Review by appropriate Minister of regulations under section 1

Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill [Lords] – in a Public Bill Committee at 2:00 pm on 1 March 2018.

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Photo of Helen Goodman Helen Goodman Shadow Minister (Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs) 2:00, 1 March 2018

I beg to move amendment 24, in clause 27, page 20, line 39, leave out

“the purpose stated in them under section 1(3)” and insert—

“(a) the purpose stated in them under section 1(3);

(b) the humanitarian impact;

(c) any British citizen, a British Overseas Territories citizen or British overseas citizen who is not the intended target of sanctions issued under this Act but who is directly or indirectly impacted by the imposition of such sanctions”.

This amendment would require the Government to review whether the sanctions regulations are still appropriate for their specified purposes, including their humanitarian impact and impact on British citizens who are indirectly affected by the imposition of sanctions.

Photo of Steve McCabe Steve McCabe Labour, Birmingham, Selly Oak

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 25, in clause 27, page 20, line 40, at end insert—

‘(2A) The review of the humanitarian impact under subsection (2)(b) must be conducted according to the methodology set out in Chapter 5 of the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee’s Sanctions Assessment Handbook: Assessing the Humanitarian Implications of Sanctions, published in 2004.”

This amendment, which is consequential on Amendment 24, would require the Government to carry out a humanitarian impact assessment when reviewing the regulations issued under section 1.

Photo of Helen Goodman Helen Goodman Shadow Minister (Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs)

Welcome to cold Committee Room 12, Mr McCabe. As we discussed this morning, clause 27 was inserted by those in another place because it was agreed that we need reviews of what is going on. Amendment 24 would extend the coverage of the reviews. At the moment, the clause proposes one question for review: “whether the regulations” relating to the sanctions

“are still appropriate for the purpose stated in them under section 1(3)”,

which is whatever purpose the sanctions have. That is absolutely fine; we agree with it and think it completely sensible, but we want to add two other things that we think should be covered by the reviews. One is the humanitarian impact, and the other is the impact of the sanctions on British citizens who are not their intended target.

Let me tell the Committee about two episodes in which the humanitarian impact of sanctions was very significant and may have made them counterproductive, because they were simply punishing poor people in the countries involved, who were not responsible for the bad behaviour of their leaders. The sanctions had horrendous negative consequences, which led to a lot of anti-western feeling.

The first example is the comprehensive, multilateral, international sanctions imposed on Iraq in August 1990 under UN Security Council resolution 661. As some of us can remember, it was after the first invasion of Kuwait. Before the sanctions, Iraq had imported roughly 70% of its food, medicine and chemicals for agriculture. Obviously, Iraq was a very wealthy country because of its oil reserves, but with trade sanctions imposed, it could not use that wealth to buy food. Some time later, in 1998, Denis Halliday, the United Nations humanitarian co-ordinator in Iraq, said:

“We are in the process of destroying an entire society. It is as simple and terrifying as that.”

UNICEF came to the view that the sanctions caused the deaths of half a million Iraqi children. That is a terrible death toll and not one that any of us can be comfortable with. Although the idea was to have sanctions instead of hot war, the toll of death and suffering for the Iraqi people was probably as bad from the sanctions as it would have been from hot war. We think that should be taken more into account.

Of course, the situation in Iraq was and is highly contested, but that is why we have tabled amendment 25, saying that the assessment must be done in accordance with the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee’s “Sanctions Assessment Handbook”. We are saying we should have an agreed methodology for making this assessment, because that way we are more likely to reach an agreed assessment of what the impact of sanctions is; then people can stop arguing about the facts and start considering whether sanctions are justifiable or not. We are not saying that this is the only question to be considered. We are saying the questions should be, “Does it achieve the objectives?” and “What is the humanitarian impact?”

There was another serious case a few years later—all of this happened some time ago, but it is significant none the less. In Haiti, following the military coup of 1991 and the fraudulent elections of 2000, the international community reacted by imposing sanctions. Here again the impact on ordinary citizens was devastating. By 1994, the rate of malnutrition among children under five in many health institutions had increased from 27% to more than 50%. The UNICEF view was that thousands of children died as a consequence.

Of course, both those cases involved countries with a history of bad governance, so disentangling the results of bad governance and the results of the humanitarian sanctions is not absolutely straightforward, and I am not saying that it is absolutely straightforward. Nevertheless, these cases reinforce the argument for amendment 25.

