Identity Cards Bill – in a Public Bill Committee at 2:30 pm on 7 July 2005.
Order. The hon. and learned Gentleman is entitled to call a Division if he so wishes. But the moment has rather passed.
Precisely. You spotted that too, Mr. Gale. That is why I expressed my opposition to clause 2 remaining part of the Bill, at the outset of my remarks on amendment No. 19. I do not think that members of the Committee are now in doubt about what I think of clause 2. However, the arithmetic of the Committee would have defeated me even if I had raised my voice earlier.
The amendments would delete subsection (1)(b) and (c), which cover
“information of a technical nature for use in connection with the administration of the Register” and
“information of a technical nature for use in connection with the administration of arrangements made for purposes connected with the issue or cancellation of ID cards”.
The provisions describe two of the four categories of information—indeed, the only information—that may be recorded in the register. What does that mean, and why?
I should like to know, too.
The amendments are not the widest drawn proposals but, judging by their introduction by the hon. and learned Member for Harborough, they must be probing amendments to find out the type of information. In fact, they could be wrecking amendments if they were accepted, because the information to which they refer is crucial to the proper running of the system.
If they had been wrecking amendments, they would not have been tabled, and if they had been tabled as such they would not have been selected.
The hon. and learned Gentleman is extremely perceptive.
I am not an IT expert, but if I can I will explain to the hon. and learned Gentleman some of the information to which these subsections refer. As he says, paragraph (c) refers to
“information of a technical nature for use in connection with the administration of arrangements made for purposes connected with the issue or cancellation of ID cards” and paragraph (b) says:
“information of a technical nature for use in connection with the administration of the Register”.
The ability to manage the security and performance of the register’s IT systems is reliant on being able to assess effectively the operation of the system, and the pieces of information referred to in paragraphs (b) and (c) are key to allowing that to happen. Although I am not an IT expert, I hope that the hon. and learned Gentleman will allow me to give some examples of such information.
We are talking about error, database or event logs, which are essential for problem diagnosis or safe recovery of information in case of a systems failure; necessary technical data, including network event information and encryption codes, which will be used to detect and prevent security attacks and protect the integrity of the data; and certificate revocation logs to ensure that lost or stolen cards cannot be used in attempts to access the register.
I hope that the hon. and learned Gentleman will accept that such information relating to a card being cancelled or disabled is crucial if we are to ensure that the system has integrity and that people are not seeking to use a card that has been disabled. That is the type of information to which paragraph (c) relates. The authorities running the database would attach a code to an entry to indicate its expiry and the fact that the card can no longer be used.
The clause is also about keeping useful records of cards and card reader and biometric reader information, such as current operational status, manufacturing information and fault history. Such pieces of information are well-established elements within standard IT infrastructure packages and are essential for the security and operation of a database of this type.
I hope that the examples I have given the hon. and learned Gentleman are sufficient. I have more detailed technical descriptions if he wants me to provide them. I hope that he will understand that this provision is innocent and purely for the good running and integrity of the database, and to ensure that people who are accessing it are doing so against a live entry that has been entered properly.
I do not think that I could say that the Minister has whetted my appetite, nor can I say that I am either better informed or any the wiser, although that may be as much my fault as his. None the less, we have heard with interest and some amazement what he has told us. I think that I shall leave it there.
There is a Thursday afternoon feel about this Committee. I take that as a request to withdraw the amendment.
Indeed. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments:
No. 128, in clause 3, page 3, line 31, leave out subsection (2).
No. 21, in clause 3, page 3, line 38, leave out ‘both practicable and appropriate’ and insert ‘reasonable’.
No. 129, in clause 3, page 3, line 41, leave out subsection (3).
The amendments can also be put in fairly short compass: they are probing in nature, rather than ones that I wish to pursue, at least at this stage. However, the Minister may say something to change my mind on that—it has been known to happen.
Many of the arguments that would be advanced in relation to these amendments are the same as those advanced yesterday in relation to the amendments that sought to limit the amount and nature of information that will be held under clause 1(5) as registrable facts. The purpose of the amendments is to remove from the register information that is held at the request of the subject of the entry. The nature and the extent of the information held on the database must be strictly limited. Although the explanatory notes give an interesting example of emergency contact information, I am not persuaded that that alone would be sufficient justification for extending the scope of the clause. However, being mindful of events in the city earlier today, I am aware that there might be some merit in that.
There is scope for abuse. It is conceivable that people could agree to information being held on them if not exactly under duress, then under misrepresentation. How many times in the course of the working week do we sign forms without reading them properly? Someone of limited intelligence, or without good literacy skills, or whose first language is not English, might have a form put in front of them that says, “Just sign here so we can keep a record of this information. It is for your own good.” It is even more likely that people will not understand the full legal significance of information held in relation to them. Let me remind the Committee of the example I offered yesterday in respect of reference numbers: people might not know how a reference number might be understood by somebody accessing the database. On balance, there is no real need for this sort of information to be held on the database, and I am interested to hear what the Minister has to say on this point.
I want to address amendment No. 21 and, possibly, amendment No. 129. Amendment No. 21 would alter clause 3(2), which deals with information recorded in the register, by changing the wording of paragraph (c). The clause is divisible into separate parts. Subsection (1) deals with information that “may” be recorded in the register, and subsection (2) deals with information about an individual that “must” be recorded in the register. Herein lies an area of concern. Information about an individual that must be recorded in the register, whether or not it is authorised by schedule 1—which we will deal with in due course—occurs when an individual applies to the Secretary of State requesting the recording of the information as part of his entry. I would be interested to discover from the Under-Secretary or the Minister what sort of information they envisage being the subject of such an application to the Secretary of State.
However, subsection (2)(b) states that
“the information is of a description identified in regulations made by the Secretary of State as a description of information that may be made the subject of such a request”.
Here, we return to the old problem. To refer to it again will seem repetitive, but that has to be done every time we return to it. We have not seen the regulations, and we have no idea what the Government envisage in respect of the information that they intend to describe in their regulations. We are simply legislating in the dark. It is not good enough, in my submission, to legislate in the dark, particularly about an area of public policy as sensitive as this. Even if a person makes an application because they want something about them to be recorded in the register, and even if it fits with the regulations that we have yet to see, they can only do that if the Secretary of State—tug our forelocks—considers that it is practicable and appropriate for it to be recorded in accordance with the applicant’s request.
How does the applicant make the application? Does he pop down to some Jobcentre Plus office? Does he go down to some local authority, or a Department for Work and Pensions office, or does he have to make a formal written application on a form, pay an application fee and send it off to the Home Office or one of the Government offices—in many cases, the Government office for the east midlands, based in Nottingham? How are such applications to be made, and how is the Home Secretary to reach a proper consideration of the practicability and the appropriateness of the information that the applicant wishes to have recorded about him? For my part, I find it difficult to think of information about me that I would want the Secretary of State to have, unless it were for some reason that would advantage me, as opposed to being convenient for the state. My hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth, East is going to tell us something.
I can think of one example that might be useful: next of kin details.
There we are. Perhaps. What that indicates is not only that the information on the register about me will contain compulsory information that I have to put there, but that it might become a general store cupboard for my entire life, which, for my personal convenience or for the facilitation of the statutory purposes, the Government decide that I should store there as well.
