I beg to move amendment No. 249, in page 34, line 16, at end add
'in whose sheriffdom the address in the register is situated'.
The amendments relate to provisions in four Acts—the Medical Act 1983, the Opticians Act 1989, the Osteopaths Act 1993 and the Chiropractors Act 1994—and the way in which, in certain limited situations, an appeal against a regulator's decision to remove a person's registration should be handled in relation to the Scottish courts.
For doctors, dentists and opticians, such decisions are those to remove registration on the ground that it has been obtained through fraud or error. I should make it clear that we are not dealing with fitness to practise cases. For osteopaths and chiropractors, the range of registration is broader, and includes the generality of such decisions—for example, where a person applying for registration was not of good character. The fraud and error provisions relate to, for example, a person who applies for registration as a physiotherapist, and presents certificates purporting to show recognised physiotherapy qualifications that are in fact forgeries.
Hon. Members will not be surprised to learn that, in a typical year, perhaps only two or three such appeals are made in respect of all professions throughout the United Kingdom. The Bill will divert those very few cases away from the Privy Council, along with fitness to practise appeals, which I shall discuss in due course. Subsequent clauses will make fitness to practise issues the province of the High Court, the Court of Session in Scotland, or the High Court of Justice in Northern Ireland. In England, the less-serious matters that we are dealing with today will be handled by the county court; in Scotland, we envisage that the sheriff court will handle them.
In Scotland, a professional whose name is to be removed from the register should be able to bring an appeal in a local sheriff court, just as such an appeal can be brought before a county court in England. However and as hon. Members may know, in Scotland jurisdiction relating to the sheriff court is based on the address of the defender—in this case, the regulatory body. Of course, the regulatory bodies are based south of the border and may not have offices in Scotland; they certainly do not have an office in each sheriffdom. The person in question would therefore find it difficult to raise an action in their local sheriff court—or, indeed, in any sheriff court in Scotland—because the Scottish courts have no jurisdiction.
Without the amendment, the perverse situation might arise whereby an appeal in Scotland could be heard only in London, but someone whose registered address was in Barrow-in-Furness—an excellent part of the country—could benefit from a county court hearing in Barrow. That would be unfair, and in effect would prevent Scottish cases from being heard in sheriff courts in Scotland. The amendments will ensure that such appeals can be heard in local sheriff courts in Scotland.
It might be helpful if I explain briefly a group of clauses that are very similar. Clause 28 provides for the transfer of appeals against fitness to practice cases from the Privy Council to the High Court, the Court of Session in Scotland, or the High Court of Justice in Northern Ireland. It also transfers from the High Court to the county court, or its Scottish equivalent, appeals against decisions to remove registration because of fraud or error. Clauses 28 to 32 deal with the important question of appeals. Clause 28 covers medical practitioners and amends the Medical Act 1983, and clauses 29 to 32 deal with the other professions in the same way.
The clauses divert appeals against the decisions of the regulatory bodies about fitness to practise cases away from the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. A registrant currently has a right of appeal against decisions of regulatory bodies on fitness to practise cases that affect their registration—for example, a decision that someone should be struck off for professional misconduct. The Bill will divert those cases to the High Court.
We have agreed with the devolved Administrations that Scottish cases should go to the Court of Session and Northern Ireland cases should go to the High Court in Northern Ireland. The clauses' purpose is to introduce consistency across the professions. Under current law, some professions appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council while others appeal to the High Court. The clauses' purpose is to redirect appeals from doctors, dentists, opticians, osteopaths and chiropractors. Appeals from nurses, midwives, health visitors and pharmacists are already dealt with by the High Court, which provides a successful model for others to follow. The GMC, for example, has no objection to the changes that we are proposing.
To a large extent, the changes rest on Lord Woolf's report ''Access to Justice'', which was published in 1996. He called for a principle of proportionality to apply to the way in which appeals are handled. We agree with Lord Woolf's opinion that an appeal should go to the lowest court that is competent to hear it. He also recommended that statutory appeals against cases that have only been through one stage of hearing, which are the cases that we are currently dealing with, should go the High Court rather than a higher body.
The reasons are largely historic. I may be able to provide further information to the hon. Gentleman, but I suspect that the answer is that this is how it has always been done. We must reconsider whether we can justify involving three Law Lords in hearing these types of cases; I do not believe that we can. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council annually deals with about 30 of these cases, which is 10 per cent. of its case load. That is not a sensible use of resources and it cannot be justified in terms of the efficient operation of the justice system. I hope that the clauses will be considered as non-controversial and sensible because they command the support of the professions.
We are happy with the thought that these appeals should be dealt with at the lowest level of the higher courts, namely the High Court and the equivalent courts elsewhere in the United Kingdom. What are the implications for further appeals? Does this mean that a decision could be appealed on a point of law from the High Court to the House of Lords or the Court of Appeal? It may be that the clauses give the registrant another tier of appeal on an issue of law should they wish to avail themselves of it.
The hon. Gentleman is probably right on that point, but given the small number of cases involved, this will not be a substantial issue. He must be right on the points of law, but the reforms are sensible. Perhaps he and I should correspond on the subject in future.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 28, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 29 ordered to stand part of the Bill.