We have also proposed adding that the impact on British citizens who are not the targets of the sanctions should be taken into consideration. It is quite easy to stand back in the Chamber and say, “Oh, we think we should impose sanctions on this person or that person.” The hon. Member for Witney is nodding fiercely; I hope he is nodding at what I am saying.

Photo of Helen Goodman Helen Goodman Shadow Minister (Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs)

Of course, sanctions also have an impact on British commercial and economic interests, and on British commercial and economic actors. I will give the Committee a couple of examples of that.

In a more recent example, from 2014, we decided to impose sanctions against Russia after the intervention in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea. One of the things that the sanctions covered was technology for oil and gas, which is obviously a very big sector in the Russian economy. SMD, a specialist engineering firm in Newcastle, makes sophisticated robots that operate on the seabed, doing the job of deep-sea divers. Those robots were banned and the chief executive of SMD—Andrew Hodgson, who I have met—highlighted the damage to his business. He said:

“Imagine we’re a 500 employee business and 20% of your business doesn’t exist, that’s 100 jobs and obviously we’ve been working hard on the technology”,

which is very modern technology. Normally, the company would have exported £20 million worth of equipment, but that business was lost, straight away. Another reason for considering the impact of sanctions on British citizens and the cost to the British economy is the possibility of counter-sanctions imposed by the person or country we are sanctioning. Russia retaliated by banning imports of agricultural and other produce from both the European Union and the United States, including mackerel from Scotland. That was not great for Scottish fishermen.

Nissan was also extremely badly affected, because the effect of the sanctions on Russia was that the rouble plummeted. Nissan had been paid for its car exports in roubles and was not hedged sufficiently to deal with a big drop in the rouble. It halted all the orders because it could not afford to take the loss, which was significant, although not as bad as if it had sold the cars at a loss.

We are pleased that the Government inserted clause 27 and that they are taking a consensual approach to the Bill—

Photo of Helen Goodman Helen Goodman Shadow Minister (Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs)

I will therefore ask for an extension to what is covered in the review. We have given an explanation as to how we think that should be done.

Photo of Alan Duncan Alan Duncan Minister of State

The Government are well aware of the concerns in the House about the humanitarian impact of sanctions. We are committed to finding constructive solutions through close engagement with non-governmental organisations and other humanitarian actors.

As part of the process of considering when to apply sanctions, the Government already consider the humanitarian impact on the individual or entity being sanctioned and on the general population, if the sanctions are countrywide. That is kept under close review, and we will continue to ensure that NGOs and other humanitarian actors can access the licences and exemptions needed to carry out their work in countries that are subject to sanctions.

In 2016, the UK secured amendments to the EU’s sanctions regime on Syria to provide a specific exemption for fuel purchases by humanitarian organisations, which assisted them in carrying out their operations in Syria while ensuring that they were still compliant with sanctions. As part of the consultation on the Bill, we hold regular roundtable meetings with NGOs and we take into account their concerns about the humanitarian impact of sanctions. A variety of tools and guidance are available for assessing that humanitarian impact, of which the UN handbook, which the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland referred to, is just one.

We take a case-by-case approach to the assessment of the humanitarian impact of each sanctions regime. We work closely with Department for International Development, as I recall happening when I was a DFID Minister, and with staff from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, who may be in the relevant country —I am now familiar with what the FCO does on this as well. That ensures that the humanitarian impact is minimised and that licences and exemptions can be made available to NGOs carrying out humanitarian work.

The design and implementation of sanctions has moved on considerably since the handbook was drafted more than 10 years ago. Sanctions are now more targeted and focused directly on people whose behaviour we are trying to change. To restrict the way in which we assess the humanitarian impact to the methodology laid out in the UN handbook would limit our flexibility in making that assessment. In any case, of course, handbooks can change.

The hon. Lady also mentioned Iraq, where sanctions were imposed almost 30 years ago. Those were blanket sanctions. Modern sanctions practice is very different: sanctions are precise and targeted, and the humanitarian implications are much better taken into account. We have learned lessons from historical sanctions regimes. The example of Iraq is useful because it shows exactly the journey that we have been on to make sanctions more precise and effective.

