Amendment proposed (this day): 34, in clause 78, page 48, line 8, at end insert—
‘(3) The CAA must report annually to the Secretary of State and to Parliament on the exercise of its duties under this Part of this Act and on the progress made towards the establishment of an outcome-focused, risk-based aviation security regime.’.—(Graham Stringer.)
(b) if making directions under this subsection, the Secretary of State must by order set out the framework for the introduction of the outcomes-focused, risk-based aviation security regime;
(c) an order under this subsection must be approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.’.
Amendment 33, in clause 109, page 64, line 29, at end insert—
‘(2A) In relation to section 78, an order under this section must set a commencement date which is later than the date of the satisfactory introduction of an outcomes-focused, risk-based aviation security regime.’.
I will quickly recap what I said this morning, but I will not start from the beginning as I have entertained the Committee enough.
I talked about the concerns raised by the Select Committee on Transport, the industry and, latterly, the staff. I was fair to the Minister by saying that she had pointed out that separating policy making from operation was not unusual and had cited the example of the Home Secretary, whereby the chief constables make operational decisions.
I remain concerned, however, that the decision to transfer aviation security regulatory functions from the Department for Transport to the Civil Aviation Authority was included at a late stage and has not been subject to sufficient pre-legislative consultation or scrutiny. I am also concerned about clarity on who is responsible for what, which is always a recipe for disaster, and on which staff will transfer.
We have been told that 85 staff will transfer, but that involves some major assumptions. Do they all want to transfer? Have we asked them? How many are of an age to choose early retirement? How many will, in the run-up to April 2014, choose to transfer to other Departments rather than be forcibly transferred to the CAA?
We have heard that staff are worried about the terms and conditions, status and redundancy rights that they have built up and may lose in the transfer. I do not think we can safely assume that 85 staff will simply transfer because the Government wish them to.
We should also remember that the staff cannot easily be replaced. I am told that they are highly specialised and experienced—we are not talking about the upstairs maid—and cannot be replaced. Such staff do not hang on the back of doors waiting for us to pick them up. At the risk of stating the obvious, any of us who has worked with and managed large numbers of staff knows that staff simply do not do what we might wish. Even if the Government wish the staff to transfer as a block, slavery has been abolished. Those highly skilled and experienced staff have many other options. We have to accept that any transfer will create gaps. How do the Government plan to fill those gaps?
Before the Bill proceeds, the Minister needs to explain not only to the CAA, but to the aviation industry and others, the detailed division of security responsibilities, how the transfer will happen and how it will operate in the public interest. She has not yet made the case for that transfer, so will she explain how she intends to ensure that ministerial responsibility for aviation security will not be reduced if the Bill is enacted in its current form? What action, if any, has she taken on the Transport Committee’s recommendations? How does she envisage the division of security responsibilities working in practice?
Going back to what I said this morning, I know from my experience of working in children’s services and child protection that tragedies and disasters happen in the gaps between responsibilities. They do not happen in those areas where everybody knows what they are doing; they happen where it is nobody’s responsibility and everybody thinks that somebody else is doing the relevant thing. How will the division of responsibilities work in practice? What evaluation has been made of the risks? What are the Government’s plans for the potential loss of expertise and experience? Finally, how will the proposed detailed division of security responsibilities operate in the public interest?
I, too, share the Transport Committee’s concern about the transfer of duties to the CAA. I share the concern about the loss of expertise that the transfer could entail; I know that that will be discussed further under future clauses. I am also concerned about the total “user pays” principle, because we do not use that for the police or for other safety and security issues and services. The Government need to explore further some of the issues around transferring all that to the “user pays” principle.
I specifically want to discuss my concerns about the outcomes-focused risk-based approach to security. As my colleagues have said, the terrorist has to get through only once, and we have to be 100% successful at stopping terrorist activity. I am still not convinced that the focus on outcomes will achieve the necessary ends.
On costs, the Government say that the freedom of airports to devise their own systems could lead to cost savings, and that worries me hugely. Will that mean airports potentially looking at how they can cut costs, and will they therefore be cutting corners? I am concerned that some airports will be less rigorous. Our biggest concern over the past few years has been about transatlantic services, which are high-prestige targets for terrorists. However, any attack on any airport or airliner—or train, ship or anything else—would be significant and would have that wonderful splash of publicity that terrorists like to see. If we do not prescribe what airports should include in their security services, the risk is that we will not be able to monitor them properly, and some of the smaller airports may become soft targets for terrorists.
