For some reason, the hon. Gentleman imagines that I was complaining about him. In fact, sometimes I want him to talk for longer. It is a pity that he was not even more comprehensive.

We are worried about giving a veto to the chairman in respect of certain decisions during the inquiry and consider that the Bill, as drafted, is sufficient and strikes the right balance. Ultimately, the Minister has the responsibility for establishing an inquiry, so it follows that the power to cope with various details as a result of that decision, including the power to appoint a panel to look into the inquiry, its terms of references and so on should also rest with the commissioning Minister. That has been the case with all past inquiries, and there have not been massive complaints about it. The clause requires the Minister to consult the chairman before appointing a member of the panel or setting the terms of reference. That requirement carries with it an obligation seriously to take into account the chairman’s views. The fact that we seek not to give a veto, should not be interpreted as meaning that we do not seriously want to have a dialogue and consultation with the chairman. Of course we do. The process must be serious.

We must remember that, in practical terms, the Minister will have to make sure that a chairman is content with the panel and the terms of reference. It would not be in the Minister’s interest to appoint members of a panel or a chairman who did not want to undertake an inquiry, given the terms of reference. That would not make for an effective inquiry panel. The chairman will have the option of walking away from the job if he is not content with the proposed terms of reference, the initial panel members or any other proposals to appoint further panel members under the Bill.

It is the Minister’s job—not that of the chairman—to set up an inquiry. As for panel membership, clauses 9 and 10 create obligations on the Minister to ensure that the panel is impartial and has the necessary expertise. If the chairman were to have a veto over panel members, that might put stress on the Minister’s ability to fulfil those obligations and could overrule his important obligations under clauses 9 and 10. That would not be right. We must remember that, when something has gone wrong with the public service system, it is the Minister’s responsibility to ensure that   it is investigated. He is responsible to Parliament for that. He or she is the person who must set out the terms of reference to Parliament and be answerable for them.

I was under the impression that amendment No. 3 drew attention to drafting issues, in that it sought to “seek the agreement” of the chairman, but not secure it. The hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland suggested that that was a deliberate attempt. I am not clear how it would work in practice because to “seek the agreement” does not necessarily entail securing it. However, it would not be wise to put that obfuscation into statute.

Amendment No. 11 deals with the removal of panel members. It is extremely important to the effectiveness of the inquiry and to public confidence in its findings that the panel members are, and are seen to be, competent, impartial and respected. The power to remove panel members is needed as a fail-safe mechanism, but the Minister must be able to act to ensure that the effectiveness and integrity of the inquiry is not compromised. The Minister is accountable to Parliament. It is important to remember that it is the Minister, not the panel chairman, who should carry the can for those changes. The Minister also has a responsibility to ensure that taxpayers’ money is not wasted. If an inquiry becomes ineffective or biased, or its panel loses the confidence of the public, it may be a complete waste of money. The Minister must be able to stop such a situation arising.