I beg to move amendment No. 341, in clause 116, page 82, line 29, after 'be', insert 'reasonably considered to be'.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Amendment No. 342, in clause 116, page 82, line 29, after 'victim', insert 'or target'.

Clause stand part.

Amendment No. 343, in clause 117, page 83, line 27, after 'presence', insert 'or conduct'.

Amendment No. 344, in clause 117, page 83, leave out lines 42 to 44.

'(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 51 weeks or a fine not exceeding level 4 on the standard scale, or to both,

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or to a fine, or to both.'.

Amendment No. 224, in clause 117, page 84, line 13, leave out 'in uniform'.

Clause 117 stand part.

Amendment No. 225, in clause 118, page 84, line 41, leave out from 'liable' to end of line 43 and insert—

'(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 51 weeks or a fine not exceeding level 4 on the standard scale, or both,

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or to a fine, or to both.'.

Amendment No. 101, in clause 118, page 85, line 4, at end add—

'(7D) Any person to whom a constable has given a direction under subsection (4)(b) may appeal against the making of the direction to a magistrates' court.'.

Amendment No. 254, in clause 118, page 85, line 4, at end add—

'(7D) Any person to whom a constable has given a direction under subsection (4)(b) may appeal against the making of the direction to a magistrates' court in the circumstances where the period specified under subsection (4)(b) exceeds 10 days.'.

Clause 118 stand part.

New clause 18—Names and addresses of members of companies: individual application—

'The following section is inserted after section 723C of the Companies Act 1985—

''723CA Individual members' confidentiality orders

(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, an individual may make an application under this section to the Secretary of State where the condition in subsection (2) is satisfied.

(2) That condition is that the individual—

(a) is or proposes to become a member of a relevant company; and

(b) considers that the availability for inspection by members of the public of particulars of his name and usual residential or business address creates, or (if an order is not made under this section) is likely to create, a serious risk that he or a person who lives with him or is an employee of his will be subjected to violence or intimidation (''a serious risk'').

(3) Where, on an application made by an individual under this section, the Secretary of State is satisfied that the availability for inspection by members of the public of the particulars of the individual's usual residential address creates or (if an order is not made under this section) is likely to create a serious risk that the individual, or a person who lives with him, or an employee of his will be subjected to violence or intimidation, he shall make an order under this section (''an individual member's confidentiality order'') in relation to him.

(4) Otherwise, he shall dismiss the application.

(5) At any time when an individual member's confidentiality order is in force in relation to an individual the name and address of the individual in the register of members of the company which is the subject of the confidentiality order shall not be disclosed to any person who may request either the company or Companies House disclosure of such name and address save in prescribed circumstances.

(6) The Secretary of State shall give the applicant notice of his decision under subsection (3) or (4); and a notice under this subsection shall be given within such period and shall contain such information as may be prescribed. 

(7) The Secretary of State may at any time revoke an individual member's confidentiality order if he is satisfied that such conditions as may be prescribed are satisfied.''.'.

New clause 19—Names and addresses of members of companies: company application—

'The following section is inserted after section 723CA of the Companies Act 1985 as inserted by section [Names and addresses of members of companies: individual application]—

''723CB Company members confidentiality orders

(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, a company may make an application under this section to the Secretary of State where the condition in subsection (2) is satisfied.

(2) That condition is that the company considers that the availability for inspection by members of the public of particulars of the names and usual residential or business addresses of the members of the company creates, or (if an order is not made under this section) is likely to create, a serious risk that a member of the company or a person who lives with or is an employee of a member of the company will be subjected to violence or intimidation (''a serious risk'').

(3) Where, on an application made by a company under this section, the Secretary of State is satisfied that the availability for inspection by members of the public of the particulars of that company's members' usual residential addresses creates or (if an order is not made under this section) is likely to create a serious risk that a member, or a person who lives with him, or an employee of his will be subjected to violence or intimidation, he shall make an order under this section (''a company members confidentiality order'') in relation the company.

(4) Otherwise, he shall dismiss the application.

(5) At any time when a company members confidentiality order is in force in relation to a company, the name and address of any individual in the register of members of the company that is the subject of the confidentiality order, shall not be disclosed to any person who may request either the company or Companies House disclosure of such names and addresses save in prescribed circumstances.

(6) The Secretary of State shall give the applicant notice of his decision under subsection (3) or (4); and a notice under this subsection shall be given within such period and shall contain such information as may be prescribed.

(7) The Secretary of State may at any time revoke a company members confidentiality order if he is satisfied that such conditions as may be prescribed are satisfied.''.'.

New clause 20—Addresses of chargees or mortgagees of companies—

''The following section is inserted after section 723CB of the Companies Act 1985 as inserted by section [Names and addresses of members of companies: company application]—

''723CC Chargee confidentiality orders

(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, an individual may make an application under this section to the Secretary of State where the condition in subsection (2) is satisfied.

(2) That condition is that the individual—

(a) is or proposes to become a chargee or mortgagee of a relevant company; and

(b) considers that the availability for inspection by members of the public of particulars of his or its name and usual residential or business address creates, or (if an order is not made under this section) is likely to create, a serious risk that he or a person who lives with him or is an employee of his or it will be subjected to violence or intimidation ('the serious risk').

(3) Where, on an application made by an individual under this section, the Secretary of State is satisfied that the availability for inspection by members of the public of the particulars of the individual's usual residential or business address in relation to documents required to be held by Companies House or by the company in relation to the charge or mortgage creates or (if an order is not made under this section) is likely to create a serious  risk that the individual, or a person who lives with him, or an employee of his will be subjected to violence or intimidation, he shall make an order under this section ('a chargee confidentiality order') in relation to him.

(4) Otherwise, he shall dismiss the application.

(5) Where a chargee confidentiality order is made under subsection (3) above the name and residential or business address of the chargee or mortgagee of the company that is the subject of the confidentiality order shall not be revealed to any person who may request either the company or Companies House access to such name and address save in prescribed circumstances.

(6) The Secretary of State shall give the applicant notice of his decision under subsection (3) or (4); and a notice under this subsection shall be given within such period and shall contain such information as may be prescribed by regulations.

(7) The Secretary of State may at any time revoke a chargee confidentiality order if he is satisfied that such conditions as may be prescribed are satisfied.''.'.

New clause 21—Confidentiality orders: associated companies—

''The following section is inserted after section 723CC of the Companies Act 1985 as inserted by section [Addresses of chargees or mortgagees of companies]—

''723CD Confidentiality orders: associated companies

(1) Where a relevant confidentiality order is made in relation to a relevant company and the Secretary of State is satisfied that in relation to another company ('company A') the condition in subsection (2) below applies, he shall extend the operation of the order to that other company or make a further relevant confidentiality order (including a confidentiality order of a different kind) in relation to that other company, as the case may be.

