Clause 5 - Applications relating to entries in Register

Identity Cards Bill – in a Public Bill Committee at 11:45 am on 12 July 2005.

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Photo of Alistair Carmichael Alistair Carmichael Shadow Spokesperson (Home Affairs), Liberal Democrat Spokesperson (Home Affairs) 11:45, 12 July 2005

I beg to move amendment No. 144, in clause 5, page 4, line 39, leave out 'must' and insert

'may, if the applicant so chooses'.

We move on to the more practical applications of the database. We get into the meat of things and how identity cards will impact on the daily lives of our constituents. If the amendment were accepted, subsection (2) would read ''Where an application to be issued with a designated document is made by an individual, the application may, if the applicant so chooses do one of the following''. At present, the way in which the Government have matters drafted means that when a person applies for a designed document—the passport, as the Minister has helpfully told us—he receives the identity card and his details become part of the identity card register as a result of that application.

The obvious effect of my amendment would be to end the element of compulsion. The hon. Gentleman and others have rightly made great play of the fact that the scheme is not yet compulsory. I suggest that the inclusion of ''must'' goes a long way towards the introduction of compulsion by stealth. We now live in an age when many more people have passports than would have been the case previously. Indeed, passports are used for a wide range of purposes other than foreign travel. By necessity, people will become holders of identity cards. They will become part of the identity register.

The Government extol the virtues of choice in the provision of health and education. It is a new orthodoxy that is sometimes difficult to challenge these days. If the identity card scheme is as good as the Minister claims, and if it has all the manifold benefits that he has spoken about, people will wish to have identity cards and compulsion will not be necessary. It is as simple as that.

Photo of Edward Garnier Edward Garnier Shadow Minister (Home Affairs) 12:00, 12 July 2005

I support the hon. Gentleman's amendment because it has far greater implications than we might realise. Subsection (2) does not deal with an application to be registered, but an application to apply for a designated document. We have just discovered that we do not know what the designated documents are; they could well be any document that the Secretary of State lights upon during the next two or three years. That is why it is all the more important that, by October, we have been given a list by the Minister. We are discussing an application to be issued with a designated document.

I hope that I am not exaggerating matters, but my fear is that, under the system that we are allowing blindly to grip us, next time the hon. Gentleman applies at Lerwick post office for a television licence, a fishing licence, a game licence or any other licence, if that is a designated document he will have to   undertake all that is required under subsection (2). Can the Committee imagine the increase in bureaucracy that will flow from the provision to go through the simple process of obtaining, let us say, a television licence? I am not sure that the Government intend such a process, but if it is what they intend, perhaps they would be good enough to tell us. The hon. Gentleman has opened up a little oyster and I hope that the Minister can explain what precisely we ought to be seeing or, more to the point, what the Government intend by the provision.

Photo of Tony McNulty Tony McNulty Minister of State (Immigration, Citizenship and Nationality), Home Office

I am not making light of the amendment. It has opened up a fair debate, but at every stage of proceedings in Committee entirely erroneous amendments are tabled that suggest ''must'' should be inserted for ''may'' or ''may'' should be inserted for ''shall'', and so on. If I were being uncharitable—which I never am—I would suggest that amendment No. 144 was a wrecking amendment. However, it is in order and on the amendment paper. It is not a wrecking amendment, but that would be the import of its acceptance. We made it clear, in the first instance, that we will introduce and implement identity cards along with a range of documents duly designated, which is what clause 4 is all about.

The hon. and learned Member for Harborough was right that this element of clause 5 is not about either the application to go on the register or the application for an ID card; it is about the application for a designated document. First and foremost, we need to ask ourselves why we have designated documents. We have done that to assist in the roll-out—if I can abuse the Committee by using that term—and implementation of the scheme. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that we make provision in clause 5 to say, ''On application from such a date for such a designated document, you will have to get an ID card as well.'' That is the premise on which the implementation is based—it is partial implementation, rather than full and compulsory implementation from day one. That is one of the key building blocks with which we seek to implement the scheme. Therefore, subsection (2) should contain no wild or stunning revelations.

Photo of Edward Garnier Edward Garnier Shadow Minister (Home Affairs)

I do not suppose that there are any stunning or wild revelations. I want to know why the Government are being so reticent about telling us what the designated documents are. With regard to the general argument about access and function creep, why do they not come clean at the beginning of our deliberations on the Bill and say, ''Right, the ID card system and register need to compulsory. Let's get on with it?'' They should just tell us that this is compulsory, rather than do that by a side wind and say, ''It is not really compulsory, but when you go to get your fishing licence, or whatever, you will have to do what is said in clause 4.''