My hon. Friend the Member for Lancaster and Wyre, yesterday or the day before, told us that huge numbers of bytes of memory would be required on the Government IT system in order to store and accumulate, and to allow the exchange of, that information. We all have our concerns about the Government’s ability to procure and manage IT projects, but I want to know what citizens will have to do in order to satisfy the Secretary of State that the information that must be recorded has got that far and crossed the hurdles of being practicable and appropriate. What does this all mean and what do the Government intend by it, and how will the citizen benefit by the exercise?
Liberal Democrat amendment No. 129 seeks to delete subsection (3), which states that where
“the Secretary of State and an individual have agreed on what is to be recorded about a matter in that individual’s entry in the Register”, and
“the Secretary of State has given, and not withdrawn, a direction that what is to be recorded in that individual’s case about that matter is to be determined by the agreement”, that should stand as a “conclusive presumption” that the information to which the direction relates is accurate and complete information about that matter. I want to focus our attention on the expression “conclusive presumption”.
The hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland and I, and possibly others in the Room, may be familiar with presumptions of one sort or another: some are rebuttable, some are irrebuttable. Some are rebuttable in the course of criminal proceedings but not in civil proceedings, and so on. A conclusive presumption is a fairly concrete dam—a large hurdle—which the citizen, or somebody else who is relying on or who wishes to question the information, will have to overcome. I am concerned about that, but perhaps my concerns will be assisted by the hon. Gentleman.
Indeed, it is curious that the expression “conclusive presumption” has been used here. Certainly it is possible that both an individual and the Secretary of State could be mistaken about something, yet they would not be able to get over a conclusive presumption. Surely there would be no difficulty in having a rebuttable presumption.
To push that a little further, there are other occasions, for example under the Civil Evidence Act 1995, in which the recording of a conviction against an individual can stand in civil proceedings as a presumption that he was rightly convicted, and had performed the criminal act. That can sometimes be overturned—the method need not detain us now. However, this seems to be a novel introduction of a category of presumption into the Bill.
The hon. and learned Gentleman can perhaps confirm my understanding of conclusive presumption—I think that the distinction between a presumptio juris and a presumptio juris et de jure is that the latter category includes such things as the presumption that there will be 24 hours in the day, whereas anything else would be a rebuttable presumption.
Clearly, they talk of nothing else in the bars of Lerwick. The hon. Gentleman is right. One’s date of birth and the fact that one is the child of the person who is recorded as one’s parent on one’s birth certificate are considered to be presumptions that the court, for obvious reasons of efficiency and the dispatch of core business, will assume to be true. However, if other information comes in that might cause that to be questioned, the court will deal with it.
I am concerned—and no doubt the hon. Gentleman is, as it is his amendment and he has given some thought to it—about the use in this sensitive piece of legislation of the expression “conclusive presumption”. If this were a straightforward criminal justice Bill, affecting the relationships between private individuals, my concerns would not be as marked as they are about this Bill. However, we are considering a potential Act of Parliament that contains a strange expression underpinning an insidious alteration in the relationship between the citizen and the state. No doubt the “nothing to fear, nothing to hide” brigade will say that I am fiddling around and making silly points about something that we need not worry about.
I am genuinely concerned that where the balance between the state and the citizen is to be changed, we should be told everything, and the Government should be as clear, open, candid and frank as they can be. Where powers are given to the Secretary of State, as they are in this clause, to do things adverse or beneficial to the interests of the citizen, we should be told more about them. So it is with amendment No. 129, and I look forward to hearing what the Minister, whichever Minister it is, has to say.
The hon. and learned Gentleman says that he hopes that the Government will tell him everything. That is exactly what my hon. Friend the Minister and I have been doing. There has been no attempt at any point to withhold any information about this legislation.
Let me begin with the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland. As he knows, clause 3(2)(c) provides that where a person makes a request to add voluntary information to his entry in the register, the Secretary of State must record that information, among other things, where it is “both practicable and appropriate” to do so. That is the purpose of the clause. His amendment would remove the ability of the individual to ask for that information to be added. I think that he indicated that that was a probing amendment, in which case let me take him through a few things that we think might be appropriate, and perhaps he will be reassured.
During the consultations that the Government carried out following the publication of the initial Green Paper in 2002, the ability to record voluntary information was mentioned frequently as a feature that people would like the legislation to cover. I refer the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland back to the statutory purposes. He will know that they relate to the individual’s convenience. Clause 1(3)(a) states that an aim is to provide
“a convenient method for such individuals to prove registrable facts about themselves to others”.
We must bear in mind that spirit. The provision that we are discussing links back to the Bill’s original purposes.
Many people who were questioned during the consultation saw the advantage in being able to record information such as organ donor status. I have had discussions with the British Medical Association about the Bill. I believe that the BMA would welcome such a provision, which could also include information about blood groups and whether an individual has a particular allergy. All those things could be helpful to the individual in any given circumstances.
The hon. Member for Bournemouth, East raised an interesting point about next of kin. I remember that when I set off on my first Inter-rail trip with my first passport at the age of 18, my mum insisted on having the details that used to be on the back page written in—I think it was an old blue passport but the details can be put in the current one. People could write down the next of kin and address details. Emergency contact details in a more modern context involve exactly that kind of information. I hope to reassure the hon. Gentleman. There is nothing sinister behind the provision. We believe that it carries forward the spirit that I mentioned. People want to have things about themselves that would be useful to them in an emergency situation included. We should give them that provision.
This is an interesting debate about what could be placed in the legislation. I think the Under-Secretary said that he was in discussions with blood donor organisations. Am I correct in that? If that is the case, and if there is a requirement to have discussions, would that mean that such organisations would be placing the information on the register? Will the Minister clarify the situation on the information? If we are talking simply about my placing such information on there, it goes no further than the debate we have had so far. If the Minister is suggesting that another organisation, separate from the governmental organisations, will be able to place information on there, that opens up a whole new ball game.
I am happy to clarify that point. The hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland raised it as well. He mentioned “sign here” and asked whether people would be under any pressure to record information when they might not want to do so. They might not understand what they were adding to their entry. I assure Members that we are talking purely about a request made by the individual and not one that empowers an organisation, albeit one with a noble and useful purpose such as an organ donation organisation. Such an organisation is not empowered to request the information gathered. It is the individual’s prerogative whether or not information should be added.
I have had discussions with the BMA. It is important to say that it sees a lot of practical advantage from the Bill. Members might know that it is keen to expand the number of people who are registered as organ donors. I would not want to overstate its support, but obviously there is potential for people to make the request more easily known to the authorities. I stress again that this is about an individual voluntarily deciding to add information to the register.
The hon. and learned Member for Harborough asked about how such applications would be made. I believe that the intention is to allow a space on the application form in which individuals could give information that they would like to be included. Once the regulations had been passed, the intention would be to set out the types of information that they would like to include under the heading. The process would be voluntary and entirely at the convenience of the individual. It would be at their disposal to decide whether it was in their interests to include that further information; no coercion at all would be involved.