(2) The condition is that the availability for inspection or disclosure by members of the public of the particulars of the appropriate individual's usual residential or business address in a document relating to company A which is, by virtue of this Act required to be available for such inspection or disclosure, creates (or if an order is not extended or made under this section) is likely to create a serious risk that the individual, or a person who lives with him, or an employee of his will be subject to violence or intimidation.

(4) The Secretary of State shall give the applicant notice of his decision under subsection (1); and a notice under this subsection shall be given within such period and shall contain such information as may be prescribed.

(5) The Secretary of State may at any time revoke a decision or a relevant confidentiality order made under this section if he is satisfied that such conditions as may be prescribed are satisfied.''.'.

New clause 22—Director's confidentiality orders: directors etc.—

'(1) In section 723C(1) of the Companies Act 1985 (effect of confidentiality orders), the words ''that were contained in a document delivered to the registrar after the order came into force'' are replaced by ''that are contained in a document delivered to the registrar at any time''.

(2) In section 723D(3)(b) of that Act (construction of sections 723B and 723C) the words ''after the order came into force'' are replaced by ''at any time''.

(3) In section 723B(3), (7), (8)(d), (9), section 723C(1), (6)(a), (7)(a) and 723D(4) of that Act and in the headings to the said sections 723B and 723C, the words ''confidentiality order'' and ''confidentiality orders'' are replaced by ''director's confidentiality order'' and ''director's confidentiality orders'' as the case may be.''.'.

New clause 23—Confidentiality orders: miscellaneous—

'(1) The following amendments are made to the Companies Act 1985.

(2) In section 709(1) (Inspection, etc of records kept by the registrar), ''section 723B'' is replaced by ''sections 723B, 723CA, 723CB, 723CC and 723CD''. 

(3) In section 356, (inspection of register of members), after subsection (6), the following subsection is inserted—

''(7) Subsections (1) and (6) are subject to sections 723CA and 723CB.''

(4) In section 408, (right to inspect instruments which create charges, etc), after subsection (4), the following subsection is inserted—

''(5) Subsections (1) and (4) are subject to sections 723CC.''.

(5) In section 723C(4) (effect of confidentiality order), ''confidentiality order'' is replaced by ''relevant confidentiality order''.

(6) In section 723D (construction of sections 723B and 723C)—

(a) In subsection (1), ''section 723B'' is replaced by ''sections 723B, 723CA, 723CB, 723CC and 723CD'',

(b) In subsection (4)—

(i) ''section 723B and 723C'' is replaced by ''sections 723B, 723C, 723CA, 723CB, 723CC and 723CD'',

(ii) the following definition is inserted in the appropriate place—

'''relevant confidentiality order' means a director's confidentiality order, individual member's confidentiality order, company members' confidentiality order or chargee's confidentiality order;''

(c) Subsection (6) is omitted.

(7) In section 723E(1) (offences), ''section 723B'' is replaced by ''sections 723B, 723D, 723E, 723F or 723G''.'.

New clause 26—Economic damage to companies—

'(1) A person (''person A'') commits an offence under this section if by acting in accordance with subsection (2) he causes financial damage to another person (''person B''), with the purpose of representing to person B, or persuading person B—

(i) that he should not do something that he is legally entitled to do; or

(ii) that he should do something that he is not under any legal obligation to do.

(2) A person acts in accordance with this subsection if those actions—

(a) involve the harassment of or violence against person B or a connected person, or

(b) involve damage to property of person B or a connected person.

(3) A connected person, for the purposes of subsection (2) above, means—

(a) a customer of person B;

(b) a shareholder of person B;

(c) an employee of person B;

(d) a director of person B;

(e) where person B is a partnership, its partners;

(f) a supplier of goods or services to person B;

(g) a supplier of goods or services to persons within paragraph (f) above;

(h) an individual normally residing with any individual falling within paragraphs (a) to (g) above.

(4) A constable may arrest without warrant anyone whom he reasonably suspects to be committing an offence within subsection (1) above.

(5) A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable—

(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 51 weeks or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to both;

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or to a fine, or to both.'.

New clause 32—Animal research: intention to cause economic loss—

'(1) A person commits an offence if, by acting in accordance with subsection (3) and with the necessary intent—

(a) he induces one connected person—

(i) to breach a contract between that connected person and another connected person, or 

(ii) to terminate a contract between that connected person and another connected person (whether or not the termination constitutes a breach of the contract), or

(b) he persuades one connected person—

(i) not to enter into a contract with another connected person, or

(ii) not to have commercial dealings (of whatever nature) with another connected person.

(2) No person shall be guilty of an offence under this section—

(a) by virtue of his doing anything in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute,

(b) if he is exercising any power conferred on him by any enactment,

(c) if he is acting for the purposes of making a protected disclosure falling within Part IVA of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (protected disclosures).

(3) A person acts in accordance with this subsection if he carries out or threatens any unlawful activity against a connected person (whether or not that person is one of the connected persons mentioned in subsection (1)).

(4) In subsection (1), the necessary intent is the intent to—

(a) prevent, stop or hinder an animal research facility operator or a person who is not, but may become, an animal research facility operator doing something which he is entitled to do, or

(b) persuade an animal research facility operator or a person who is not, but may become, an animal research facility operator to do something which he is not under any obligation to do.

(5) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—

(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 51 weeks or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to both,

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or to a fine, or to both.

(6) In this section—

''animal research facility operator'' means a person under whose direction or control the following are carried out—

(a) regulated procedures for the purposes of the Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986 (c. 14) (''the 1986 Act''), as described in section 2 of that Act, or

(b) the breeding of protected animals under the authority of a certificate under section 7 of the 1986 Act;

''connected persons'' are—

(c) animal research facility operators,

(d) holders of licences under section 4 or 5 of the 1986 Act (personal licences and project licences), persons specified under section 6(5) or 7(5) of the 1986 Act (scientific procedure establishments and breeding and supplying establishments),

(e) suppliers of goods or services to persons falling within paragraphs (a) to (c) or (f) to (k) of this subsection,

(f) suppliers of goods or services to persons falling within paragraph (d) above,

(g) customers of an animal research facility operator,

(h) shareholders in an animal research facility operator (if the operator is a company),

(i) subsidiaries of an animal research facility operator,

(j) companies of which an animal research facility operator is a subsidiary,

(k) trade organisations representing animal research facility operators,

(l) trade unions whose members include employees of any person mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (i) above,

(m) employees of any person mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (i) above,

(n) where the person mentioned in paragraph (a) to (i) above is a company, its directors,

(o) where the person mentioned in paragraph (a) to (f) above is a partnership firm its partners, and

(p) individuals normally residing with any individual falling within paragraph (a) to (g) or (l) to (n) above; 

''trade dispute'' has the same meaning as in Part IV of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992,

(7) The Secretary of State may by order—

(a) add a description of person to the list of connected persons in subsection (6),

(b) remove a description of person from that list,

(c) amend the list in some other way.'.

