Of course, the approach taken needs to have foundational principles aligned to it, and those can be questioned in specific contexts and by the mechanisms that I have described.
The distributional impact of the way the loan charge disguised remuneration population breaks down has been put into the public domain and analysed by HM Revenue and Customs. For example, a relatively small number of people work in caring professions, contrary to the impression that colleagues may have been given. That is the context in which the final recommendation by Sir Amyas Morse, which is that these debts should be written off after 10 years, has been rejected by the Government. It is a recognition of Sir Amyas’s expertise and independence that 19 of his recommendations were accepted, and the Government have given a full account of the reason why they have rejected the 20th.
In line with Sir Amyas’s recommendations on voluntary restitution, HMRC will refund voluntary restitution already paid for years now out of scope of the loan charge, but will not refund settlements for the underlying tax liability where HMRC had protected its position. That is so that the treatment remains in line with the existing legal framework for HMRC to recover tax. Sir Amyas also recommended that for disguised remuneration loans taken out on or after
Regarding some of the impact of the different pressures that may be on taxpayers, HMRC will not as a matter of course meet professional costs incurred by taxpayers in reaching their original settlement or claiming refunds, but it may meet professional costs where they have been incurred as a direct result of a mistake or an unreasonable delay in its own dealings with a taxpayer’s affairs. That was not the position when HMRC was applying legislation in place at the time.
Refunding fees to those who have used avoidance schemes would send the thoroughly troubling message that taxpayers who had not used those schemes might not do as well as those who had, which is not one that this House should be particularly encouraging. Of course, if a taxpayer feels they have grounds for making a complaint, the usual mechanisms are available for them to do so.
In his recommendation 14, Sir Amyas called for the Government to report to Parliament on all aspects of their implementation of the loan charge changes,
“before the end of 2020”.
We will do that. I am grateful to the hon. Lady for laying out her concerns in that regard in this debate, and I will ensure that the officials understand and reflect on them when they start to frame this report.
As per Sir Amyas’s recommendations, the report will draw on input from the HMRC customer experience committee. It is very important to realise that the committee includes not only the non-executive directors of Revenue and Customs, but highly experienced independent people in positions of authority and expertise who are specifically customer experience experts in the private sector. The effect of the committee is to support but also challenge the HMRC executive on customer experience-related issues, and to help the Department deliver on its strategic objectives. In other words, part of its point is to ensure that HMRC treats taxpayers with a proper degree of courtesy and service levels, but in no sense becomes oppressive to them.
Let me pick up another important point, which I meant to mention earlier but have not yet: the very strong approach that HMRC is taking on promoters and enablers of tax avoidance. Certainly since I have been Financial Secretary to the Treasury, we have significantly enhanced the already substantial work being done in that area. That includes work that builds collaboration across Government, including with bodies such as the Advertising Standards Authority or the Insolvency Service. It involves proactive communications to help taxpayers to steer clear of avoidance.
HMRC has launched a consultation on ways to combat the promotion and enabling of tax avoidance; colleagues from different parties are welcome to make contributions to that if they wish. The areas it is looking at include tackling promoters and their supply chains, looking at the economics of tax avoidance, disrupting business models and improving compliance and enforcement in other ways. I would like the Committee to understand that HMRC is in no sense minimising the importance of going after promoters and enablers where it can—subject to law, and with new powers if it should be so decided after the process of consultation.