Does the Under-Secretary not think that his life would have been rather easier if these regulations, forms and so on had been prepared in advance of this discussion? He would then have been able to say, “There is absolutely nothing to worry about; here is what we propose.” At the minute, however, he is guessing and cannot reassure me about the application procedure. He says, “I believe” or, “It is hoped that”. A little more certainty at this stage would have been useful for the presentation of the Government’s case and the relief of Opposition fears.
With respect to the hon. and learned Gentleman, I should say that I am not guessing. I have just outlined the process by which people would add such information to the register. As I said, there would be a space on the application form—that is pretty clear.
The hon. and learned Gentleman complains that I cannot hand him the national identity register application form with all its boxes and details, and I cannot do that. However, we have not yet passed the Bill into law; it is proper that we should be discussing such issues now so that if concerns are raised, they can be taken on board before final decisions are made.
I am trying to explain to the hon. and learned Gentleman the clear process by which that information would be added. That other section would list, for instance, the kind of information that people may want to add. That seems an entirely sensible process, and a lot of people would take advantage of it.
If somebody wanted to make a subsequent change or addition to what was already in that block, would they be charged? What would the process be? How much would it cost to do that?
As the Bill makes clear in other places, it is for the individual to be satisfied with the information held about them on the register. They will be in full control of what is applied in the register, particularly in the voluntary section, when they enter their details on it. If people want to make a correction, a process will be outlined through which they can simply and easily do that.
Before now, we have said that internet access to the record would be free. A process will be outlined whereby people can amend their record simply. It will be there for the convenience of the individual and not to complicate the process or put obstacles in the way of people wishing to do so.
Did the Minister say that the only way of doing that would be via the internet?
No; that would not be the only way. However, the scheme is to be designed for ease of access to the individual’s record—obviously with the necessary security measures in place—so that people can access and view their records on the database with ease and, if necessary, request that changes be made. That should be as simple as possible and at as little cost as possible, if any cost at all. It is in everybody’s interest that the record should be accurate and reflect the individual’s wishes, particularly about the extra information that could be added.
I move on to other points raised by the hon. and learned Gentleman. He questioned why this part of the Bill was secondary legislation. The information placed in the register would be entirely voluntary. In that spirit, I hope he understands that it is proper for the provision to be left flexible, so that we can consider the range of information that people might wish to register.
I want to clarify internet access to the record. Will the individuals’ process of accessing their record from the internet be free?
I can confirm that there will be no charge to amend a record that is held on the register, unless—there is an “unless”—a new card needs to be issued. If that is necessary, a charge will probably be attached to it. However, if the matter is one of simply correcting or expanding a record on the register, there will be no charge and it will be there for the convenience of the individual.
I am sorry to press the Minister, but I noted yesterday that there was a charge of £10 for the data to be checked. I understand now that it is possible to do that via the internet for free.
That is a different point. The charge of £10 relates to a data access request under the Data Protection Act 1998. It is a usual charge that most public authorities make because a certain administrative process is involved. The point made yesterday by my hon. Friend the Minister was that the Government are clear that the system is being conceived to allow people free access to their record via the internet. There will be no charge to view the record on the internet. I hope that my explanation has clarified the point for the hon. Gentleman.
The hon. and learned Member for Harborough did not talk a great deal about amendment No. 21, but I shall expand on some of the reasons why we believe that the practicable and appropriate test is right, but not the test of reasonableness. He referred to an intervention by the hon. Member for Lancaster and Wyre about the potential size of the files that could be held. In that sense, practicable is important because the information to be held will be of a reasonable size that can be stored easily on the system. The test of “practicable and appropriate” is equivalent to what is reasonable to be recorded, but it gives greater clarity in respect of the information that can be stored. Obviously, the test of appropriateness is important, too. It will make it absolutely clear that some information is inappropriate to be held, such as matters relating to people’s political opinions, ethnicity and so on. It is probably inappropriate to hold some information, which is why the test is set out in the Bill.
People who are unhappy with the Secretary of State’s decision not to record information about them will be free to complain to the national identity scheme commissioner. Although he would not have the power to direct the Secretary of State to reverse the decision, he would be able to examine and report on the way in which the Secretary of State had used his power under the clause. I hope that my comments have cleared up matters.
We have been told that the Information Commissioner will be allowed to tell the Secretary of State to change his decision. What is the implication of his power in such matters? What is the point of him in that regard?
The point of the Information Commissioner is to receive the request from the individual who was unhappy with the Secretary of State’s decision. To be clear, the hon. and learned Gentleman’s complaint all along has been about the state wanting too much information on the register. I am referring to the position when people are unhappy that the Secretary of State has refused to add to the register extra information about them, so we are probably discussing a small number of cases. We would be considering information that goes beyond those simple and well understood matters that I mentioned to the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland, such as next of kin and blood group.
The Secretary of State has all the cards in his hands. It is for him to make the decision about whether whatever the citizen wants to put on the register is “both practicable and appropriate” to store, but if he is dissatisfied with the decision that it should not go on the register, the citizen can complain to the Information Commissioner. The Information Commissioner, however, cannot change the Secretary of State’s decision; he is not an appeal court. All he can say is, “Sorry, bad luck.” The Secretary of State can carry on refusing. There will be a dissatisfied citizen at the outset, and a dissatisfied citizen at the close of proceedings, so what will be the point? Is this a release valve of some sort?
I would like to be clear with the hon. and learned Gentleman. The national identity scheme commissioner will not run the scheme; he will not be the person who is accountable or responsible to the Secretary of State, and ultimately to Parliament, for how it is run. He will monitor, advise and provide scrutiny, not run the scheme. It is not appropriate to give power to a person who is at arm’s length and not involved in ensuring the proper maintenance and running of the register. That is he will be able to receive a complaint from a member of the public.
The commissioner will have the power to examine such a complaint, report on it and comment to the Secretary of State. He will not have the power to overturn decisions of the Secretary of State, which is an appropriate way for his powers to be used. If the commissioner had the power to overturn the decisions of the Secretary of State, he would effectively be running the scheme.
The Under-Secretary is perfectly accurately describing the powers of the commissioner and of the Secretary of State. However, the two do not seem to bite on each other. I can understand that the Secretary of State does not want the commissioner telling him how to run the system—he is not there to do that—but the commissioner must have a purpose in that regard. If an individual is dissatisfied and has a right to complain to the commissioner, but the commissioner can do nothing other than examine and report, how is the citizen to feel that he has had his day in court and that his complaint has been addressed? Will the Minister address that point, rather than telling me about the respective powers of the commissioner and the Secretary of State?
I am trying to do that. Before I give further clarification, may I remind the hon. and learned Gentleman that the information is to be given voluntarily? We are talking about a voluntary request and dissatisfaction with the Secretary of State’s refusal to agree to that voluntary information. We have moved away from the crux of the scheme and are dealing with additional information.
We can speculate about what information people might complain about. I have said before that, in the normal run of things, people will be able to register pieces of information that are acceptable and useful to them in their everyday lives. The commissioner will perform a role that is common with that of other ombudsman-like figures. He will be able to receive, report on and comment on complaints, but will not be able ultimately to direct or overturn the decisions of those running the scheme.
