Amendment moved [this day]: Amendment No. 341, in clause 116, page 82, line 29, after 'be', insert 'reasonably considered to be'.—[Dr. Evan Harris.]

Question again proposed, That the amendment be made.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment No. 342, in clause 116, page 82, line 29, after 'victim', insert 'or target'.

Clause stand part.

Amendment No. 343, in clause 117, page 83, line 27, after 'presence', insert 'or conduct'.

Amendment No. 344, in clause 117, page 83, leave out lines 42 to 44.

Amendment No. 223, in clause 117, page 84, line 4, leave out from 'liable' to end of line 6 and insert—

'(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 51 weeks or a fine not exceeding level 4 on the standard scale, or to both,

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or to a fine, or to both.'.

Amendment No. 224, in clause 117, page 84, line 13, leave out 'in uniform'. Clause 117 stand part.

Amendment No. 225, in clause 118, page 84, line 41, leave out from 'liable' to end of line 43 and insert—

'(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 51 weeks or a fine not exceeding level 4 on the standard scale, or both,

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or to a fine, or to both.'.

Amendment No. 101, in clause 118, page 85, line 4, at end add—

'(7D) Any person to whom a constable has given a direction under subsection (4)(b) may appeal against the making of the direction to a magistrates' court.'.

Amendment No. 254, in clause 118, page 85, line 4, at end add—

'(7D) Any person to whom a constable has given a direction under subsection (4)(b) may appeal against the making of the direction to a magistrates' court in the circumstances where the period specified under subsection (4)(b) exceeds 10 days.'.

Clause 118 stand part.

New clause 18—Names and addresses of members of companies: individual application—

'The following section is inserted after section 723C of the Companies Act 1985—

''723CA Individual members' confidentiality orders 

(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, an individual may make an application under this section to the Secretary of State where the condition in subsection (2) is satisfied.

(2) That condition is that the individual—

(a) is or proposes to become a member of a relevant company; and

(b) considers that the availability for inspection by members of the public of particulars of his name and usual residential or business address creates, or (if an order is not made under this section) is likely to create, a serious risk that he or a person who lives with him or is an employee of his will be subjected to violence or intimidation (''a serious risk'').

(3) Where, on an application made by an individual under this section, the Secretary of State is satisfied that the availability for inspection by members of the public of the particulars of the individual's usual residential address creates or (if an order is not made under this section) is likely to create a serious risk that the individual, or a person who lives with him, or an employee of his will be subjected to violence or intimidation, he shall make an order under this section (''an individual member's confidentiality order'') in relation to him.

(4) Otherwise, he shall dismiss the application.

(5) At any time when an individual member's confidentiality order is in force in relation to an individual the name and address of the individual in the register of members of the company which is the subject of the confidentiality order shall not be disclosed to any person who may request either the company or Companies House disclosure of such name and address save in prescribed circumstances.

(6) The Secretary of State shall give the applicant notice of his decision under subsection (3) or (4); and a notice under this subsection shall be given within such period and shall contain such information as may be prescribed.

(7) The Secretary of State may at any time revoke an individual member's confidentiality order if he is satisfied that such conditions as may be prescribed are satisfied.''.'.

New clause 19—Names and addresses of members of companies: company application—

'The following section is inserted after section 723CA of the Companies Act 1985 as inserted by section [Names and addresses of members of companies: individual application]—

''723CB Company members confidentiality orders

(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, a company may make an application under this section to the Secretary of State where the condition in subsection (2) is satisfied.

(2) That condition is that the company considers that the availability for inspection by members of the public of particulars of the names and usual residential or business addresses of the members of the company creates, or (if an order is not made under this section) is likely to create, a serious risk that a member of the company or a person who lives with or is an employee of a member of the company will be subjected to violence or intimidation (''a serious risk'').

(3) Where, on an application made by a company under this section, the Secretary of State is satisfied that the availability for inspection by members of the public of the particulars of that company's members' usual residential addresses creates or (if an order is not made under this section) is likely to create a serious risk that a member, or a person who lives with him, or an employee of his will be subjected to violence or intimidation, he shall make an order under this section (''a company members confidentiality order'') in relation the company.

(4) Otherwise, he shall dismiss the application.

(5) At any time when a company members confidentiality order is in force in relation to a company, the name and address of any individual in the register of members of the company that is the subject of the confidentiality order, shall not be disclosed to any person who may request either the company or Companies House disclosure of such names and addresses save in prescribed circumstances. 

(6) The Secretary of State shall give the applicant notice of his decision under subsection (3) or (4); and a notice under this subsection shall be given within such period and shall contain such information as may be prescribed.

(7) The Secretary of State may at any time revoke a company members confidentiality order if he is satisfied that such conditions as may be prescribed are satisfied.''.'.

New clause 20—Addresses of chargees or mortgagees of companies—

'The following section is inserted after section 723CB of the Companies Act 1985 as inserted by section [ Names and addresses of members of companies: company application]—

''723CC Chargee confidentiality orders

(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, an individual may make an application under this section to the Secretary of State where the condition in subsection (2) is satisfied.

(2) That condition is that the individual—

(a) is or proposes to become a chargee or mortgagee of a relevant company; and

(b) considers that the availability for inspection by members of the public of particulars of his or its name and usual residential or business address creates, or (if an order is not made under this section) is likely to create, a serious risk that he or a person who lives with him or is an employee of his or it will be subjected to violence or intimidation ('the serious risk').

(3) Where, on an application made by an individual under this section, the Secretary of State is satisfied that the availability for inspection by members of the public of the particulars of the individual's usual residential or business address in relation to documents required to be held by Companies House or by the company in relation to the charge or mortgage creates or (if an order is not made under this section) is likely to create a serious risk that the individual, or a person who lives with him, or an employee of his will be subjected to violence or intimidation, he shall make an order under this section ('a chargee confidentiality order') in relation to him.