Photo of Tony McNulty Tony McNulty Minister of State (Immigration, Citizenship and Nationality), Home Office

That is entirely wrong. While I ruminate over the summer—happily, for at least three weeks in France, although, unhappily, probably next to an empty swimming pool, given the droughts—about whether to produce this list, I can say with a   high degree of certainty that fishing licences will not be on it.

Photo of Tony McNulty Tony McNulty Minister of State (Immigration, Citizenship and Nationality), Home Office

Yes, make a note of that.

I can say that the biometric passports of 2008 will certainly be included, and that Criminal Records Bureau letters might be—there are discussions to be had on that—and that a variety of other documents will also be considered. I will seriously consider this matter, and I may well return to the Committee with a little list—as it has been described.

Let us nail the other canard. It comes in one of two forms. The one that is easier to dispose of is that it will be compulsory to carry an ID card. We have been there; nothing in any part of the Bill suggests that, but it is still hawked around by those who wish to detract from the Bill. That is fine; they have the right to do that. The other form that it comes in is that somehow the Government have tried to bring in compulsion on the register by the back door. As the Bill clearly illustrates, that will be introduced by the front door; we have made no attempt to disguise that compulsion, in terms of registering on the national register, is the end game for the Bill. That must be the case. We have also said that partial and steady implementation building up to compulsion—to be on the register, not to carry the card—is the most appropriate route to take, especially given everything that people have said about the great size and complexity of the scheme. We have clearly stated that we should build up to that by utilising designated documents. That is all that clause 5(2) provides for.

The hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland is right that the distinction between ''must'' versus ''may'' is important in this instance—although, sometimes, and invariably when the argument about it is introduced by the Liberal Democrats, it is not important. Designating the document means that, for that document, from a subsequent date the individual concerned will get a package of that designated document and the ID card. That makes sense to me.

We have said—the Financial Times carried the story a couple of weeks ago as if it were a shock, horror revelation—that from next year, with phase one of the introduction of biometric passports, some 4 million people will have to be interviewed and have their biometrics taken by the UK Passport Service. Everybody knew that about a year earlier, but somehow that was news to the Financial Times. Given that the processes and a lot of the data involved are exactly the same for passports and for ID card registration, it makes perfect sense for that to be the first designated document, and part of the partial implementation of the scheme. However, it does not make a great deal of sense if it becomes ''may'' rather than ''must''. The amendment is entirely fair, and I can understand why the hon. Gentleman tabled it, but it causes a very slight hole in the implementation plan outlined in earlier consultation documents about the partial, and eventual universal, roll-out of the scheme.

Photo of Edward Garnier Edward Garnier Shadow Minister (Home Affairs)

Could it be that a lack of specificity is needed in clause 4 because, while the biometric   passport is useful for the Government's purposes in that it brings people into the identity card system register, not everybody wants a passport. I think that some 30 per cent. of the UK population—or perhaps it is 3 million; the figure 3 is involved—does not currently have a passport. Perhaps the Government will have to fill the gap with the unspecified designated documents.

Photo of Tony McNulty Tony McNulty Minister of State (Immigration, Citizenship and Nationality), Home Office

That is an entirely fair point. It is 20 per cent. of the population who never have had and never will have a passport—where the ''3'' comes from I do not know, but I am sure that, as the hon. and learned Gentleman suggests, it is in there somewhere. That is why there will have to be further debates about what to do with that 20 per cent. Perhaps we will designate other documents. If we designate driving licences as well, we might bump it up a bit—a Venn diagram showing those who have both and those who do not will cover about 90 per cent. of the population. We have made no secret of the fact that registration on the database will ultimately be compulsory—we want universal coverage. That means two things: it might be appropriate to designate other documents, and it might be that the designation of such documents means a faster coverage of the entire population.

Photo of Patrick Mercer Patrick Mercer Shadow Minister (Homeland Security), (Assisted By Shadow Law Officers)

We have been groping for that. Would it not be helpful to spell it out again?

Photo of Tony McNulty Tony McNulty Minister of State (Immigration, Citizenship and Nationality), Home Office

Absolutely not. The hon. Gentleman should not imitate the Financial Times. This is not revelatory. It might be—although I should be astonished if it were the case—that the hon. Gentleman has only just noticed that; it was discussed in the previous Bill Committee. There is provision throughout the Bill for what might prevail when registration is compulsory. That is not there in idle speculation because the parliamentary counsel ran out of time and decided to add a few more references in case we went down that route. The ultimate goal has never been anything other than that.