The commissioner will have the power to report on the performance of the Secretary of State, or those delegated to exercise his powers for him, and to lay those general reports before Parliament. I can reassure that hon. and learned Gentleman that there will be full public scrutiny of the use of the powers, including scrutiny by this place. Ultimately, a person who still strongly disagrees with the Secretary of State’s decision might pursue legal routes. I am sure that the hon. and learned Gentleman is all in favour of people fully using their rights to access the courts and spend a great deal of money doing so.
I cannot let the Under-Secretary get away with that; he could make better points. We want to ensure that this system works. Let us leave aside the fact that I oppose the Bill. If it is to be enacted, we must ensure that it works and it is sensible. It is not a satisfactory answer for the Under-Secretary to say, “It doesn’t matter, because people can sue to recover their rights or to ensure that their rights are protected.”
Although I object in principle to the legislation, we want to build a Bill that does the best for the individual. We are trying to make legislation for the citizen, not for the Government. Can the Under-Secretary not understand that there is a difference between worrying about how the system works and addressing that complaint? The simple declaration, “If you don’t like it, sue,” is not a satisfactory answer. It is an answer of last resort.
I did not just say, “If you don’t like it, sue.” I laid out a whole process that people can go through, including invoking the scrutiny of the scheme’s commissioner. All the hon. and learned Gentleman’s remarks on this matter are based on the assumption that the Secretary of State is entirely unreasonable and will be as obstructive as possible. We are talking about information being given voluntarily, and I have already made it clear that, where it is practicable and appropriate to do so, the Secretary of State will include that information. That is the basis on which the clause has been drafted.
Will my hon. Friend make clear the difference between his proposal and that of the Opposition? I pointed it out earlier that some of my constituents want him to go further; they want even more information to be on the register—their full medical records, for example. We on the Labour Benches have resisted that for good reasons, but one of my constituents might want to insist on it, even though it would have implications for others and put uncertainty into the system. Is that the situation he is referring to?
My hon. Friend makes a helpful point. That situation could arise if this provision were removed. It would be impractical to add large amounts of information that an individual might want to have added. That is why the scheme is configured in this way.
My hon. Friend is right that the Opposition seem to want the commissioner to be all-powerful and ultimately to decide whether information is added to a scheme. I point out to the hon. and learned Member for Harborough that no public service or scheme operates in such a way that those who provide scrutiny and monitor those services ultimately run them. That is not their role. In the process that we have laid out, so long as the request is reasonable and practicable, the Secretary of State will accede to it.
We are discussing medical records being placed on the register, which is an interesting idea as they would take up quite a lot of space on an electronic file. Bearing in mind the problems we have had in respect of size and implementation with other databases such as that for NHS passports, do the Government have any idea what size of electronic file will be allocated per person in this example?
I refer the hon. Gentleman to my earlier comments. I am not an IT expert—I have trouble running my own laptop—so I cannot tell him how many bytes or megabytes might be involved. However, I will endeavour to write to him to inform him exactly what size file we intend to hold on him and others.
In the hope that doing so will allow me to draw this discussion to a conclusion, I say again that this is a voluntary process. The test is “practicable and appropriate”. People might want to add swathes of data, but it might not be appropriate for such information to be held on the system. That is why the test is defined in this way. I will even concede to the hon. and learned Member for Harborough that even if a Conservative Home Secretary were administering this scheme, even I would not accept that he would be so unreasonable as to turn down a request for the addition of simple information to the scheme. One hopes that any reasonable Home Secretary would listen to the national identity scheme commissioner and accede to the points they made, if they were reasonable and correct.
Amendment No. 129, tabled by the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland, would remove clause 3(3), which will enable the Secretary of State to agree with a person being registered what facts should be registered, where there is some doubt as to what the true facts are—for example, the place or date of birth. That refers us back to the comments made by the hon. and learned Member for Harborough on the use of the term “conclusive presumption”. It is important that we outline what this part of the Bill refers to, why it is important for the provision to be framed as it is and why the words “conclusive presumption” are included.
It is also important for the Bill to have the flexibility to cater for those people who may not be able to provide the details requested, but where there is no question of that person trying to conceal their true identity. That pertains to people for whom a new identity needs to be established—for example, for those in a witness protection programme. That would be a proper agreement. Obviously, the Secretary of State would know why that person was seeking to create a new identity, it would be clear that the person was justified in creating it and there would be no doubt that that person was not doing so for improper reasons. In fact, that example is connected with the statutory purposes of the Bill, because it relates to aiding the detection or prevention of crime.
That is an interesting and helpful illustration, but if a rebuttable rather than a conclusive presumption were involved, the position in relation to it would be in no way diminished.
I accept that point, but the Bill is meant to give absolute clarity on the fact that people in that position could not be deprived of their rights as a citizen, or deprived of their ability to have an accurate, accepted entry on the register. That would be done with the complete agreement of the Secretary of State, presumably with oversight from the scheme’s commissioner.
I can give the hon. Gentleman some other examples, if it will help. The provision might, for instance, relate to somebody from Traveller community who, for proper reasons, does not know with certainty their place or date of birth. I have encountered examples in my constituency surgery of people who came to this country in the 1960s or 1970s from Jamaica, or parts of the West Indies, without documentation. I have seen only recently the example of a young Kosovan gentleman who was swept up by the British Army when he was only 13 or 14 and taken out of the country.
There may be people who for genuine, valid reasons do not have absolute certainty on some particulars relating to their identity, but that should not preclude them from being fully entered as a citizen with all the same rights.
These are good examples. The Minister might recall from yesterday that I mentioned people who are not always aware of their true date of birth. Does he not accept, however, that that is where the operation of a conclusive presumption, as opposed to a rebuttable one, can be dangerous? If it subsequently came to light that the information agreed between the individual and the Secretary of State was wrong, the operation of a conclusive presumption would close down or might cause difficulties in relation to the use of information that both parties had agreed on.
I am listening to the points that the hon. Gentleman is making. He is more well versed in matters of law than I am. My understanding is that the phrase in question creates an unalterable fact, and I can see why he is slightly uncomfortable with using it as the test. However, great care would obviously need to be taken in registering, particularly for someone in a witness protection programme. On the other hand, a police officer who had undertaken dangerous undercover work for a number of years could be in the same position. For people in such a position, the important thing is that they should have absolute certainty that, once the new identity is agreed and created, people cannot challenge, unravel or undermine it.
This might not be the time to raise this subject—I am thinking of stories involving an attempt to take child out of the country illegally—but there could be cases in which people with dual nationality hold a British passport, and therefore an ID card, and a foreign passport. There are people from Ireland and various parts of Europe in the UK, but where would the information that those people held two passports be?
I should like to give my hon. Friend a conclusive answer, because my wife holds two passports and I am sure that she would expect nothing less from a Minister. I would guess that the information could be held in the “other” section. People would register as a national of a particular country, but the fact that they held dual nationality could be recorded. I could come back to my hon. Friend with more clarity on that point, but that is how I guess it would be dealt with.
On the point that the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland made, the key to the conclusive presumption test is the phrase
“for the purposes of this Act” in subsection (3). The test is concrete and unchallengeable, as he said, but the foundation of the Bill is the fact that, when an identity is entered into the register, we are as sure as we can be that that identity is correct and cannot be challenged further. That is why great care will be taken at the earliest stages of the process to ensure that the facts about any individual are unchallengeable. That, I believe, is why the phrase “conclusive presumption” is used, rather than “rebuttable presumption”, because a person who had been through those uncertainties would not want any further challenge to their new identity.