(4) Otherwise, he shall dismiss the application.

(5) Where a chargee confidentiality order is made under subsection (3) above the name and residential or business address of the chargee or mortgagee of the company that is the subject of the confidentiality order shall not be revealed to any person who may request either the company or Companies House access to such name and address save in prescribed circumstances.

(6) The Secretary of State shall give the applicant notice of his decision under subsection (3) or (4); and a notice under this subsection shall be given within such period and shall contain such information as may be prescribed by regulations.

(7) The Secretary of State may at any time revoke a chargee confidentiality order if he is satisfied that such conditions as may be prescribed are satisfied.''.'.

New clause 21—Confidentiality orders: associated companies—

'The following section is inserted after section 723CC of the Companies Act 1985 as inserted by section [Addresses of chargees or mortgagees of companies]—

''723CD Confidentiality orders: associated companies

(1) Where a relevant confidentiality order is made in relation to a relevant company and the Secretary of State is satisfied that in relation to another company ('company A') the condition in subsection (2) below applies, he shall extend the operation of the order to that other company or make a further relevant confidentiality order (including a confidentiality order of a different kind) in relation to that other company, as the case may be.

(2) The condition is that the availability for inspection or disclosure by members of the public of the particulars of the appropriate individual's usual residential or business address in a document relating to company A which is, by virtue of this Act required to be available for such inspection or disclosure, creates (or if an order is not extended or made under this section) is likely  to create a serious risk that the individual, or a person who lives with him, or an employee of his will be subject to violence or intimidation.

(4) The Secretary of State shall give the applicant notice of his decision under subsection (1); and a notice under this subsection shall be given within such period and shall contain such information as may be prescribed.

(5) The Secretary of State may at any time revoke a decision or a relevant confidentiality order made under this section if he is satisfied that such conditions as may be prescribed are satisfied.''.'.

New clause 22—Director's confidentiality orders: directors etc.—

'(1) In this section 723C(1) of the Companies Act 1985 (effect of confidentiality orders), the words ''that were contained in a document delivered to the registrar after the order came into force'' are replaced by ''that are contained in a document delivered to the registrar at any time''.

(2) In section 723D(3)(b) of that Act (construction of sections 723B and 723C) the words ''after the order came into force'' are replaced by ''at any time''.

(3) In section 723B(3), (7), (8)(d), (9), section 723C(1), (6)(a), (7)(a) and 723D(4) of that Act and in the headings to the said sections 723B and 723C, the words ''confidentiality order'' and ''confidentiality orders'' are replaced by ''director's confidentiality order'' and ''director's confidentiality orders'' as the case may be.''.'.

New clause 23—Confidentiality orders: miscellaneous—

'(1) The following amendments are made to the Companies Act 1985.

(2) In section 709(1) (Inspection, etc of records kept by the registrar), ''section 723B'' is replaced by ''sections 723B, 723CA, 723CB, 723CC and 723CD''.

(3) In section 356, (inspection of register of members), after subsection (6), the following subsection is inserted— ''(7)Subsections (1) and (6) are subject to sections 723CA and 723CB.''

(4) In section 408, (right to inspect instruments which create charges, etc), after subsection (4), the following subsection is inserted— ''(5)Subsections (1) and (4) are subject to sections 723CC.''.

(5) In section 723C(4) (effect of confidentiality order), ''confidentiality order'' is replaced by ''relevant confidentiality order''.

(6) In section 723D (construction of sections 723B and 723C)—

(a) In subsection (1), ''section 723B'' is replaced by ''sections 723B, 723CA, 723CB, 723CC and 723CD'',

(b) In subsection (4)—

(i) ''section 723B and 723C'' is replaced by ''sections 723B, 723C, 723CA, 723CB, 723CC and 723CD'',

(ii) the following definition is inserted in the appropriate place— '''relevant confidentiality order' means a director's confidentiality order, individual member's confidentiality order, company members' confidentiality order or chargee's confidentiality order;''

(c) Subsection (6) is omitted.

(7) In section 723E(1) (offences), ''section 723B'' is replaced by ''sections 723B, 723D, 723E, 723F or 723G''.'.

New clause 26—Economic damage to companies—

'(1) A person (''person A'') commits an offence under this section if by acting in accordance with subsection (2) he causes financial damage to another person (''person B''), with the purpose of representing to person B, or persuading person B—

(i) that he should not do something that he is legally entitled to do; or

(ii) that he should do something that he is not under any legal obligation to do.

(2) A person acts in accordance with this subsection if those actions—

(a) involve the harassment of or violence against person B or a connected person, or 

(b) involve damage to property of person B or a connected person.

(3) A connected person, for the purposes of subsection (2) above, means—

(a) a customer of person B;

(b) a shareholder of person B;

(c) an employee of person B;

(d) a director of person B;

(e) where person B is a partnership, its partners;

(f) a supplier of goods or services to person B;

(g) a supplier of goods or services to persons within paragraph (f) above;

(h) an individual normally residing with any individual falling within paragraphs (a) to (g) above.

(4) A constable may arrest without warrant anyone whom he reasonably suspects to be committing an offence within subsection (1) above.

(5) A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable—

(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 51 weeks or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to both;

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or to a fine, or to both.'.

New clause 32—Animal research; intention to cause economic loss—

'(1) A person commits an offence if, by acting in accordance with subsection (3) and with the necessary intent—

(a) he induces one connected person—

(i) to breach a contract between that connected person and another connected person, or

(ii) to terminate a contract between that connected person and another connected person (whether or not the termination constitutes a breach of the contract), or

(b) he persuades one connected person—

(i) not to enter into a contract with another connected person, or

(ii) not to have commercial dealings (of whatever nature) with another connected person.

