In tabling these amendments, we sought to address the Secretary of State's power to intervene where an authority is failing. Amendment No. 92 would remove from subsection (1) the reference to an authority that ''is likely to fail''. It is not unreasonable that the intervention should take place after the offence has occurred, not when the Secretary of State thinks that it might occur.

Together, the amendments would remove references to acting

''in accordance with the Framework'',

and substitute them with references to authorities discharging their functions under clauses 6, 7, 8 and 9. If an authority was properly discharging its core functions, it would be wholly inappropriate for the Secretary of State to intervene because it was not complying with all the requirements of the framework in relation to human resource issues or employment practices. If we do not limit the Secretary of State's powers to intervene to cases in which there has been a clear failure to discharge statutory functions, the concept of local accountability and autonomy will have become meaningless.

Amendment No. 98 would amend clause 23—again replacing the reference to compliance with clause 21 with a reference to the authority discharging its functions under clauses 6, 7, 8 and 9.

The amendments are necessary to preserve the autonomy of fire and rescue authorities, and to ensure that the draconian powers granted to the Secretary of State under the clause, which will be exercised under the best value audit system, will not be imposed on authorities merely for failing to comply with the national framework, but according to the much more important question of whether they are discharging their statutory functions in relation to fire, road traffic accidents, fire safety or any other duties that the Secretary of State might prescribe under clause 9. That should be the test of whether intervention is required.