The Government recognise the risks of unintended effects of sanctions on British citizens, as mentioned in the amendment, and on other individuals and entities. A thorough consideration of the possible unintended effects of sanctions is already part of the process of designing and implementing sanctions regimes, and it will continue to be in future. Given that sanctions have an international dimension, it is important that we do not just look at British citizens, but have safeguards for anybody who is unintentionally affected by a sanctions regime. Our concern for justice should not be confined to British citizens.

I assure the Committee that our review, which we will report annually to Parliament under clause 27, will assess the humanitarian impact of each sanctions regime; our approach to mitigating the risks of unintended effects; and our approach to humanitarian licences and exemptions that allow non-governmental organisations to continue their work in countries affected by sanctions.

I hope that that explanation has reassured the Committee sufficiently for the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland to withdraw her amendment.

Photo of Helen Goodman Helen Goodman Shadow Minister (Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs) 2:15, 1 March 2018

I accept what the Minister says about amendment 25, but I do not understand. Basically, he is saying that he agrees with our proposal but does not want it in the Bill, which I do not find very reassuring, to be honest. I wish to divide the Committee.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

The Committee divided:

Ayes 9, Noes 10.

Division number 7 Caledonian Pinewood Forest — Review by appropriate Minister of regulations under section 1

Aye: 9 MPs

No: 10 MPs

Aye: A-Z by last name

No: A-Z by last name

Question accordingly negatived.

Amendment made: 5, in clause 27, page 21, line 5, leave out “(d)” and insert “(h)”—(Sir Alan Duncan.)

The provision amended here concerns a Minister’s review of regulations made under Clause 1 which state a purpose within Clause 1(2). The amendment expands the reference to Clause 1(2) so that it covers paragraphs (e) to (h) of Clause 1(2) (as well as paragraphs (a) to (d)).

Photo of Helen Goodman Helen Goodman Shadow Minister (Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs)

I beg to move amendment 26, in clause 27, page 21, line 8, at end insert—

“(d) the steps taken to promote the adoption of sanctions on a multilateral basis;

(e) a summary of any representations made in relation to the exercise or proposed exercise of the powers and the response of the appropriate Minister to the same;

(f) a review from the Independent Reviewer, appointed pursuant to section 20 of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (‘the 2011 Act’), of the operation of this Act in the reports by the Independent Reviewer produced pursuant to the 2011 Act.”

This amendment would require the review of regulations to include consideration of the steps taken to promote the adoption of sanctions, a summary of the representations made in relation to powers under this Act and an independent review of the operation of this Act.

I will not press the amendment to a vote, but moving it gives me the opportunity to make a couple of points and perhaps to ask a question. Proposed new paragraph (d) takes us back to whether we accept the Foreign Secretary’s rhetoric about being independent in how we implement sanctions, or whether we know that sanctions are most effective when we do them multilaterally. It is our firm view that we should implement sanctions multilaterally and that Ministers should explain to the House what they have done to secure international consensus on them.

Proposed new paragraph (e) was inspired by representations made to us by the voluntary sector, which wanted to be reassured that Ministers were listening to NGOs in their assessments. The clause says that Ministers have to explain the reasonableness of their “course of action”. That is a sensible thing to do. People will be confident that it is reasonable if they know that the views and information of NGOs have been taken into account. Mr Browder, whom the right hon. Member for Newbury referred to, was keen to have something along those lines, in order to demonstrate that the Government were in listening mode on the sanctions.

Proposed new paragraph (f), with the read-across to the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, was also part of our Magnitsky package of measures. Rather than having a separate amendment with a new clause, I thought it was neater to wrap it in to the review at clause 27, to which Ministers have already agreed. I thought Ministers would find it easier to agree if we made this an amendment to clause 27.

Photo of Richard Benyon Richard Benyon Conservative, Newbury

The hon. Lady is right that this is a key part of the Magnitsky elements of the Bill. There may be a more elegant way of landing this and I am looking forward to hearing what the Minister says about it.

The review aspects are fundamental to achieving what I was talking about earlier: consistency with other jurisdictions. I know the Government are keen to work with us. It may be that that happens in the coming weeks and we find some mechanism by Report stage. Again, the Minister has this in his gift. There are those who say that what we propose would somehow be more than other countries have adopted as part of their Magnitsky legislation, but the US, for example, has a far more onerous oversight provision. It allows certain members of Congress the right to demand that the Government consider sanctioning certain individuals, and the Government have to respond within 120 days to give the reasons why they did or did not. That is called the congressional trigger, and there are other mechanisms in other jurisdictions elsewhere.