(2) No person shall be guilty of an offence under this section—

(a) by virtue of his doing anything in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute,

(b) if he is exercising any power conferred on him by any enactment,

(c) if he is acting for the purposes of making a protected disclosure falling within Part IVA of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (protected disclosures).

(3) A person acts in accordance with this subsection if he carries out or threatens any unlawful activity against a connected person (whether or not that person is one of the connected persons mentioned in subsection (1)).

(4) In subsection (1), the necessary intent is the intent to—

(a) prevent, stop or hinder an animal research facility operator or a person who is not, but may become, an animal research facility operator doing something which he is entitled to do, or

(b) persuade an animal research facility operator or a person who is not, but may become, an animal research facility operator to do something which he is not under any obligation to do.

(5) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—

(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 51 weeks or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to both,

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or to a fine, or to both.

(6) In this section— ''animal research facility operator'' means a person under whose direction or control the following are carried out— 

(a) regulated procedures for the purposes of the Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986 (c. 14) (''the 1986 Act''), as described in section 2 of that Act, or

(b) the breeding of protected animals under the authority of a certificate under section 7 of the 1986 Act; ''connected persons'' are—

(c) animal research facility operators,

(d) holders of licences under section 4 or 5 of the 1986 Act (personal licences and project licences), persons specified under section 6(5) or 7(5) of the 1986 Act (scientific procedure establishments and breeding and supplying establishments),

(e) suppliers of goods or services to persons falling within paragraphs (a) to (c) or (f) to (k) of this subsection,

(f) suppliers of goods or services to persons falling within paragraph (d) above,

(g) customers of an animal research facility operator,

(h) shareholders in an animal research facility operator (if the operator is a company),

(i) subsidiaries of an animal research facility operator,

(j) companies of which an animal research facility operator is a subsidiary,

(k) trade organisations representing animal research facility operators,

(l) trade unions whose members include employees of any person mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (i) above,

(m) employees of any person mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (i) above,

(n) where the person mentioned in paragraph (a) to (i) above is a company, its directors,

(o) where the person mentioned in paragraph (a) to (f) above is a partnership firm its partners, and

(p) individuals normally residing with any individual falling within paragraph (a) to (g) or (l) to (n) above; ''trade dispute'' has the same meaning as in Part IV of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992,

(7) The Secretary of State may by order—

(a) add a description of person to the list of connected persons in subsection (6),

(b) remove a description of person from that list,

(c) amend the list in some other way.'.

Amendment No. 311, in title, line 10, after 'Scotland;', insert

'to make provision in connection with economic damage to companies;'.

Welcome to our proceedings, Dame Marion. I hope that we are going to make progress and, at the same time, have a good debate. At the end of the morning sitting, I was trying to clarify some of the issues surrounding the use of injunctions. At the risk of a repetition in Hansard, in case I did not make the points earlier, let me make it clear that under the amendments, the main company could get an injunction to protect smaller companies.

The hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) asked whether supplier companies or contractors would have to be named in an injunction. I am advised that they do not have to be; for example, the injunction granted to Oxford university protects not just staff in the university's colleges, but contractors. They are defined simply as the contractors, sub-contractors and suppliers who are or will be engaged by the university to carry out work in connection with the construction of the university's research laboratory. I hope that that clarifies the situation. As I said earlier, ''person'' could include the   body corporate when we are talking about injunctions, and person in this regard would also cover university institutions.

Clause 117 is designed to give additional protection to people who are being harassed at home because of the work that they do.

Unless I missed it in the hubbub, I tabled another amendment to clause 116, dealing with whether the term victim or target should be used. There might have been another, too.

I think that I dealt with the issue of ''reasonably considered'', with which the hon. Gentleman's amendment No. 341 was concerned, in that we believe that ''may'' should suffice in this situation. One of the issues on which I elaborated earlier is that victims include not only immediate relatives but others who socialise, or are otherwise associated, with the individuals who work for organisations involved in animal research, or their suppliers. That is why we want to make sure that we do not leave any loopholes that could be exploited by extremists.

On the hon. Gentleman's amendment No. 342, we do not think that ''target'' adds anything. A person who is, or might be, a victim for the purposes of the subsection will already be a target. Therefore, we believe that clause 116 covers people who might be victims in future. I think that that was his concern.

I think that what the hon. Lady said was that people who are victims will be targets. My question is, are all targets necessarily established as victims, or is she saying that ''victims'' is wide enough to cover people who are in the process of being victimised or are due to be?

I think that we would take the view that it covers a wider group than those who are currently victims. We are mindful of those who might be victims. That is important in the context of what I said earlier, namely that in such matters, it is not always the most immediately obvious group of people who are victims. I shall review the hon. Gentleman's comments later and see whether there is anything on which I can supply more assurance, if that will be of help to him.

Clause 117 concerns people who are being harassed at home because of the work that they do. I should stress that we fully support a person's right to protest peacefully and within the bounds of the law. However, when that protest turns to intimidation, threats of violence or worse, the police must have powers that enable them to deal effectively with the situation.

As was outlined this morning, one of the problems is that such campaigns operate on a number of different fronts. Someone's name and address might appear on a website. Although that website does not necessarily directly say ''you will go out and vandalise this person's property''—the protesters running the websites are very clever about that and have their own legal advice—we feel that the inference is there. People's property is often vandalised within a short   space of time after their name and address have appeared on websites. Their cars have acid thrown on them, leaflets are sent around the neighbourhoods—saying in some cases that people are paedophiles—and so on. When linked to those other issues, a presence outside someone's home is about terror. That makes people concerned about what might happen next based on other examples. They have to try and get on with their everyday lives, but that presence outside their home adds to their sense of fear.