Amendment No. 311, in title, line 10, after 'Scotland;', insert

'to make provision in connection with economic damage to companies;'.

This is the first time that I have spoken in this Committee. I came specifically to speak to some of the amendments and clauses in this group—we clearly have a large group of matters to discuss.

It might be convenient if I explain the order in which I will deal with the issues and the amendments tabled in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath). Amendments Nos. 341 and 342 deal with clause 116, and amendments Nos. 343 and 344 with clause 117. They are followed by new clause 32, which is important. I note that the Conservatives also have amendments in the group, to which we will respond when they have spoken to them. I know that my hon. Friend hopes to speak to amendment No. 101, which is tabled in his name.

Clauses 116 to 118 relate to problems of animal rights extremism, although they do not specifically state that. Given that we have so much ground to cover, I do not think that this Committee is the place to make long speeches about the issue, but I would like to put on record a number of points about the problem that the clauses are intended to solve.

Work using animals for medical research is necessary, valuable and carefully regulated. Often it is necessary because of Government requirements for toxicity testing; the onus is therefore on the Government and Parliament to ensure that individuals and firms can carry out in peace the testing required by Government, Parliament and statute, that they are not subject to unwarranted intimidation and that they are not victims of violent acts or harassment. Such work is valuable not only to identifying new treatments for human and animal disease, but to the livelihood of people working in the pharmaceutical and medical research industries and indirectly to the economic well-being of the country. That is why we have to ensure that the work can be carried out in this country free from harassment, the threat of violence and intimidation. It is important that Parliament and the Government ensure that the legislative framework provides for that as well as possible.

Some people object to the use of animals in medical research, even when it is carefully regulated. They have the right to hold those views—many members of my party, and of all others, share them—and they should have the right to express them peacefully. However, I have not yet met a Member of the House of Commons who supports the activities covered by the clauses: harassment, intimidation, threats of violence and   violence. It is clearly possible without having recourse to harassment, intimidation, violence and threats of violence to have a debate, to have protests, to have strongly held views and to advance those views, to seek for them to be debated and for regulation to be reviewed and changed if necessary.

Although I am usually sceptical about increases in the law surrounding personal freedom and the ability to protest, my party and I agree that the clauses, on balance, are a reasonable and proportionate response to the problem. We do not believe that they go so wide as to catch animal rights or any other protest activity that we do not want to catch. Nevertheless, we recognise that there is a debate to be had. We look forward to that debate and to hearing any concerns that may be expressed. We hope that the Government will be open to tabling amendments if not now, then later, if issues are raised by people who believe that the powers are too wide. Local businesses and constituents in my area and that of the hon. Member for Huntingdon, and probably in the constituencies of other hon. Members, have been put under huge pressure, which I shall discuss when I speak to new clause 32.

Clause 116 is designed to extend the provisions of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 to make it absolutely clear in law that the Act can be used to protect the victims of harassment or alleged harassment when one or more persons are involved. That is set out in the explanatory notes. I understand that some court judgments have taken a literal view of the word ''another'' in the Act—there was a case in Hull, for example, in which a company could not be protected under the Act because of the rather narrow interpretation of the relevant section. I understand what clause 116 aims to do, and I support it.

Amendment No. 341 is a probing amendment, designed to elicit from the Government an explanation of two points—three, when taken with amendment No. 342. First, is the term ''may be a victim'' too wide? Anyone ''may'' be a victim, particularly in the case of harassment that is intended to have victims but that we hope can be stopped at some point during the harassment. Amendment No. 341 probes whether the words ''reasonably considered to be'' a victim might therefore be appropriate.

Similarly, one might argue that it would be unfortunate if intelligence showed clear evidence of a plan to harass and that there had already been harassment elsewhere, but one did not want anyone to become a victim of that harassment before having a form of legislative comeback. I do not know whether that would be appropriate, and I suggested the words ''or target'' to probe the Government's view of how predictive such a measure is deemed to be. I am concerned about legislating against intended crime rather than against crime itself, but I would be grateful if the Minister explained whether, if there is clear intelligence of a plan or conspiracy to harass and a pattern of behaviour has already been set in motion that suggests that there is about to be another victim who has not yet been harassed, that person will be   protected, particularly if the victims of the previous activity are unwilling or unable to give evidence in court, whereas a future victim or target may be able to.

It is not clear to me why subsection (2)(a) is needed when subsection (2)(b) seems to cover the persons listed in proposed new subsection (1A)(c), which seems to cover most people. Will the Minister clarify? Proposed new section 3A(2)(a) seems to suggest that the person need not even fall within proposed new subsection (1A)(c), so I question what sort of people are included in proposed new section 3A(2) who are not already included in subsection (2)(b).

Clause 117, as the Minister will no doubt explain, deals with home visits, which is a prevalent tactic among animal rights extremists. It is a great problem for medical researchers and for the companies associated with them. As I understand it, the measure is designed to ensure that people can be caught on one occasion in order to prevent a flitting campaign, going from house to house and home to home.

Amendment No. 343 simply probes the Government to see whether an individual's presence is required for the provisions on harassment to apply, or whether conduct using remote means—electronic communications and then an amplifier, for example—that causes alarm and distress but does not require the actual presence of the perpetrator is covered.

Amendment No. 344 probes the Government about why new subsection 42A(3) is required. It states that

''The references in subsection (1)(c) and (d) to a person's presence are references to his presence either alone or together with that of any other persons who are also present.''

I am sure that there is a good reason, but the explanatory notes merely restate that wording, so I should be grateful if the Minister explained why that is a requirement. What does it seek to capture that is not already captured?

Clause 118 deals with the police direction to somebody to stay away from a person's home issued in advance of its having been found that he has been there. I know that my hon. Friend the Member for Somerton and Frome has a view in relation to amendment No. 101 about the rights of people who face a police direction of that kind.

New clause 32 deals with the separate question of economic damage. Members of the Committee will have received the briefing that I have had from the Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry demonstrating how great a problem that is. It is a problem for the individuals concerned and their families—sometimes including families far removed from the economic purpose of the company and, indeed, companies several times removed from the work involving animals. It is also a problem for economic reasons. There are concerns that research and development investment will decline because this country is no longer a civilised place in which to undertake such business, even though it is valuable, necessary and carefully regulated. There is evidence that such investment decreased last year for the first time in a long time. That is worrying on economic grounds as well as on the human grounds that I have set out.