I have two passports, and I have often chosen whichever queue was shorter when going through border checks. I have been asked different questions depending on which channel I went through. My concern is that, once the register was up and running, and depending on which passport I used, I could end up either with duplicate identities or with two identities that did not necessarily correlate.
The hon. Gentleman sounds exactly like my wife, who has her cake and eats it, depending on which she country she is travelling to. She holds an American passport and a Dutch passport, and takes the American passport when it suits her. That is entirely proper and perfectly legal under the law of the countries where those passports are held. Under clause 1(7)(a), nationality is a registrable fact. As I explained to my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow, North-West, rather than being in the “other” information, it would probably be recorded that the applicant held dual nationality. Those data could be recorded, but it would not in any way alter the convenience that the hon. Gentleman and my wife have at immigration points around the world.
I hope that I have given a lot of reassurance to the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland about the voluntary information, and about why we believe that subsection (3) is crucial to people in a vulnerable position, who should not be deprived of their rights under the scheme. I hope that he agrees that there is no sinister intent; the provision is purely a measure to help the good running of the scheme. I also hope that the hon. and learned Member for Harborough will accept that, although the “practical and appropriate” test is similar to his test of reasonableness, it is a clearer one to opt for.
I hope that the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland will seek leave to withdraw the amendment.
Every day in Committee one learns something new. It is perhaps a sign of my advancing age, but I remember the days when Conservatives were proud to be British, but according to the hon. Member for Bournemouth, East, it is now a matter of convenience. Things seem to have reached a pretty pass. I apologise to the hon. Gentleman for that slightly unfair comment, but I could not resist it; I think that I have suffered enough.
This is not being translated, so I cannot understand you.
In view of the hon. Gentleman’s sedentary remark, I hereby withdraw my previous apology. I shall bear that remark in mind for the future when he next presents me with such an opportunity.
Amendments Nos. 127 and 128 deal with subjects that have frankly been done to death, and I do not think that we need to go over them any further. However, there is more to be said on amendment No. 129, and I am spurred to speak further about it by the helpful examples that the Minister gave us.
We are dealing with a number of different likely scenarios. The Minister gave the example of someone who is on witness protection and who wishes to have a new identity, whose terms must be agreed by that person and the Secretary of State. It is perfectly reasonable that such a person should want security in their identity. I do not take any exception to that, but I am not convinced that the offer of a presumption, as opposed to a conclusive presumption, would necessarily diminish the protection that such people would have.
I hope that the Minister might take the matter away and discuss it further with his officials. There are other people whom the provision would cover who come closer to the situation that he outlined, such as Travellers, whose date and place of birth might not be easily known or ascertainable. They would be covered, and caught in an unhelpful manner. He says that the important rider is the words
“for the purposes of this Act”, but we must remind ourselves that one of the purposes of the Act, as set out in clause 1(4)(e), is
“securing the efficient and effective provision of public services.”
Presumably—the Minister can correct me if I am wrong—when the register is up and running and cards are issued under it, one will have to produce one’s identity card to obtain one’s state pension. I presume that that is the sort of service that would be included in the provision.
The expression “for the purposes of this Act” is relevant. If a subject’s date of birth is not clear, it might be agreed by that person and the Secretary of State, but subsequently transpire to be wrong. That person might, “for the purposes of this Act”, be entitled to use their card to obtain their state pension, but because we have a conclusive presumption, rather than a rebuttable one, that the date of birth is correct, they would not receive the entitlement that they would otherwise have received.
The provisions stray into an area in which rebuttable rather than conclusive presumptions are normally used. The Government should look at that, and perhaps the Minister can assist us.
I am listening carefully to the hon. Gentleman, and he is making a point that bears further thought. As he said a moment ago, the provision relates to an agreement between the Secretary of State and the individual. This is not a one-way agreement, but very much an agreement into which both parties would enter. Any facts that were entered in the register would obviously have been agreed by both sides.
The hon. Gentleman envisaged a scenario in which an order for compulsion was made and people drew down benefits. As I understand it from colleagues who know more about the law than I do, the data could still be changed even if they were subject to a conclusive presumption, as long as one of the two parties agreed that they should be further changed in the light of new information. So the provision does not preclude changes further down the line; it solidifies the information for so long as it is not challenged by the emergence of new information—if the hon. Gentleman understands my point.
I think that I understand what the Minister says, although I shall read the record carefully tomorrow to make sure that I am correct.
The Minister’s intervention was helpful to some extent, but the conclusive presumption is not simply between the Secretary of State and the individual, but against the world. Anyone faced with the information contained in the agreement cannot get around it, even though they may have other information that undermines that presumption.
Yes. Both the Minister and the hon. and learned Gentleman are correct. This is not a situation that cannot, under any circumstances, be got around—I would be surprised if there are not to many “nots” in that—but there is a suggestion that the presumption would normally be rebuttable. The standard for rebuttal would be very high, and something pretty dramatic would be required to overturn the presumption, but that is why it would always be a rebuttable rather than an irrebuttable presumption.
I should add some further clarification. Contrary to what the hon. and learned Member for Harborough said, the agreement is not between the individual and wider society, but between the Secretary of State and the individual for the purposes of the Bill. It relates to the individual and the registrable facts laid out in the Bill.
I refer the hon. Gentleman to clause 3(3)(b), which uses this phrase:
“the Secretary of State has given, and not withdrawn, a direction that what is to be recorded in that individual’s case”.
The Bill therefore acknowledges that the Secretary of State may withdraw a direction and enter a new fact. I entirely understand the hon. Gentleman’s point, but for as long as the facts are not challenged, it is important that they are given as much solidity as possible.
I take the Minister’s point. He is right that this is an agreement between the individual and the Secretary of State, but that is not the issue. It is the consequences of that agreement that are at issue, and they are affected by the fact that the presumption is conclusive, and the matter can clearly be changed with the withdrawal of the Secretary of State’s direction. That is important, but unless and until that withdrawal is made, there is still a consequence that would be unnecessary if we were dealing with a rebuttable rather than conclusive presumption.
We have probably done the point to death; I am boring myself now. Something in the amendment might still benefit, however, from further quiet reflection in the course of the month. When the Minister’s officials head off to the south of France, they can think about the subject on the beaches of St. Tropez. When we return, and the leaves are turning in the trees, we might be able to revisit the subject, possibly even with a Government amendment.
The amendments moved by the hon. and learned Member for Harborough were interesting, and I do not think that they are a million miles apart from the other proposals. This has been an interesting and useful series of debates, but nothing is included in the group on which I would seek to divide the Committee, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
I feel obliged to indicate to the Committee that if we sit beyond 4.30, I shall suspend the sitting for 15 minutes at that time. I am quite prepared to carry on, but I shall suspend.
I beg to move amendment No. 22, in clause 3, page 4, line 4, leave out subsection (4) and insert—
‘(4)Information which is not personal data, once entered in the Register, may continue to be recorded in the Register for so long as it is necessary for the statutory purposes for it to be so recorded.’.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments:
No. 130, in clause 3, page 4, line 7, leave out subsection (5).