The presence of groups of protesters outside the homes of employees of targeted companies is distressing, as it affects both the employees and their families, possibly including children and other vulnerable people living at that property. In one extreme case, a farmer and his family were subjected to constant protests at his farm for four years. There is a gap in the legislation. Currently, when the police are in attendance, they are generally able to contain protests in the vicinity of the person's home and often a direction to someone to stop drumming, take down an offensive banner or leave the area under section 42 of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 is complied with before an arrest becomes necessary. However, the current provision does not cover the situation where a complaint is made about the presence of protesters outside a person's home but they disappear before the police arrive, or the police are unable to give a direction as they do not have the resources to enforce it at the time.

The new offence set out in clause 117 significantly strengthens the existing law and will attract a specific power of arrest, so a constable would be able to make an arrest where he has reasonable grounds for suspecting that an offence has taken place and the protester is guilty of the offence. That means the police can deal with protesters after the event, which will be useful if there is evidence of protest on CCTV, for example, but the police were not present, or they were present and could not identify the protesters, or there was some difficulty in enforcing a direction at the scene.

The penalty for the new offence will be imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months or a fine not exceeding level 4 on the standard scale, or both. However, that will rise to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 51 weeks or a fine not exceeding level 4 on the standard scale, or both, when the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 come in to force.

Amendment No. 344 removes subsection (3) of the new offence. That subsection is needed to ensure that all those in a group could be charged with the new offence when it is the presence of the group as a whole that causes the harassment, rather than an individual on their own. For example, one person on their own wearing a tee-shirt saying ''Puppy Killer'' may not cause harassment, but if there is a group of people all wearing similar tee-shirts, harassment or distress may be caused.

Amendments Nos. 223 and 225 seek to make the offences in clauses 117 and 118 triable either way. I understand the concerns expressed by Opposition   Members about the sentencing of animal rights extremists, but I do not think their amendments are appropriate or proportionate, nor would they be effective. The offence in clause 117 is comparable to harassment, which carries a maximum penalty of six months and/or a £5,000 fine. That is why the new offence has been drafted with the same maximum penalty. I have even more concerns regarding amendment No. 225, which would result in the new offence of contravening a police direction to stay from a person's home for a specified period also being triable either way and carrying a maximum sentence of three years on conviction on indictment. As drafted, the offence carries a maximum sentence of six months, which will become 51 weeks when custody plus is introduced. The penalty for the new offence is in line with that for the existing offence of ''non-compliance with a police direction'' under section 42 of the Criminal Justice & Police Act 2001. The offences do not justify the sort of penalty proposed by the Opposition. Other criminal behaviour, such as putting people in fear or if violence or damage occur, can be prosecuted under different offences that rightly carry much higher penalties. I hope that, if the evidence exists, those other offences can be used to deal with some of the people about whom we are talking. I understand the concerns about the sentencing of animal rights activists, and it is very important that the judiciary are fully aware of the aggravating nature of animal rights extremist activity and understand its impact on victims. However, increasing the penalties as the amendments propose would result in an offence framework that did not accurately reflect the relative seriousness of various offences.

Harassment reflects a threat to an individual and is rightly a summary-only offence. Affray reflects a higher level of threat and requires the use or a threat of the use of violence towards another person, and a threat cannot be made by the use of words alone. The maximum penalty for affray is three years' imprisonment. Putting people in fear of violence is one level higher again, and attracts a maximum penalty of five years' imprisonment. Those are the sorts of offences that can be tried either way. The penalties that we have provided for and the offences in clauses 117 and 118 are appropriate for the level of offence, as we are talking about people being directed to leave because they are present outside someone's home. They do not necessarily have to engage in an activity for those offences to be applied.

Other measures, including preventive orders such as antisocial behaviour orders, can also be taken and are effective. Heather Nicholson, who also uses the surnames Avery, Barwick and James, was convicted of common assault and aggravated trespass and received a five-year ASBO on Monday 17 January. That ASBO prevents her from going within 500 m of Phytopharm premises, Huntingdon Life Sciences research centres in Cambridgeshire and Suffolk, Halifax house at the University of Oxford, and Darley Oaks farm in Staffordshire. Additionally, she cannot knowingly contact the owners or employees of Phytopharm and   Huntingdon Life Sciences or their families. The ASBO also covers any company that does business with Huntingdon Life Sciences. That sends out the clear message that we can use ASBOs to great effect, because they tell people what they should not do, and if they breach an ASBO, they will be brought before the courts again.

Is the Minister aware that at least one of the ASBOs to which she refers has been breached in Cambridgeshire and that the police decided not to prosecute? If she was not aware of that, will she investigate why it happened?

I am happy to look into that incident and the circumstances surrounding it, but my point remains that ASBOs can be used very appropriately to tackle certain individuals. As we know, communities that have been affected by the sort of activity that affected Darley Oaks are seeking injunctions and ASBOs to protect the wider community, which relates to the point made by the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome.

In such circumstances, the penalties that we have outlined are appropriate for the offences that we are discussing. As Liberal Democrat Members have said, we should be mindful of the fact that we are pushing at boundaries in trying to find a balance between dealing with people who we fear are engaged in totally unacceptable activity and ensuring that we protect people's right to protest, which should not be restricted by the Bill. The offences we propose would deal with someone whose very presence, regardless of any conduct, is a threat. So the offences are strong and powerful, but should at the same time carry proportionate penalties. People engaged in other activities should, of course, be arrested and charged for those offences, and the higher offences would apply if they were found guilty of those offences in court.

We must raise awareness of the effect on victims of animal rights activity through the national forum, which involves the Attorney-General, the Minister responsible for such matters in the Department of Trade and Industry, Ministers from the Department for Constitutional Affairs, officials, police and others doing relevant work, and myself. We meet regularly to oversee current activity and what the police are doing and to build better awareness. The Crown Prosecution Service has developed guidance on taking witness impact statements in animal rights extremist cases to maximise the prospects of obtaining appropriate disposals and orders such as ASBOs. The Court Service is educating magistrates and the courts about the methods and tactics of animal rights extremists, using guidance and best practice material so that the judiciary is aware of the aggravating nature of the activity when they consider relevant cases.

