sympathetic on this point. There is a good reason for prioritising Cart—we have a judicial backlog, and the resource implication of it is immediate and credible. [Interruption.] My right hon. Friend says from a sedentary position that he understands. It will be important to ensure that before an ouster clause is proposed in any particular context, careful thought is given to what will be achieved by doing so and to considerations germane to that context. One size does not necessarily fit all, but we are open minded.
A key point I wanted to communicate is that my right hon. Friend invited me to become a star. His invitation to stellarhood is one I cannot begin to match, but I will at least attempt to do so by offering him an invitation to attend the Ministry of Justice to discuss with officials present some of these ideas in depth—especially given his expertise from his time as a Minister, talking in that neat language of Ministers and officials who know their Bill—and to talk through some of the technicalities. We do see the merit in what he says; it is more a question of timing.
In summary, my right hon. Friend says we do not go far enough; I would say that we go this far at this time. I hope that reassures my right hon. Friend and other colleagues that this is an issue to which the Government are already alive and to which I am sure future consideration will be given. But for now, for the specific purpose of the Bill, I respectfully request that he withdraw his new clause.
When I said the Minister could become a star, I should have said a brighter star, because he has already shone in his response, particularly his generous invitation to meet with and discuss these matters with his officials in his Department. I take his point, of course, about the characteristics of the Bill, the need to address Cart in particular, and its relationship to the backlog in the courts. However, the Bill is about principle as well as practice. There is a practical reason for introducing the Bill, but a principle underpins it, which he has articulated a number of times during our deliberations: it is not right that the court system should be gamed to frustrate the will of the House.
My hon. Friend the Member for Don Valley spoke about his constituents wanting to see the will of the House as a manifestation of their will being delivered. The disturbing rise in judicial activism and judge-made law raises fundamental questions of parliamentary sovereignty. Mr Rosindell, whether you are or are not convinced of that I do not know, as you are the impartial Chair in our affairs, but the witnesses who gave evidence to the Committee are certainly convinced. Professor Ekins said that the Privacy International case did constitute a “very serious attack” on some fundamental questions of the constitution. He stated:
“The rule of law requires respect for the law, which includes parliamentary sovereignty and the stability of statute”.
In oral evidence, Sir Stephen Laws said:
“If the courts are deciding judicial review decisions that set the rules for future hypothetical cases, they are usurping the legislative function.”––[Official Report, Judicial Review and Courts Public Bill Committee,
That is pretty damning criticism of the Privacy International judgment and other recent cases.
There is an argument that at that time there was a particular group of Supreme Court judges—I am hesitating so as to choose the right words—who took eccentric decisions, and that things have now returned to normal, but that is not good enough. As the Attorney General said in her recent speech,
“the mould has been broken.”
Precedent was set, and that is the problem with ouster clauses. As the hon. Member for Hammersmith will know, other Acts of Parliament, including the Intelligence Services Act 1994, Security Service Act 1989 and the Police Act 1997, contain ouster clauses that could be challenged on the basis of the Privacy International case.
Does my right hon. Friend agree that the key issue in relation to new clause 3 is the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, the complexity of the things it will deal with, and the complexity of the roles of the organisation and people it is overseeing? That complex debate should be dealt with only by Parliament. We are best placed to have that debate and to come to the right conclusion. Decisions about whether judicial review will apply to that or not should be for this place, not for the judiciary.
I agree. Indeed, when I proposed the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, to which the hon. Member for Hammersmith referred and which built on the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, which Privacy International specifically dealt with, there was a genuine spirit of co-operation across the House. I worked closely with my then shadow, who went on to become Leader of the Opposition. I often say to him these days, “You learned your trade under me.” In fact, I think he said that to me. In any case, we worked closely on those matters and it was detailed scrutiny, as my hon. Friend has just described, that led to that Bill becoming an Act.
Indeed, we undertook extensive pre-legislative scrutiny, and one of the people I appointed to that task is now Attorney General. The scrutiny, under Lord Murphy, looked at the Bill in some detail, as the hon. Member for Hammersmith suggested, and there were long debates in the House and in the other place before it became law. As I emphasised earlier, we were determined that there should be proper safeguards.
The essence of this, Mr Rosindell, is that in these difficult, delicate and challenging matters of security, Parliament has to legislate—I would not say regularly, but as often as necessary—to allow our security services and the forces of law to stay ahead of those who wish to do us harm. The problem is that the capabilities of malevolent elements are dynamic, so the legal powers of those with the mission to keep us safe must match that dynamism. That is always challenging to Parliament, because there is a balance to be struck between the maintenance of law and the protection of liberty. That debate is the context for many of these considerations. It is not the place of the courts of make up the law as they go along, but that is exactly what has occurred.
“The Supreme Court’s judgment in the case of Privacy International was also profoundly troubling for a number of reasons. A decision by Parliament to limit the judicial review jurisdiction of the Courts should only be taken after the most serious consideration by the legislature. And there may well be circumstances where Parliament does consider that to be appropriate. In such circumstances, the Court should be very slow to deprive legislation of its proper meaning”.
That is essentially what the Court did in the case of Privacy International. It deprived legislation of its proper meaning. The most generous way to describe it is that the Court interpreted the decision made by Parliament in what I regard as a perverse way, and, in the words of the Attorney General, a “profoundly troubling” way.
The new clause, which the Minister will know is in scope—it is not for me to gauge that; our expert Clerks judged it, so there is no doubt about whether it is appropriate to add it to the Bill—would address that concern about creeping judge-made law in what is, as my hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich said, a very sensitive area. I am grateful to the Minister, who made a generous offer and rightly drew attention to his helpful letter on issues raised by me and other hon. Members in our earlier consideration. I am particularly grateful to him for fully taking into account the case that I made on behalf of disadvantaged court users; his letter is most welcome in that respect. With the offer that he made of further discussion, the open-mindedness that he has shown and his clear understanding of why the new clause was tabled, I will—hesitatingly and to some degree reluctantly—beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.