New Clause 8 - Money laundering: electronic money institutions

Part of Financial Services Bill – in a Public Bill Committee at 2:00 pm on 3 December 2020.

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That rapid growth is placing significant pressures on FinTechs, customers and law enforcement. For example, a recent article in The Times showed that many customers have their accounts locked out for extended periods. More worryingly, the head of the UK Financial Intelligence Unit, Ian Mynot, told the Financial Times last week that unnecessary DAML reports are affecting the NCA’s ability to investigate criminals. I am sure the Committee will agree that that is really worrying. The article says:

“The…National Crime Agency has called for deeper reform of the system for flagging potential money laundering”

There are concerns out there; it is not just Opposition Members who are concerned.

I am concerned that FinTechs have to spend significant amounts of time and money sending requests to the NCA, which provides the agency with extra admin and work that it does not want to do. That time and money could be used to build new products and services that would benefit customers and businesses and therefore be more cost-effective.

Subsection (4) of the new clause would extend the DAML threshold eligibility to electronic money institutions. When the Minister replies, will he give his assessment of how many DAMLs have been submitted this year and, of those, how many have been for sums under £250? Are the numbers now in the tens of thousands? How many DAMLs for sums under £250 have been refused in the past year? Is it zero? If so, what was the associated cost to the economy of all that unnecessary paperwork, not to mention the diversion of law enforcement resources from proactive investigation to dealing with administration and the intangible costs and frustrations to customers who have had their accounts frozen with no reason given? What is the Minister’s estimate of the amount of time and money FinTechs have expended on submitting DAMLs that the NCA does not want? Does that put the UK FinTech sector at a competitive disadvantage? I realise I am asking a lot of questions, but I have just a few more. How many DAMLS does the Minister expect to be submitted in each of the next three years if the definition in POCA is not updated through the Bill?

Before moving on, Dr Huq, it is worth pointing out that the new clause does not affect the parallel requirement for regulated firms to submit suspicious activity reports to the NCA every time a firm knows or suspects that someone is engaged in money laundering, regardless of the sums involved. I reassure hon. Members that the new clause would not change the SAR process. Does the Minister think that DAMLs of under £250 provide any useful intelligence to the NCA, given that it already receives SARs and given the comments of Mr Mynot? Can the Minister address that in his response?

The second issue that the new clause addresses relates to account-freezing orders, or AFOs. The Proceeds of Crime Act includes provisions that enable law enforcement agencies to freeze and forfeit funds held in UK bank or building society accounts, where there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that those funds are the proceeds of crime. In order to freeze funds in an account, a senior law enforcement officer has to apply to the courts for an account freezing order. Under POCA, AFOs can only be used to freeze funds held in bank or building society accounts.

The Minister may be able to correct me on this, but I understand that AFOs cannot be used to freeze funds held in accounts of FinTechs, which are regulated as electronic money institutions. It seems to me that there is clearly a significant risk that criminals will exploit that loophole and run illicit activities through FinTech accounts to avoid having their funds frozen.

Subsections (2) and (3) of the new clause would update the necessary definitions in POCA, meaning that law enforcement could use AFOs to freeze funds held in FinTech accounts in the same way that they can in standard current accounts. In his response, can the Minister let the Committee know if his Department is aware of any suspected money launderers exploiting this AFO loophole? That is important if we are to move forward. What are the sums involved? Have any police forces or law enforcement agencies made representations to the Minister urging him to adopt the measure? If so, does he agree with us that the loophole needs to be closed as a matter of urgency, and that the change in definitions cannot wait any longer?

Dr Huq, we all want to make progress on this issue. I will therefore be listening very carefully to the Minister’s response to my questions. As I said at the outset, I hope that we can use the opportunity today to obtain a cross-party consensus to fix these issues during the passage of the Bill. That would be good for consumers, it would support our crime prevention agencies and send a strong message of support to our fast-growing FinTechs. If the Minister is unable to commit to looking at this issue during the passage of the Bill, we would welcome his bringing it up at a later stage. I look forward to the Minister’s response.