What we would like to achieve is that as soon as practicable after six months have elapsed, beginning with the day the Act is passed, and every 12 months thereafter, the Secretary of State prepares a report about the exercise of the powers conferred by the Act and lays that report before Parliament. Subject to issues of clear confidentiality—I absolutely accept that is a requirement—that report should include a summary of any representations made in relation to the exercise or proposed exercise of powers and the response of the appropriate Minister to do the same.

I think there may be some work to be done on the question of who the independent reviewer should be. I note the form of words, which I was initially attracted to by the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland. There may be machinery of Government issues, which mean that that is not the right place for the independent reviewer to reside, but I think there are many ways of skinning this particular cat. The review element is fundamental, because it is important that those organisations that are taking forward evidence are able to have that evidence independently verified and Government held accountable.

On a related issue, which is not specific to this Bill but that makes my point, campaigners—with very good evidence—have brought cases about people connected to serious organised crime from overseas who operate in this country. They have taken that to agencies such as the Serious Fraud Office, the National Crime Agency and others, but it has not been taken up. When they have done that in other countries, assets have been frozen, people have been subject to visa denials and other measures have been taken. Somehow, people slip between the cracks in our system, and this is an opportunity to close that gap.

On where that independent reviewer resides, I am open to suggestions from my right hon. Friend the Minister or anyone. I am glad that the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland has given us a bit of breathing room to resolve this. By Report, we really need to have a review process that is independent and comprehensive; that addresses the measures that we require to allow people who have access to information to bring it forward; and that holds Government accountable for how they deal with that kind of information.

Photo of Alan Duncan Alan Duncan Minister of State

The amendment is important because it overlaps with our earlier discussions about the broader Magnitsky issue. It also introduces two other elements, so it has three distinct elements.

The first element is the issue of adopting sanctions on a multilateral basis, which is what sanctions are really for. It is quite rare for sanctions to be adopted by only one country. Their whole effectiveness depends on multilateral co-operation. UN sanctions, which we are obliged to implement, are multilateral by their very nature. All the other sanctions that we have imposed in the past have also been multilateral, because we have imposed them as part of the EU. Although our departure from the EU necessitates our having an autonomous sanctions regime, we envisage that its operation will almost inevitably be multilateral. We agree that sanctions are more effective when they are adopted by a greater number of countries.

The UK plays a leading role as a permanent member of the UN Security Council in negotiating sanctions measures that build on the entire international community. We also work closely with the EU and other international partners in a range of groupings, such as the G7, and we will continue to work hard internationally to gain the widest possible support for sanctions measures.

In the second element of the amendment, the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland asks us to show our hand at all stages and to show the manner in which we piece sanctions together. However, to publicly reveal our discussions and the steps that we take to work with international partners could be damaging to those efforts. We would not wish to embarrass partners who, for their own reasons, decline to align with our sanctions policy or to risk the targets of sanctions understanding too much about which country was in which position on any given sanctions regime.

A related issue is whether an individual can nominate someone to be sanctioned, which they can. Any person can write to the Government and the Government will respond. Individuals may request that the Government apply new or additional sanctions regimes, and we will of course consider that.

Photo of Helen Goodman Helen Goodman Shadow Minister (Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs)

How often does that happen in the real world? Does the Minister get a long letter from Amnesty International every week or every month that says, “We’ve seen this person and this person, and we think there is a problem”? I give that as an example, because one might imagine that it happened in that kind of way.

Photo of Alan Duncan Alan Duncan Minister of State 2:30, 1 March 2018

I cannot quite say that it happens in that way, although there are some issues, and of course countries being discussed in the UN—because, for instance, they may be developing nuclear weapons—obviously does come across a Minister’s desk. That happens less frequently in the case of any individuals, particularly because at the moment we do not have an autonomous sanctions regime that would make all such representations come directly to the desk of a Minister or his close officials, because we are part of the broader EU system. When we have an autonomous regime, I envisage that that type of thing is more likely to happen than it does now, because it tends to happen much more within the EU system at the moment.

The third issue about the amendment is the question of oversight. May I just say to my right hon. Friend the Member for Newbury that I totally understand that the two key words in what he is pressing for are “independent” and “reviewer”? He suggests the need for some kind of independent entity, force or person that perhaps represents the interests of those calling for sanctions, rather than just the interests of the Government in executing sanctions. I understand what he is saying and we will have to consider this matter further.

