I beg to move amendment No. 132, in

clause 44, page 21, line 6, leave out from 'admission' to 'dwelling' in line 7 and insert

'by virtue of his powers under subsection (1) to any premises occupied as a'.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment No. 133, in

clause 44, page 21, line 9, after 'not' insert

'by virtue of his powers'.

Amendment No. 134, in

clause 44, page 21, line 9, leave out 'as of right'.

Amendment No. 135, in

clause 44, page 21, line 12, leave out 'private'.

Amendment No. 136, in

clause 44, page 21, line 29, after 'a' insert 'premises occupied as a'.

Amendment No. 137, in

clause 44, page 21, line 34, after 'any', insert 'reasonable'.

Clause 44 deals with powers of entry other than in cases of emergency. Subsection (1) sets out the scope of those powers—the obtaining of necessary information for the discharge of the functions of a fire and rescue authority or the work of investigating a fire. Subsection (3) then sets out a limitation on those powers of entry in respect of dwellings. It is in that area that the amendments bite.

Amendment No. 132 seeks to do two things. First, it would remove the reference to admission ''as of right'', which seems to be a very broad and sweeping claim. ''As of right'' suggests something superior to any mere body of legislation, yet it seems that any powers exercised would not be ''as of right'' but by virtue of powers granted by subsection (1), which is somewhat more prosaic. Therefore, the amendment would replace the sweeping expression and replace it with:

''by virtue of . . . subsection (1)''.

That is much more modest and less threatening, and consistent with the normal form of drafting that we are used to.

Secondly, the amendment would remove the reference to ''a private dwelling'', substituting simply ''a dwelling''. That is a perfectly well used term; it is used throughout legislation—particularly planning legislation, which is within the remit of the same Department, so Ministers should be able to check that fairly quickly—and, indeed, elsewhere in this Bill. Subsections (3) and (4) refer to a ''private dwelling'' and subsections (7) and (8) to a ''dwelling''. That appears to be inconsistent.

By my logic, if there is such a thing as a private dwelling, there must be something that can be juxtaposed with it, such as a public dwelling—but that does not make any sense. I asked myself whether the issue was about ownership of dwellings, but I am certain that that cannot be the intention. A dwelling is a dwelling; it is a place where somebody lives, and who owns it is immaterial. The concept of a public dwelling is rather mysterious to me. Perhaps a hotel is a public dwelling; perhaps the Minister will clarify that in due course. On first reading, the construction seems odd, and references are inconsistent throughout the clause—private dwellings in some places and just dwellings in others.

For the sake of consistency, amendments Nos. 133, 134 and 135 raise the same issue in relation to subsection (4), although the point is made by amendment No. 132. Amendment No. 136 is also an attempt at consistency. Subsections (3) and (4) refer to premises occupied as a dwelling, but subsection (7) uses only the word ''dwelling''. The amendment would create symmetry of language throughout the clause. It is the occupation, not any other characteristic, that seems to be the determining factor that makes it subject to the limitation.

Amendment No. 137 would restrict the right of entry by warrant to a dwelling in a non-emergency situation to during a reasonable time. It is sensible to have the power to get a warrant to obtain entry to a dwelling by force if necessary, but there is no obvious reason why such entry should not be limited so that it may occur only at a reasonable time. We do not want to create a regime under which entry can be effected by force under the power of a warrant in the middle of the night, unless there are compelling reasons and in emergencies. Why would it not be appropriate to add such a restriction?

To address amendments Nos. 132 to 137, it may be helpful to set out the aim of the clause, although I know that the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge has already done so. Its purpose is formally to authorise activities that the fire service undertakes for the public good, which might otherwise amount to trespass. It provides several safeguards so that a proper balance is struck between the rights of occupiers of dwellings and the public interest in ensuring that the causes of fires are investigated quickly and effectively.

Subsection (3) provides that an officer may not in exercising his powers of entry under subsection (1) demand admission as of right to premises that are occupied as a private dwelling without giving 24 hours' written notice to the occupier. The words ''as of right'' refer to the officer's powers under subsection (1), which makes amendment No. 132 unnecessary.