On discrimination, security services have talked to us about the profiling of potential offenders, but I am concerned that people with brown skin are more likely than others to be pulled over for more rigorous security checks. I am not yet convinced that that will not occur, and we have certainly seen it happening with stop-and-search on the streets. Will that be replicated in our airports?
Is the hon. Lady comparing the stop-and-search of the ’70s and ’80s with the highly intelligent risk-based profiling that goes on in the security system nowadays?
I am not talking about the ’70s and ’80s; I am talking about what is happening with stop-and-search on our streets today and about the police targeting certain groups. The percentage of black and minority ethnic people who are stopped and searched by the police is much higher than that for the white population. The police can argue, as can any security service, that certain people are more likely to be involved in street crime and gang-related violence, but the result of that is the capturing of everybody of a certain colour or ethnicity, which becomes worrying.
I want to discuss what was going on in Manchester, because the system there meant that someone would not be targeted because they looked or behaved in a certain way or had a certain background. It was about everybody being treated the same in certain ways, and then people being picked out for extra attention. The issue should not be based on ethnicity, but I am concerned that that will continue.
That is my concern. I am not saying that it is based on any evidence, but the points on which people will be profiled must be specified. We were told, both at the Select Committee and here, that the issue is also about looking at people’s behaviour—how they purchase tickets, insurance policies and other things. However, I am concerned that a fundamental element underneath that is saying, “But that group of people is more likely to be committing that offence.” Certainly, that happens on the streets with the police. The idea is that a certain group of people is more likely to commit an offence.
On Monday, in Washington, I met Homeland Security officials from the Transportation Security Administration. Profiling carried out by US and British authorities is far more sophisticated than simply profiling people crudely; it includes looking at how tickets are purchased and whether cash is used. Other sophisticated profiling methods are used. That has to be beneficial for the security of the travelling public.
I am glad that the hon. Gentleman is reassured by all those things. I am not yet reassured. I hope that the Minister will reassure me and colleagues that the proposals will ensure that people are caught and not able to commit atrocities in our skies.
There is an increasing number of complaints from disabled people concerned about how they have been treated at airports, particularly when people with colostomy bags, or other physical attributes, have needed pat-down searches and so on. Again, we must consider how we are going to ensure that disabled people are not discriminated against.
I went on a trip to Auschwitz with my hon. Friend the Member for Barrow and Furness, who was on crutches; he was taken away to be searched because he was on crutches and setting off machines. That demonstrated that somebody with a disability—fortunately, a temporary disability in my hon. Friend’s case—was singled out for different treatment because he was on crutches.
The hon. Lady is so completely wrong that it defies belief. The hon. Member for Barrow and Furness, who was legless at the time, was taken away for a different security procedure precisely because he had crutches on and therefore would set off the machines. To allow everybody else on the plane to feel secure, he had to undergo a special security check. This is what happens. It is not special profiling or discrimination; it is just security.
Let me explain myself and what happened in the airport on the way back from Auschwitz. I had done my knee in and had a metal strap around it. The problem was that that set off security scanners. In that instance, the airport did the right thing, because I was led off and put in a private room to take my trousers down while officials had a good prod around. [ Laughter .] I will not dwell on that for longer than necessary.
My hon. Friend makes a good point, however. Although Warsaw airport did things right and enabled me to do that in privacy, there are still too many examples of airports that do not allow that, which is why I am glad that my hon. Friends have tabled the amendment.
I thank my hon. Friend, because it is about people being treated differently. That has happened to a number of people, and they have certainly written to me—if not to other members of the Committee—about their having medical evidence to prove they have a colostomy bag, for example. That should mean they are not singled out, treated differently and given a pat-down, or subjected to other searches. If a person has a colostomy bag, they should—[ Interruption. ] The hon. Member for North Herefordshire looks puzzled. I hope he is puzzled by the fact that an airport is treating people in such a way, and not by my talking about it.
