I beg to move amendment No. 156, in

clause 17, page 6, line 37, at end insert—

'( ) the earlier communications are sexual in nature or involve A impersonating another person in a way calculated to induce B to believe that it would be safe and appropriate to meet A,.'.

In clause 17, we come to an important area in relation to the creation of a new offence. I wholly support the principle of the new offence that we are introducing of meeting a child following sexual grooming. It is, therefore, with a certain amount of diffidence that I table amendment No. 156. I should make it clear that it is not my amendment; it was introduced by Liberty. As I open on the matter, I say that I am not wholly convinced of the merit of the amendment, but I am convinced that it raises a legitimate issue that the Committee should consider. That is why I tabled it.

Liberty's anxiety, which one can follow when one reads clause 17, is whether there is a danger that in our worthy attempt to properly criminalise an activity that is preparatory to carrying out a sexual assault or offence against a child, we might criminalise perfectly innocent communication and reach the conclusion that because a 40-year-old happens to be communicating by e-mail with a 13-year-old it is absolutely of necessity that a nefarious purpose lies behind it. Our society seems to me to be increasingly sexualised in many ways—sexual motives are attributed even to innocent actions and activities. We are sometimes in danger of putting labels on individuals and activities that are not always deserved.

Liberty's amendment spells out specifically that the communication that has to take place before the meeting is organised must be either ''sexual in nature'', or involve a deception by the person concerned so that although there is no sexual nature to the communications, one would be able to examine them and see that one person has attempted to deceive the other as to their identity, for instance, or age.