However, the hon. and learned Gentleman is right that one document—whether a passport or anything else—will not be suitable to cover everybody. That is why the drafting is broad, but with the caveat that any document required to be designated will come back to this House and will be so designated subject to affirmative resolution by both Houses. It is not for us to invent whatever we want—dog licences, TV licences or anything else that the hon. and learned Gentleman might suggest—and process it through the Home Office meat grinder. Anything that we say should be designated for the purposes of the Act will come back to this House to be designated. In that context, I would ask the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland to withdraw his amendment.

Photo of Edward Garnier Edward Garnier Shadow Minister (Home Affairs) 12:15, 12 July 2005

With your permission, Mr. Hood, might I make a brief second contribution? I am   fascinated by what the Minister said and, rather than having my concerns allayed, I am increasingly concerned by the way in which he is responding to the amendment. I know that the Minister is boxed in; he has been presented with a Bill that is not his. He arrived as the new Minister of State at the Home Office and was told, ''Right, your No. 1 duty is to get this Bill through.'' That is fair enough and I do not attach any personal blame to the Minister. However, he is the representative of the Government and it is right that we should express our alarm at how this is coming forward. I am very concerned—I hope that the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland shares my concern—that the more we probe into this issue with these innocent sounding amendments, the more we discover the total lack of preparedness at the Home Office.

The Home Office says that this Bill has been round the houses once before, that it had pre-legislative scrutiny and that it has been through a Standing Committee. Why, then, have these issues not been dealt with? Why have answers not been provided, given the number of times that this issue must have been thought about?

I do not know what official has responsibility for driving this area of policy in the Department. However, surely he or she must have been appointed by virtue of their expertise in identity card systems and of their experience of being seconded to other countries where identity cards and registers have been prepared. Surely someone heading up this process is advising the Minister that such problems are to be anticipated.

I am concerned that, although the Minister is doing his level best as the political head of this Committee, we are not getting the sorts of answers that we would expect about this Bill and that process. Both should have received further thought. I look forward to hearing whether the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland's reaction is the same as or similar to mine.

Photo of Alistair Carmichael Alistair Carmichael Shadow Spokesperson (Home Affairs), Liberal Democrat Spokesperson (Home Affairs)

Yes, I share many of the concerns expressed by the hon. and learned Gentleman. Like him, I have found precious little that is reassuring in this debate. As a former civil servant, albeit only briefly, I suspect that there may be an element of naivety in the hon. and learned Gentleman's view of how people get jobs in the civil service and what expertise they bring. However, I do not know the background of the team that has been advising the Minister, so I shall not pursue that point.

As one who instinctively dislikes this whole project, I hope and pray that driving licences become designated documents. Everything that I have learned about the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency during my working life—before I entered Parliament and subsequently—leads me to think that, given its efficiency, if it got its sticky little mitts on this scheme, it would take 48 hours before the whole thing was turned into reverse. That would be the most effective way of undermining the implementation of the ID card scheme that I could possibly hope for.

The Minister said that there were no wild or stunning revelations; he has rarely spoken a truer   word, and the lack of such revelations concerns me most. We do not know what documents other than passports will be designated, nor what the implications will be for everyday application. The hon. and learned Gentleman mentioned the next time I went to Lerwick post office to get my television licence. As I said at the start, that gets to the heart of how the Bill will impact on the daily lives of our constituents.

The hon. and learned Gentleman picked a very good example. I shall also come on to this point when we discuss the next group of amendments, if we get there. What would be the situation if we made television licences, for example, designated documents? Such documents are widely available at post offices. Will Lerwick post office have all the equipment necessary for the acquisition of biometric information?

Photo of Edward Garnier Edward Garnier Shadow Minister (Home Affairs)

I can help the hon. Gentleman on that question. A few days ago, I tabled a number of parliamentary questions to various Departments of State asking about the cost of installing scanners or readers, and what preparatory work had been done. Invariably, the answer was ''None''. They had absolutely no idea what they would have to pay, nor whether they would have to install the readers in all their various offices. The Treasury has not done that work either.

Photo of Patrick Mercer Patrick Mercer Shadow Minister (Homeland Security), (Assisted By Shadow Law Officers)

The hon. Gentleman puts his finger on a good point, if the Committee will excuse the pun. Clearly, the point that he makes is about going into a post office. Unless there will be a piece of equipment that can recognise the person who is applying for the driving licence or whatever, this particular aspect of the Bill will be nonsensical. Is it not staggering that no preparation has gone into that, and that there is no understanding of the costs involved?

