Clause 1

Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism Bill – in a Public Bill Committee at 8:55 am on 9 September 2014.

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Photo of Andrew Slaughter Andrew Slaughter Shadow Minister (Justice) 8:55, 9 September 2014

I beg to move amendment 1, in clause 1, page 1, line 4, leave out “a” and insert “the relevant”

Photo of Adrian Sanders Adrian Sanders Liberal Democrat, Torbay

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment

Amendment 2, in clause 1, page 1, line 4, at end insert—

‘( ) Nothing in this Act confers on any person immunity from civil liability, nor does it change the relevant standard of care in negligence or breach of statutory duty”

Photo of Andrew Slaughter Andrew Slaughter Shadow Minister (Justice)

It is a genuine pleasure to be here this morning under your chairmanship, Mr Sanders, to begin and—who knows?—perhaps end consideration of this short Bill. I have been reflecting, in the light of the evidence sittings that most of us were privileged to attend on Thursday, and have concluded that perhaps we have been a little harsh about it. Perhaps it is not so much a bad Bill as a sad Bill. There are two confusions or conflicts at its heart. One is the poor drafting. Amendment 1 is the first of the amendments intended to address that, although there are others to come.

I should perhaps say that I generally share the view of Mr Whitehead, representing the Law Society, who said in evidence on 4 September that he thought the Bill was so poorly drafted as to be “probably unamendable”. That is clearly the Government’s view; they have tabled no amendments. I could not resist tabling a few, but it is only a few, and they tend to fall into two categories, the first of which is to attempt to improve the drafting, which may be a vain hope.

Amendment 2 is in the second category. The debate may take a little while because I hope that the amendment will tease out from the Minister the Government’s real intention. I think that a number of the witnesses—if they had views about it—were confused about that. I am still a little confused, but I have my own view. I think that the impact assessment and the remarks of the Lord Chancellor in some of his early press articles are probably right: the intention is not to change the law—but there is some doubt about that. Amendment 2 is intended to flush that out, and I will spend a little time on it.

I suspect that the Committee will not be terribly troubled about clause 1 stand part, although no doubt we will welcome short stand part debates as opportunities to give our differentiated views on clauses 2, 3 and 4. After amendment 2, I do not intend to spend a great deal of time speaking to any of amendments. Many of them are the equivalent of Gallic shrugs. I am effectively saying to the Minister, “What can that possibly mean?” or “Where can we possibly go from here?” For the benefit of Hansard I will try to communicate verbally rather than by gesture.

Amendment 1 may appear slightly pedantic but it may offer the Minister an opportunity to make my day. For the first time in all the Bills that we have sat on together since the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 he could condescend to agree to one of our amendments. This is one of those things that rankles every time I read through the Bill. Clause 1 states:

“This Act applies when a court, in considering a claim that a person was negligent or in breach of statutory duty, is determining the steps that the person was required to take to meet a standard of care.”

It is a long time since I was at law school but that is fairly first term stuff. When one is looking at negligence or breach of statutory duty, there is in each case a relevant standard of care. That is governed, as several witnesses reminded us, by the common law in the case of negligence. The test that has to be satisfied that there is a duty of care involves foreseeability, proximity and reasonableness. How much care is needed? Has that care been taken? What is the appropriate level of care of the alleged tortfeasor? Are they a professional? Are they a rescuer? Are they a surgeon or are they simply a bystander helping out? Has there been damage? Is there  foreseeability? The standard of care will vary from case to case. Equally, on breach of duty there will be a standard of care which is applied by the relevant statute.

Initially I thought of tabling an amendment to leave out throughout the Bill, the phrase

“or in breach of statutory duty” because I thought that the highly inappropriate section 69 of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 had effectively got rid of breach of statutory duty as a remedy and taken us back, as one of the witnesses said, to Victorian times. But I stood to be corrected by the experts who said that there were some reserved positions, either through inference or where limitation periods had not expired. In the future, I hope that we will look at repealing that provision and therefore I will not seek to pursue this now: I simply point out that where there is a breach of statutory duty there will be a relevant standard of care in each case. That is all I have to say on that. The amendment is better drafting. The Bill is sloppy drafting and our wording should be preferred. We shall see whether the Minister is feeling in a charitable mood.

Amendment 2 adds:

“Nothing in this Act confers on any person immunity from civil liability, nor does it change the relevant standard of care in negligence or breach of statutory duty”.