However, I have to be firm in my view that the counter-terrorism figure suggested in the amendment is not the suitable person to do this work. The amendment is about counter-terrorism, if it is counter-terrorism, but this measure is more broadly about sanctions. So what would happen under the amendment is that someone whose job at the moment is counter-terrorism would have their job widened. It may be too burdensome; the whole job description would have to be changed. They would not necessarily have the required skillset, so they would be the wrong person to try to designate for this purpose. In simple language, they are not the right horse for the course. However, given what my right hon. Friend has said, we will of course need to discuss this matter further, as we approach Report.

Photo of Richard Benyon Richard Benyon Conservative, Newbury

I am grateful for that assurance. I am not qualified to say who this person should be and where they should reside. However, my right hon. Friend is right to say that the words “independent” and “reviewer” are fundamental to those who have been campaigning for this change for some time, and they would put the final icing on the cake of the Magnitsky element to this Bill.

However, will my right hon. Friend allow me, in as mild-mannered a way as I can put it, to convey to him that if other forces in the orbit of the postal district of SW1 were to rain on his parade of the assurances he has given us—I am mixing my metaphors here—there would be a problem for him on Report, and I want to make his life easy? I want this Bill to breeze through the Chamber with universal support and adulation for him, and that we will not find any need to argue the point.

Photo of Alan Duncan Alan Duncan Minister of State

I both thank and congratulate my right hon. Friend for the elegance with which he has made his point, and I can say in clear and simple language, “Message received.”

Perhaps I can also take this opportunity to inform the Committee, in a little more detail, our feeling and understanding of what we know are the independent oversight powers in the Bill, because they are a central part of the broader picture of oversight.

We think the Bill finds the right balance of powers and independent oversight of those powers, because—rightly—the powers to impose sanctions are placed in the hands of the Executive. As such, the Government will decide whether or not to impose sanctions and on whom. Likewise, in the first instance the Government will decide when to lift sanctions. That is in line with the standard practice of the Executive deciding foreign policy and is consistent with international practice.

However, the role of the courts—as the independent arbiter and judicial authority overseeing the powers in the Bill—is significant. The courts can look at decisions made by the Government under the Bill and judge whether those decisions were correct. If not, the courts’ judgment will of course be binding on the Government. Furthermore, the Bill has significant transparency requirements and the Minister has numerous reporting obligations to Parliament. The reports will all be laid before and scrutinised by Parliament. As is the case now, parliamentary Committees can produce their own independent reports and can take evidence and make recommendations. That will continue. There is far more scope for such independent oversight by Parliament than there is now, where decisions are taken in Brussels and there are limited reporting requirements to the UK Parliament. As such, we believe that the Bill finds the right balance of Executive decision making, independent judicial arbitration by the courts and independent political oversight and scrutiny by Parliament.

Photo of Helen Goodman Helen Goodman Shadow Minister (Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs)

We have had another interesting exchange. We are extremely grateful to the right hon. Member for Newbury, who knows about the issues in great detail. When it was first suggested to me that we involve the independent reviewer for terrorism, I was a bit taken aback as well. At first blush, one thinks that sanctions and terrorism are not quite the same thing. However, that person is looking at assets frozen under terrorism legislation as well, so it is appropriate, and I do not think that the job description-type points that the Minister made quite hit the nail on the head.

Had the Minister said to us, “No, we have thought about this, but the independent reviewer for terrorism is not the right person—we would propose that it would be X,Y or Z,” that would have been a good response. Then, we would have had more confidence in the Minister’s willingness to engage in the consensus-building process that we are all, across the House, looking for on the Bill. It seems to me that the Minister is being extremely cautious, to the point of not acknowledging that some changes will have to be made if the Government are to get the Bill on to the statute book. The Minister would have done well to have thought about that between 20 February and today, and he would do well to be more flexible now than he has been.

The suggestion that we rely on the courts is not very practical. That means, in effect, that people have to take the Government to court using the judicial review processes. It is incredibly ad hoc and unsystematic. It will mean that somebody with a lot of money who is critical of the Government’s actions can go to court and get their justice. This is not a place where we are about to have legal aid, is it?

