Part of Civil Contingencies Bill – in a Public Bill Committee at 3:30 pm on 3 February 2004.
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman. Standing Committees exist precisely to elicit information about who is and who is not a Lords Commissioner. I am sure that we shall find out in the course of the debate. I hope that the Under-Secretary can respond on that point. In that case, it is even more extraordinary that the more junior members of the Whips Office—those who are more junior than the Officers of Her Majesty's Household—can exercise these powers.
The powers can be exercised by those in the Whips Office, but that does not include even the Chief Whip or those at the top level. The Whips may be perfectly able, but they are not normally held accountable to the House. They do not speak to the House in their own right and they would never introduce regulations in normal circumstances. The Bill is clear that the regulations will be brought into play in an emergency and then must be brought to the House of Commons within seven days. Therefore, those people must stand up and justify why the regulations have been introduced. It seems extraordinary that those who normally never conduct such parliamentary business should be given that power.
We can argue about Secretaries of State. The hon. Member for Newark (Patrick Mercer) may have a point that, unless there is a major crisis in theatreland, it is hard to see why the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport should make emergency regulations. However, at least all Secretaries of State regularly make regulations and justify what they do to the House and, in the public's view, are accountable in the ordinary sense of the word. Whips are not normally publicly accountable, which is why it seems extraordinary to include them in the Bill.
I should appreciate clarification from the Under-Secretary as to the extent of the power. It may be more restrictive than I first imagined and only seven of those individuals would be given the power, rather than the nine whom I listed. However, the Government will have to make a powerful case for moving down the chain of command to the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, when however many Secretaries of State are available as well as, potentially, the First Lord of the Treasury. It would be much better if the Government conceded that it would be better if the Bill named the Prime Minister and the principal Secretaries of State and left it there.