Photo of Alistair Carmichael Alistair Carmichael Shadow Spokesperson (Home Affairs), Liberal Democrat Spokesperson (Home Affairs)

It is staggering, and it is all the more staggering when one considers, as others have observed, that we are second time around the course on this matter. If the House of Lords had acquiesced before the general election, the Government had got their way and the Bill were now an Act, we would not be discussing it, but how many unanswered questions would there still be?

Photo of Ben Wallace Ben Wallace Conservative, Lancaster and Wyre

I might be able to help the hon. Gentleman. There is a project under way, which the Home Office has called Project Iris. It is trialling iris readers at 10 locations throughout the country. The running costs for the 10 points are £27.8 million, so while it is of course a pilot, that is some allusion to the cost.

Photo of Alistair Carmichael Alistair Carmichael Shadow Spokesperson (Home Affairs), Liberal Democrat Spokesperson (Home Affairs)

I am aware of Project Iris, and of other projects that have been undertaken and other reports that the Home Office has conducted. It all brings us back to the point that the Government are asking us to buy a pig in a poke. That is not a canard. The Minister is clearly practising for his holidays already. A pig in a poke is the one important aspect of the Bill that impacts directly on our constituents, and that is why at this stage we are entitled to more information than the Minister has given us.  

Photo of Tony McNulty Tony McNulty Minister of State (Immigration, Citizenship and Nationality), Home Office

I take the latter point about more information at this stage, but I should say, while mixing contributions, that it is a pig in a poke with at least 60 regulatory power-making elements that will return in some form or other for due parliamentary scrutiny. The hon. Gentleman said that, had the Lords acquiesced and had we had time before the general election, the Bill would be off and away; however, that is not entirely accurate. Those order-making powers are important, and they are a key element of the process.

Photo of Alistair Carmichael Alistair Carmichael Shadow Spokesperson (Home Affairs), Liberal Democrat Spokesperson (Home Affairs)

With respect to the Minister, my point was entirely accurate, though we would now be seeing something of the size and nature of the pig that was emerging from the poke. That has worked that metaphor as far as we can reasonably expect it to go.

Given that we are discussing the Bill second time around; given that we are still not getting any of the detail; given that the provision involves the practical application of the Bill, as it will impact on the lives of our constituents; and given that we have still had no proper answers, I seek to insist on this amendment, and to test the Committee's opinion of it.

Question put, That the amendment be made:—

The Committee divided: Ayes 5, Noes 9

Division number 8 Nimrod Review — Statement — Clause 5 - Applications relating to entries in Register

Aye: 5 MPs

No: 9 MPs

Aye: A-Z by last name

No: A-Z by last name

Question accordingly negatived.

Photo of Jimmy Hood Jimmy Hood Chair, European Scrutiny Committee, Chair, European Scrutiny Committee

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 134, in clause 5, page 5, line 16, leave out

', and other biometric information about himself,'.

No. 46, in clause 9, page 8, line 32, after 'allow', insert 'all of'.

No. 165, in clause 12, page 11, line 8, leave out paragraph (b).

No. 166, in clause 12, page 11, line 8, leave out

', and other biometric information about himself,'.

No. 174, in clause 14, page 13, line 15, leave out paragraph (a).

No. 175, in clause 14, page 13, line 16, leave out paragraph (b).

Photo of Alistair Carmichael Alistair Carmichael Shadow Spokesperson (Home Affairs), Liberal Democrat Spokesperson (Home Affairs) 12:30, 12 July 2005

Amendments Nos. 133 and 134 should be read together, as should amendments Nos. 165 and 166 and Nos. 174 and 175, as the same principle is read across different parts of the Bill. For the convenience of the Committee, I shall refer   principally to amendments Nos. 133 and 134, and I ask hon. Members to accept that the same effect would be read across from the rest of the group. Amendment No. 46 stands in the names of Conservative Members, and I shall leave them to deal with it.

The purpose of the amendment is to explore in some detail the use, as intended by the Government, of the biometric data that will be gathered for the purposes of the Bill. From a practical point of view, that use is quite important because both the way in which data are used and the complexity of that use will have significant cost implications. As we all know, the cost of implementing the scheme causes significant concern to an increasing number of people.

Amendment No. 133 would delete paragraph (b) of subsection (5), while amendment No. 134 would leave the reference to fingerprints in that paragraph but remove the reference to biometric information. The two amendments are obviously not compatible, but as they are probing in nature, they can be considered together.