Photo of Alan Duncan Alan Duncan Minister of State

There are many stages to be gone through before it ever needs to go to court. One of the provisions that I really pressed hard for in the preparation of the Bill was that there could be swift and direct redress for someone caught up in sanctions unfairly—as they might see it—who needs to defend themselves but does not have money. That is why there is a process for being able to submit arguments that say they have been wrongly caught up. If they are justified, those issues can hopefully be resolved before there is any need to go to court. The hon. Lady is making a very valid point, and, if it were the case, that is addressed in the Bill.

Photo of Helen Goodman Helen Goodman Shadow Minister (Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs)

I am sorry, but I think we are now conflating two things. The Minister is conflating the arguments that were had in the other place on designated persons, and the arguments here. The changes that were made with respect to designated persons were completely reasonable. I would go further than that: I would say that the Minister in the other place, Lord Ahmad, was right to resist the blandishments of Lord Pannick, who wanted to provide a court process for UN sanctions as well as non-UN sanctions, but that is not what we are talking about here. I am disappointed that the Minister has not shown a more flexible posture, and indicated more clearly that he is prepared to think again. His intervention was really a defence of the Bill. He did not indicate that he was prepared to go some way, but not to have this precise wording. That being the case, I think we do want to test the will of the Committee.

Photo of Richard Benyon Richard Benyon Conservative, Newbury

Perhaps there is an opportunity, in the relatively short period of time between now and Report, for us to work collectively with the Government to try to identify a structure that would read better in the Bill, and that would give the kind of assurances that the hon. Lady is after. Without having gone into the weeds of the issue, I am quite attracted by what Congress has—the congressional trigger is a relatively powerful means of holding the Executive to account. The Joint Committee on Human Rights may be a vehicle in Parliament to give it an added degree of independent oversight. I have not consulted to any great degree with those who have been working on this matter for longer than I have, or with those who understand more about drafting a Bill, but I would be very keen to work with the hon. Lady on trying to achieve that.

Photo of Helen Goodman Helen Goodman Shadow Minister (Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs)

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman. I do not know whether the Minister would like to intervene again in the light of that, or whether he is content with what he has said.

Photo of Helen Goodman Helen Goodman Shadow Minister (Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs)

Okay. In the light of the intervention from the right hon. Member for Newbury, I will stick with what I had first thought to do, and will not press the amendment. However, the Minister needs to understand that we will have to come back to this matter on Report. From his point of view, it would be best if he took the initiative. He has not taken any initiative so far. If he does not, we will. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Photo of Helen Goodman Helen Goodman Shadow Minister (Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs)

I beg to move amendment 36, in clause 27, page 21, line 17, at end insert—

“(5A) The Appropriate Minister who made the regulations must in each quarterly period lay before Parliament a report for each sanctions regime and regulation containing—

(a) the aggregate value of funds and other assets frozen;

(b) the number of suspected breaches and the aggregate value of such breaches; and

(c) actions taken on suspected breaches.”

This amendment would require the Government to report to Parliament on a quarterly basis about the impact of sanctions regimes, including the number and value of suspected breaches of those sanctions.

We discussed this matter a bit the other day. The amendment is a request for information from the Government on breaches to sanctions. I will not embarrass the Treasury Minister again by going into the full detail of how, on 8 February, he told me that the sanctions busting in 2017 was £117 million, but by 22 February it had shot up to £1.4 billion, and how concerned I was by that. Our interest in transparency did not begin with that episode. We think that it is important to have more information about this subject.

The amendment would require Ministers to report regularly on the value of funds and assets frozen, the number of breaches, and the actions taken on those breaches. We discussed this issue when we were looking at the Crown Prosecution Service guidelines on breaches. We need to understand this matter better, and we think that without shining the light of transparency on it, breaches can very easily be swept under the carpet and not acted on. We are not happy about that, particularly given how the Government have acted in the past when challenged.

I will share an episode with the Committee—it will take a couple of minutes, but I think that it is relevant. In July 2011, information was sought from the Treasury on its reasons for approving and licensing the CAMEC platinum deal—the CAMEC being the Central African Mining and Exploration Company. It bought a platinum mine in Zimbabwe from the sanctioned regime of Robert Mugabe. It transferred $100 million to the Mugabe regime as part of the purchase, and that injection of hard currency funded a campaign of violence against opposition supporters. The funds appear to have paid for weapons, trucks and the dispatch of youth militias and war veterans to crush the opposition.