New clause 32 would create a new offence in relation to animal research and the specific intention to cause economic loss. It is not the sort of measure that should be taken lightly, and that is why I was keen to ensure that we could debate the matter. The hon. Member for Huntingdon has tabled an analogous new clause, the terms of which I believe—I should not interpret it for him—go a little wider than those of mine. We both wanted a debate in Committee so that, if the Government were minded to do something of the kind, they could be informed of the views of members of the Committee before tabling an amendment on Report. It is of course regrettable that there is not already something showing the Government's intention for us to see now, but the debate presents us with an opportunity. Perhaps the Government are thinking of something with similar architecture, and we can thus carry out at least partial scrutiny of their proposals.

I shall not go through the new clause in detail because of the time constraints, but I hope that the Government will comment on it in reasonable detail. It is intended to create a new offence in the context of an unlawful activity that is already taking place. I draw the Committee's attention to subsection (3), which would require a person to have carried out or threatened

''any unlawful activity against a connected person'' to fall within the ambit of the new clause. It could be argued that a new offence is not necessary if unlawful activity has already taken place that could be prosecuted or lead to proceedings, but I do not agree. Extra sentencing provisions may be available where an offence is part of a pattern of activity, but there will be occasions when victims of harassment and intimidation are not willing to seek a prosecution and find it onerous to be forced to give evidence in public, particularly if the root problem is their being exposed, accused or intimidated.

The new clause provides that if there is a contract between connected persons as defined in subsection (6), a person can commit an offence if, by acting in accordance with subsection (3)—that is, committing a separate offence—he attempts to induce a connected   person to breach a contract, as set out in subsection (1). The wording used is not dissimilar from that in clause 116 and in other legislation.

I believe that the new clause is a proportionate response and is sufficiently narrow not to cause excessive concern to people who, like me, take a civil libertarian view of protest. First, the measure is restricted to the context of animal research. I know that there is debate and argument—we may touch on that in connection with new clause 26—about whether other spheres of activity might in the future be subject to the same sort of harassment and intimidation. I accept that internet methods could be used in other contexts about which strong views are held, including areas of science and technology such as mobile phone masts or genetically modified crops. Nevertheless, because the intention to cause economic loss is potentially a relatively wide offence, without—except in relation to the existing unlawful act—specific individual victims, a high threshold should be set, including an existing problem, a pattern of behaviour, and a network of people who have not been tackled by existing legislation, before a law of this kind should be made.

Animal research protests meet the criteria that we want to meet. There is an established problem, which has existed for several years and is getting worse. Existing legislation has been tried but has not worked, and the activity that is being affected is carefully regulated and subject to parliamentary scrutiny. Parliament has made it clear that the activity is an economic, scientific, academic and research activity that it supports, within clear regulation, which is subject to review and can be amended. That, by definition, narrows the proposed provision, because one would not expect the same problem to arise in less well regulated areas of activity.

If problems arise in another sphere, the Government might come forward with a package to regulate it, so that the public can see that Parliament is willing to regulate it. Alongside that legislation, the Government might also introduce something similar to my new clause. However, many people would have problems with a wider provision, which is why I am concerned about the new clause that the hon. Member for Huntingdon tabled and why I thought to table a narrower one.

I understand that some people feel that the new clause is too wide and might prevent legitimate protest. I do not believe that, because subsection (2) details exemptions relating to industrial relations disputes and, for example, the work of inspectors of animal research establishments, who may well by their findings have an economic effect—rightly so, if they find breaches of the regulation. Subsection (2) also protects disclosure under the so-called whistleblower's Act. I do not believe that those provisions would catch journalists doing their job or consumer boycotts, because they require that someone is carrying out or threatening unlawful activity, which is nothing like   journalistic campaigns, lobbying or calling for consumer boycotts. Marches and protests that are within the existing law and that do not harass also fall outside the provisions, which would apply only to those who are threatening unlawful activity.

I shall draw my remarks to a close, because other hon. Members want to speak and we have a strict timetable. I recognise the Government's support for the industry and the people in my constituency who work in animal research. There are questions to be asked about how quickly the Government have responded to the issues, but there is no doubt that Ministers in the Home Office and the Department of Trade and Industry are now actively engaged with the problem. The measures in the clause—and those in new clause 32, if the Government accept it or introduce something similar, albeit not significantly wider I hope—will show that the Government are committed to legislating to protect the livelihoods and interests of those conducting such important work.

I hope that the Government will bear in mind that although there might be considerable support in the House for such measures, we must have regard for the civil liberties issues. The fact that there is a problem and a desire to solve it—I believe that Opposition parties will support most of the Government's measures—makes it incumbent on us to ensure that the measures are not drawn too widely, because they will not be subject to the degree of scrutiny to which contentious measures are usually subject. In saying so, however, I welcome the proposals and commend new clause 32 in particular.

We are having a general debate on animal rights issues. The hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon gave a good justification of the need for animal testing, and I will not take up more of the Committee's time in adding to what he said. However, although direct action and terrorist activity is emanating from animal rights activities today, the same methods could be used tomorrow by other groups. If drugs manufacturers and animal testing companies are affected now, meat importers, road builders, handbag manufacturers, furniture makers or mining companies could be affected next week. The provisions are general and reflect that.

For too long, the Government and the City have allowed pharmaceutical companies to be attacked, while hoping that the issue would just fade away. It will not just go away; unless we counter it head-on, it will fester, grow and become much more of a problem, across a much bigger board. We must act, and we must act now.

I heard the Liberals' approach to the clauses. The official Opposition will support the clauses, although they are too little, too late. The Government have been made fully aware of the problem, but have failed to act to the extent necessary to deal with it.

So, what is the problem that faces us now? There are animal rights extremists, who can, and should, be classified as terrorists. Of course, the vast majority of animal rights activists are not terrorists, but within their ranks are activists who are prepared to use the worst varieties of extreme violence and intimidation to   get their way. Those people organise themselves in cells, operate internationally and fund themselves internationally, which, to me, indicates a terrorist organisation. I would be interested to hear whether the Government have considered proscribing organisations such as the Animal Liberation Front or Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty under the terrorism laws.