The expression

''other biometric information about himself'' causes me some concern. We know from the schedules that that will include iris and face recognition biometric information. The Minister has continued to defend the argument that schedule 1 should be amendable by statutory instrument only, so we also know that it would be possible to add other biometric information, presumably including such things as DNA. It would be fairly straightforward for him to add such definitions, as it would merely involve introducing a statutory instrument. I find that quite concerning.

There are substantial considerations about practical application. How many places will be made available for the recording of such information? I declare my constituency interest in that regard. How will the process be made to work for people in the remoter parts of the country, by which I mean those that are remote from London? Does the Minister intend that we should have an office in Orkney and one in Shetland? I should hope so. Otherwise a significant cost for my constituents will be attached to obtaining a designated document. There was talk at one point of a mobile unit travelling to parts of the country that are more difficult to reach. I think that that would also be unacceptable. One does not always know when one may want to obtain a designated document such as a passport, if that is what we are considering. If it so happens that one of my constituents in Shetland needs a passport at short notice when the mobile unit happens to be in the Western Isles, it will be of no use to them.

What criteria will the Government use in establishing the areas that will be served in that way? Will there be a general rule? I think I heard a suggestion about those living within 45 minutes' journey of a centre. On a good day, with a following wind, 45 minutes might take some of my constituents to Bergen. Will we have facilities in the consulate   there? This issue seems to strike at the heart of the Bill. There are cost implications, and I have a particular concern, as a constituency MP, that when the question of cutting costs arises, provision will diminish in areas such as the one that I represent, simply for the convenience of the Government, who will want to maintain costs for the scheme at a lower level.

I am raising an important practical question to which there has so far been no answer. There may be other points to be raised, but I want to keep the debate tightly focused at this stage.

Photo of Patrick Mercer Patrick Mercer Shadow Minister (Homeland Security), (Assisted By Shadow Law Officers)

Much of what the hon. Gentleman has just said makes a huge amount of sense to Conservative Members. In particular, those of us with rural constituencies where people are more widely spread out may feel the need to question the Government, especially about mobile units and the specified time and place at which people would attend, as well as about the practical provisions in clause 5, such as when and where to be photographed and have fingerprints taken or

''otherwise to provide such information as may be required by the Secretary of State.''

My principal aim, however, is to speak to amendment No. 46, which falls sensibly and conveniently under clause 9, which is entitled:

''Renewal of ID cards for those compulsorily registered''.

The amendment would ensure that clause 9(4)(b) required the relevant person to allow ''all of''

''his fingerprints, and other biometric information about himself, to be taken and recorded''.

I want to talk first about fingerprinting and secondly about biometric information.

There has been criticism on all sides, but particularly from the Government, of the London School of Economics document, ''The Identity Project''. I do not want to quote matters of principle involved, however; they may come up later. I will focus on the specific examples that the document discusses concerning fingerprints and their reliability in the context initially of the register, and later of the card. Some good points are made. For instance, the document states:

''The GAO report concluded that the fingerprints of about 2 to 5 percent of people cannot be captured 'because the fingerprints are dirty or have become dry or worn from age, extensive manual labour, or exposure to corrosive chemicals'.''

Later on, there were suggestions that refuseniks as far as the register and the card are concerned could willingly damage their fingerprints by taking up a pumice stone and setting to work. That is not an agreeable prospect, as I am sure hon. Members would agree, but it can be done. Anybody who has sanded a piece of oak or hardwood knows that at the end their hands feel agreeably smooth. They will run them over the hands of their spouse and he or she will say, ''What smooth hands you've got''. I will go no further, Mr. Hood, but that is what I am told by colleagues.

The point is that it might seem that a fingerprint is not only unique, which clearly it is, but indestructible, which it is not. It can be worn off. In the same way in which one can file a nail, one can pumice away one's fingerprints. On top of that, if people are skilled   enough, they can fit false fingerprints. I gather that that has been pioneered—if that is putting my finger on the right phrase—in Russia and Ukraine by some of the serious and organised crime agencies there.

Much more worryingly, the report that I mentioned went on to say:

''People who had recently used hand cream created serious problems for the fingerprint readers''.

A number of the people currently in this Room will have used hand cream this morning. Perhaps they have popped out for a quick comfort break to stick on a bit of hand cream—I do not know. I do not wish to be silly about this issue, but it is possible that innocent activities will create great difficulties for fingerprinting. Similarly, there could be a problem involving those with

''particularly hard or calloused skin, such as chefs, gardeners and labourers.''