No. 131, in clause 3, page 4, line 9, leave out subsection (6).
No. 23, in clause 3, page 4, line 11, leave out ‘consistent with’ and insert ‘necessary for’.
No. 132, in clause 3, page 4, line 13, leave out subsection (7).
No. 24, in clause 3, page 4, line 13, leave out from ‘order’ to ‘unless’ in line 15 and insert ‘under this section’.
No. 188, in clause 3, page 4, line 14, leave out from second ‘provision’ to ‘unless’ in line 15 and insert
‘that the Secretary is authorised to make by this section’.
No. 25, in clause 3, page 4, line 16, at end add—
‘(8)Particulars relating to disclosure of information about an individual from the Register which falls within paragraph 9 of Schedule 1 must be retained in that individual’s entry in the Register if that disclosure did not have the consent of that individual.
(9)In the case of particulars which are contained in personal data as a result of the requirement specified in subsection (8), the Information Commissioner shall, following consultation with relevant persons including the Commissioner established under this Act, publish criteria which specify the circumstances when such particulars can be removed from the Register.’.
No. 26, in clause 3, page 4, line 16, at end add—
‘(8)No draft order containing a provision that the Secretary of State is authorised to make by this section is to be laid before Parliament unless—
(a)the Secretary of State has prepared and published a report containing a proposal for the making of such provision;
(b)the report sets out the Secretary of State’s reasons for making the proposal;
(c)the report has been laid before Parliament and each House has approved the proposal contained in the report, either with or without modifications; and
(d)the draft order gives effect to the proposal so far as approved by both Houses.’.
No. 28, in schedule 1, page 40, line 18, leave out sub-paragraph (b).
No. 29, in schedule 1, page 40, line 30, at end insert
‘and his ID card number, which shall be the same’.
No. 30, in schedule 1, page 40, line 31, leave out sub-paragraph (b).
No. 31, in schedule 1, page 41, line 16, leave out sub-paragraph (l).
No. 32, in schedule 1, page 41, line 19, leave out sub-paragraph (m).
No. 33, in schedule 1, page 42, line 9, leave out sub-paragraph (g).
No. 34, in schedule 1, page 43, leave out lines 1 to 9.
No. 118, in clause 43, page 37, line 5, at end insert—
‘“Information Commissioner” means the Commissioner established by the Data Protection Act 1998 (c.29);’.
No. 119, in clause 43, page 37, line 11, at end insert—
‘“personal data” has the same meaning as in section 1 of the Data Protection Act 1998 (c.29);’.
We can divide the amendments into four categories. Amendments Nos. 22 and 23 are to do with a discussion about the recording of information that is either, as the Bill would have it,
“consistent with the statutory purposes”,
or as the amendment suggests
“necessary for the statutory purposes”.
Amendments Nos. 25, 24 and 26 are in a separate category, which I shall subdivide. Amendment No. 25 deals with the public’s right to know, while amendments Nos. 24 and 26 deal with Parliament’s right to debate and to check the Government. Amendments Nos. 28 to 34 deal with the contents of schedule 1, and amendments Nos. 118 and 119 deal with the Information Commissioner and the data with which we are concerned.
First, I will deal with amendments Nos. 22 and 23. We can see from the amendment paper that the amendment refers to information that “is not personal data”, and discusses the fact that such
“Information ... once entered in the Register, may continue to be recorded in the Register for so long as it is necessary for the statutory purposes for it to be so recorded.”
Amendment No. 23 would replace “consistent with” with “necessary for”. The arguments may be semantic, but they are of some importance. They tease out the policy behind the Government’s reliance on statutory purposes and the need to record information, which is what clause 3 is about.
We have heard and discussed, to some extent, what the Government hope to do by storing the information, exchanging it between various agencies and providing us, the fortunate citizens, with the entitlement to oblige them by providing all that information. To protect ourselves against terrorism, and therefore enhance our national security, prevent and detect crime, enforce immigration controls and the prohibitions on unauthorised working or employment and secure the efficient and effective provision of public services are all perfectly laudable aims, subject to our discussion on Tuesday. I am concerned that the expression “consistent with the statutory purposes”, however, is not as strong or clear as “necessary for statutory purposes”.
I do not wish to give information to the Government that I do not volunteer unless that is strictly necessary. Such action might be consistent, but not something that I wish to do. It might be necessary, but if so, it is in a different category of problem. I trust that the Government can see the sense in extracting information from people only when it is necessary to do so. In this electronic age, we are all properly fearful about the misuse of information and unauthorised access to it, and about the lack of security of Government computers and information-holding systems.
For example, we often have to deal with constituency cases relating to the Child Support Agency or to the computer that holds information about county court judgments, which contains inaccurate information or information that, although accurate, has been misapplied. Using the word “necessary” rather than “consistent” would keep the Secretary of State on a choke chain, so that he realises that there is a higher test for the extraction, and therefore recording, of information on the register.
Let me move on to amendments Nos. 25, 24 and 26. I would loosely describe amendment No. 25 as covering the public’s right to know. It would add two new subsections. The first states:
“Particulars relating to disclosure of information about an individual from the Register which falls within paragraph 9 of Schedule 1”.
Paragraph 9 of schedule 1 refers to
“particulars of every occasion on which information contained in the individual’s entry has been provided to a person; ... particulars of every person to whom such information has been provided on such an occasion; ... other particulars, in relation to each such occasion, of the provision of the information.”
Our point is that when those events happen, they must be recorded, especially if the individual did not consent to the disclosure of the information to third parties. As far as I can understand from paragraph 9, a “person” could be national security offices, another Department or another civilian or non-governmental organisation.
Proposed new subsection (9) to clause 3 reads:
“In the case of particulars which are contained in personal data as a result of the requirement specified in subsection (8), the Information Commissioner shall, following consultation with relevant persons including the Commissioner established under this Act, publish criteria which specify the circumstances when such particulars can be removed from the Register.”.
Again, the amendment seeks to encourage greater public understanding of and participation in the system that is holding and exchanging information about them. The country is better governed when the public know more about what is being done to them or on their behalf by the Government. Except in special circumstances of national security, investigation of crimes and so forth, there is a need for the greatest possible freedom of information and candour. I hope that, through amendment No. 25, we can achieve something along those lines.
Amendments Nos. 24 and 26 would allow Parliament to keep a hold on the Government. The Bill has already been described as merely an enabling Bill, as though that was a term of approbation. In my view, it is the contrary: the fact that the Bill is so vague and provides the Secretary of State with such a huge number of regulation-making powers is a matter of concern not congratulation. Amendments Nos. 24 and 26 are designed to redress the balance.
Amendment No. 24 would constrain the Secretary of State from making orders under the clause unless a draft has been laid before Parliament and approved by a resolution of each House. That seems perfectly sensible and wholly uncontroversial, as is amendment No. 26, which states:
“No draft order containing a provision that the Secretary of State is authorised to make by this section is to be laid before Parliament unless ... the Secretary of State has prepared and published a report containing a proposal for the making of such provision; ... the report sets out the Secretary of State’s reasons for making the proposal; ... the report has been laid before Parliament and each House has approved the proposal ... either with or without modifications; and ... the draft order gives effect to the proposal”.