All people should be treated with respect and in the right way. It is a question of how people should be treated in the first place, rather than adopting an-outcomes focused, risk-based approach.
I would like to give some reassurance. As we will discuss in considering the next set of amendments, it is vital that disabled people be treated with dignity and respect, whether during the security process or in relation to anything else at the airport. It is important, however, that they be subject to the appropriate security checks, both for their safety and that of other passengers. If any group receives special, lighter treatment, it makes them a target for terrorists who might seek to blackmail them into taking explosive devices on planes.
I thank the Minister for that intervention. We are in agreement, because it is about the “how”. I absolutely agree that some people should not be treated better than others, but we need to work out how to deal with this issue.
My hon. Friend the Member for Blackley and Broughton has mentioned Manchester airport, and I want to talk about the scheme in place there and the concerns that have emerged. Since 2009, Manchester airport has been trialling body scanners that use backscatter X-ray technology, which has not yet had EU approval. The radiation from a body scan is equivalent to cruising for two minutes at altitude, and the scanners have been approved by the Health Protection Agency. However, when the trial ends in October 2012, unless there is an extension, the airport will not be able to continue using those scanners.
The passenger approval rate for the body scanner is 95%. People much prefer it to the old-fashioned pat-down search, as do security staff. It avoids the need to touch the passenger, and for a lot of bending and stretching. Not everybody goes through the body scanner, but everybody goes through the first security phase. Then, a door opens and people either go through the body scanner, or they go straight ahead. The system has worked, but the concern is that if the EU does not approve it, the investment will be wasted.
On the outcomes-focused, risk-based approach, the Minister seems to be saying that the Bill gives airports the chance to innovate and to look at other ways of reaching the same solution. However, that approach is not working for Manchester airport, because it will not be able to continue using the scanners unless the Government can agree with the EU that that system should continue. That raises an ongoing issue: will airports be less likely to want to innovate? Will they be less likely to want to invest their own money in different security systems—which may reduce costs or be more efficient, for example—if they can be prevented from using them? Even if the outcomes that the Government desire were being achieved, a different input method would be being used. My worry is that there is not a clear enough picture of how we achieve the outcomes-focused, risk-based focus.
I completely understand the hon. Lady’s points. Perhaps she is willing to join the EU Fresh Start cross-party group in this place and vote against certain EU regulations, or to try to repatriate the powers that cause the problems, so that Manchester airport can provide security in the way the Bill envisages. It is not the Bill that will stop innovation in this context; it is the European Union’s regulations.
I think I will resist the hon. Gentleman’s invitation to join his group. However, this is a worldwide issue, and we need to make sure that passengers returning to and departing from the UK have stringent security checks. Whether it is across the European Union or globally, we need to have security systems in place that we can all live and work with.
I hope the Minister will come back to this issue. I am not at all convinced that saying that there is an outcomes-focused, risk-based approach will allow innovation or ensure that all our airports have the same level of security. It is not just about EU regulations; we operate globally, and it is a question of ensuring that air passengers, and people on the ground, are safe. Will airports be able to innovate in the current situation, even in the light of this Bill? I suspect that innovation will not happen, which will have all sorts of consequences for us.
I am grateful for the opportunity to have a wide-ranging debate on an important issue. I will run through a number of the points made by hon. Members before looking at the wider issues concerning the transfer of functions to the CAA and the nature of the complementary reform, which is a move to an outcomes-focused, risk-based approach to aviation security regulation. In response to points made by a number of Members, including the hon. Members for Barrow and Furness and for Strangford, I can confirm that security is paramount. That is the case under the current system and will remain so under the reformed system. Matters such as cost and passenger convenience are significant ones to consider, but keeping passengers secure will always be the paramount consideration.
The Government would not be putting forward the changes set out in the Bill if we believed they would in any way jeopardise the current high levels of security that we deliver in the UK aviation sector. As I will explain, we believe that combining safety and security regulatory enforcement functions in the same body, and the move to outcomes-focused, risk-based security, have the potential to improve high security levels still further.