It is interesting that the error rates in fingerprinting are both significant and poorly understood. The report said that, according to the fingerprint verification competition 2004—a recent review of available systems—

''only a handful of products achieved an equal error rate of under 3 per cent., and most were much worse. Furthermore, it would be hazardous and risky for governments to lock their core infrastructure into a single proprietary product while both attack and defence are evolving rapidly.''

I will move on from there and illustrate the point. Following the Madrid bombings on 11 March 2004, the Spanish national police managed to lift a fingerprint from an unexploded bomb. Three highly skilled FBI fingerprint experts declared that Oregon lawyer Brandon Mayfield's prints were a match to the crime scene sample. American officials described the match as ''absolutely incontrovertible'' and as a ''bingo match''. As a former US soldier, Mayfield's fingerprints were on the national fingerprint system. He was imprisoned for two weeks. However, the fingerprint was not his. According to one law professor:

''The Mayfield misidentification also reveals the danger that extraneous knowledge might influence experts' evaluations. If any of those FBI fingerprint examiners who confidently declared the match already knew that Mayfield was himself a convert to Islam who had once represented a convicted Taliban sympathizer in a child custody dispute, this knowledge may have subconsciously primed them to ''see'' the match.''

Photo of Nick Palmer Nick Palmer Labour, Broxtowe

Does the hon. Gentleman accept that a fingerprint check would normally be made to verify whether he or someone else is who they claim to be? Although, as we know, it is always possible that a fingerprint will match someone somewhere else in the world, the probability that it will be the particular person whom someone is attempting to impersonate is negligible.

Photo of Patrick Mercer Patrick Mercer Shadow Minister (Homeland Security), (Assisted By Shadow Law Officers)

That is exactly the point that I have talked about with the Mayfield example. People may ''see the match''. The situation that the hon. Gentleman refers to is extremely unlikely. The point of the amendment is that if indeed we are to use fingerprints, we should use all of them, rather than one. I hope that that will satisfy the hon. Gentleman, who is another Nottinghamshire Member, I might add. I am not an expert and I would have to be   convinced, but I think that that would clear up any possibility of misidentification.

I talk about fingerprints at some length simply because I want to ask the Minister whether he is content that this is a properly tested system. I repeat that both the defence and the attack on fingerprints as a means of identification are still developing. The more that we intend to use fingerprints as a means of identification, an anti-crime measure or whatever, the more criminals and ne'er-do-wells will try to improve their ability to erase or counterfeit them. So the first question for the Minister is whether he is content that we know enough about fingerprint technology, and the technology of faking or eradicating, to use it at the moment.

Secondly, if the Minister is content that we do know enough, or if he says, ''Who knows, but it is the best thing that we have at the moment in conjunction with other biometric knowledge'', then I would probably accept that. However, in that case, would it not be sensible to amend the Bill so that all fingerprints—all 10 dabs—are used, rather than the customary one on the left hand and one on the right hand? As someone who has had his fingerprints taken many times, I think that that is clearly something on which we need to concentrate, because the old system, under which one print was taken on each hand, has changed dramatically. Attack and defence is evolving, and I hope that he will make it very clear how that piece of biometric information would function.

Photo of David Drew David Drew Labour, Stroud

I want briefly to follow on from where the hon. Gentleman left off, and to take up the other part of the issue: the

''other biometric information about himself, to be taken and recorded'' mentioned in clause 5(5)(b). Why can we not specify what the other biometric information is? Quite simply, this is enabling legislation, and we either know what that other biometric information is, and so should be able to specify it, or do not know, and so should not have reference to it in the Bill.

The issue is partly about cost, but it is also about the logistics of how we use the new technology. To my mind, we are talking about fingerprints and facial and iris recognition. If we are serious about the Bill and how we are to cost the implications of ID cards, we should either spell that out in the Bill or accept that we cannot legislate on it as yet and not spell it out. I look to my hon. Friend the Minister to give me clarification on whether that information can be captured at this time, made meaningful in the legislation and made distinct.

Photo of Edward Garnier Edward Garnier Shadow Minister (Home Affairs)

I agree with the hon. Gentleman, who makes a telling point, just as I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Newark. I remind the Committee that Leicester, which is the nearest big city to my constituency of Harborough, was one of the five cities that trialled the Home Office testing that was carried out in relation to the ID scheme. I am afraid that the results of the fingerprint tests in that city were not very happy for the Government. Of the 772 people who submitted their fingerprints in Leicester, 642, or 83.16 per cent., were identified correctly, and that is   the lowest rate of any test centre in the United Kingdom. That is a failure rate of almost 17 per cent. in matching the individual to the fingerprint. The test centre also threw up problems with eye identification, with the second poorest verification rates of the five centres throughout the country.