No one has yet given me an accurate assessment of the number of extreme protesters, although the number of incidents involved makes it likely that there are at least a few hundred people who are prepared to use severe violence, at least against property. Here is a taste of some sections from a leaflet that was openly handed out at one of their meetings. These meetings, by the way, are attended by members of the public, as well as the hard core. The leaflet says:

''This edition . . . is dedicated to the hands on animal abusing scum who kill animals everyday at HLS, get paid for it and then go home eat their dinner and put their feet up and relax by watching some mindless television. They are smug in the knowledge that they are safe and hassle free at the moment. Well, enough is enough. These monsters do not have the right to a happy life. How dare they do what they do behind closed doors. They are all cowards, bullies and perverts. What we want to do is show you how to move things along a little faster . . . Direct action works. It's as simple as that. Think what you wouldn't want done to you and do it to them. Think what would cause you stress and worry, what would keep you up at night, what would give you a headache or cause you embarrassment.''

It then gives a list of things to do. Let me mention just one:

''A simple tactic has been adopted recently. Simply pick you target and throw a couple of rape alarms in their roof guttering or thick hedgerow and leg it (in the middle of the night obviously). Being kept awake at night hardly puts you in a good mood at work or with your family.''

The list goes on an on, but I do not think that hon. Members will appreciate it being put on the public record for people to read. At the end, however, are the names of 35 directors, employees and scientists at drug-testing companies. It says which of them have children; it names their partners; and it gives their addresses and telephone numbers. The fact that half of those people live in my constituency is, of course, of particular concern to me, but, as hon. Members can imagine, this sort of stuff is of extreme concern to any normal thinking person.

Over recent years, a frenzy of hate and violence has been directed at scientists and research workers. All pharma and biotech companies that want to market new drugs will have to test them on animals at some point, and many such companies have testing facilities. The unique point about places such as Huntingdon Life Sciences and the Newchurch guinea pig farm, however, is that they are exclusively animal testing-related, so they tend to act as a weather vane for the wider industry.

HLS has approximately 1,000 employees in my constituency, so, unfortunately, I have significant knowledge of this issue. Every week, I receive notice from constituents who live in constant fear of violence. I have heard of things being put through letterboxes, hooded thugs scaring kids at home, cars vandalised, homes daubed with paint, neighbours told that the victim is a paedophile, people's cars being filmed as   they leave home or work, people being followed home from work, messages left on phones, and sleep deprivation. Let me give a typical example from the website of Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty about a raid—such raids occur daily, sometimes more frequently.

''The Animal Liberation Front is claiming responsibility for the two recent actions taken against Huntingdon Life Sciences. In the early hours of 10th of September, a newly formed cell of volunteers visited the homes of two . . . directors . . . in Surrey and Sussex, and planted crude white-spirit devices under their cars. As a result of this action, we have learned that the company

''have terminated their contract with HLS. We did not want to take this action, as we are not violent individuals, but ordinary people, caught up within a system of institutionalised violence that is perpetuated against all life on this planet.''

That is the way in which those people think. It is what is happening in this country daily in areas that have testing units and pharmaceutical units. However, the situation has been changing. The trigger came when HLS managed to secure an injunction under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, which was originally intended to stop stalking.

Without my going into all the details, the court found that the injunction could cover all the employees, and at multiple locations, including employees' homes. Injunctions have subsequently been sought by various companies, and gradually the courts have extended the remit of the injunctions so that the one granted recently in respect of Oxford university also covers unnamed third-party suppliers to the proposed research premises. As the scope of such injunctions has been extended by the courts beyond what was, perhaps, the original intention of the Act, so the risk of their being overturned at a full hearing has grown.

Clause 116 aims to redress the balance, in that for a harassment conviction to be secured, it needs to be proven that there has been a course of conduct in which a person harassed another. The strict interpretation of that by the courts will now be widened, as the clause extends the Act to cover harassment of two or more people who are connected, even if each individual is harassed on only one occasion. New section 3A will also allow for a wider group of individuals to be clearly covered by the order. Can the Minister confirm that the word ''person'' in section 3A(2) will include companies? I think that that is the case. The Liberal Democrats' amendments Nos. 341 and 342 would have the effect of slightly broadening the application of the clause and would make it more bullet proof by inserting the reasonableness qualification. I have no objection to either of them.

Clause 117 creates the new offence of harassment of a person in his home, as an amendment to the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001. Under section 42 of that Act, the police are able to direct protesters to move away from premises. The new provision is intended to catch broadly similar behaviour with four ingredients needing to be proved. I shall not read them out; they are in the Bill.

Amendment No. 343 extending presence to conduct is sensible. My hon. Friends and I have proposed two changes to the clause. First, we fail to see why the arresting constable needs to be in uniform. A constable, as we have discussed in previous debates, has the powers of a constable whatever he is wearing. Amendments Nos. 224 and 223 provide for the possibility of the offence being heard in a Crown court as well as in a magistrates court with the longer possible sentence of three years.

Such offences can be so serious and damaging to families and children living at home that a maximum of 51 weeks seems inappropriate in the possible circumstances. We support clause 118, which allows the police to make a direction to a person to leave the vicinity of a home and specifies that they cannot return to the vicinity for a set period of up to three months. Should they return within that period, they will be committing an offence. However, as with the previous clause, we would like the possibility of an indictment with up to three years in prison. That is the reason for amendment No. 225.

I note that the Liberals have suggested that the Law Society amendment No. 101 should be included, allowing for an appeal against the making of the direction to the magistrates court. Although we understand the need for a balance and the right of an individual to seek redress from a constable's decision, we feel that that right must only kick in after a reasonable period to ensure that our courts are not clogged up with minor appeals. Our compromise is for a right of appeal to exist if the constable's direction lasts for more than 10 days, as proposed in amendment No. 254.

That is where the Government have reached when it comes to dealing with the problem. Unfortunately, the scenario has now changed. It would seem as though the Government either have not realised that or, more likely, are not willing to realise that. Therefore, let me explain why my hon. Friends and I are now proposing new clauses 18 to 23 and new clause 26.

The injunctions have been working fairly well. About a dozen companies—perhaps more—have obtained them and their impact has been to stop business premises and employees' homes being invaded or targeted openly. However, that has meant that the extremists' campaign has become wider and   often more underground. Yesterday, the ABPI released some interesting figures, which were alluded to in part by the hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon. They showed that the number of home visits to directors was down to 90 in 2004 compared with 113 in the previous year. For employees, the number went down from 146 to 89. However, anonymous activities have increased, with abusive calls rising from 38 in 2003 to 108 in 2004, and 177 instances of criminal damage compared with 146 the previous year and only 60 the year before. Most of those are conducted in the middle of the night.

Furthermore, as the pharma and research companies were the first to take out injunctions, the extremists have now started to look for easier targets. Therefore we have seen a rise in the number of secondary and tertiary target companies. In 2002, 113 companies were targeted. In 2003, 203 were targeted and last year 313 were targeted, with 29 of those reporting more than 10 criminal incidents against them. The extremists' basic idea is that the target company is bullied until it signs a declaration that it will not trade with the initial target. In the last quarter of 2004, 42 companies were bullied into so-called capitulations: 37 per cent. of the years' total capitulations.

