Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

With this, it will be convenient to take new Clause 2—Section 202: reviews—

`After section 202 of the 1996 Act (right to request review of decision) there is inserted—

``202A Section 202: reviews

(1) This section applies where an applicant has the right to request a review of a decision by an authority or authorities under section 202.

(2) If the applicant is dissatisfied with a decision by the authority—

(a) not to exercise their power to continue to secure that accommodation is available for the applicant's occupation pending a review under section 188;

(b) in a case where the authority have secured that accommodation is available for the applicant's occupation under section 190(2)(a), to cease to secure that accommodation is so available before the time available to the applicant to bring an appeal under section 204 has expired (or, if sooner, the day on which an appeal is brought by the applicant);

(c) not to exercise their power to secure that accommodation is available for the applicant's occupation pending a review, under section 200(5); or

(d) to exercise their power under either section 188 or section 200(5) for a limited time ending before the time available to the applicant to bring an appeal under section 204 has expired (or, if sooner, the day on which an appeal is brought by the applicant), or, in either case, to cease exercising their power before that time,

he may appeal to the county court against the decision.

(3) An appeal under this section may not be brought after the time available to the applicant to bring an appeal under section 204 has expired (or, if sooner, after the date on which an appeal is brought).

(4) On an appeal under this section the court—

(a) may order the authority to secure that accommodation is available for the applicant's occupation until the time available to the applicant to bring an appeal under section 204 has expired (or such earlier time as the court may specify); and

(b) shall confirm or quash the decision appealed against,

and in considering whether to confirm or quash the decision the court shall apply the principles applied by the High Court on an application for judicial review.

(5) If the court quashes the decision it may order the authority to exercise any of the powers mentioned in subsection (2) above in the applicant's case for such period as may be specified in the order.

(6) An order under subsection (5)—

(a) may only be made if the court is satisfied that failure to exercise the power in accordance with the order would substantially prejudice the applicant's ability to pursue the review against the authority's decision in his case;

(b) may not specify any period ending after the time available to the applicant to bring an appeal under section 204 has expired.''.'.

Mr. Griffiths, you are new to our deliberations, so you will not be fully aware of the importance of postcards written to Mrs. Foster. However, for some members of the Committee—not least myself—they have become a significant feature of the passage of homelessness legislation. I am delighted that in Clause 11 there is--already, before any deliberations have taken place—an opportunity for me to write another postcard to Mrs. Foster.

During our deliberations on part II of the Homes Bill, I expressed concern about the availability of accommodation for people seeking to challenge a decision by a local housing authority. At that time, the Government were not minded to accept my amendments; however, I am absolutely delighted to see in the new Homelessness Bill the very wording that I had proposed as an Amendment at an earlier stage of our deliberations. Unfortunately, the Government have not gone as far as I would have liked: they covered one part of the amendment but not the other. The purpose of the new clause is to seek to persuade the Government to even the situation out and ensure that both aspects of my concerns are covered. In doing that, I shall deploy the same arguments that were, clearly, very successful.

I apologise to the Committee for the complexity of the new clause. To ensure that it fully meets all the various aspects of the legislation, the new clause has become somewhat complex, although the issue is simple. Let me explain it in a simple way.

When a homeless person or household applies to a local authority, the local authority must make two decisions: first, whether the person is deemed to be unintentionally homeless—the eligibility issue; and secondly, the priority that is to be afforded to a person who has met the first part of the test—the priority issue. If a person is unhappy with the local housing authority's decision, he has two opportunities to challenge it. The first is during the review process, which is an internal review carried out by the local authority itself. We discussed that in an earlier debate. If the person is not satisfied with the outcome of the review, the second stage is the appeals process, in which there is an opportunity to ask the court to decide the matter.

In our earlier deliberations, I argued that, during the review process and the subsequent appeals process, a person seeking to challenge a local authority's decision would be disadvantaged if he or she did not have accommodation during that period. I proposed several amendments that would seek to ensure that, in cases that were likely to be won by the applicant, it would be reasonable for the local authority to provide accommodation.

