Clause 5 - Winding up of OFCOM on abandonment etc.

Part of Office of Communications Bill [Lords] – in a Public Bill Committee at 4:30 pm on 5 February 2002.

Alert me about debates like this

Photo of Michael Fabricant Michael Fabricant Conservative, Lichfield 4:30, 5 February 2002

Of course I support the inclusion of clause 5. A mechanism to wind up Ofcom will be required if the communications Bill, which has not yet been published, receives Royal Assent. However, it is also right and proper to consider what would happen in the unlikely event of it not receiving Royal Assent. As the Minister said, unanticipated circumstances could arise—heaven forbid—that not only delayed its introduction, but prevented it from receiving Royal Assent.

Conservative Members support the establishment of a communications agency for all the reasons set out in the White Paper, which was preceded by the report of the Select Committee on Culture, Media and Sport. However, I want to pick up on a couple of points and raise a new point about clause 5. I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Vale of York that

at any time after the end of 2003

should be rephrased. The word ''by'' should have been used. Whether 2003 is the date is another matter—it

could be 2004 or 2005—but there must be a sunset clause to provide some limitation. That is not in order to constrain us here in the House of Commons, but to give some reassurance to people in the industry that the Government have set themselves a realistic target for the establishment of the communications agency.

Everything that has come out of the Committee so far suggests that the Government are unclear about their timetable, about how Ofcom will be funded during the transitional stage and about how the regulatory bodies will be funded in terms of their providing people to be seconded to the shell Ofcom and of the extra work that will be required, which we discussed under clause 4.

Subsection (6) deals with the procedures that will apply in relation to the shell Ofcom's assets if—I accept that it is unlikely—it were to be wound up. Subsection 6(a) refers to the

power to provide for the transfer of property, rights and liabilities of OFCOM to the Secretary of State, to any of the existing regulators or to any other such person as may be specified in the order.

Who will be the arbiter where there is a dispute? If assets are owned by the shell Ofcom organisation, a dispute may arise from the ITC, the Department for Culture, Media and Sport or from the Department that is not represented here in Committee; the Department of Trade and Industry. Who will be the arbiter of where the liquidated assets are disposed? It is important that the Minister clarifies that.

Paragraph (b) refers to the power to provide for the property, rights and liabilities of Ofcom to be divided between different persons. There might be arguments from regulators, who could say that they will not accept liability. Who will be the arbiter? Similar questions relate to paragraph (c).

The part of the Bill that makes no attempt to address a particular problem—I wonder why, because it could have been anticipated—concerns compensation for the operating costs of Ofcom. I shall clarify what I mean. Earlier in Committee, it was established that Ofcom, in its shell form, would initially be funded either by the Treasury or by the Department of State.