I beg to move amendment 65, in schedule 5, page 81, line 31, leave out from “application” to end of line 32
This amendment removes the requirement for a preliminary adjustment plan.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 66, in schedule 5, page 81, line 44, leave out sub-paragraph (3)
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 65.
Amendment 67, in schedule 5, page 82, line 14, leave out paragraph (e)
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 65.
Amendment 68, in schedule 5, page 82, line 21, leave out “(d)” and insert “(c)”
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 65.
Amendment 69, in schedule 5, page 82, line 26, leave out “(d)” and insert “(c)”
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 65.
Amendment 72, in schedule 5, page 86, line 29, leave out from “21)” to end of line 34
This amendment removes the requirement for an adjustment plan to be in place prior to TRA making a recommendation under paragraph 14.
Amendment 73, in schedule 5, page 91, line 8, leave out paragraph (d)
This amendment is consequential upon the removal of reference to an adjustment plan in Amendment 72.
Amendments 65 to 69 and amendments 72 and 73 have been grouped together as they all refer to the removal of the preliminary requirement for adjustment plans. It states in the Bill that the Trade Remedies Authority may only make a recommendation if it is satisfied that there is an adjustment plan in place setting out how the UK producers of the relevant goods intend to adjust to the increased importation of goods affecting their industry. In addition, it stipulates that the TRA may only initiate a safeguarding investigation in relation to goods where the application for it is accompanied by a preliminary adjustment plan. As is explained in the Bill’s explanatory notes, this is to ensure that producers have a plan to improve their competitiveness alongside any measures which may be imposed, so that measures are not only a temporary solution.
The amendments tabled by the Opposition would remove the need for such adjustment requirements. The reasons behind this are numerous. It seems counter-intuitive to make it incumbent on industries to draw up their own adjustment plans. Surely if an application is being made to the TRA then this is already a measure of last resort for an industry. It may also provide an easy exit for the TRA to avoid opening an investigation if it is perhaps resource-constrained, by pointing instead to the measures that the producer has drawn up as an alternative to remedies being imposed. Equally, given that time is of the essence—that seems to be a point of agreement between both sides of the House—mandating producers to include adjustment plans before a recommendation can be made risks adding a delay to a process that is already time-sensitive.
Kathleen Walker-Shaw of the GMB, who gave evidence to the Committee on
“extremely alarmed by how weak the remedies were in terms of anti-dumping cases.”
She pointed out specifically that they
“are very data, document and resource-heavy cases to bring forward.”
It therefore makes little sense for us to add to that burden by putting another barrier in place for UK industry to jump over right at the outset by drafting an adjustment plan.
This is not simply the view of the Opposition. Representatives of industry have also argued that these requirements are likely to be problematic. The Manufacturing Trade Remedies Alliance has explained that there is absolutely no requirement in the WTO agreement for an adjustment plan at any of these early stages, either prior to an investigation being opened or when measures are being considered for extension. As the MTRA highlights, the only stipulation from the WTO is that there must be evidence of the industry adjusting if the relief is to be extended beyond four years, and they point out that the EU follows the same approach.
The Manufacturing Trade Remedies Alliance also believes that the requirements as laid out in the Bill are disproportionate, and conflict with the provision allowing safeguarding measures to be entered into in the case of a threat of serious injury. It also highlights the risk that these measures could reduce the Government’s options for tackling aggressive trade protectionism by foreign countries. It notes that the EU has in the past introduced safeguard measures to temporarily protect the steel industry from the side effects of WTO-incompatible tariffs imposed by the US pending resolution of the dispute.
It is surprising that—for a Bill which is so light on detail—this is the one area in which the Government have decided to provide some certainty that flies in the face of expert advice to the contrary. Given the historical context and the anxieties of UK industry, these concerns are understandable. All members of the Committee will be familiar with the implications of what will happen if we do not get this right, as was illustrated catastrophically by the impact of cheap Chinese steel imports.
It is important that the Government give confidence to the UK industry at this stage that they are not anti-protection in principle. This amendment would demonstrate that the Trade Remedies Authority is supportive of this notion, and would streamline the process towards remedies where they are necessary. It would not preclude the development of an adjustment plan on a longer term basis by the industry or producer in question, but would simply prevent a more restrictive process being in place that is out of step with the one being followed by our global partners.
I conclude by returning to Kathleen Walker-Shaw’s testimony of
“I just feel that the provisions in the Bill do not fulfil the promise we were given that British jobs, British industry and the British economy would thrive post-Brexit.”—[Official Report,
This Committee is now in its third day of investigating ways to try and do this, and can get us closer to that outcome.