The term ''private'' is used to differentiate between private living accommodation, which a person should be able to occupy without undue interference, and common areas, to which others have access but form part of premises that might be considered to be dwellings. Those of us who have ever canvassed in flats with entry blocks know the difficulty of trying to gain

entry by pushing all the entry phone buttons, and that is why we want to ensure that fire officers are able to do so. Removal of ''private'' is therefore undesirable.

I was unaware that the common parts of a block of flats were construed as a dwelling. The Under-Secretary seems to be speaking authoritatively on the matter—[Hon. Members: ''Oh.''] I meant to say that he speaks more authoritatively than Ministers invariably do. I wonder whether he could tell the Committee from where that definition derives. Does it appear in a planning Act? I have never come across a distinction between private dwellings and dwellings.

I hope that, by elaborating on and describing the terms in this debate, we are establishing the clarification that the hon. Gentleman requires, and that he therefore understands the difference between common areas—in flats and so on—and others. I will provide further clarification if any inspiration arrives.

Amendment No. 136 would restrict application for a warrant to premises occupied as a dwelling. That would preclude application for premises no longer occupied as such but for which there may be an urgent need for the cause of fire to be ascertained, as provided for in subsection (4). It is therefore not sensible to limit the powers of a magistrate in such circumstances.

The term ''private'' was first used in the Fire Precautions Act 1971. Another example of shared accommodation might be a kitchen. My son's shared kitchen at university might be regarded not as private but as a common area, yet we would of course expect firefighters to be able to gain access if necessary.

The Under-Secretary says that of course we would expect the firefighter to be able to gain access, but I remind him that we are talking not about access in an emergency but routine access.

For the purpose of an investigation.

Perhaps for the purpose of an investigation, but perhaps to obtain information needed for the discharge of a fire and rescue authority's functions—routine inspection. It is not so abundantly clear to me that a kitchen does not form part of someone's castle, to use the expression of the hon. Member for Southport (Dr. Pugh), and ought to enjoy a measure of protection. In general, when there is no urgent need, we restrict the access of the authorities to private homes to times when it is convenient and by arrangement.

I understand the hon. Gentleman's point. I want to emphasise the difference between private living accommodation, which an individual or family occupies, and shared or common areas. I have been trying to give helpful examples to illustrate why we needed to use the word ''private'' and not have it removed as according to his amendment.

With regard to amendment No. 137, subsections (7) and (8) provide that a justice of the peace may authorise entry to dwellings without first giving 24

hours' notice in writing or where forcible entry is needed. Although those subsections allow the justice to authorise entry at any time, by force if necessary, their purpose is to provide a method of disapplying the restrictions on entry under subsections (3) and (4). However, they do not affect the basic provision provided in subsection (1) that the officer may enter only ''at any reasonable time''. The key point is that what is reasonable will vary according to circumstances, and be for the justice to determine. The amendment is therefore unnecessary.

Although the amendments have been helpful in teasing out some points for debate, I hope that, with those points of clarification, the hon. Gentleman will feel free to withdraw his amendment.

I accept what the Under-Secretary said about amendments Nos. 136 and 137. On reading the text with the benefit of his explanation, I can see the logic.

On amendment No. 132, although I still think that the phrase ''as of right'' is unusual and not consistently used throughout the Bill—we could go right through the Bill and refer to the exercise of each power created ''as of right'' rather than in accordance with the powers granted under whichever subsection—I also accept that it does not matter that much.

The distinction between a private dwelling and a dwelling is genuine news to me. I will have to go away and try to understand that a bit more. I have taken on board the reference that the Minister has given and I shall try to understand the issue.

To help with the hon. Gentleman's understanding, my recollection is that the Fire Precautions Act 1971 distinguishes private dwellings from ''common parts''. There are therefore clear definitions in legislation of private property and of common parts.

The hon. Gentleman has obviously read that fascinating statute, which I cannot claim to have done. I certainly had not appreciated that the term ''dwelling'' encompassed two things: a private dwelling and common parts. Immediately into my mind come various provisions of different Acts dealing with totally extraneous matter, such as planning, in which that definition would sit uncomfortably. I will need to go away and have a look at that. I am grateful to the Minister for his explanation, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 44 ordered to stand part of the Bill.