We now enter the lush hinterlands of the banking surcharge regime. Clause 32 makes changes to the regime that ensures that the surcharge operates as intended when it was introduced.
The Government believe that even as reliefs are provided to support the economy in response to the coronavirus, the tax rules should continue to operate fairly and consistently for all businesses within their scope. Previously, the Government have legislated so that banks make a fair tax contribution, which reflects the risks they pose to the UK economy. That is why the Government introduced the bank levy in 2011—a tax on banks and building societies’ balance sheet equity and liabilities. It is also why banks have been subject to additional taxes above and beyond general business taxation ever since then.
In 2015, the Government made changes to the bank tax regime to ensure the sustainability of the tax base. They introduced the new bank levy rate, but offset that with the introduction of a new 8% surcharge on banks’ profits over £25 million, on top of corporation tax. The surcharge applies to corporation tax profits of banking companies within a banking group.
For corporation tax purposes, companies are able to make a number of adjustments when arriving at their profits. That might include transferring losses from one group company to another or carrying forward losses to the next accounting period. However, to ensure that banks are paying tax on all their banking profits, some of these are disallowed when arriving at the profits subject to the surcharge.
One such disallowed adjustment is for capital losses that are transferred from a non-banking company to a banking company and set against the capital gains of that banking company. That transfer should be disregarded when calculating the surcharge profit for the banking company. Currently, where these capital losses are carried forward to a future accounting period, that transfer is disregarded.
However, under the legislation as it stands, such transferred-in capital losses are not disregarded when they are set against the capital gains of the banking company in the same accounting period. That could, counter to the original intention, mean banks using losses from non-banking companies in their group to reduce their surcharge profits. That cannot be right, and the changes that we are making in the Finance Bill will ensure that it cannot happen. The changes made by clause 32 will stop surcharge profits being reduced by all capital losses transferred in from non-banking companies, whenever they are utilised against capital gains.
The changes made by clause 32 will ensure that the surcharge operates in the way that was intended when it was introduced. They will ensure that banks cannot reduce their profits subject to surcharge by using losses from non-banking companies in their groups. Above all, they will ensure that banks pay the additional tax on all their banking profits.
We welcome clause 32 and the Financial Secretary’s explanation of why the measure is necessary. It is important to emphasise, particularly for those in the banks who pay close attention to proceedings in Parliament, a couple of points that they should bear in mind, even a decade on from the financial crisis.
Across the House, we recognise and welcome—certainly this is true of Her Majesty’s official Opposition—the fact that the UK is a global financial centre and that the financial services industry is an asset to our country. It generates jobs and employment, and provides the oil to grease the wheels of the economy. We can see now, in response to the present crisis, the importance of getting finance to where it is needed.
Whether we are talking about business or personal customers, business loans and lending, mortgages, pensions, savings or bank accounts, people in their day-to-day lives understand the importance of a strong financial services industry. Across the House we recognise the importance of the financial services industry to the economy as a whole. As we saw, painfully, back in the midst of the global financial crisis, when the financial services industry fails and suffers, the whole economy suffers, too. It is important to acknowledge the value that we place on it.
However, it is also important that the banks should continue to reflect on the fact that the financial crisis—which came about as the result of irresponsible and reckless actions, and greed—demanded a significant price that fell on the heads of taxpayers and citizens of this country and around the world, who had no part in the making of that crisis. For the past decade of cuts to public services and pain that has been felt by businesses and households across the country—although part of the blame rests with Government for policy decisions that were taken, which we have rehearsed many times in those 10 years—it is a fact that the decisions and choices faced by successive Governments were made all the more difficult because of the irresponsibility of the spivs and speculators in financial centres, who did not understand their responsibility to society as much as they understood their own reckless greed.
In that context it is right that over the past 10 years Governments have asked banks, through the bank levy and other provisions, to pay back the debt they owe to society, so it is disappointing when new ways are found to try to lessen their tax liabilities. It is important that when the Government identify gaps and loopholes in legislation that have unintended consequences, they act to close them.
I hope that my remarks will achieve two things, the first of which is to reassure the financial services industry that we value its contribution and see it as an important part of our economic success and national life. However, I also want to remind financial services of the responsibilities that they have to the society they serve. The clause goes some way to ensuring that the debt they owe to society is properly repaid.
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his remarks. I share his view: it is of enormous value to the UK to have a global financial sector between the City of London, Birmingham, Leeds and Edinburgh. The UK is a country with astonishing heft in global markets, which is a very good thing in many ways. As he said, however, it is also important that those institutions pay the full burden of taxation that is due. There is very little concern that they have not done so in this case, and the concern has now been addressed because a potential loophole has been removed.
If I have understood him correctly, the hon. Gentleman attributes the crash of 2007-08 to spivs and speculators in the financial markets. There was a lot of that, but it is important to recognise that it was also a function of incentives, law and culture. Those things were all, in some respects, out of control before 2007-08. We talked banteringly about the level to which the Government have attempted to tinker with the legislation. In that case, however, it is perfectly clear that there was a failure not of regulation, but of supervision. It was a failure that was extraordinarily costly to this country.
In the spirit of putting things on the record, it is important to remember that, as the Vickers report found, the level of aggregate bank leverage in the financial sector in this country remained roughly steady for 40 years between 1960 and 2000 at 20 times capital. Between 2000 and 2007, it increased to 50 times capital. The effect of that was that, when the financial crisis hit, the UK banking sector was vastly over-leveraged. I am thrilled that this Government, as I suspect other Governments would have done if they were in place, have taken steps to extract a proper level of taxation from the banking sector and thereby set incentives that restrain the tendencies to growth and periodic explosion in the banking sector, because such tendencies are often absolutely ruinous for the wider economy.
It is, of course, right to say, especially with the benefit of hindsight, that the supervisory arrangements governing financial services in this country and other countries were insufficient. That is why we have a much more robust supervisory regime in place, which has been implemented to a large degree with cross-party consensus over the course of the past 10 years. I would gently point out two things. The first is the global context, and the second is that, although the Financial Secretary may point to the apparent failure of the last Labour Government to put in place a greater degree of regulation, I would challenge him—he can write to me if he cannot answer immediately—to cite a single example of a Conservative shadow Chancellor or shadow Treasury Minister calling for greater financial regulation by the last Labour Government. In fact, I remember the charge against the Government being that we were too prone to regulation rather than too hands-off, but I stand to be corrected.
I do not think there is any doubt at all that MPs and politicians across the political spectrum were taken by surprise and were not as alert as they should have been to the expansion in bank leverage that took place. I was merely putting those facts on the record. Inevitably, the responsibility lies with the Government in power at the time, as it would do in other crises, and it is for posterity to decide how it wishes to judge. I just mean that this is a proper response to a crisis that is much worse than it should have been; if those in charge at the time had taken the measures and spotted the crisis in advance, it would not have happened, notwithstanding all the ameliorative points that the hon. Gentleman has made in opposition to that.
Having said that, let me move on to points of greater overlap and agreement, and recommend to the Committee that the clause stand part of the Bill.