That may not go quite as far as I wanted to or as the Government previously went. I have taken some of those words from the impact assessment, which states:

“the Government believes that further legislation is needed to allay public concerns about this issue and to encourage participation.”

In the Minister’s letter to the Joint Committee on Human Rights from 23 June, which expresses the purpose of the Bill in broad terms, he says that

“it will send a strong signal to reassure people that the courts will consider, in all cases, the wider context of the defendant’s actions before reaching a conclusion on liability.”

We are told that the Bill will reassure people. We had a flurry of articles to launch the Bill, after which we lost interest and moved on. I will not quote all of those articles, but they emphasised that it was about not changing substantive law but sending out signals and reassuring. I tend to agree with the hon. and learned Member for Harborough (Sir Edward Garnier), and many others. The hon. and learned Gentleman made an excellent speech on Second Reading in which he said that this is not the purpose of legislation. He preferred to see black letter laws, which were clear and effective and which the courts were instructed to implement.

There is clearly often a need for judicial discretion and that issue will be raised when we debate some of the later amendments. However, simply using legislation to educate, urge, console and reassure in this way seems inappropriate. I suspect that is the reason there has been such—contempt is too strong a word—a desultory interest in the Bill from the start. I looked back at its progress, starting with the Queen’s Speech, which both Houses debated. There were about 35 speakers in this House, two of whom mentioned the Bill, apart from those on the Front Bench. There were about 50 speakers in the other place; no one mentioned the Bill, apart from those on the Front Bench. My point is a patent one. On Second Reading, two Back Benchers spoke: the hon. and learned Member for Harborough and the hon.  Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon). Both speeches were good but that is not a terribly impressive turnout for a Government Bill’s Second Reading.

The Joint Committee on Human Rights sent the Minister a series of very detailed questions that go to the heart of my point, which is about identifying the real purpose of the Bill. Does it aim to change the law? Does it aim to dictate to courts and judges in such cases or, as appears to be the case from the quotes I gave, does it aim to turn away from the law and turn to the general public, exhorting them to volunteer to intervene? Those are all laudable aims but I do not know if legislation is the right place for that. The Minister may have sent a response to the Joint Committee’s letter, but I am not aware that it has been published; I am sure he will correct me if I am wrong and give me a copy if he can. He may say that is a matter for the Joint Committee, but it is unfortunate that we do not have the letter before us.

We had the witness sessions last week. My maths is not exact but the point will be well made. When the original list of witnesses was drawn up before the recess, there were about 18 witnesses on the Government’s list, most of whom—not all—would have supported or been expected to support the Government’s case for the Bill. I thought that was somewhat imbalanced. We put forward our own list of about eight witnesses, of whom I think five were accepted. When we came to hear evidence, only five of the 18 witnesses whom the Government invited actually attended. I find that surprising. Even more surprising were the reasons given for not attending. The Forum of Private Business said it did not have anything to say on the issue and had no evidence base. The CBI said that it was not a Bill it was following and it does not have a membership mandate to comment on it. Even the Association of British Insurers—it was probably drafted by the ABI—could not be bothered to turn up. It really was extraordinary. All five of our witnesses turned up; they were very keen. I am sure the other three would have been as well; we had space for them.

Five out of 18 is not very good. Of those who did turn up, the National Council for Voluntary Organisations was broadly supportive, and the Forum of Insurance Lawyers was supportive of the principle. I will say something relevant to the amendment in a moment about the FOIL’s attitude, which goes to the heart of the Government’s dilemma. The FOIL was scathing about the drafting of the Bill. It thought it was dreadful and did not achieve any purpose at all.

The Health and Safety Executive did not know why it was attending. It did not have a clue why it had been taken away from work of national importance to give evidence on the Bill. The Law Society was so antagonistic that the Minister spent his time trying to undermine its evidence. I said he should have declared them a hostile witness if he wanted to examine them in such a way. The National Union of Teachers was also firmly opposed.

I preferred the interesting session with the lawyers, who could have kept going among themselves for several hours in a sort of endless loop without any questions at all, but it was fascinating stuff and cast a light on the issues. They shared my confusion about the purpose of the Bill.

