I am not certain that that is a parallel, which might become obvious if we see what Macrory says. The hon. Gentleman will be familiar with what I cite, but I am going to put it on record.

Macrory recommends that we have seven principles for penalties. The seventh is germane to the argument:

“It is important that regulators do not have targets for different types of enforcement actions or any correlation with salary bonuses or similar incentives. This might incentivise staff to pursue certain enforcement actions inappropriately.”

He goes on:

“I would emphasise that regulators should not retain the revenue from Monetary Administrative Penalties, or exercise any control over how that revenue should be spent.”

Those points are relevant. Macrory reinforces the argument in a way that will help hon. Members later on:

“I want to avoid creating any perverse financial incentives for regulators that might influence their choice of sanctioning tool. This view is already entrenched in relevant section of HM-Treasury’s Consolidated Budgeting Guide and I echo their views on the separation of revenue streams in order to eliminate perverse incentives.”

Finally, he says:

“I have also emphasised that regulators must avoid creating perverse incentives (such as staff appraisal criteria) that will encourage the use of financial penalties without regard to the regulatory outcomes to be achieved.”

Given that here we are dealing with pensions and company contributions to pensions, which are therefore related to the other questions, and that, in implementing Macrory, we are pursuing his recommendations specifically on the issue, going down the route suggested by the amendment would take us in the wrong direction. The compliance regime is designed so that jobholders are not put at any sort of disadvantage. Where an employer is non-compliant, we are designing the regime based on the principles that employers are not better off by not complying, and jobholders are not worse off because their employer failed to comply. We do not want any risk-perverse incentives coming in. If we stick with the principle that sanctions of that nature come directly to the Consolidated Fund and there is no question of the regulator distributing them in any way, we can remain consistent with that principle. That is important for both this measure and that on sanctions regimes in general, which is being considered in the other place. Given that, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will withdraw the amendment.