As for amendment No. 224, I understand the wish of the hon. Member for Sutton Coldfield (Mr. Mitchell) to give police officers more flexibility in exercising their power of arrest for the offence of harassment outside a person's home. I think that Conservative thinking is in line with ours on that issue, but the amendment is a little premature, because we   are amending arrest powers more broadly elsewhere in the Bill. The arrest powers specified in clause 117(2) will cease to have effect on the commencement of clause 101. As hon. Members know, that clause codifies the powers of arrest available to a constable under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. The effect of the wider changes will mean that the power to arrest without warrant will be exercised by any constable and not restricted to a constable in uniform. However, in the transition period before the changes come into effect, we wish to retain consistency between the arrest power for the new offence of harassment outside a person's home and the police's current power of arrest for non-compliance with a direction under section 42, which is currently exercised by a constable in uniform.

Clause 118 strengthens the police powers to direct protestors to stay away from a person's home where harassment, alarm or distress is caused to the resident. The clause amends the existing direction power in section 42 of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 to allow a constable to direct a protestor to leave the vicinity of the home and not to return within such period as the constable may specify, up to a maximum of three months. If the protestor returns to the vicinity of the premises within the specified period for the purposes of representing to or persuading the resident that he should not do something that he is entitled to do, or that he should do something that he is not obliged to do, he will commit an offence. The penalty for failing to comply with the direction or for returning to the area within the specified period will be imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months or a fine not exceeding level 4 on the standard scale, or both. That will rise to a period of 51 weeks or a fine not exceeding level 4 on the standard scale when the relevant provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 come into force. Those penalties are consistent with the penalties for failing to comply with a direction from the police in other contexts.

The hon. Member for Somerton and Frome commented about the effect of the provision on people in workplaces. I understand that that is covered by other legislation. Section 14 of the Public Order Act 1986 gives the police powers to impose conditions on assemblies of as few as two people. A condition could include the direction to move away.

That also covers the situation outside someone's home. If it is necessary to strengthen the law that applies outside the home, one would think that it was also necessary to strengthen the law that applies outside the place of work.

The circumstances that we are dealing with in relation to someone's home give rise to issues such as vulnerability in a community or neighbourhood. I will double check, but the measure is about a gap that we have identified and we do not believe that there are the same concerns about workplaces as about people's private home. We want to plug that gap.

Amendments Nos. 101 and 254 place an unnecessary hurdle in the way of the police in their exercise of the direction power, which may include an additional requirement not to return to the vicinity. That is related to appeal mechanisms. The amendments would create an anomaly in relation to other police direction powers that have no appeal mechanism. For example, the police have the power to direct protesters to leave land where they reasonably believe that a person is committing, has committed, or intends to commit the offence of aggravated trespass on land. If, having left the land, the person again enters as a trespasser within a period of three months, he commits an offence. More significantly, that the amendment would render the power to direct a person away and not to return unworkable. I have no need to remind hon. Members how canny that particular group of people are when it comes to exploiting the law.

Safeguards are built into section 42 of the 2001 Act before a police officer can give a direction. A constable may give a direction to any person if that person is present outside or in the vicinity of any premises that are used by an individual as his dwelling, if the constable has reasonable grounds to believe that a person

''is present there for the purpose . . . of representing to the resident or another individual . . . or of persuading the resident or such another individual—

(i) that he should not do something that he is entitled or required to do; or

(ii) that he should do something that he is not under any obligation to do'' and the constable also believes on reasonable grounds that the presence of the person amounts to or is likely to result in the harassment of the resident or is likely to cause alarm or distress to the resident. Those are the steps that have to be gone through before a constable can issue a direction, and rightly so. We are not seeking to give the police the power to ban all protests outside homes or to impose directions indiscriminately. I believe that clause 118 would clarify a grey area. When regular protests are taking place outside someone's home, it is not unreasonable for the police to have an additional ability to tell someone to leave the vicinity and not come back for a certain number days or weeks, or for three months at most.

I hesitate to rise to discuss this amendment, which was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Somerton and Frome. However, I am a little confused by what the Minister initially said about the powers in amendment No. 101 or the equivalent amendment tabled by the Conservatives meaning that the clause would be unworkable. Let us say that a constable said, ''Go away and do not come back for three months''. Neither those who have tabled the amendments nor I would suggest that direction should not come into force until it was confirmed by a magistrate; we simply propose that it should be challengeable later during the ban. I do not see how that would stop the operational effectiveness of the police direction.

When I say that the provision would become unworkable, I am voicing my belief that courts would be clogged up with appeals. There are other areas of law where the police can give direction without any right of appeal. I do not want to hamper the police, but in issuing a direction, a police officer has to go through a number of issues. I would be concerned about applying a restriction that could be undermined by unnecessary appeals to the courts. If someone chooses to breach the direction, their case will be heard in court.

I remain slightly concerned, although I support the thrust of the clause, that the basis for not allowing the effective right of appeal is that the court system is too clogged and is nothing to do with the effectiveness of the measure. I do not think that it is reasonable for someone's right of appeal to be curtailed on the ground given by the Minister, which I do not necessarily dispute, that people might take advantage of their right of appeal. It is a bizarre situation if the idea that people might take advantage of their rights puts pressure on the Government not to issue those rights in the first place. It is a dangerous precedent if it is extended.

I do not think that we are setting a precedent; rather, we are following the practice in other matters on which the police have the power to direct. If an appeal mechanism was put in place, it would lead to problems, as animal rights activists would be likely to appeal every direction not to return during a specified period. That is one argument: the other, as I have said, is that other police powers to   direct are not subject to an appeal mechanism, so we would be setting a precedent by introducing one. Having an appeal mechanism for the order-making power in question would be anomalous.