Typically, the target company will be sent a letter saying that it must sign a document promising not to trade with Huntingdon Life Sciences, for example, and that if it does not sign, it will be put on the SHAC website. That is often threat enough to get a capitulation. For the brave traders who refuse to be intimidated, being placed on the SHAC website means that their company is game for visits from the thugs. That is when it starts to get nasty. Normally things start with protesters invading the premises. More than a dozen small businesses in my constituency have called me, sometimes weeping on the phone because of the torment that they have been put through by those thugs.

If the police get seriously involved, which happens occasionally, the cost can be dramatic. For instance, The Times reported on 18 January that the police have spent £2.5 million protecting the Staffordshire guinea pig farm.

For most companies, however, full-time police protection is not an option; they only course is an injunction. A typical example is the small biotech company that wrote to me recently. It wrote:

''To date, we have had three actual visits from SHAC activists . . . and various threatening letters mailed to our offices, as well as leaflets distributed outside our buildings and in neighbouring gardens. On the first visit . . . four protesters were inadvertently given access to our reception building by a member of staff. They were very disruptive, distributed leaflets and used megaphones outside our site. On the second visit . . . nine protesters appeared to force entry into the reception building, which was captured on CCTV. Then they made their way into four offices while causing complete havoc in reception. They were threatening and abusive, distributed leaflets in all offices and intimidated staff. This was a very well planned visit, with maximum disruption and a timely exit before the police arrived. On the third visit . . . four protesters demonstrated at our entrance with megaphones and very large banners. As our offices are amongst domestic dwellings, this caused great anxiety to many of our neighbours. Our main site is just opposite a housing development for elderly people. In  addition, our . . . site is near a park, playgroup and primary school. The leader of the protesters . . . was videoing all the car registration numbers in our car park. She also tried to video through the office windows and as you can imagine this again caused anxiety to our members of staff. This was particularly disturbing for one female member of staff, who used to work at HLS and has been assaulted by SHAC protesters prior to working for us; she was very frightened and intimidated by the threats. They also tried to disrupt our AGM . . . by using megaphones air horns and displaying banners. The Police were on site to control threatening behaviour however we also hired security guards to protect the investors and employees on site . . . In light of these visits, we have had to upgrade our security system to protect our staff.''

The costs are broken down in the letter, but they are confidential, and I do not want to read them to the Committee, but take my word for it—they are very significant. The costs include those of obtaining an injunction, of installing security gates and CCTV systems, of having dedicated phone and fax numbers and e-mail addresses, of security guards and, of course, the huge cost of the lost man hours. The letter then states:

''As you can see, this is not an insubstantial amount of money that was not included in our projected annual expenditure . . . Personally, I am baffled by the fact that the Government appears to be focusing on the war against terrorism abroad yet is paying scant attention to the terrorism that exists in the UK.''

That small biotech company really needs that money to be invested in its products, but it is having to spend it on security and buying injunctions.

That company was slightly larger, and the problems are suffered mainly by the small, local family companies that supply pharmaceutical companies or research companies—for instance, with laundry services, taxis and cleaning services. Those companies cannot afford injunctions, which can cost anything from £30,000 to £300,000.

More to the point, thousands of companies are saying, ''Why should we have to spend our money on injunctions when it should be for the state to defend us against terrorist activities?'' That is the fundamental issue that the Government are failing to address in the Bill. For instance, the injunction will normally include a clause allowing for a certain level of non-violent protest at set times and in set places outside the place of business. One company suggested to me that the Government could set out a more predetermined set of activities and of behaviour as a benchmark for regulating unlawful protest behaviour—for instance, a code similar to the picketing code could save hours of time and expense for the police, courts and British business in negotiating areas of protest, but the manner of protest and the number of permitted protesters, although ensuring legitimate protest, could continue. By the way, it is not only companies that the protesters attack. In the past six months, they have brutally threatened to disrupt two schools in Cambridgeshire that had invited HLS to their jobs fairs. That is how low those people will go.

HLS shows how exposed British companies can be to concerted terrorist attack. We must learn lessons from it. Companies that have capitulated to the terrorist demands not to trade with HLS include Barclays, Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, Credit Suisse First Boston, HSBC, Phillips and Drew, WestLB Penmure,   and Royal Bank of Scotland. HLS must now keep its current account at the Bank of England. All its market-makers and brokers refuse to deal with it; it cannot get insurance, other than from the DTI; and it has even had problems retaining its auditors.

The utterly weak, unco-ordinated and short-termist view of the City towards defending its client's interests is the subject for another day's debate, although I note that the NAPF is now saying that it is waiting for a lead from the Government on what to do, and the Minister may wish to comment on that.

We need, however, to be mindful of the impact on HLS. Unable to survive registered in this country—not least because of the hate mail and death threats being sent to its shareholders—it repatriated itself and is now thriving on the US stock exchange. It has re-registered in Maryland, where only holders of 5 per cent. or more of the company's shares have to be disclosed, and then only to other shareholders. I note that Montpelier in Oxford resisted the terrorists when it was building the university premises but stopped work when its shareholders started being threatened and attacked.

And so it goes on. The extremists claimed yet another victory in December, after BOC severed its ties with HLS. Brian Cass, the managing director of HLS, said:

''The stark reality is that companies like BOC are not guaranteed the security of their employees.''

Interestingly, BOC had got an injunction, and it was working. However, SHAC simply changed its tactics and began targeting Marks and Spencer, one of BOC's biggest clients. Therefore, leaving companies to fend for themselves through injunctions is simply not an adequate solution.

If we do not get on top of this issue, we shall see lots more HLSs—lots more companies repatriating to the United States. We shall also see a flood of investment out of the United Kingdom. GlaxoSmithKline spends more than £1 billion a year in Britain, but its head, and the head of AstraZeneca, have apparently warned the Prime Minister that they will not spend another pound on new facilities unless action is take to stop the violence. The Government have placed R and D at the centre of their drive for a knowledge-based economy. Pharmas contribute £6.7 billion a year to Britain's GDP and £12 billion in exports. They employ 80,000 people directly and 250,000 indirectly. We are the world's largest pharma exporter; it is one of the few areas in which we really are world-beaters. All of that is at risk because of a few hundred—perhaps fewer—animal rights protesters. As the Government have included nothing in the Bill to address those concerns, however, we have tabled a package of new clauses and amendments that go some way towards doing so.