On the point made by the FOIL, a written submission from the City of Westminster and Holborn Law Society came in last night. It made a similar point: it does not  think the Bill goes far enough. When the Compensation Act 2006—I will say a little more about that in a moment—was under consideration, the Constitutional Affairs Committee made the same point. The Library brief refers to that. So several people have said that if we are serious about the issue, we need to change the law, and there were various suggestions for doing so. It can be applied to quantum rather than to liability, and we can reduce quantum if we wish.

The FOIL and the insurance industry are very robust. They think we should start with Tomlinson and go much further, and some of the more laissez-faire organisations, such as the Campaign for Adventure, would say the same thing. I disagree entirely with that. I agree with what some of the other witnesses said: this is a balancing act between risk and safety, and that should be left firmly and squarely with the courts. We should not be trying to micro-manage the individual decisions of the court, which is what I think the Bill sets out to do.

Amendment 2 is designed to be helpful and it is important to include it in the Bill. If the Minister does not accept it, we will press it to a vote. At the very least, the Government need to be clear. Is it right, as appears to be the case from what Ministers have said—the Minister will be on the record shortly and can confirm it—that there is no intention to change the substantive law here, and that this is just another layer of exhortation to add to the Compensation Act 2006 and to what Ministers have said? If that is right—I think that it probably is—it is a relatively harmless Bill and just unnecessary.

I think that a witness, or a member of the Committee, mentioned Lord Denning and Watt v. Hertfordshire County Council in 1954—always a good place to start in such debates—a case that set down the balance that needs to be struck, but which clearly talked about public benefit. However, the leading case in relation to this matter, which several witnesses mentioned, is still Tomlinson, a case in which a young man was tragically severely injured by diving into a shallow lake where there were warning signs and the relevant authority that had custody of it had taken steps. There were interesting legal arguments, but it has become the leading case because, as Lord Hobhouse put it,

“The pursuit of an unrestrained culture of blame and compensation has many evil consequences and one is certainly the interference with the liberty of the citizen. Of course there is some risk of accidents arising out of the joie de vivre of the young, but that is no reason for imposing a grey and dull safety regime on everyone.”

That is taken, in some quarters, as being a sea change in relation to balance of risk. I do not think that it was, by any means; it simply developed the law as case law has done, including in relation to the law of negligence and breach of statutory duty, over decades if not centuries.

I cannot see why Parliament constantly needs to interfere in this way—there were many references to this during the passage of the Compensation Act—in something that works extremely well and, as Mr Whitehead said, with fluidity. The courts respond not only to legal argument but to social change, as is obvious, and they do that balancing act in every case, but that balance changes over time. To introduce legislation in this way  is, at best, confusing. If I am wrong in my interpretation of that being all it is, the Minister needs to be clear about that, because it is possible that the Bill will be misleading.

I differentiate between the three clauses, although none of them is brilliant, frankly. I am least concerned about clause 2, although all that can be said about it is that it is inoffensive; it duplicates what is contained in section 1 of the Compensation Act, with the difference that it has a “must” rather than a “may”. Clause 4 is also well-intentioned, being designed to encourage people to intervene, but is terribly badly drafted and contains at least one positively dangerous part that we will seek to amend. We have the most problems with clause 3, which is primarily aimed at shifting the balance yet again in employment cases, although clearly it has a wider remit than simply employment cases.

The Bill is another part of the myth of the compensation culture. We do not live in a country with a compensation culture. Only about a quarter of people who have suffered personal injuries claim; that number has fallen in the past two years from just under 30% and it continues to fall. The number of money claims has been falling sharply in recent years. Everybody, from Lord Young on behalf of the Government—he said in his report that that culture is a perception not a reality—to Lord Dyson, as Master of the Rolls, has said clearly that the compensation culture does not exist and that it is just a perception.

The Minister may say, “Yes, it is a perception and we wish to correct it, because it is preventing people from volunteering and getting involved.” That may be right, and I blame the Government in part for creating that perception. I have nothing against them trying to destroy that perception, but I do not think the Bill is a particularly good way of doing that. I do not think that the intention behind clauses 2 and 4 is particularly dangerous, but they are so poorly drafted that they will not achieve those objectives and could have deleterious effects, since they will be confusing to both individuals reading them and the courts trying to interpret them.

I do not have anything else to say at present, and we will return to some of these issues with later amendments. I am trying to be constructive—I always try and sometimes succeed—and I would like the Minister to accept amendments 1 and 2. I would very much like him to take this opportunity to give us an insight into, and a conclusive view of, the Government’s intention behind the Bill.

