New Clause 1

Part of Counter-Terrorism Bill – in a Public Bill Committee at 2:15 pm on 15 May 2008.

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Photo of David Heath David Heath Liberal Democrat, Somerton and Frome 2:15, 15 May 2008

This is an important issue. The Minister is right that this is one element among a range of tools that should be available. No one has ever suggested that it is the one tool which is going to be efficacious when nothing else is. It is part of an array which we have been assembling in order to fight terrorism effectively. It is reasonable that we argue that when we have all the elements in place we can question whether other less satisfactory suggestions are required. That is the basis of the argument on 42 days or any other extension of pre-charge questioning but that is a debate we have had and will have and not the one we are engaged in now.

The Minister is also right to say there is widespread confusion about what we mean by intercept evidence. That is one reason people are very confused; not because they think all intercept evidence is not admissible but because they know that some is. They question why when one bit of electronic kit picks up evidence it can be put in front of a court but when another bit of electronic kit picks up the same conversation it cannot be. That has added to the confusion and the sense that this is not a sensible position to be in.

I said earlier that the matter has ramifications beyond terrorist cases. It is also an important weapon in fighting serious organised crime. An Italian Government official recently asked me, unofficially, why on earth we do not allow intercept evidence, as it is a crucial part of the fight against organised crime in his country. Of course, they have some experience of fighting organised crime. There are anomalies, such as allowing some types of intercept evidence to be admissible in court but not others, or the fact that other democracies, including those with a common law jurisdiction, can apparently get round the problems that prove so difficult for us to deal with. There is a nagging suspicion that although this is not a panacea or silver bullet—one could use all the clichÃ(c)s that can be adduced—it is nevertheless an important tool within the array, and it should be possible to deploy it. For a long time, all those arguments hit a brick wall. There was simply no question of the admissibility of intercept evidence because important and highly placed officials within the security services advised against it. We are entitled to take that into account when assessing the present progress, which I agree is entirely to be welcomed.