The hon. Gentleman keeps referring to and giving evidence of anti-dumping. These amendments affect adjustment plans that apply to safeguards—so not anti-dumping.
I said in my introduction that this is about the hoops that have to be jumped through before the Trade Remedies Authority can take action. As I was just coming to my conclusion, I now appeal to the Minister for greater certainty for industry and greater authority so that they can plan for going forward, by adding more clarity at this stage and not introducing things that are not replicated in our closest trading partners.
The amendment would provide that in safeguard investigations UK complainant producers are not required to provide adjustment plans outlining the steps they intend to take to adjust to increased imports in their market. That would be out of step with our objective to create a balanced and proportionate trade remedies system for the UK. It is noticeable that the only detail given in the hon. Gentleman’s presentation was not do with safeguards, but with anti-dumping. It was not clear from his response whether that was due to confusion or because there simply was not enough information to back up what he was saying about safeguards.
There are many benefits to requiring adjustment plans and the need to promote adjustment is implicit in the WTO agreement. Adjustment plans serve to reinforce the rationale for applying safeguard measures and ensure that measures are used fairly. Unlike anti-dumping and countervailing measures, safeguards relate to perfectly fair trade and apply globally. Therefore it is especially important that those measures balance the interests of producers and downstream consumer industries. Having listened to the speech just given, one would be forgiven for thinking that those issues were not true.
Having a plan for adjustment helps to ensure that measures protect producers from injury, while giving them time to adjust to increased imports. It provides precisely the certainty which, in his peroration, the hon. Gentleman called for. However, though we have put that on the face of the Bill, because of the nature of safeguards —which have got nothing to do with dumping—we have a peroration that asks why we do not provide certainty. It is exactly the certainty that we need to provide. We have spelt it out; we have taken the principle implicit in WTO agreements and put it in the Bill, so that we can improve on existing operations—stick conceptually to the existing rules but do so in a better way, which gives exactly the certainty that the hon. Gentleman talked about wanting to provide.
As so often in our debates in this Committee—which has been a stimulating and fantastic experience so far—amendments tabled by the Opposition have exactly the opposite effect to the ones that they claim. They say they want to do one thing, but when one bothers to read their amendment, look at the Bill and put the two together, one sees that the effect is the exact opposite. It is fascinating to see how, in almost all cases, the Scottish National party supports the Opposition, even when it is clear that the amendments are technically flawed—they do not do what the Opposition think they are doing, let alone achieve the end policy result. Perhaps that is a sad reflection on the state of the Opposition today.
Our intention is not to create additional burdens on business but to ensure a light touch approach which means that industry is able to compete without the need for protection as measures are rolled back. As such, it is undoubtedly in the interests of UK producers to use these plans and to be thinking about adjustment as early as the initiation stage of an investigation. Furthermore, the steps outlined in an adjustment plan provide a useful tool for determining the suitable pace of liberalisation, tailoring measures where appropriate. In drafting our secondary legislation, the Government intend also to build in flexibility to account for scenarios where different levels of detail would be appropriate in the plans.
In terms of whether they would be overly burdensome on business, we will ensure that the process is both flexible and proportionate, in order to serve the needs of business in the most appropriate way possible. It is for those reasons—although I can provide others—that I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment.
Division number 19 - 9 yes, 10 no
I beg to move amendment 74, in schedule 5, page 91, line 9, at end insert—
‘(3A) The TRA shall only recommend extending a safeguarding remedy, whether in the form of a safeguarding amount or a tariff rate quota, beyond the 4 year period referred
(3B) The total duration of a safeguarding remedy after any such extension shall not exceed 8 years.”
This amendment makes provision on the face of the Bill about the extension of a safeguarding remedy.
I will not speak on this for long. We have much else to get through this afternoon, and maybe I am about to be surprised, but I anticipate that we may have a similar result to one we just had, particularly given that many of the same issues come up in relation to this amendment as to that just moved by my hon. Friend. It would be interesting if we had a plurality of views; maybe that day will come eventually.
As with many of our other amendments, this amendment clearly aims to increase the predictability for British business in the Bill. In particular, we think it is important to make provision in the Bill about exactly how a safeguarding remedy could be extended, to expand the considerations taken on board in that process.
With this amendment, the TRA would only recommend extending a safeguarding remedy beyond four years if the authority were satisfied that there was evidence that UK producers were adjusting to the importation of the goods in increased quantities—so not a plan, actual evidence of that adjustment would be necessary. The total duration of any such extended remedy would be only be another four years, so eight years in total. As with many other elements of the Bill, more clarity is needed here and our amendment would deal with that deficiency.