Photo of Shailesh Vara Shailesh Vara The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice 9:15, 9 September 2014

I welcome everyone to the Committee; it is good to see that it is well attended. The hon. Gentleman raised a number of issues, principal among which was the purpose of the Bill. The Bill is important and sends out a powerful signal to the public. Indeed, it directs the courts to take certain factors into account.

We have said that clauses 2 and 4 essentially reflect the current law but strengthen and emphasise it, while clause 3 changes the law. We want courts to consider the factors in the Bill along with any other relevant factors whenever they determine a claim, and we made those points clear in our letter to the Joint Committee on Human Rights.

The hon. Gentleman speaks of the Bill not being substantive. It is important to recognise that, when Labour was in government, it also introduced legislation—the Compensation Act 2006—that was intended to send out a message. We believe that the Bill will be more effective than that attempt.

The hon. Gentleman has been quite dismissive of much of the oral evidence, but it is fair to say that he has been somewhat selective in his choice of examples. I will dismiss the contribution made by the so-called representative of the Law Society, Fraser Whitehead. It was abundantly clear that none of the thousands of Law Society members had been consulted, and Mr Whitehead admitted as much. When I pressed him and asked if he had bothered to consult the people on the relevant committees, he numbered them at around 30 and admitted that he had not consulted the majority of them. Apart from the odd reference to the Law Society, most of his evidence was in the first person: “I” this, “I” that, “my practice” and so on. As far as I can see, that is a personal contribution, albeit one masquerading as being from the Law Society. The hon. Gentleman also ignores the written evidence submitted by the Cheshire Fire and Rescue Service, the Campaign for Adventure and Westminster Law Society, which was broadly supportive.

Photo of Andrew Slaughter Andrew Slaughter Shadow Minister (Justice)

I referred to two out of three of those. I am happy that the Minister talks about the Cheshire Fire and Rescue Service’s evidence, which I thought was disgraceful and seemed to be far more about limiting claims from people who had tripped over their hoses than the safety of firefighters.

Photo of Shailesh Vara Shailesh Vara The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice

I am afraid that I must disagree with the hon. Gentleman’s interpretation of the evidence. A survey conducted by St John Ambulance and referred to in written evidence also illustrated that the fears of liability remain. I take the view that amendment 1 is unnecessary and would make no substantive change to the effect of the clause. The standard of care that the court is required to apply will be obvious from the facts of the case, as will whether or not the clause is relevant to the case.

Amendment 2 is intended to clarify that the Bill does not confer immunity from civil liability upon any individual or class of individuals and does not change the relevant standard of care. Again, I take the view that this is unnecessary. Nothing in the Bill suggests that it gives immunity from civil liability. It also does not change the standard of care that is generally applicable. That is and remains what the ordinary and reasonable person should have done in the circumstances. The Bill simply requires the court to have regard to certain factors in deciding what steps should have been taken to meet that standard of care in a particular case. It does not tell the court what conclusions to draw or prevent a person from being found negligent if the facts of the case warrant it.

In a finely balanced case, if the court’s consideration of these provisions tipped the balance in favour of a defendant who had acted for the benefit of society, demonstrated a generally responsible approach towards the safety of others during an activity, or intervened to help somebody in an emergency, we would welcome that outcome. It would be for the courts to decide how much weight to give those factors on a case-by-case basis. We do not consider that there is any risk of the  clause being misinterpreted by the courts as somehow granting individuals immunity from civil liability or watering down the standard of care that is generally applicable.

Photo of Chris Williamson Chris Williamson Labour, Derby North

I do not really understand the Minister’s rationale. If he argues that this does not avoid the duty on defendants to ensure that they fulfil their obligations, why does he reject the amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Hammersmith which simply clarifies the point that he makes? Surely it would be better for it to be in the Bill so that everybody knows where they stand. There would be no room for misinterpretation.

Photo of Shailesh Vara Shailesh Vara The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice

I take on board what the hon. Gentleman is saying but certain things are taken as read. In this case it would simply be additional and superfluous wording. We are not in the business of adding wording that is not necessary and the courts can continue to interpret in the same way as they have done.

Photo of Chris Williamson Chris Williamson Labour, Derby North

I hear what the Minister says, but this is hardly a big Bill, is it? It is one and a tad pages, and the Minister objects to an additional two lines. It is hardly verbose. I cannot understand the Minister’s rationale. Surely it would make sense. There would be no room for any doubt in anybody’s mind.