The Treasury was asked to give some information about what had happened, including the amounts and the sale of the shares. When it responded, it relied on an exemption under the Freedom of Information Act, which prohibits disclosing information that is incompatible with any EU obligation. The UK had signed up to EU sanctions, and in the Government’s view article 8 of Council regulation No. 314/2004 of 19 February 2004, which implemented sanctions on Zimbabwe, prevented the disclosure of any information gathered. That article is repeated under most EU sanction regimes. Of course, Brexit means that we will be free of those European constraints. We will be an independent nation, as the Foreign Secretary put it, so it seems to me that that excuse for not providing the information no longer holds, and that we ought to be able to keep track in public of what is going on.

Photo of Richard Benyon Richard Benyon Conservative, Newbury 2:45, 1 March 2018

I will not detain the Committee long. The Government have an opportunity to show off their virtue here. Yesterday, we saw the first application of the criminal finance powers to go after the people we are talking about. I gather that yesterday the courts granted us the first unexplained wealth order on a foreign person to freeze £22 million-worth of property assets in London. Within the constraints of what is wise in terms of disclosure, I think that some element of this proposal might be acceptable to the Government, although I feel that it could all be drawn together in a much simpler amendment. I refer to my earlier comments about how I think we should take that forward.

Photo of John Glen John Glen Minister of State (Treasury) (City), The Economic Secretary to the Treasury

I am grateful to the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland for not seeking to embarrass me again.

Amendment 36 requires the Government to provide quarterly reports on the impact of all sanction regimes, including the number and value of suspected breaches of sanctions. In considering the sorts of scenario that are in play here, hon. Members will remember that sanctions breaches are highly complex and involve multiple parties across various time periods. Sometimes they take place across borders and in different jurisdictions. The complexity of most sanctions breaches means that the investigation process from initial report to action often takes significant time and resources. There is also often a time lag between the breach taking place and being reported. The Government therefore continually adjust their figures as new information comes to light. Hence, it is very challenging to make the process fully accurate. It would be extremely difficult for the Government to report accurately on the number of breaches suspected or found at any one time. That would render the information published in the quarterly reports of little practical value.

The amendment would also place a significant burden on businesses. Currently, the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation collects information on the value of funds frozen annually, which is onerous on businesses but important for compliance purposes.

Photo of Anneliese Dodds Anneliese Dodds Shadow Minister (Treasury)

I understand that the US Office of Foreign Assets Control routinely releases details of licences and other information. It believes it has achieved an appropriate balance between commercial confidentiality and public accountability, and it does not appear to be overly onerous in the US context. I wonder why we view it as being overly onerous in the UK context.

Photo of John Glen John Glen Minister of State (Treasury) (City), The Economic Secretary to the Treasury

It is not about the reporting, but the frequency of the reporting. The point I am making is that to increase it to quarterly would add unnecessary compliance cost to industry, when that cost is already considerable if necessary. It would also result in an administrative burden for Government to produce figures that may not be of much practical use. We do not think that is the best way to spend the limited resource of public money.

Providing quarterly reporting regime by regime may also risk breaking other laws. At the moment we only provide regime figures for the largest regimes. For the small regimes there may only be a small number of designated persons with frozen funds in the UK so providing that specific information, which can easily be traced back to them, may risk breaching data protection laws.

The Government have already committed to being transparent where appropriate. As part of the monetary penalty guidance published last year by the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation, the Government committed to publishing details of breaches and criminal prosecutions. That is a matter of public record.

For those reasons, I urge the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland to withdraw the amendment.

Photo of Helen Goodman Helen Goodman Shadow Minister (Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs)

I am sorry, but notwithstanding the blandishments of the right hon. Member for Newbury, I do not think that the Minister has made the case for keeping that information secret. The fact that the numbers can jump around in the way that they did last month suggests that the Government have not got a grip. One way to incentivise Ministers is through the OFSI, which after all is the body that the Treasury set up to run sanctions policy. We have a whole group of people there devoting their lives to that—perhaps they are even in room, supporting the Minister today—and to supporting Ministers to do that. It is a perfectly reasonable piece of information for us to be requesting. It would help Ministers to manage things better and help to give the public confidence that breaches of sanctions are being dealt with properly. I am afraid that I therefore wish to press the amendment to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

The Committee divided:

Ayes 9, Noes 10.

Division number 8 Caledonian Pinewood Forest — Review by appropriate Minister of regulations under section 1

Aye: 9 MPs

No: 10 MPs

Aye: A-Z by last name

No: A-Z by last name

Question accordingly negatived.

Clause 27, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 28 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 29