As I said, under section 69(2) of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 the police have the power to direct protesters to leave land where they reasonably believe such people are committing, have committed, or intend to commit aggravated trespass. If, having left the land, a person so directed re-enters within a period of three months—the provision is similar to the situation that we are discussing—he commits an offence. There is no appeal mechanism for that. To establish such a mechanism would be to set a precedent. I am sure that the same arguments that I am trying to explain to hon. Members were used in the debates about directions on aggravated trespass.

I am grateful to the Minister because I see the value of the order and I am not arguing against it. However, I am trying to apply a little judicial oversight. Surely she accepts that there is a difference between the power to deal with aggravated trespass on private land that she cited and the power to remove people from a public place where they would otherwise be entitled to be. The more apt analogy is perhaps with the power to direct dispersal from a designated area under the Anti-social Behaviour Act 2003, which extends to a maximum of only 24 hours, not three months.

Yes, I understand, but we are also discussing the context in which a police officer might use a direction. As I explained, a police officer would apply a number of different benchmarks to determine that a direction should be issued in the first place. The impact on the residents and their concerns would be taken into account.

We are talking about a situation in which families on their own property, experience such things as sabotage in the middle of the night—I shall not list all the things that animal rights extremists get up to, as we have discussed that already. They can then face individuals or groups, perhaps with placards and drums, mounting a vigil outside their door. However, the very presence of such people there is a serious matter. An individual might throw acid on someone's car and 24 hours later a vigil might appear, with people urging that person to stop doing something that is legal. I know that the hon. Gentleman does not disagree about that combination of harassment. There is a need to give the police effective powers.

Although the offence we propose is not exactly the same as aggravated trespass on land, we would be setting a precedent if we put in place an appeal mechanism when there is no such mechanism for similar laws.

I understand the Minister's point and I am not trying to pick an argument. The judicial supervision point is important, but other factors need to be taken into account. She has said that the means of appeal is the enforcement mechanism in breach—in other words, if an order is placed on someone and they breach it, they are taken to court and given the   opportunity to argue the case. However, I am not sure that there is a defence that the order should not even have been made. The person brought before the court either has breached the order or has not.

I would be happier if there was at least the capacity to argue in court that the police officer was mistaken in issuing the order in the first place, either through incorrect identification of the individual in question, or because the officer was exceeding his powers. At present there is such no provision. The policeman makes the order; someone who breaches it will be found guilty, but there is to be no judicial oversight of whether the order was made properly in the first instance.

But the same applies to aggravated trespass on land. The police officer makes the direction and there is no appeal mechanism. If someone breaches that direction, they will have their day in court, where they can say why they breached the direction. We might have to agree to differ on the issue. Directions can take many forms, but given the processes through which a police officer must go to determine whether to issue a direction, I do not want us to apply an appeal mechanism in this instance when one does not apply in others. Although the directions are not the same, there are good comparisons to be made between them.

New clauses 18 to 23 deal with concerns about confidentiality. I understand those concerns. As I hope to explain, there has been some confusion about people having to disclose their names and home addresses on various registers. We have sought the advice of our DTI colleagues on the issue and I have had to take a crash course on company law with them. There is no need for any member to give a home or business address and many use P.O. boxes or something similar. Again, one of the problems has been communication and information—knowing which companies might be under threat and therefore which people need to know that they can take such steps. Some of the companies that are directly involved in animal research are very aware of the different ways in which the law can protect them, but problems have emerged when more arm's-length companies supply the company involved in the research—the parent company, as it were. So, measures already exist. It is also common for shares to be held through nominees, and in such cases it is the nominee's details that are public. We do not feel that it is necessary to provide for the statutory protection of information that is not required.

On new clause 20, the Law Commissions have fully considered the position of secured lenders, and we are awaiting the recommendations of the Law Commission for England and Wales. I understand that it is likely to propose that the contact details of a lender's agent may be filed in place of the lender's details. New clause 18 is unnecessary because company members are not in the same position as their directors. We introduced confidentiality orders for directors because they generally have to provide their   forename, surname and residential address for the public record, but the requirement for company members is not so specific; it merely requires their names and addresses, but they do not need to give their home address, and, as I said, a P.O. box number would do.

Keeping members' addresses off the public record raises certain issues, including some relating to corporate governance, as my DTI colleagues informed me. It is important that those who own a company engage thoughtfully in its operation and exercise the responsibilities of ownership, as well as take dividends. As part of that role, it is important that members are able act together, which means that they must be able to contact one another—for example, they may need to collect signatures to propose a resolution at an annual general meeting, and how they vote on resolutions may have far-reaching implications for many others. The independent company law review consulted widely and concluded that any solution to the problem of people abusing the public availability of companies' registers of members should not interfere with members' rights or otherwise damage the proper use of registers or the information in them.

Can the Minister confirm whether the review considered the implications in terms of extremist activity of access to the register? I would suggest that it did not; it was looking at other things.

I will check that, but the issue has been incorporated into the review, which is now looking into how such things might help the company law reform Bill, which the Government are hoping to introduce. It has certainly considered issues of confidentiality.

Confidentiality orders provide that directors do not have to seek an order to be protected, but can simply provide something like a P.O. box number, as can members. That would actually negate the need for confidentiality orders, because people will simply be able to say that they want a P.O. box address, which helps. That will apply to everyone, whatever the situation with regard to animal rights extremists. On a practical note, there are issues about the consideration of millions of separate applications for members' confidentiality orders, which would obviously be a very bureaucratic task. They certainly could not be handled by the handful of people who operate the current system for directors' confidentiality, but that difficulty would be negated by the fact that neither directors nor members will have to go through that process, but can simply have a P.O. box number, as I said. We believe that new clause 19 is unnecessary because members can already keep their home addresses off the public record. Companies do not need the right to make their members' addresses secret.