I turn first to new clause 22. Some time ago, the Government provided for directors' confidentiality orders, which enabled directors under threat to have a service address, rather than their home address, used on the public register. That was a good move, which we supported; the only problem is that the previously filed home addresses are not removed from the public register at the same time, which rather ruins the effect.   The new clause therefore says that when a confidentiality order is put in place, all references to the director's previous addresses should be removed from the public register at the same time.

I mention new clause 22 first because the same concept of confidentiality should be extended to the register of members of companies and the register of mortgagees of companies, both of which are currently open to public view under normal circumstances. The application of the provisions would be triggered using the same rationale as currently exists for directors; the justification for the order does not take us into new territory.

New Clause 18 provides for an individual company member to apply to have his or her name and address made private. New clause 19 provides for a company to apply to have its entire register of members made private. If companies are not to move abroad or to cease doing business with companies such as HLS, it is vital that we can defend their members' personal details. Of course, one could say that people should use nominee services, but no company in this country is prepared to act as a nominee for HLS. Having companies act as their own nominees is not practical, nor is it acceptable to many shareholders and companies. We could go down the route taken in America—in Maryland, to which HLS has repatriated—of making registers of members secret. However, that would be to go too far. Our amendment provides a fair and workable halfway house.

New clause 20 aims to secure privacy for funders. Of course, there is no reason why a bank's details need to be made public in respect of a normal loan. However, a bank will usually wish to secure the mortgage or charge, and the security interest does need to be placed on the public register. Our proposal would mean that the bank's security would still be registered, so warning people of the loan's existence, but the bank's name and address would be made private. New clause 21 extends the impact of confidentiality orders to associated companies, and new clause 23 covers various bits of tidying up relating to confidentiality orders.

That brings me to my final point, and to new clause 26. It seems that in this country to destroy a company through violence and intimidation is not a criminal offence. I suggest—and I see that the Liberal Democrats are doing so in new clause 32—that that needs to change. I would be the first to agree that we need to debate the scope of this type of provision—to avoid restricting legitimate trade disputes and whistleblowers, for instance. However, if we can protect individuals, I cannot believe that we cannot also find an appropriate balance for companies.

New clause 26 aims to prevent companies from being forced to act, or not act, in a certain way in circumstances in which there is harassment, violence or damage to property. In other words, it stays well clear of anything to do with peaceful protest. New clause 32, put forward by the hon. Member for   Oxford, West and Abingdon, the ABPI option, does roughly the same thing, but it ties down the application just to animal research facility operators. I shall be interested to hear the Minister's views. I have already given my reasons for believing that research companies are just the tip of the iceberg. The protection that is offered should be available more widely, not least because making law for just one sector seems to be unusual and might produce policy difficulties. I am open-minded on the issue; if the Government bring forward a suitable proposal, we will consider it.

Let me end with a warning. Any legislation that we agree on here will mean nothing unless the fight against extremists is properly led and funded by Government. Such support has been lacking to date. I hope that the Bill represents a change in the Government's attitude to one of the most pressing problems facing British business and affecting the personal security of individuals.

We have had an interesting debate, led by my hon. Friend the Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon and the hon. Member for Huntingdon, both of whom have direct constituency interests in the matter. That is crucial, as it informs their comments. My hon. Friend is concerned not only with the university but with companies that operate in association with it, and the hon. Gentleman with Huntingdon Life Sciences, which has been targeted for a long time.

It is important that we stress that we understand the views of those who oppose animal experimentation, and who argue strongly that it should be further regulated, or even that it should cease altogether. We should also recognise that we have an extremely well regulated system in this country. That was not always the case. My hon. Friend and I are probably the only members of the Committee who held licences for vivisection during our earlier lives. It was not because we wanted them; I certainly did not, and neither, I assume, did my hon. Friend. I was very uncomfortable to have one, but it was a requirement of matriculation in my university course. As an undergraduate, when I took my physiology degree in the early 1970s, I had a licence for procedures on live animals. It was entirely unnecessary for the degree course I was taking, and I was not undertaking any research. Frankly, it is far better that licences are not handed out in such a cavalier fashion nowadays, and that animals are spared as a result. Times have changed.

The right of people to protest is something we should uphold and be clear about. However, their rights do not extend to intimidation, harassment, violence, death threats, or actions that could cause death or serious injury. Those are uncivilised and inappropriate acts, outside the norms of a civilised society.

I am pleased that the Government have brought forward their proposals. We are concerned that they are not sufficiently comprehensive to meet the demand, and I will be interested to see what the Minister has to say. I want to raise three points, beginning with an issue raised by the hon. Member for   Huntingdon. Does the word ''person'' in the context of these clauses include a body corporate? I assume that it does, but it is important that we understand that. If so, I have an ancillary question: does a university have the legal personality of a body corporate? I am not clear about that. I hope that someone is, because universities are important to this debate.

Secondly, will the new provisions deal with the protection of communities as well as individuals? I say that not because I do not understand that communities are made up of individuals, but simply because, as the Minister knows, there have been cases where whole communities have been harassed in a way that is abhorrent and deplorable. The harassment may not be directly linked to any particular individuals, but may be conducted simply on the grounds that everyone somehow shares a corporate responsibility for something that is going on within that community. I do not entirely understand why police forces in the areas concerned are not able at the moment to take more effective action. I am sorry if that sounds like a criticism, but there are many provisions under the Public Order Act 1986, the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 and the Criminal Justice & Police Act 2001 where I would have expected rather more robust action to have been taken on the basis of the activities currently taking place. I share the view of the hon. Member for Huntingdon that we can do what we like in legislation, but until policed effectively that legislation will not have the proper effect. Is it the Minister's view that intelligence or enforcement might fall within the responsibilities of the Serious Organised Crime Agency? The borderline of that agency's responsibilities is unclear, as is whether organised harassment is something with which it might properly be concerned, as in many cases it is a national or international conspiracy.

My third point, which amplifies the point that my hon. Friend the Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon made in respect of new clause 32, is that it is surely right that special circumstances apply to companies or universities that are licensed under the Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986. That is the crux of the matter. There is a clearly defined group of companies and individuals who are vulnerable to such intimidation.

I entirely understand the Conservatives' point about the capacity for such harassment to be extended into other areas. However, I am equally conscious of the need to strike a balance, because there can be perfectly legitimate protest against the activities of companies, whether as part of a trade union dispute or because people simply do not think that those activities are ethical.

I remember a time, again in the early 1970s, when Barclays bank was heavily investing in the apartheid regime in South Africa. The Barclays branch in Oxford had to change its blotting paper every day because every day, curiously, it was defaced with the words ''Barclays are a piggy bank''. As soon as the blotting paper was removed, a new piece was similarly defaced. Some might say that that was potentially causing economic damage to Barclays.