Schedule 5 sets out the provisions that will apply in cases where UK industry finds itself being harmed by unforeseen surges in imports. The WTO agreement on safeguards set outs the requirements that must be met for the UK, as for other members, to be able to impose safeguard measures. Through this schedule, we are adopting the key principles into UK law and setting out the broad elements of the safeguard process that will be operated by the TRA.
As we have already discussed, there will be a need for more detail. This will, rightly, be set out in secondary legislation. The schedule also provides the necessary powers for the Secretary of State to make regulations to do this, including, for example, to define what is meant by “increased quantities”, “UK producers” and “like goods”. Paragraph 19 of schedule 5 provides that regulations can be made to set out the process for reviewing safeguard measures. The regulations will set out, among other things, the circumstances in which measures can be continued.
Amendment 74 seeks to require UK producers to provide evidence that they are adjusting to increased imports before a safeguard measure can be extended beyond four years. It also aims to add into primary legislation that safeguard remedies may only be in place for a maximum of eight years. As I explained earlier, once we leave the EU, the UK clearly needs to be able to take action where our industry is being harmed by unfair trade from other countries, whether that is by dumped or subsidised goods, or as a result of fairly traded but unforeseen surges in imports. The safeguard provisions set out in schedule 5 achieve this. Unlike anti-dumping and countervailing measures, safeguards relate to fair trade and apply globally. Therefore, it is especially important that these measures balance the interests of producers and downstream consumer industries by facilitating adjustment.
We have already discussed adjustment plans when considering the previous group of amendments. As I said, these are a vital tool in ensuring that safeguard measures not only provide protection, but allow those affected the opportunity to make necessary adjustments. It is not appropriate to introduce a requirement for producers to provide evidence of adjustment when seeking to extend measures beyond four years.
I ask the Committee to consider for a moment that we have measures in place—a safeguard—because of a massive surge on imports. The TRA has done its work. In an entirely novel process—I am aware of no parallel anywhere—Her Majesty’s Opposition, doubtless supported by their allies in the Scottish National party, want to impose a bureaucratic and burdensome measure—[Interruption.] I notice that the SNP Members are shaking their heads. For once, perhaps, they will strike out and not support something that is so clearly damaging to the interests of Scottish producers. Why on earth would the producers have to provide evidence of their adjustment when the main issue should be other aspects and criteria? It is a strange innovation that the Labour party has put forward.
Introducing a requirement for producers to provide evidence of adjustment when seeking to extend beyond four years would undermine the need for flexibility in our approach, which recognises—this is worth reflecting on—that adjustment is not always dependent on a producer’s own efforts. Yet, under the amendment, protection measures would cease if producers were not able to provide evidence that they were adjusting. Adjustment plans are a more suitable way of building in that flexibility and ensuring that there is a commitment to adjustment from as early as the initiation stage. Finally, with regard to the eight-year rule, the Government intend to be WTO-compliant by setting that out in secondary legislation.
The hon. Lady will find that the evidence of adjustment by UK producers is unlikely to be provided by anyone other than UK producers. It is a rather strange innovation to insert that into legislation for the continuation of measures that are put in place because of the injury caused and the massive surge on imports. It is an entirely novel concept. I am not aware of its being anywhere in WTO schedules although, admittedly, after so little time in the job I cannot claim to know them inside out. If any Member of the Opposition, who after all came up with the extraordinary innovation, has evidence of a basis in WTO law or anywhere else, I would be fascinated to hear it. Perhaps the hon. Lady will support the amendment anyway, even though there is no evidence for it, legally or otherwise but I hope that she, like me, will oppose the amendment if it is pressed to a vote.
I am pleased to hear the Minister accept our call to ensure that the total duration of any such extended remedy shall be for another four years—eight years in total. He seemed to suggest that that would be forthcoming in secondary legislation. We are pleased to hear that, although it is unfortunate that it is not clear in the Bill.
On the evidence, much of our concern behind the amendment is motivated by the burden on the affected industry. That was set out clearly in remarks on a previous Opposition amendment. I hope, Mrs Main, that you will not see this as facetious: talking about novelty, we learned this morning that the market share threshold before an investigation can be initiated appears to be novel in the world, and the Minister said it was a wonderful innovation on the part of the British Government, so perhaps he can also sometimes see innovation when it comes from the Opposition.
Division number 20 - 9 yes, 10 no