In response to some of the points made by the hon. Member for Blackley and Broughton, yes, it is acknowledged that transferring regulatory enforcement functions to the CAA will mean that the cost of the system is transferred to the aviation industry. That will add some £4.8 million to industry costs, but that is significantly outweighed by the reduction in regulatory costs provided by other parts of the Bill. As I informed the Committee last week, the Bill will deliver a reduction in costs for the aviation sector of approximately £150 million net present value over 20 years. That does not include any potential savings the industry might make as a result of a move to outcomes-focused, risk-based security.
The hon. Member for Blackley and Broughton also referred to the 1p and 2p figures in the impact assessment. The net cost per passenger is 1p, and for freight owners the net cost per kilogram of cargo is 0.001p. Where the cost is applied only to passengers, it is 2p. The hon. Gentleman also expressed concern—as did the hon. Member for Bolton West—that the aviation industry had to pay for the costs of security, and he asked for examples of the approach taken overseas. Like the UK, most European countries apply the “user pays” principle. We believe that it is fair to ask those who use and provide aviation services to meet the costs of keeping them secure. The last Government did not propose to change that approach during their 13 years in office; if the Opposition now propose doing so, that would involve a spending commitment of some £1 billion.
The hon. Gentleman also mentioned APD. Tempting as it is to trespass on to that turf, taxation matters are of course a matter for the Chancellor, as he will appreciate. He also highlighted the cost of computers, referring to an estimate of £1.5 million. That figure includes some transitional costs, but his point is well made and it will of course be important for this project to be properly managed and scrutinised, as arrangements for the transfer of functions develop. The Department will be making those arrangements with care. The Government take seriously the need to improve the track record we inherited from the previous Administration on IT projects whose costs spiralled out of control.
Both the hon. Gentleman and the hon. Member for Bolton West mentioned the very successful security scanner scheme run by the Manchester Airports Group, involving backscatter technology. As I said in an intervention, the Government have been very impressed by the results of the pilot, although it is currently just a pilot and not authorised as a primary screening method for the purposes of EU regulation. The issue is still under discussion and has been referred for further expert consideration. We continue enthusiastically to support the approval of this type of scanner as a primary screening method for the purposes of EU regulation.
A number of Members—the shadow Minister, and the hon. Member for North West Durham in particular—talked about how the split of responsibilities between the CAA and the Department for Transport will work in practice. It is an important issue, which is one of the reasons why the Department has circulated a note to Committee members giving them further insight into our approach. I emphasise that the policy and the giving of directions will remain the responsibility of the Secretary of State for Transport. The CAA will be given responsibility for enforcement and for providing advice on policy and directions.
The shadow Minister mentioned the introduction of the rules on liquids and the circumstances that led to their introduction. Under the new system and the proposed transfer of responsibilities to the CAA, such changes would still be decided by the Secretary of State. They would be advised by the CAA, which is the expert regulator dealing with the front line and enforcing the provisions, but the Secretary of State would decide whether additional rules on liquids, for example, were required.
I had understood that; that was our understanding of what the regime would be. My particular question is about capacity. Once significant efficiencies have been made in a risk-based system, is there not an increased risk that, if such increased stringency suddenly needed to be directed again, a more fragmented and pared-down system would be unable to meet that challenge?
I was going to come to that, actually. The capacity issue is very important. When the liquids rules were introduced, my understanding is that there were certainly issues with capacity, which is why queues lengthened considerably for some time after that. However, I think that I can provide the hon. Gentleman with some reassurance on the point. As in the current regime, ensuring that airports take appropriate steps to deal with contingencies—preparing for them and providing the necessary spare capacity to react to changing circumstances—will form part of the new regime.
I want to give a further illustration of the split of responsibility between the CAA and the DFT. If, for example, problems were to arise, as was the case with the impact of new EU rules on the searching of religious headgear, it would again be entirely open to the Secretary of State under the new system to take exactly the same steps as the former Secretary of State took in that instance—temporarily to suspend the operation of the new EU rules until a way could be found to run a pilot to provide a more culturally sensitive way to ensure that the goals of the EU rules were achieved.
The Minister is being generous with her time. I was going to touch on that topic in the next debate. As she has brought it up, I should say that she will be aware that, although the trial has been implemented, it is not universal. There are still significant problems in some areas. Indeed, my right hon. Friend the Member for Warley (Mr Spellar) and my hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton North East (Emma Reynolds) raised the issue with me last night and hoped I would be able to press the Minister on it. Does the Minister think that any change could create another opportunity to get more universal coverage for the issue of Sikh headgear being treated with greater sensitivity, or could it place greater barriers?
