Okay. I will give it my best shot. My understanding is that the hon. Gentleman is trying to extend the rule that works in Northern Ireland and to apply it to the whole of the UK by saying that we could take a grouping of five or more constituencies, whose combined electorate meets a certain mathematical criterion.

I have said it before and I will say it again: the Government are committed to delivering equal and updated constituencies for the UK. We can do that only if the rules set for the boundary commissions allow them to propose constituencies that are equal or as equal as possible. That loops back to many of the nuances and balances that we have spoken about throughout the Committee. I fear the new Clause goes in the opposite direction and, in doing so, raises a couple of problems, which I will try to draw out.

Let me start with what rule 7 is for. It exists because of a specific issue arising in Northern Ireland. Of the four nations, it has the smallest discrete group of constituencies. At the beginning of a boundary review, as I referred to earlier, numbers of constituencies are allocated to each nation using the Sainte-Laguë method. As each nation must have a whole number of constituencies, there is inevitably either a rounding up or a rounding down at the moment. For Northern Ireland, that has been likely to mean—and will still be likely to mean—either a rounding up to 18 or a rounding down to 17. The effects of that can be quite significant when you have only a double-digit number like that.

Rule 7 first applies a mathematical formula to assess the significance of the rounding effects. If, as a result of the rounding down, the overall electorate in Northern Ireland is significantly more than might be expected, by taking the UK electoral quota and multiplying by 17—the number of Northern Ireland seats—then rule 7 may come into play if the Boundary Commission for Northern Ireland judges that is necessary in order for it to adequately perform a boundary review. In those circumstances, rule 7 then allows the Boundary Commission for Northern Ireland to apply a more generous electoral quota variance range, that range being ascertained through a second mathematical formula. I apologise for the level of detail, but I wanted to set out what rule 7 does before going any further.

I turn now to whether rule 7 could be extended, through this new clause, to any grouping of constituencies, and whether that should be five or more constituencies. If I understand the new clause correctly, it suggests that if the combined electorate of any grouping of five or more is greater than the UK electoral quota by more than one third—in other words, around 25,000 electors—then rule 7 should apply by taking that electoral quota and multiplying it by five. In that instance, the boundary commission in question could then apply a more generous variance range.

I have three points to make about the new clause based on that. First, it could engender some controversy around how the constituencies are selected. That is my core concern and why I, perhaps unfairly, put the hon. Gentleman on the spot as to why he chose five as his number of constituencies. I foresee huge issues in how any five could be put together, as well as calls for a different five to be combined or for groupings of any kind to enjoy the added flexibility. I am unsure whether that would provide the most transparent and satisfactory experience for the electorate, and making boundary commissions subject to such calls and controversy would also put them in a difficult position.

Secondly, boundary commissions could differ in their application of any such rules. Depending on how a grouping was picked, there would invariably be differences in their judgments and, again, those judgments could be challengeable or appear arbitrary or unfounded. All told, compared with the status quo, that would add more complexity and offer less confidence in the work of the boundary commissions, which would be a bad thing.

My final point relates to the central argument that having equal votes really matters. The new clause opens up the possibility of that being chipped away at once again. I am sure that any application of rule 7 under this new clause could be justified locally, but each case would be likely to result in constituencies that would be outside the tolerance level set by Parliament for the rest of the country, and that matters. Unequal constituencies mean unequal votes, unfairness and poorer treatment for some citizens. This Bill and its parent Act contain a limited number of exceptions, which we have discussed in some detail in Committee, but this new clause does not represent a good argument for another one. It could create a bit of a free-for-all, and I am not persuaded by it.

I thank hon. Gentleman for tabling the new clause, which has elicited an interesting exchange, and I hope that my response has done it justice, but I urge him to withdraw it, and the rest of the Committee may feel the same way.