Clause 49 - Powers

Part of Proceeds of Crime Bill – in a Public Bill Committee at 9:45 am on 29 November 2001.

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Photo of Dominic Grieve Dominic Grieve Shadow Minister (Home Affairs) 9:45, 29 November 2001

I listened carefully to what the Minister had to say. I had hoped that he would explain in more detail the reasoning behind the amendments, rather than simply explaining the bare bones of what they would achieve. If I understood the hon. Gentleman correctly, the amendment is designed, in the case of a management receiver who is dealing with property under a restraint order, to give him the power to be remunerated from the assets that are under restraint and widen those powers to enable him to draw down certain assets more easily. I have a worry about that. The assets are under restraint. They are not assets that have been confiscated, nor is the confiscation process taking place. It must therefore be possible that, at a later stage, those assets—if the confiscation procedure does not work—might have to be returned to the defendant.

That brings us to an issue that we should look at later. Indeed, last night I was drafting an amendment about the potential knock-on effects on an individual of the way in which his assets are handled during the restraint procedure. Let us suppose that a person has a pool of money and the receiver draws down on that money while the assets are under restraint. If at a subsequent point—I ask the Minister to reassure me on this—no confiscation order is made, the pool of money will have to be replaced before it is given back to the defendant. That will compensate him, and the cost of the receivership will be borne by the taxpayer and by the state.

If, during the course of the receivership under the restraint order, there is a complete muddling of the defendant's existing financial arrangements, he may have a legitimate grievance. The immediate monetary loss that he has suffered will not in fact be his true loss. The true loss is much more complex, and is incalculable, because his business and everything associated with it may have been destroyed. The Committee ought to bear that possibility seriously in mind, because we are using the restraint procedure widely for a variety of individuals, with the intention that we will confiscate. Of course if we confiscate, there is no problem. However, if we end up not confiscating for any reason, it is incumbent on us to ensure that a regime is in place that minimises and removes any suggestion that the person has been subject to a financial disadvantage. That may be impossible to achieve in 100 per cent. of cases, but it means that careful thought must be given to issues such as who pays the receiver. While the assets are under restraint, there is a strong argument that the receiver should be paid by the state. If, after the completion of the process, a confiscation order is made, that is the time for the receiver to draw down his money from the confiscated assets.