As I am sure the hon. Gentleman is aware, a significant majority of the UK’s major airports are participating in the pilot. We have been very impressed with its results so far. We are also ensuring that the European Commission is made aware of progress on the pilot, because we think there is potential for lessons to be learned in relation to the EU rules. I have written to Transport Ministers across Europe, explaining the work we are doing on this and the importance of the issue to minority ethnic communities in the UK.
The hon. Gentleman asked whether similar risk-based approaches are being developed elsewhere; one example is the field of civil nuclear security. He asked whether it was worth going ahead with an outcomes-focused, risk-based—or OFRB—approach in relation to UK rules before the EU rules start to adopt a similar approach.
I would argue that it is worth making progress even before any changes at EU level. Roughly a third of the rules that we apply in aviation security regulation are UK-based. There is real scope for OFRB to deliver change, even if the EU does not subsequently follow a similar approach. We hope that with engagement the EU will find that an outcomes-focused, risk-based approach could play a positive part in improving security outcomes across Europe.
The hon. Member for Bolton West asked about profiling. We do not use profiling as a means of selecting passengers for security searches. Ethnicity is expressly excluded by the rules as a criterion for selecting people for searches. We have been working with security agencies on what value behavioural analysis could provide in aviation security, but again that focuses not on ethnicity, but on issues such as paying cash for a ticket.
I hope the hon. Lady will be reassured that her fears are not justified by the present system. We have no plans to change that at the moment, and neither the move to the CAA in terms of enforcement of regulation responsibilities nor an OFRB approach to security need have any impact on that general approach.
I am confused. Some of the people who gave evidence to us talked very much about this, although “profiling” may be the wrong word to use. In answer to questioning, they talked about looking at the individual in terms of the risk they pose. They seemed to talk very much about profiling, although, as I said, I am not sure that “profiling” in its full sense is the correct word. It is used in the sense that a person fits certain patterns. I am confused by the Minister’s statement that that is not used now and will not be in future.
I can only repeat that ethnicity is expressly excluded as a criterion for selecting people for security searches. That is the case now and the Government have no plans to change that. The changes in the Bill would have no impact on that.
On the general issues to do with the security reforms, the Government are committed to reforming how aviation security is regulated and that work features prominently in the Department for Transport’s business plan. I welcome the indication of support in the amendments and from some, although not all, members of the Committee.
We have put together a joint Department for Transport and CAA team with the relevant skills and knowledge to develop, trial and implement the new regime. We have consulted stakeholders and hosted several interactive events with industry to explain our proposals and understand industry views. Later amendments will give us more opportunity to debate staff transfer in greater detail with the hon. Member for North West Durham, so I will not dwell on that, but we are already engaging with those staff because we fully value the skills that they offer, and we are hoping that as many of them as possible will want to stay in post.
We are analysing the responses to the consultation before making decisions on the next step. We will move forward with our reformed approach to security regulation as quickly as possible, but the priority must be to ensure that aviation security remains robust at all times. The industry asked for the move to an OFRB regime, experts on security regulation expressed support for it in the evidence sessions and it had the support of the previous Government.
The proposal to enable the industry to use security management systems approaches, which would draw on the safety management system approach currently used by the CAA, will have a positive impact on security outcomes. As I said during the evidence sessions, an outcomes-focused approach could deliver important benefits and could well be expected to improve levels of security above the high standards that apply today, because we will be giving more opportunity for the airport industry to develop innovative ways to deliver security outcomes and apply principles of continuous improvement.
A focus on outcomes, with more flexibility for airports to decide the best way to deliver them, should enable security to be delivered in a potentially more passenger-friendly and lower-cost way. Conferring aviation security regulation enforcement functions on the CAA could also benefit industry. With the industry able to deal with only one regulatory body, rather than two, we anticipate that efficiencies could be gained through having aviation security and safety regulation in one place.
The CAA also has valuable experience not only of regulation generally, but of safety management systems designed to manage risks as effectively as possible. Such experience, coupled with the skills and experience of Department for Transport staff, could benefit how we regulate aviation security.
