The Delivery Authority

Part of Parliamentary Buildings (Restoration and Renewal) Bill – in a Public Bill Committee at 8:00 pm on 4 June 2019.

Alert me about debates like this

Photo of Meg Hillier Meg Hillier Chair, Public Accounts Committee, Chair, Public Accounts Committee 8:00, 4 June 2019

I beg to move amendment 15, in schedule 2, page 22, line 6, at end insert—

“(10) The Comptroller and Auditor General must have access rights to allow him to examine the preparedness of the Sponsor Body and the Delivery Authority to undertake the Parliamentary building works.

(11) In exercising the power in sub-paragraph (10), the Comptroller and Auditor General must have particular regard to procurement practices and the need to ensure that small businesses have sufficient opportunity to participate in the Parliamentary building works.”

One might expect that I would want to see good auditing of this project, not only because I chair the Public Accounts Committee but because, like all of us, I represent taxpayers, and it will be taxpayers who ultimately fund it. It is also important that the proper audit arrangements are in place to make sure that everybody working on the project is aware that the eyes of the Comptroller and Auditor General and the National Audit Office are on them—that is what I am proposing as the best approach to audit. That approach also brings in parliamentary scrutiny, because under the arrangements of Parliament, the National Audit Office’s reports can automatically be taken up by the Public Accounts Committee. Of course, other Committees can look at the project too, but it means that we would have numbers.

For those who have not been on the Public Accounts Committee, I will set out the process. When the National Audit Office produces a report, the figures are agreed with the audited body. That enables the members of the Committee to focus on the detail rather than arguing about the numbers. The report is an accurate record of what the costs are, but the National Audit Office also looks more widely at the efficiency and effectiveness of programmes, including how business cases are set up and so on. It is really important that we build that in from the outset. A new Comptroller and Auditor General took office on Saturday 1 June; I have not had a chance to discuss this with him in detail, but I have been in touch with the National Audit Office.

In some respects it is possible to do this without an amendment to the Bill, but it is still discretionary. Until this Bill is passed, under section 6 of the National Audit Act 1983, the CAG may be appointed an auditor of a body to which he has not been appointed by statute

“by virtue of any agreement made, whether before or after the passing of this Act, between that authority or body and a Minister of the Crown.”

An appropriately worded agreement would trigger the CAG’s economy, efficiency and effectiveness powers, but of course, we do not know if we can get that. While I would hope the Sponsor Body would embrace that, it would be helpful and not detrimental in any respect to have it in the Bill, so that it is very clear. Of course, in so far as is possible before the Act is passed, the CAG can enter into an agreement that would hopefully mirror his statutory rights.

I am very concerned, though, that we have this in statute—in the law—to embed the National Audit Office’s embrace of this role at an early stage. My amendment proposes that that happens with both the Sponsor Body and the Delivery Authority, and that it starts now, so that the National Audit Office is not looking at this project in 15 years’ time, perhaps when something has gone wrong; we build it in from day one. It would ultimately be for the Comptroller and Auditor General to decide how often he looks at this, but I would suggest an annual approach. Obviously, the National Audit Office would annually look at the accounts, if that were agreed, and would have the ability to produce individual reports on aspects of the project. That would be within the properly independent powers of the Comptroller and Auditor General. My amendment does not directly prescribe what the CAG does, because that would be wrong: he is an independent person, representative of this House and of the tax-paying public. However, it is important to set this out in statute.

There is another element that we may want to consider, and I would be interested to hear the Minister’s views on it. Currently, it is not easy for the Comptroller and Auditor General and the National Audit Office to access a company’s records. They can look at a contract between Government and another body in the private sector or wherever, and will then be able to see certain elements of what is going on with that private company, but the NAO does not have access rights to those companies’ accounts. For the purpose of value-for-money examinations, it might be helpful for the CAG to have unequivocal access to relevant information that contractors, subcontractors and grant recipients of the Sponsor Body and Delivery Authority have. I have not put that in the amendment, because I received late advice on how we might approach it, but I would be interested in the Minister’s views.

If we are really serious about ensuring that we are watching taxpayers’ money and that this does not spiral out of control, that level of audit would really hold the feet of the companies working on this project to the fire. They would know that everything they did would be available. I should be clear that under audit rules, that would not necessarily be public information; the National Audit Office would have access, but there would still be considerations about whether it was published. It would not be an open and published document, but the National Audit Office would have access rights, as it has with the BBC and the Bank of England, two recent additional audits that it has done.