Photo of Shailesh Vara Shailesh Vara The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice

When words are superfluous to requirement, they are superfluous regardless of whether a Bill is one page, 27 pages or 101 pages. I give the hon. Gentleman credit for trying, but he will not succeed on this one.

Photo of Ian Swales Ian Swales Liberal Democrat, Redcar

I am enjoying my time on this Bill Committee. I am not a lawyer. As we talk about the choices of words, will the Minister give us specific examples of cases where the judgment would have been different as a result of the Bill? The Opposition should do the same if they want to change the Bill.

Photo of Shailesh Vara Shailesh Vara The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice

Each case will be judged on its facts. It would be difficult for me to stand here now and say, “The outcome of this case would have been different.” But I will say that the Bill directs the court to take into account certain factors in every case of negligence. The law does not do that at present. Each case will be different. During the oral evidence sessions one of the lawyers gave the example of someone crossing red lights, and he used it to suit his arguments. I described different circumstances and he nodded his assent that in those circumstances the consequences would be different.

Photo of Ian Swales Ian Swales Liberal Democrat, Redcar

I understand the Minister’s point about the specifics of a judgment, but the Bill has been tabled to fix some kind of problems. As a non-lawyer I am struggling to know what those problems are. If not with specific cases, perhaps he could tell us generically what he thinks is going wrong that the Bill will fix.

Photo of Shailesh Vara Shailesh Vara The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice 9:30, 9 September 2014

The thrust of the Bill is to send a powerful message to the public that when they do the right thing, the courts will take that into account and they will not be penalised. That is the thrust of it.

Photo of Shailesh Vara Shailesh Vara The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice

I suggest that the hon. Gentleman speaking from a sedentary position looks at the Compensation Act 2006, which his party’s Government introduced. It made a similar attempt, but the Bill goes a lot further. I simply ask the hon. Member for Hammersmith to consider withdrawing his amendment on the basis of the arguments that I have put forward. I hope he will see the rationale behind the clause and recognise its merits.

Photo of Andrew Slaughter Andrew Slaughter Shadow Minister (Justice)

I will not press amendment 1 to a vote, although I am disappointed, but I will press amendment 2 to a vote, because it goes to the heart of the Bill.

To respond to the points that the Minister made, I do not know what this particular animus is that has existed for at least four years now between the Government and the Law Society. The Law Society seems to be an excellent body of men and women doing their best to save the legal profession from its decimation—well, it is rather more than decimation—by the current Lord Chancellor, as we saw in the High Court yesterday.

It sits rather ill for this Government—particularly with the current Lord Chancellor, who does everything based on instinct and without evidence—to complain that people have not consulted. The evidence for the Bill is based on a survey of a weighted sample of 300 people taken 10 years ago. I would rather have the grey beards of the Law Society sitting around in conclave as my source than those folk.

The hon. Member for Redcar made a good point. I am not going to give any examples, because I do not want to change the law. I want to do what the Minister sometimes says he wants and sometimes says he does not want, which is to leave it to the courts to make a decision in every case.

Photo of Shailesh Vara Shailesh Vara The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice

For the sake of clarity, the Bill does not direct the court on what conclusion it should arrive at. The courts will maintain that power and prerogative, and they will decide on the facts. The Bill simply directs them to take into account certain factors. Both the pre-eminence of the courts and their right to judge and come to conclusions based on facts still exist; we are not interfering in that area.

Photo of Andrew Slaughter Andrew Slaughter Shadow Minister (Justice)

Sadly, the Minister is adding layers of confusion rather than stripping them away. He said a moment ago that the Bill goes much further than the 2006 Act. We will see when we come to the next set of amendments that it is intended to fetter discretion to some extent, although it is not entirely clear to what extent. He also said—I do not think I had heard the Government say this before—that whereas clauses 2 and 4 are not intended to change the law, clause 3 is. That was my suspicion, and I now find it to be well founded. We will certainly be voting against clause 3 now.

To return to the point made by the hon. Member for Redcar, the central point is that the courts already take these things into consideration. I read part of the judgment in the Tomlinson case and, in that case and cases following it, that was exactly what the court did. In considering the Compensation Act 2006, a number  of eminent persons said that it was unnecessary, because the courts already fulfilled that role, as they are in a prime position to do. The sort of meddling suggested in the Bill does not go down well.