We need to get such things right to ensure that our aviation security is not at risk. The Committee had a reminder of that during the evidence that Andrew Haines, chief executive of the CAA, gave the Committee on 23 February. The amendments ask us to press ahead quickly with outcomes-based security, but he emphasised his concerns about a “one-hit implementation”. In his view, moving regulatory responsibilities at the same time as a big transition to an OFRB approach would be a riskier strategy than a staged approach. It is also not possible to move to an OFRB system in a one-off change; it will take some years to roll out across industry, depending to a significant extent on the pace at which different airports want to deliver new systems and methods.
The new approach is in some senses a cultural change, which will take some time to filter out across the industry. We will press on with reforming the aviation security regime at an appropriate pace, but do so in a way that avoids risking our aviation security by clustering reforms too closely. That is why I am unable to accept amendment 33, which explicitly links the two.
On amendment 34, I assure the hon. Member for Blackley and Broughton that section 21 of the Civil Aviation Act 1982 already obliges the CAA to make an annual report to the Secretary of State on the performance of its functions during the year. Subsection (2)(d) enables the Secretary of State to specify such information with respect to the plans and the past and present activities of the CAA that shall be included in its annual reports. Subsection (3) requires the Secretary of State to lay a copy of every report made to her before each House of Parliament. The requirements of the 1982 Act are sufficient to achieve the purposes of amendment 34.
The CAA’s aviation security functions, as conferred on it by the Bill, would fall within the scope of section 21 of the 1982 Act. Thus the CAA will be required to report on those to the Secretary of State, who in turn must lay the reports before Parliament. There is nothing to prevent the Secretary of State, when using the powers given to her under section 21 of 1982 Act, from requiring the CAA to report on its work regarding the outcomes-focused, risk-based approach to aviation security.
I hope that that explanation provides the reassurance needed to persuade the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment.
Thank you, Sir Roger, for indulging me a little bit further in setting out our general concerns about the clause. I ought to have done so in my first speech, but foolishly I had not anticipated that we would not have a stand part debate.
First, I am disappointed that the Minister rejects our amendment’s proposals for a sensible, greater level of parliamentary scrutiny for the move to a risk-based system. Such scrutiny could be a sensible way to ensure greater confidence in the measure and tease out any further, as yet unknown, problems with the proposal. We will not force the amendment to a vote, but we hope that the Minister will give it serious thought before Report and return with something a bit more measured—I do not suggest that she has not been measured; Committee members know what I mean.
My hon. Friends have mentioned concerns about the clause, but it is worth stressing the manner in which the changes have appeared, which increases our concern about the process and therefore, potentially, the outcome of the changes. The proposal to transfer security is one of the most significant changes in the Bill, so we are slightly at a loss about the haphazard way in which it has evolved. It is worth stressing that, at the time of the Queen’s Speech, the Government had no intention to include security in the Bill. The pre-legislative scrutiny report makes it clear that industry witnesses told the Committee that there had been no discussion with them about that aspect of the Bill.
Thus far the Minister has not adequately explained why the Government have chosen to go about the process in so rushed a way. Why does she believe that now is the right time to make the change, given that, as we have already discussed, a consultation is under way on moving to risk-based security? How will the new system overcome the challenge of increased fragmentation in moving security functions to the CAA, while retaining security policy and direction with the Secretary of State? That is important.
Again, we are not necessarily opposed to such a move. As the Select Committee mentioned, there may be welcome synergies in placing safety and security functions under one regulator, but the case has not yet adequately been made. All Committee members should be clear that these are big changes. For example, shifting vetting, renewing and withdrawing security clearance to the CAA is a remarkable expansion of its capacities and we should leave no room for doubt about its ability to undertake the new responsibilities.
The Minister rightly suggested that there would be greater discussion about this matter in debates on future clauses, but there are widely acknowledged difficulties to do with the staff transfer involved. I hope that she can tell us, either now or in future debates, how she has such apparent confidence—at the moment, frankly, we do not share it—in the ability of the Department and the CAA to manage the process of transfer effectively so that we end up with the right result.
