Part of Finance (No. 3) Bill – in a Public Bill Committee at 3:45 pm on 6 December 2018.
It is a pleasure to address the Committee on behalf of the Opposition for the final time today—I am sure to the great disappointment of all. The two clauses both address the soft drinks industry levy, often known colloquially as the sugar tax, which came into force in the current tax year. Given the scope of the two clauses, you will be relieved to hear, Mr Howarth, that I will not attempt to have a general debate on the basic principle of the tax—as tempted as I was. Nor do the Opposition disagree in principle with the Government’s broad intention in the clauses.
As the Minister said, clause 66 allows penalties to be imposed on businesses eligible to pay the soft drinks industry levy where they fail to submit the required quarterly return by the due date. It also ensures that similar penalties can be imposed for non-payment of the levy, contingent on certain provisions in the Finance (No. 3) Act 2010 being enacted. For context, will the Minister clarify the Government’s plans in relation to the enactment of these provisions? Will he explain why they have come to be made now, rather than during the passage of previous legislation?
On the substantive point, let me start by asking the Minister for some clarity about the number and types of business that might be affected. How many companies are now registered for the soft drinks industry levy, and what analysis can he give us of their size and scale? How does that compare with the number and composition originally anticipated? Will he outline for the Committee what kind of penalties a business might face, first, for failing to submit a quarterly return and, secondly, for non-payment? Is he convinced that the penalties are sufficient to deter tax evasion, while not being so high that genuine errors are disproportionately punished?
To put this in context, will the Minister tell us what level of evasion, late or non-payment, and failure to submit quarterly returns has been recorded to date? What estimate has the Treasury undertaken of any revenues lost to tax evasion? Has HMRC been able to give him any idea of the scale of the failure to submit returns? Is that related to evading payment, or is it simply down to administrative failures? How many returns are submitted late, and how many are not submitted at all?
On a related question, will the Minister tell us how much he expects to be raised through the imposition of these penalties and—perhaps more significantly—through any deterrent effect on tax evaders? Will the penalties, particularly for non-payment, form part of the revenue take for the tax, or will they be considered separately for purposes such as the intended link to funding for child health?
The Minister will be aware that the projected tax take from the levy has declined precipitously since the former Chancellor’s original estimates when he announced the levy. The original forecast was for £520 million in the current fiscal year. The latest “Economic and fiscal outlook” from the Office for Budget Responsibility, produced for last month’s Budget, anticipated that just £240 million will be raised. I assume the Minister stands by that figure, unless it has declined even further in the past few weeks. How much of that difference is down to the kind of deliberate evasion that clause 66 addresses, and how much is simply down to error in Treasury forecasts or—being generous—to changing economic circumstances and the impact of behavioural change? I should say for the record that, in the case of this tax, behavioural change is welcome, because it effectively means less sugar in soft drinks, with consequent benefits for public health. As I will touch on later, the dramatic shortfall in tax receipts has had some less desirable consequences.
I note that this measure comes into force at Royal Assent, rather than in the next tax year. We do not object to that, as measures to tackle tax evasion and avoidance should not be delayed. However, what steps have the Treasury and HMRC taken to ensure that businesses are alerted and that tax collectors can take full advantage? When does the Minister expect the first quarterly returns to be due under this measure?
Perhaps the Minister can explain what will happen should Royal Assent occur around the due date for a quarterly returns. If, for example, a quarterly return is due on