We want Parliament to have sight, be told the reasons and have the power to amend, because as I understand it, statutory instruments are amendable—we either take them or leave them. The amendment would increase parliamentary oversight over the process, and I hope that no Member would find that objectionable.
The amendments to schedule 1—amendments Nos. 28 to 34—are a debating device by which we can discuss the information that may be recorded in the register. Amendment No. 28 would leave out paragraph 2(b), which relates to the signature, while amendments No. 29 and 30 would make it clear that the ID card number should be the same as the NIR number. Amendment No. 31 would delete paragraph 4(1)(l), which concerns personal reference numbers and mentions
“the number of any designated document which is held by him and is a document the number of which does not fall within any of the preceding sub-paragraphs”.
That provision basically covers any number attached to any document that the Government have not yet thought of but which may come into existence in due course. Amendment No. 32 would delete paragraph (m).
One could say many things about the schedule, and some have been said about it in earlier debates on personal information. Paragraph 2, which deals with identifying information, says:
“The following may be recorded in an individual’s entry in the Register—
(a) a photograph of his head and shoulders”.
I do not want to make a flippant point, but the provision does not say “a photograph of his face”. One may have the joy of looking into the register to find a picture of the back of the subject’s head and shoulders. I know what the Government intend, but that is not what is in the schedule, so I can imagine that all sorts of fun will be had by a clever fellow unless the wording is improved.
I do not wish to have a long discussion about handwriting and signatures, some of which are more legible than others. Over time, people change their signatures. I cannot say that my signature is identical each time I write a cheque. I do not intend to go too far into a discussion about people changing their signatures when they get married or are granted or inherit a life peerage. There any many reasons why people change their names and therefore their signatures. Such points need to be considered as we discuss the Bill.
The numbers game needs to be thought about. The Government seem merely to be allowing themselves to think of anything that might have a number and which can go into the great well of recorded information on the register. I need to be convinced that such information, as contained on the register, whether it is personal or identifying information, residential status, personal reference numbers or whatever else, is strictly necessary and will not interfere with the rights of the citizen to enter into agreements that might be numbered or arrangements with organisations that will lead to the numbers being put on a database.
How can it possibly be correct to delete paragraph 4(1)(m) of the schedule? That would mean that, although it would be possible to check that the individual had a work permit, it would not be possible to check whether the permit was still valid.
That is one reading of the amendment. As I said at the outset, the purpose of the amendments is to provide us with an opportunity to discuss the whole principle behind the provision, but I do not need to say more about that.
As for amendments Nos. 118 and 199, I have no doubt that all members of the Committee will have taken the trouble to look at the Data Protection Act 1998. Amendment No. 118 would add to clause 43
“‘Information Commissioner’ means the Commissioner established by the Data Protection Act 1998”.
That clause is the interpretation clause. We wish to insert into it a definition of the Information Commissioner. His position was confirmed by the 1998 Act, but was created by the Data Protection Act 1984, as set out under section 6 of the 1998 Act. There is a good case for not having a separate Information Commissioner, but eliding the office with that of the data commissioner under the Data Protection Act, so that there are not two separate offices.
The more interesting point for us to consider is personal data under amendment No. 119. Under section 1 of the 1998 Act, personal data means
“data which relate to a living individual who can be identified ... from those data, or ... from those data and other information which is in the possession of, or is likely to come into the possession of, the data controller, and includes any expression of opinion about the individual and any indication of the intentions of the data controller or any other person in respect of the individual”.
Early in our discussions, the Minister said that the data in the identity register would not contain opinion. There is a conflict in such matters because, under the 1998 Act, there is provision for data to be defined as opinion. It includes any expression of opinion. We can imagine the sort of opinion that might be in the national identity register: “Subject is known to associate with serious drug runners, people traffickers or suspected terrorists, so they are a suspected security risk.” That is the sort of opinion that the register might contain. When the Minister says, “It won’t contain opinion”, we must be sure that he is excluding such information. If he is including it, he should tell us, so that we know.
I have outlined the rough thrust of the amendments. I will resume my seat and listen to others who wish to speak.
Amendments Nos. 130, 131, 132 and 188 stand in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale (Tim Farron).
The hon. and learned Member for Harborough made a couple of interesting points and gave some interesting working examples in relation to schedule 1. On signatures, he is right that it is common for people to have more than one signature. That happens for a number of reasons. When I sign constituency correspondence I take care to sign “Alistair Carmichael”, but when I sign a cheque or anything else I tend to employ a different and much less painstaking signature. He was also right about the difference between the face and the head, which arises quite commonly. Committee members might not be aware that when doctors refer to facial injuries and head injuries, they mean quite different things. Although it was an amusing example, the Government would do well to think about it. It would be difficult to compel somebody not to have a picture taken of the back of their head. They would be complying with the Bill, as drafted. We will hear what the Minister has to say.
Amendments No. 130, 131, 132 and 188 all refer to subsections (5), (6) and (7). They seek to delete them for the purpose of focusing debate on what the Government intend by them. Our principal concern is that we are dealing with an awful lot of what will be highly significant detail by way of secondary legislation. I hope that I have made it clear during today’s sittings that there is clearly a place for the appropriate use of secondary legislation, even though I never feel that this place scrutinises it particularly well.
My concern in relation to amendment No.130 is that subsection (5) allows the amendment of primary legislation—the Bill when it becomes enacted—by way of secondary legislation. It refers to schedule 1, which contains the meat of the Bill, because it specifies the information that can be held in the database. That is already drawn in exceptionally wide terms. If the terms are to be widened or constrained, that provision should come back to the Floor of the House. We are not dealing with some minor consequential measure; as others have said, we are dealing with a Bill that seeks to redefine the relationship between the citizen and the state. If we are to do that, it behoves Parliament to make time to do it properly. Seeking to make such a change by way of statutory instrument represents a poor deal, and I think that our constituents would expect rather more of us.
Subsection (6) gives the Secretary of State the power to
“make an order under this section adding information to the information that may be recorded in the Register only if he considers that it would be consistent with the statutory purposes for the additional information to be so recorded.”
That is an exceptionally wide provision. Indeed, for the recording to be “consistent” with statutory purposes seems a little weak. It is possible for something to be consistent without necessarily being on all fours. I cannot think what form of words I would favour, but I would like something rather stronger.
Amendments Nos. 132 and 188 refer to the operation of subsection (7), which requires the laying of a draft order before Parliament and its approval by a resolution of each House. Again, I wish to probe the Government’s thinking. Amendment No. 131 seeks to remove subsection (6), and we tabled amendment No. 188 because we do not wish the Government to have the power given under subsection (7). The Government must justify why matters of such consequence, which are of fundamental importance to the Bill, should be dealt with in a fairly peremptory and almost administrative manner.
I have not yet made a speech in the Committee, but as it is some time since the sittings began, I shall not get involved in pleasantries, Mr. Gale. I shall keep my remarks short.