The concerns of the trade union representative have been well set out, and it is worth adding a flavour of similar concerns that airline and airport representatives have expressed about the lack of clarity. For example, David Hart of British Airways told the Transport Committee:
“There is a lack of clarity for us, as an airline, about exactly who will be doing what and how the policy decisions will be filtered down and implemented.”
In the light of all that, I press the Minister to set out more convincingly how she can be confident that the proposed division of responsibilities is sufficiently robust and clear.
My final point concerns timing. On Second Reading, the shadow Secretary of State, my hon. Friend the Member for Garston and Halewood (Maria Eagle), raised concerns about the proposed time scale for the transfer. The Under-Secretary of State for Transport, the hon. Member for Lewes (Norman Baker), responded to the debate, because it was on the day or just after—
The Minister was on the operating table at the time, and for some reason seemed unwilling to make the commitment to do her duties in the House. The Under-Secretary of State for Transport responded to the question in writing, stating that the DFT was aiming for a transfer of function to the CAA in spring 2014.
I feel a little indelicate about doing so, but it is important to point out that the Department has got itself a bit of a reputation for tardiness under the stewardship of the Minister and her colleagues. We have these brand spanking new departmental business plans, but the deadlines that they loving set out regularly sail past without the Department’s raising so much as an eyebrow.
The Secretary of State has just finished setting out the Government’s rail strategy, which was originally timetabled for November last year, and there is still no sign of a policy on airport capacity. The fact that Ministers regularly fail to meet deadlines set only a few months in advance means that we must surely treat the spring 2014 deadline with some scepticism.
Will the Minister give us a whizz-bang, copper-bottomed guarantee in this debate that that deadline will be met, or will she at least set out her continued commitment to the time scale given by the Under-Secretary of State for Transport for the transfer of aviation security regulation functions? In addition, will she set out how many staff are or will be working on the arrangements for the transfer of functions, and the expected costs of making that transfer? Those costs have not been fully set out in any statement that has been made so far.
Clause 78 represents the largest shake-up of aviation security regulation in well over a decade, and it is right that we continue to press for details before we are able to give it our support.
I will respond briefly. I spared the Committee my technical concerns about amendment 76, but as the shadow Minister is keen to press the point, I will return to them. I do not see that amendment 76 would produce the enhanced parliamentary scrutiny that he feels it would. It seems to suggest that the Civil Aviation Authority could implement the outcomes-focused, risk-based aviation security regulatory regime. That is a misunderstanding of how aviation security regulation is implemented, and how it would be implemented under the new arrangements in the Bill. Part 2 of the Aviation Security Act 1982 sets out the Secretary of State’s powers to give directions to industry for the purposes of that part of the Act. Those powers broadly cover the protection of civil aviation against acts of violence. It is those powers that the Secretary of State intends to use to implement the requirements relating to outcomes-focused, risk-based regulation.
Clause 78 inserts new section 14A into the 1982 Act, which confers on the CAA a duty to review the aviation security directions currently in force and make recommendations to the Secretary of State about them and about giving further directions. The clause also amends the definition of “authorised person” in section 24A of the 1982 Act, so that it can mean a person authorised in writing by the Secretary of State or the CAA. Authorised persons—that is, inspectors—monitor and enforce compliance with the directions in force.
The CAA will not, therefore, have the power to give aviation security regulation directions to industry. As I have said, that is a matter for the Secretary of State under the current and proposed regimes. There would, therefore, be no point in the Secretary of State directing the CAA in the terms suggested in amendment 76.
I am grateful to the Minister for picking up on what she believes is our imperfect drafting. I would be delighted if she wanted to take the amendment away to her splendid team of civil servants and bring back something that she believes would do the trick on Report. I would be happy to withdraw the amendment in those circumstances.
I am afraid that I do not find that an attractive option, because I have not found the shadow Minister’s arguments convincing. As I say, I find it surprising that Labour has made another U-turn, because it supported this general approach in government. It has certainly changed its approach.
Consultation has taken place on a possible move to an outcomes-focused, risk-based security approach. The transfer to the CAA proposed in the Bill was referred to in that consultation. Pre-legislative scrutiny has also taken place, including on the provisions on transfer of responsibilities between the Department for Transport and the CAA. I assure the Committee that the DFT is actively engaging with staff on the transfer’s impact on them.