On new clause 20, the public record of details of companies' secured borrowing was introduced to protect creditors, particularly unsecured ones, and there has been careful consideration of any proposal that might increase their commercial risk. The Law Commission for England and Wales and the Scottish Law Commission recently examined aspects of the law   on secure lending, including registration requirements. In view of the potential risk of lenders being intimidated, we asked both commissions to consider what, if any, lenders' details should be on the public record. The Scottish Law Commission recommended that the text of the deed of a floating charge, which will include the lenders' details, should be registered,. The Law Commission for England and Wales has not yet reported, but both commissions advise that very few respondents to their consultations, and notably no lenders, believe that the details of the person taking securities should be protected. In the case of a charge over land, the information would still appear on the land register, as would charges over ships, aircraft and any other asset for which there is a specialist register. The DTI is considering the report, which, if there are still concerns, might provide an opportunity to raise the matter in relation to the company law reform Bill, on which the DTI will lead.

May I make the same point as before? The reviews are considering other areas of the law. I hear what the Minister says, and I agree that she may be making an important point, but the people who are asked to give responses should be asked to give their views in the context of access by terrorists, about which they may not be thinking.

I will check with my DTI colleagues, but I guess that several organisations—certainly those that have lobbied me and others on what the Home Office should be doing about law enforcement and the policing of animal rights extremists—will look to other Departments to determine whether any other aspects of legislation affect their members. As the hon. Gentleman knows, my noble Friend Lord Sainsbury has worked closely with me to tackle animal rights extremism. I understand that the review considered extremism towards company directors, but I will double check if the hon. Gentleman needs any more reassurance. We have been working very closely together across Departments, and it would be rather strange if Lord Sainsbury and outside organisations had not been mindful of that matter.

It is not entirely clear what new clause 21 would achieve. It is clearly intended to provide another, perhaps easier, route to obtaining a confidentiality order where one is already in force, but, for the reasons that I gave for resisting other amendments, I am not sure if the new clause is really necessary.

New clause 22 is difficult. I have had discussions with DTI officials about it. It is intended to expunge information from the public record that is already there, but it is a fact of life that once information has been made public, it is public for ever: it can be found in libraries and various other places where people can gain access to information. However much we may regret that fact, I am not sure that statute law can change it. The forthcoming company law reform legislation will make it much easier for company directors to keep their home addresses out of the public record, and all directors will be entitled to file a   service address for the public record. Much as we might like to remove information from existing records, I am not sure that it is possible. Legal issues are involved that might be important in other proceedings or actions taken against individuals. Again, it comes down to a balance between questions of confidentiality, with which I totally sympathise, and matters of corporate governance.

I fully understand the concerns expressed through new clauses 26 and 32. Much of what we have been discussing today has been about the protection of individuals but we are aware also of the need to protect the corporate body from the damage done by animals rights extremist to those companies that, I repeat, are engaged in legal, lawful activity, using animals in science and research in what is one of the most regulated areas in the world. I am sympathetic to the problem.

We have been working hard across Government to identify a clause that includes an offence linked to economic damage. We have had to work through a number of issues. The first is how to create such an offence that still allows people who want to protest legitimately against a company or an organisation to do so. There are plenty of examples of such protest from the past and from today and protest should continue to be allowed. Mention was made of other campaigns, such as that the one against apartheid and environmental campaigns, but the list is endless. We have had to think seriously about how to legislate without creating a disproportionate response and stopping people using their democratic right to protest in a law-abiding way.

That is one issue, but there are others. For instance, new clause 32, tabled by the hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon, would allow the offence to be applied only once the company had decided to stop trading. We do not necessarily want to reach that point. Hon. Members might want to think about how to create an offence that can be used before a company decides to stop trading—a supply company that decides to stop working for Huntingdon Life Sciences, or a company that decides to stop its activities entirely. We do not necessarily want take action only after the event, because that would not stop undue and illegal pressure being put on such companies.

Other issues are highlighted in both new clauses. For instance, going back to my first point, the question is whether the provision should be restricted to the groups involved in animal science and research identified in new clause 32 or whether it should be broader. The Government are still thinking about that important point. However, we are taking legal advice and hope to table amendments on Report. I understand that the nature of the offence that we are talking about is groundbreaking in legal terms, so I offer Opposition Front-Bench Members the opportunity to meet me on Report to talk through the clause.

The Minister's offer is helpful to us and we are grateful for it. We understand what the Minister says about the provision being groundbreaking—I think that that was her term—and the need to proceed with caution. I recognise also that she will not say which way she is minded in respect of a restricted activity or a wider provision. However, it would be useful if at this point, without coming down on either side of the argument, she shared her views about the advantages and disadvantages of each of those approaches.

I tabled the new clause for public debate; I could otherwise have had a private chat about the issue. Perhaps the hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr. Djanogly) could, too. I know that the Minister has not made up her mind, but if she explained the issues, that would help to inform Report stage.

I think that I have been generous in discussing this aspect—that is why I have offered Opposition Members the opportunity to see me to discuss the issues. We will have a debate; the hon. Gentleman should not worry about it. There will be a debate on Report and, of course, in the other place. I think that I have been very open in sharing with the Committee today some of the complexities that are involved in this matter.

There are complexities, too, in the term ''connected persons'', for the reasons I explained earlier. They could be people such as a niece or an aunt, or people involved socially with those directly involved.

I hope that hon. Members will not press their amendments and new clauses. We take the issue seriously—and not just in relation to the Bill. We have been working hard to ensure that the current law is used to its utmost and to improve the relevant mechanisms through, for example, the national extremism tactical co-ordinating unit. The police, the CPS and the judiciary are fully aware of the nature of the activity that we are talking about and how serious it is to the individuals and companies concerned and to the country as a whole.