I wish to speak to amendment No. 130, which was tabled by the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland. I think that I shall speak not only for myself, but for other Labour Members who are not present. The amendment would remove subsection (5), which refers to schedule 1. A number of us feel that schedule 1 is far too widely drawn, and I hope that the Government will look at it carefully. For the Secretary of State to be able change the schedule through secondary legislation under subsection (5) is quite unacceptable. It needs to be done through primary legislation, I hope to redefine the whole the schedule, but I wish to make it clear that major requests about what information should lie on the register must be as clearly put and as carefully defined as possible.
I could give many examples, but I shall not do so because of the lateness of the hour. We may not get to debate the schedule, but there are a number of points in it that go way beyond the normal requests that one would expect to be made in order to create a register. I have my own misgivings about biometrics, which may be discussed later, but I hope that the Government will think again and redefine schedule 1, and in particular, how they go about adding or removing items from it.
I want to raise a number of points that pertain to the amendments and to schedule 1. First, can the Minister expand on the phrase “other biometric information” in paragraph 2 of schedule 1? “Other biometric information” covers a whole range of issues, from DNA to facial recognition and iris scan. When I had a meeting with officials from the Minister’s Department, as we all had the opportunity to do, we were assured that DNA would not be one of those biometric elements, but nowhere does the Bill specify what those biometric elements will be. That leaves it open for a future Government to add different types of biometric element, such as DNA, to the biometric register. They would be free to do so.
The Government may say that that is because the technology is not mature enough across the board and that, in the long run, they might have to deselect one option, such as iris recognition, and go for DNA. Certainly, DNA is the one biometric element that does not change according to people’s age, beauty or whatever, but it is much more intrusive. I am keen to know the Government’s reasoning for not choosing it.
According to the explanatory notes, and the case that the Government make, the Bill’s purpose has always been to provide a register of identification to use for verification. Our amendment No. 34 would delete paragraph 9. We believe that is the make or break bit that changes the Bill from a verification system to more than that—to leaving a footprint of medical records, checks and people’s inquiries—and that it leads to all the different issues I raised with the Minister during the first sitting.
For example, I asked about the information requested under clause 1(5)(h), which is expanded in paragraph 9 of schedule 1. The Minister said that paragraph 9 information cannot be disclosed except in limited circumstances. That information can be quite personal. So, who decides the limited circumstances in which that information can be disclosed? Well, hey presto! Clause 23 provides that the limited circumstances will be dictated by the Secretary of State for the Home Department, so the protection of the individual in relation to those limited circumstances is not included in the Bill. It is down to the Secretary of State to decide what the limited circumstances are and who gets the information.
I tried to catch the hon. Gentleman’s eye earlier, in relation to his point about biometrics. On the point he is making now, it will not be the current Home Secretary who decides, just the Home Secretary. We do not seek to include powers invested in my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary that endure beyond his tenure in that post.
Clause 43 identifies biometric information and makes it clear that that means external characteristics. I am told that, in accordance with the rules of statutory construction, that is not construed as DNA. I fully accept that DNA can be collected as biometric data, but it would need to be explicitly included in the Bill for that to happen. Clearly, DNA is not an external characteristic, so the Bill does not include DNA. I want to make that point very clear.
I am grateful to the Minister for clarifying the latter point, but his first point is rather fatuous. I am afraid that he let himself down there. We are arguing about whether the Secretary of State—the holder of the office—rather than this Parliament, the people or the individual, should authorise what is limited and who is allowed access to paragraph 9 information. That is the crux of the issue as to when the Bill moves from verification to allowing others, such as Government agencies, to browse through the footprint of the questions put to the database so that they can track where someone—[Interruption.] Perhaps the Minister would like to say why I am wrong.
Perhaps I was being facetious previously, but the hon. Gentleman needs to be exact in his language. He should show me the part of the Bill that allows any Government agency—security services or otherwise—to browse through the database. That is the exact term he used, but the Bill will not allow agencies to do that.
If the hon. Gentleman can show me a clause that permits such a thing, I shall happily withdraw what I said. He should not use language such as “browse through”, “open access” and “fishing through the database” when those things will not be permissible activities for any agency, Government or otherwise, under the Bill.
Government agencies will have access to paragraph 9 information and be defined by the Home Secretary. I concede that the Bill does not use the word “browse”, but it does not matter whether it says “browse” or not. What matters is that the Home Secretary will decide who has access, with or without an identity card being presented. That is the difference.
If one looks at the explanatory notes, one sees that the Government say that this is supposed to be about a person presenting their ID card and verifying that they are who they say they are. However, paragraph 9 information involves the Secretary of State being able to decide that an agency of the Government can have access to that database. The individual with their ID card does not have to turn up, if the Secretary of State so decides. That is the difference. We have gone from verification to something more. That is important, and that is why we seek to remove paragraph 9.
But what the hon. Gentleman describes is not in the context of browsing, going fishing or other such wide and permissive terms, but in the very clear context outlined time after time in clauses 19 to 23. This is not a permissive all-open, “Come down to the tombola and pick out whatever you want” element of the Bill, as he suggests. He should not suggest that without fully understanding every aspect of the Bill and how they interlink. He should not pick out one clause and build a case on it, because that case will collapse.
The Minister says that this is not browsing, but he must allude to what he defines as a focused request to look at records. I shall describe my involvement in that in this country and in Northern Ireland. One starts one’s investigation by focusing on a village or a well known pub in Northern Ireland, say. One says, “We know that the suspect went to a pub but we do not know who owns it, so we shall browse the information on that individual. We shall then browse the information about everyone in the flats above the pub.” The Minister must define his focus.
I am trying to understand the hon. Gentleman’s objection to this clause, which involves registering facts about an individual and identifying them, rather than the use to which the registering is put. It is interesting to hear how he operated searches in his previous occupation, but clause 19 is about access to the information. Is he not satisfied that what he is talking about is simply precluded under all the other existing statutes and those limitations in clause 19, which we shall come to later?
I am grateful to the hon. Lady for giving me an opportunity to explain and expand on clause 19, subsection (2)(c) of which states that the provision of information is authorised
“to the Director of the Government Communications Headquarters for purposes connected with the carrying out of any of the functions of GCHQ”.
Do you know what the functions of GCHQ are, Mr. Gale? They are listening and intercepting. The paragraph says “any of the functions”, not “specific functions” or “specific requests from members of the security services”. We need to understand the functions of those Government agencies and how they carry them out. Then we will recognise the fact that they will not come with a specific request for the Secretary of State, such as, “Mr. Secretary of State, can we specifically look at this individual?”
I understand that when we reach clause 19 the hon. Gentleman will object to those aspects of the Bill, but how does the registering of facts about an individual, under either clause 3 or schedule 1, make any difference? I am trying to understand what objection he has to those pieces of information.
My objection is to the fact that once the footprint facts have been recorded, under clause 19 certain Government agencies will be able to look at them. If we prevent the footprints from being recorded, the Bill will move to providing for a verification system, which is what the explanatory notes say it will provide, and it will go no further. That is why we object to paragraph 9 of schedule 1. It goes beyond providing for the verification role, and we need to explore it.
To sum up, that move has gone beyond what was expected, and I think that a number of people from a number of parties believe that to be the case. If the Government were serious and they removed that footprint, they might get more support at the next stage of the Bill’s consideration.
Debate adjourned.—[Joan Ryan.]