Leicester has an ethnic minority population, predominantly of Indian, Bangladeshi and Pakistani extraction, of about 30 to 35 per cent. One of the points that was made forcefully, not least by the hon. Member for Hackney, North and Stoke Newington (Ms Abbott), was that the system would create problems for ethnic minorities, not only because of the process, but because of the recognition failures that will follow. We can understand that in respect of those who are less experienced in fingerprints. Other biometric information shows that those who have a cataract operation cannot properly use the iris scan system. Those who have an eye disease cannot necessarily use it. The biometric system will throw up plenty of built-in faults.

I return to schedule 1 and a point about which the hon. Member for Stroud reminds us from time to time. The photograph will simply be of the head and shoulders. I referred to that at our previous sitting. For facial recognition, the Government must be fairly clear that they want a picture of someone's face, not the back of his head.

Photo of John Robertson John Robertson Labour, Glasgow North West 12:45, 12 July 2005

Like the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland, I have certain worries about people and access when being called to give their fingerprints or to attend a retina test. During our proceedings on the previous Bill, we had some help from the Minister. He allayed some of my fears when he said that he was discussing with the Royal National Institute of the Blind and disability rights groups the accessibility of such facilities to people with disabilities. We must think of the aged and consider how they will deal with such requirements. Can the Minister again allay my fears about such matters?

Photo of Tobias Ellwood Tobias Ellwood Opposition Whip (Commons)

The impact of subsection (5)(b) will be huge. It is requesting a database of more than 60 million entries. That is large, and, at our previous sitting, I asked the Minister about the size of the individual file that would be held on it. I look forward to his providing that information. I hope that he will use the opportunity today to let us know exactly how much information will be placed on the database, from fingerprints and other biometric information, that will have an impact on the file size and say how large a database we shall have.

Let us consider some of the other databases for which the Government have been responsible. The latest, the NHS database, as well as the air traffic control system database have suffered because of their size and the difficulties in providing information to the people who are supposed to being using it. The more information that we place on the identification card or on the register, the more people we will require to   gather the information. Will the Minister explain the size of the staff that would be required nationally to make the system work?

There are also cost implications. I challenge the Minister to come up with an upper figure and say how much is the maximum projected cost that the Government would be willing to spend on the project? I ask because the original cost of the NHS database was £6.2 billion, and it has spiralled to £20.3 billion. The probation service database started at £85 billion, then increased to £120 billion before it was scrapped. The air traffic control system database increased from £35 billion to £630 billion. Those are huge jumps from starting costs to the final package.

When we debated such matters for the first time in the Chamber, we learned that there are several gaps in the information provided by the Government about how matters will work in practice. Without all the information, it is difficult for us to place a figure on matters. The sum of £5 billion has been suggested, but all sorts of figures have been mentioned. I would be grateful if the Minister could say whether there is a maximum figure.

We are clearly not the first country to go down the road of considering ID cards and biometric data. Will the Minister let us know what research there has been and what lessons he has learned from considering other systems? I understand, for example, that China has thrown out the use of some of the biometric information-gathering processes because of cost and accuracy. It would be useful to know whether a yardstick, precedent or system already exists that we can point to and say, ''Yes, this is what we would like and what we would like to work in the United Kingdom.''

Photo of Ben Wallace Ben Wallace Conservative, Lancaster and Wyre

I rise not to question the idea that biometrics should be part of the ID card system, because I am aware of the Government's commitment to the European passport and the agreement to include biometrics. I was reassured by the Minister's comments—in the previous sitting, I think—that DNA could not be included unless that was specifically part of the Bill. He said that there would have to be separate legislation. He will probably repeat that point later.

Perhaps I should declare an interest. Until recently, I was part of the Government's Qinetiq and was involved in the e-borders initiative and in some of the evidence on biometrics given to the Select Committee before the election. Knowing the Minister's dislike of the LSE report, perhaps it is best if I take my references from the report of the Home Affairs Committee.

The real question reflects the views of the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland about rural issues and about people travelling from far away. Before I came to the House, I represented part of north-east Scotland in the Scottish Parliament. There were very large rural areas to cover. When people go to register or to become involved in the system, there may be an awful lot of mileage to cover.