The Minister has clarified the points on which I requested clarification, and I thank her for that.

We have spent a lot of time on the clause, and I do not intend to take up much more. The Minister's expressed sentiments are certainly in favour of dealing with the problem and I respect that. The question is whether action will be taken that stops the extremism. Proposals and laws have been introduced before, but the problem is as bad as ever—in many ways worse.

I want to look on the bright side and be positive, but during the lunch break my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) and I attended Solicitor-General's Question Time. The Solicitor-General was asked whether animal rights terrorism was being prosecuted and my hon. Friend pressed the question whether the special prosecutors promised nearly a year ago had been provided. The Solicitor-General's response was that the process was still under way. That   is what happens consistently with regard to dealing with animal rights extremism. We shall simply have to see how we progress.

The Bill will, in our opinion, do much to counter extremist activity, particularly against individuals and particularly against those individuals in their homes. We support that. However, the Bill fails to attend to the task of securing the position of companies. The Government seem to fail to appreciate that by defending companies they would be defending their employees. I disagree with a lot of what the Minister said about shareholders' registers. The average shareholder will not use an alias or a nominee service. Anyone who had shares in HLS could not have used a nominee service because no nominee would have acted for HLS. I believe that a context system would be possible, but the Minister helpfully suggested a P.O. box solution.

As I understand it, shareholders can already use P.O. box addresses. One of the problems has been that they have not been aware that they can do that. That is why I have said that we do not need legislation for such people, we need to ensure that they are aware of what they may do. In future, it will be the norm for directors, instead of going through confidentiality orders, to avail themselves of a P.O. box address.

The Minister is quite right. That is the case in relation to members. In relation to directors and to mortgagees, changes will be required, and I understand that changes are being considered. However, I first wrote to her Department—and to the DTI, as it happens—about four years ago, yet here we are, still talking about it. Perhaps there will soon be some kind of action.

After four years of campaigning on the issue, I am truly delighted to hear the Government say that they will review the position on economic damage. That is a tremendous thing to hear. However, one swallow does not make a spring. Until the Government actually present us with a clause and a strategy to deal with economic damage, we will pursue new clause 26. I am grateful for the Minister's offer of a meeting to discuss the proposed clause and I will certainly take her up on that. If we can sort something out before Report stage, that will really be fantastic. However, I shall wait to see that happen.

On the basis of the Minister's response, I shall not press any of the amendments tabled by my hon. Friends and myself, other than new clause 26, on which I will request that the matter be put to a vote at the appropriate time. That will provide an indication that the Conservative party does not accept the economic intimidation of companies and will make it clear that the next Conservative Government will address the issue directly.

I am grateful to the Minister for having clarified the points raised by my probing amendments, and I am satisfied with her answers. In respect of the amendments on directors' and shareholders' confidentiality, I think that the hon. Member for Huntingdon made some important points. I, too, am   not convinced that they can be wholly addressed by an awareness-raising exercise that puts the onus on the shareholder. We shall consider our position on such amendments for later stages of the Bill.

Before I come to new clause 32, I should like to clarify another point. After I spoke, the hon. Gentleman was rather critical of the Government's position, and the Government rather objected to the tone or the content, or both—

The tone.

Was it the tone? Right. I suspect that it was the content, too, because I am not sure that the Minister pleaded guilty. It is worthwhile to an extent to come to the aid of the hon. Gentleman, who has similar concerns. The point that I was trying to make is that the Home Office and the DTI, particularly the DTI, are fully apprised of the situation and are keen to make progress. DTI Ministers have been extremely supportive of businesses based in my constituency and of the university. That is not the same as saying that it was inevitable that we should be in this situation. Some actions that are being taken now could have been taken some time ago. There has been a pattern of such activity and only recently have the correct police structures been introduced. That is no criticism of the Minister—from the moment she took up her position, we saw rapid progress on appointments.

We could go further back and look at the Labour party's decision to withdraw its investment from Huntingdon Life Sciences on the basis that it thought that its work was unethical. I know that that is not the Government's responsibility—it is not responsible for the Labour party or, indeed, sometimes, the other way round. Nevertheless, that was a bitter blow, as I know from speaking to people at HLS, because it gave the imprimatur of political approval to that sort of approach. In saying that the current office-holders are doing a good job, I want to associate myself partly with the remarks that some criticism can be made of what happened previously.

I appreciate the offer of a meeting with the Minister in respect of new clauses 32 and 36. I hope we will be properly consulted, rather than presented with an approach at the meeting on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. I am sure the Government feel that they have a majority for this measure. The point of tabling the amendments in Committee was to advance the debate. I am grateful for the Minister's clarification on dealing with things before they become a problem. It may be the words ''seeks to induce'' need to be inserted in new clause 32. I understand the Minister's point about the list of connected persons not covering fully all those who may need to be covered, using the example of the niece in the pub in the north-west. The new clause may not be perfect in that respect

There are still issues around the broader provision. The more I think about that, the more difficult it will be for my colleagues and me to be persuaded that there is a basis to go further than legislation restricted at this point to animal rights extremists. There may be a   middle way, whereby secondary legislation requiring affirmative action by both Houses could be used to add to a list of areas where there is regulation, and so on. I was hoping we could have that debate today on the record, at least generally, but we have not been able to do so.

On the basis of what I have said, it may be difficult for us to support new clause 26, even though we sympathise with the reasons behind it. The hon. Member for Huntingdon indicated he wanted a vote, and we do not want to pre-empt the discussion we want to have, nor any decision, about whether the legislation should be extended. In view of the fact that the Government are seeking to engage with us on the question of animal rights extremism and economic damage, it is not our intention at this point to press our new clause to a vote. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 116 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 117 and 118 ordered to stand part of the Bill.