Finally, clause 118 deals with ''police direction to stay away from a person's home''. I wonder whether the Minister considered a similar direction to stay away from a person's place of work or whether she believes that to be covered elsewhere. Very often harassment takes place not at a person's home but at the university department or other place of work where they are engaged in a lawful activity, so I wonder why that is not covered specifically.

Before I resume my seat I must briefly mention amendment No. 101, which stands in my name and that of my hon. Friend and concerns the order-making power that clause 118 gives to the police. I understand the need for that power, but a degree of judicial oversight is important when dealing with the power, given under proposed new section 42(4)(b) of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, of a police constable to impose a direction

''to leave that vicinity and not to return to it within such period as the constable may specify, not being longer than 3 months''.

That is a fairly hefty direction from the police and it would not be unreasonable for it to be open to challenge within the legal system—for confirmation by a magistrate. The hon. Member for Huntingdon said that he thought that was fine, but that it ought to be necessary to wait for 10 days. That is a slightly novel view. Given the severity of the potential order-making power, the matter ought to return a magistrates court. That could be done in two ways. The first way would be by appeal, although I accept that that might, for example, cause appeals to magistrates courts, which I would not want to encourage. Alternatively, an order could be of a minimum duration in the first instance, after which the constable would be required to go to a magistrates court for confirmation of the order over a longer period. That would have the added advantage that the person on whom the order was served would have no doubts about its scope and what was intended.

Also, there is no capacity in clause 118 as drafted for an officer to serve a written order. The possibility for confusion and argument when returning to court for a breach of an order is quite patent. It is therefore good practice that the terms of an order be confirmed, despite the fact that it might, dare I say it, increase the bureaucracy of the procedure, in order to make it court-proof later.

This is an important debate. I very much welcome the fact that the hon. Members for Oxford, West and Abingdon and for Huntingdon are serving on the Committee, because the targets of the attacks about which we have heard today are in their constituencies. Having said that, I am a little concerned by the tone that the hon. Member for Huntingdon has taken today, which does not help the debate or help us all to acknowledge how serious this   issue is or what progress has been made in other areas in the past year or so, particularly with regard to police response, which was mentioned in particular.

One of the difficulties that we face is that on the one hand we have 43 police forces working with communities, which is very positive, but on the other we have animal rights extremists who, by their very nature, can target an individual at a company in the north-west that supplies Huntingdon and be down in the south-west the next day targeting other companies there. We have had the problem of ensuring that we link those incidents, partly because some of the supply companies involved are not aware of the possible threat to them, probably because the parent company may not want to alarm them unduly. To deal with that, we have taken action in several different ways on several different fronts. First, we have established the national extremism tactical co-ordinating unit, whose role is to ensure better policing and joined-up thinking and to take forensic evidence from one part of the country to see if it matches forensics from another part of the country. Because of that activity, which is ongoing, there has been a huge increase in the number of arrests and convictions of the relatively small number of people involved in these offences. We must continue to do better, but that is a practical measure.

The hon. Member for Somerton and Frome makes the very valid point that police forces already have several different pieces of legislation that they can enforce in several different sets of circumstances. One of the things that we have been trying to ensure while developing this legislation is that we do not lose sight of what powers the police can already, and importantly need to, use. Police forces up and down the country need to be aware of the nature of the people with whom we are dealing as well as the nature of their offences, which are very serious and are not simply one-offs.

We should also acknowledge that the UK probably has the toughest regulation in the world on experimentation and research involving animals. That is important to remember. That is not to say that alternatives to the use of animals cannot be developed in the future, which we support. It should be acknowledged that there have been developments in the past 50 years in several different areas, which we welcome, and we set up the national centre for the 3Rs to support that activity. The reality, however, is that animals are still needed in several different areas. Polls of the British public have shown that although people have genuine concerns about the use of animals, they understand why there are no alternatives when the matter is explained to them, and the majority are in favour of the use of animals for research. It is also important to acknowledge the several organisations and groups concerned about animal welfare and the use of animals for testing and research that have nothing to do with the activities that we are discussing today.

Clause 116 also amends the civil remedy in section 3 of the 1997 Act to clarify that a company can apply to the High Court or county court for an injunction to protect persons associated with a company from harassment. In answer to the question raised by a couple of hon. Members about injunctions, people who will be covered by proposed new section 3A(2)(a) are not necessarily the people whose behaviour the protest is intended to change. Such a person might be a relative of a director, for example, and not directly involved in the activities in question.

Proposed new section 3A(2)(b) would enable companies to apply for injunctions as well. In addition, the main company—Huntingdon Life Sciences, for example—could obtain an injunction to protect smaller companies, such as supply companies. That would enable Huntingdon Life Sciences to protect its laundry company, for instance.

Would there be a requirement on the principal company to list the supplier companies by name in an application for an injunction, or could the application cover any company in a contractual relationship with it, so that it would not need to return to court every time that a new supplier was taken on?

I shall check the detail on that point and notify the hon. Gentleman, if that is all right.

A person, in relation to an injunction, includes a body corporate, but it is individuals rather than companies who are the victims of harassment. My understanding is that the term ''person'' would included university institutions as well. I think that that is how the matter stands, but I shall check.

We are trying to bear down on aspects of the matter where there are gaps and problems. One of the difficulties in dealing with animal rights extremists is that they are very canny in identifying loopholes and gaps in the system. The clause is important, but it is also important that it should anticipate future similar activity by other groups. That is why the provisions are   not confined to dealing with those involved in animal rights extremism.

Without the changes, it would remain uncertain whether companies could apply for injunctive relief under the 1997 Act. It would also be more difficult for the police and prosecutors to charge and prosecute those who harassed employees of different companies, as they would have to show that an extremist pursued a course of conduct that amounted to harassment of the same individual on at least two occasions. The provisions will help the police.

Amendment No. 341 does not add anything to the drafting. The term ''may be'' is no wider than the term ''may be reasonably considered to be''. A person who may be a victim of harassment will clearly already be someone who is reasonably considered to be a victim of harassment. One of the issues is recognition of the wide group of victims that we are considering. A niece   of the Hall family of Darley Oaks was harassed while working in a pub. I understand that every window of the pub was smashed and she had to leave her job.

There have been instances of harassment of social organisations to which people working for animal research companies, either directly or in supply, belong. The chairman of the local golf club or other association, or a charity that someone is involved with, has been seen as a potential pressure point on the individual who provides supplies for or is directly involved in the research. I understand people's sensitivities about civil liberties and about how wide the provision is going, but it is a matter of the context.

It being twenty-five minutes past Eleven o'clock, The Chairman adjourned the Committee without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.

Adjourned till this day at half-past Two o'clock.