I question the maturity of the biometrics being proposed and, therefore, the viability of the Bill, for   now. I understand, in part, why the Government do not want to tie down specific biometrics in a prescriptive form, because the reading of biometrics is not particularly mature. It is changing all the time. We may find in a year's time that another type of biometric can come to the fore. The Government do not want to be hemmed in, but that in itself raises the question why there is so much urgency to have the Bill now.

Iris recognition is currently a very expensive method of determining identification. Although I know that Project Iris has a lot more to it than just 10 units around the country, it is still a £28 million project and even if a fraction of that was the cost of a reader, that could be £28,000. That is a lot of money per reader. That is not because the Minister has gone out and bought the most expensive readers; it is because the technology is not mature.

In the past, I often took initial technologies and tried to make them mature for the marketplace. It is an expensive and volatile process. My hon. Friend the Member for Newark pointed out the problems with fingerprints and my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough pointed out the problems with iris recognition. I question whether we are doing this too early. I know that the Minister will say that this is enabling legislation and that we can keep it in our back pocket and then start using it. However, the nature of these things is that it will not happen that way. We will start by going down the path of one of biometric; we are already committed to a number of them for passports.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth, East (Mr. Ellwood) has pointed out, the cost implications every time we change a system in any Government project—every time we decide, for example, that we are not going to have a signature, but are going to have a fingerprint—are such that costs are massively magnified. The changing of the spec is a problem. I have only to quote from the report, which stated that the delay in the pilot run by the UK Passport Service was because it was subject to

''a series of hardware, software and ergonomic problems''.

Imagine the ergonomic problems if one had to go to a post office in Lerwick or somewhere else to take part in that process.

I am not saying the biometrics should be cut, because we shall need them if we are to have ID cards. However, I am not sure that we are at the right stage to have them, because they have not been tried and tested and the cost has not been properly assessed. I hope that the Minister can reassure us about the DNA, as he has done before.

Photo of Andy Burnham Andy Burnham Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Home Office)

Amendments Nos. 133 and 165 seek to remove the power to require individuals to provide biometric information. The hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland raised some valid points about access for his constituents, which I shall deal with in a moment. I shall start with the principle, and why we believe it right to link the scheme to the capture of biometric information. Amendments Nos. 134 and 166 would limit the power so that only fingerprint biometrics are required. Amendments Nos. 174 and   175 would prevent biometric information from being verified using the register, even when it is done with the consent of the individual—for example, when opening a bank account.

The amendments go to the heart of our scheme. As the Committee knows, the scheme is based on the premise of using a biometric identifier. The reason for going down that path—this links to points raised by the hon. Member for Lancaster and Wyre—is that it will prevent the use of multiple identities. One of the core values of the biometric system is that it will prevent the same person from registering and acquiring multiple documents in different names. The use of a biometric will prevent that; it means that one person will be able to register for one passport or other document.

Photo of Tobias Ellwood Tobias Ellwood Opposition Whip (Commons)

The Minister makes a valid point. If things were as simple as that, it would make sense. Unfortunately, the biometrics are not up to such a technical strength as to guarantee that the details on the card are those of the person whose biometrics have been captured. We sense that when the card is used, the information may have changed or that there might be a discrepancy between the person being checked and the information originally captured some months or even years ago. If the system was foolproof, it would be a different ballgame, but it is not and we cannot rely on it.

Photo of Andy Burnham Andy Burnham Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Home Office)

The hon. Gentleman has to understand that we propose a highly secure enrolment process to ensure that people applying for documents such as passports or identity cards are who they say they are and that they are the holder of a unique biometric. People talk about the complications that will be caused by the Bill, but the material difference, bearing in mind that large databases already exist, is that the Bill links the personal data held on the system and the biometric. We believe that the creation of that linkage between the data—facts and figures such as an address and a date of birth—and the personal biometric will provide the high standard of identity verification that will bring many benefits.

The hon. Member for Lancaster and Wyre said that the technology is in its infancy, but I refute that. The FBI automatic fingerprint identification system has some 47 million fingerprint records. Hon. Members will know that, as a matter of course, the US immigration authorities take biometric fingerprint scans of people entering the country. That is a huge database. The US Department of Defence has a biometric database of about 22 million records. Those systems are already in use, and we think it right and prudent to take advantage of them.

The hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland questioned the phrase ''other biometric information'', as did my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud. A clear explanation of the terminology used in the Bill can be found in clause 43. Biometric information is defined as

''data about . . . external characteristics, including, in particular, the features of an iris or any other part of the eye''.

Our intention is to have flexibility, so that a range of external biometrics can be used.  

It being One o'clock, The Chairman adjourned the Committee without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.  

Adjourned till this day at Four o'clock.