The shadow Minister persists in the allegation that the outcomes-focused, risk-based security approach will lead to lower standards and increased fragmentation. I do not believe that it will. As I have said on numerous occasions, there are good arguments that the new approach could improve security as well as making it more passenger-friendly. We have an example of where such an approach has worked well. The CAA’s safety management system has much in common with the security management system that will be an important part of an OFRB approach. The safety management system has been incredibly successful in protecting and keeping safe passengers on aircraft in this country.
The shadow Minister persists in concern about the division of responsibility. We have sought to provide further detail as the process goes forward. We will provide further details nearer to the implementation of the transfer, but the reality is that our proposals are not out of line with other regulatory contexts where Ministers set policy and give directions and enforcement is left to expert independent regulators.
Will the Minister—I will happily give way to her—agree to put in the Library or provide to members of this Committee the information that she was relying on when she said that the funding basis for security in other European airports was akin to the proposals in the Bill? I have no reason to disbelieve her, as she has always been straightforward in her dealings with me, the Transport Committee and this Committee, but I would like to see the evidence.
Mrs Villiers indicated assent.
The Minister is nodding, so I look forward to the Committee receiving that information.
I was less convinced by the Minister’s belief that the aviation industry would have fewer costs at the end of the process. As any reading of the regulatory impact assessment will show, that view is at odds with the information in that assessment. At best there is ambiguity, and as we have debated the issue in Committee, the ambiguity on cost has increased. We do not understand how the CAA will approach its regulatory asset base. We do not even know why certain elements, such as hotels in terminals, are included. There is much that we do not know and cannot be sure about. The CAA may have a different approach to the economic regulation of airports, and the Minister’s argument rests on there being less regulation. I hope that she is right, because that would be the right direction to go in. However, she has not offered any reassurance that convinces me that that is definitely the case.
Sir Roger, I am sure that you will not let me get into a debate on European regulation, but we should all be worried about the transfer of functions from the CAA to the European Aviation Safety Agency; the Transport Committee has been concerned about that for some time. As the Minister will know from her recent visit to the Transport Committee to discuss flight time limitations, the Transport Committee is worried that European regulations will lead to lowest-common-denominator reforms. On that visit, the Minister was able to reassure the Committee—I do not want to pre-empt its report—that that would not be the case with pilot hours. On security and other issues, however, I am worried that the transfer to EASA will lead to lowest-common-denominator policies.
Those points bring me back to costs and what is really happening in the Bill. At the start of the debate, I read from a 2006 Transport Committee report that basically asked why, if many safety functions are transferred from the CAA to EASA, and if the general direction is to have less regulated airports, which I think the Committee would welcome, there will be more staff at the CAA at the end of the process than when it had two major functions. If the Minister looks at the evidence given to the Transport Committee, she will find that the CAA will grow, not diminish, despite the significant losses and the addition of the security service.
I will not repeat what my hon. Friend the Member for Barrow and Furness said about the security services, but my worries are similar. The Transport Committee clearly stated that the proposal was added to the Bill at the last minute. It is not wrong in principle, but sufficient thought has perhaps not been given to it. As the trade unions said, if it ain’t broke, why try to fix it? To put that in a different way, if an awful thing happened because of a security lapse, and there was successful terrorist attack in this country, who would be to blame? Under the regulations, is it easier to know whether the Secretary of State, the chair of the CAA or its chief executive are to blame? There is a balance to be struck between the synergies of putting the security and safety functions together in the CAA, which the Minister has talked about, and the transparency of the line of responsibility up to the Cabinet and the Secretary of State for Transport. I am unconvinced that adding the measure quickly at the end of the process will provide clarification or improvement. That is a different way of saying that if it ain’t broke, why try to fix it?
Finally, the only difference between the Minister and me on amendment 34—she accepts the principle—is whether it should be in the Bill. The difference is not, as she said in response to my hon. Friend the Member for Barrow and Furness, about the speed of implementation. The amendment could be implemented at any speed. Rather than leaving the matter to the discretion of the Secretary of State, the amendment states that the principle is of sufficient importance to be in the Bill.
Having said that, this has been a wide-ranging debate, and I am certain that we will return to the subject of security on Report. I hope that the Minister will fair-mindedly reflect on the points raised. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.