The other point that the hon. Gentleman made, which I thought was spot on, was that we need to hear about some cases. Let us hear about the case of the person who was sued for clearing snow from outside their neighbour’s front garden. Let us have the case of the heroic rescuer who rushed in, did his or her best, but caused some collateral damage and was sued for that. I cannot think of any actual cases for either. All the wise heads last Thursday could come up with was one case that they sort of remembered where somebody cracked someone’s ribs doing cardiopulmonary resuscitation and there might have been some action resulting, but that is not a hero case in any event; it is simply a first aid case. Someone is not risking their lives to do that.

Cases such as I mentioned do not happen. They never happens—the Lord Chief Justice has said that. Straw men are being created, and I am not sure of the derivation of the Bill—perhaps another donation is due from the ABI. I ask the Minister to please get his story straight.

Mr Vara rose—

Photo of Andrew Slaughter Andrew Slaughter Shadow Minister (Justice)

I will give the Minister one more chance. Is the Bill about saying to the general public, “Don’t feel worried about being a Scout master or trying to give first aid to someone by the roadside,” or is it about saying to the senior judiciary, “You are getting this all wrong. You are supporting this compensation culture and you need to buck up”?

Photo of Shailesh Vara Shailesh Vara The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice

May I point out that the hon. Gentleman is a former lawyer and that, therefore, he will appreciate the nuance that I am about to mention? I had intended to refer to this later, given the amendments that he has tabled to subsequent clauses, but whereas the Compensation Act says that a court “may” consider certain factors, the Bill directs that certain factors “must” be considered. Even he can appreciate the difference between “may” and “must”.

At the moment, the court may take into account certain factors, which means that it does not have to do that. We are seeking to direct that the courts must do that. That is pretty simple and straightforward, but it is important. The hon. Gentleman seems to have missed that, because we will come to his amendments that would change that very feature of the Bill.

Photo of Andrew Slaughter Andrew Slaughter Shadow Minister (Justice)

The Minister is right, and we will come on to that issue shortly. He refers to amendments to clauses 2, 3 and 4, but the selection list has been magically altered as I speak. We will conclude clause 1 and then go on to consider the those amendments, and perhaps it will be more appropriate for the Minister to deal with the matter then. Perhaps can think about now and answer it when we get there.

To go back to the point made by the hon. Member for Redcar, the Minister can think about this question and answer it either now or when we get to that point. I know what I think, but what material difference does he think the change from “may” to “must” will make in  these circumstances? Let us say I was the judge who was trying a case. Would I look at the Bill and think, “It’s a ‘must’, not a ‘may’. I was just going to use my old Compensation Act trick, but now I’ve got a ‘must’ from this new piece of useless legislation. What am I going to do now?”. The Minister may answer now, or perhaps we will wait for his answer and get some more clarification as the morning goes on and we all warm up a bit. Although I stand here more confused that I was 45 minutes ago, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment proposed: 2, in clause 1, page 1, line 4, at end insert—

‘( ) Nothing in this Act confers on any person immunity from civil liability, nor does it change the relevant standard of care in negligence or breach of statutory duty’—(Mr Slaughter.)

Question put, That the amendment be made.

The Committee divided: Ayes 5, Noes 9.

Division number 1 Decision Time — Clause 1

Aye: 5 MPs

No: 9 MPs

Aye: A-Z by last name

No: A-Z by last name

Question accordingly negatived.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Photo of Shailesh Vara Shailesh Vara The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice

Clause 1 sets out the circumstances in which the Bill’s provisions apply. Committee members may be aware that, in determining a claim for negligence, the court must consider whether the defendant had the duty to take reasonable care towards the claimant and, if so, whether as a result of the breach of that duty the claimant had suffered loss or injury. In reaching a decision as to whether the standard of care has been met, the court will consider whether the defendant took reasonable care in all the circumstances, against an objective test: that of the ordinary and reasonable man.

The court performs a similar exercise in those cases where a defendant is alleged to have breached a statutory duty that requires a standard care to be met. What is necessary to meet the standard of care in a particular case must be decided by the court on a flexible basis, according to the circumstances of the case.

The clause provides that the Bill will apply where the court is considering the steps that the defendant was required to take in a particular case to meet the standard of care.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 1 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.