With regard to the second stage—the appeals process—the Government were not initially prepared to accept my proposal. However, I am delighted that in clause 11(4)(a) the Government clearly state that they now accept that a county court should be able, if it thinks that it is an appropriate course of action, to instruct a local authority to make accommodation available to an applicant during the appeal period.

Strangely, however, the Government have not so far seen fit to accept that the same principle is valid with regard to the internal local authority review process. It is equally true that a person who is going through the review process would be disadvantaged if he or she did not have access to accommodation. The Government will argue that, in such circumstances, accommodation will probably be made available, because existing legislation gives the local authority the opportunity to do that. Indeed, the right of review is contained in section 202 of the 1996 Act, and section 188(3) gives local authorities the power to provide accommodation during the review period.

Sadly, it is the clear experience of many people who have gone through the process that local authorities do not make accommodation available, despite the fact that they have the power to do so. The Government have provided strong guidance to local authorities that they should make that accommodation available. The guidance says that authorities should

``give careful consideration to the merits of each case'',

``consider the personal circumstances of the applicant and the consequences for him or her of deciding not to exercise their discretion'' to provide accommodation. However, although the power exists, in far too many cases local authorities do not provide that accommodation.

I moved amendments to part II of the Homes Bill that sought to make it more likely that local authorities would provide accommodation in such circumstances. The Government responded—perhaps not unreasonably—by saying that, if accommodation was to be made so easily available, many people would seek a review, although it did not stand much of a chance of succeeding, in the knowledge that it would provide them with accommodation for a period of time at least. Thus vexatious requests for reviews would be made, merely to get accommodation.

Although the Government put forward a reasonable point, they had made a similar point with regard to an earlier attempt by me in respect of accommodation during the appeals process. On that occasion, they were prepared, in effect, to say that if one solution does not work, a different solution should be found. Therefore, with regard to the appeals process, it has now been accepted that the county court should be allowed to make a decision on such matters and, if it considers that it is appropriate, to instruct the local authority to make accommodation available.

Therefore, I make a simple appeal to the Committee. Having already accepted my arguments as a way of achieving that end without causing the problems that the Government foresaw initially in respect of the appeals process, I now appeal to the Government to accept exactly the same logic in respect of the review period. Failure to do so would mean that, in the early stage when more people are likely to have their claims tested, they will be put at a significant disadvantage if they do not have that access to accommodation in the event that they have a strong case—a strong case which, under my new clause, would be judged by the county court.

My proposal is clear. I am sure that the Government will want to redraft my complex new clause, but I hope that today I shall be able to write at least the first lines of a postcard to Mrs. Foster to tell her that we are getting somewhere. I look forward to the Minister saying that that is the case.

I should like to comment on the serious intention of the hon. Member for Bath, although his speech and his new Clause are a long-winded way in which to amend section 202 of the Housing Act 1996. There is a more simple way of doing what has taken him a page and quarter of gobbledegook to do. If the word ``may'' in section 204(4) of the 1996 Act had been altered to ``must'', that would have eliminated the entire need for the hon. Gentleman's new clause. If the local authority had to provide accommodation during the period when an applicant was appealing against its review procedure, that would have had the same effect as the new clause. However, the hon. Gentleman is now about to tell me that I am wrong.

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving me the opportunity to tell him why he is wrong. If a local authority had to provide accommodation in all cases, undoubtedly a large number of people who did not have a leg to stand on would request an appeal for exactly the reason that I described earlier, which is at least to ensure that temporary accommodation was provided to them for the period of the review process. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman made a slip of the tongue when he referred to the appeals process, because we have already sorted that out—at least to my satisfaction. We are now dealing with the review process, not the appeals process.

We are discussing an appeal against the provisions of the review process. If the hon. Member for Bath had read the further qualifications under section 204(4), he would know that paragraph (a) refers to

``during the period for appealing under this section'', while paragraph (b) states:

``if an appeal is brought, until the appeal (and any further appeal) is finally determined.''

In other words, my suggestion of amending the word ``may'' to ``must'' would have applied only when an applicant appealed, which is surely the whole thrust of section 204 of the 1996 Act. It deals with a situation in which an applicant appeals against a decision by the local authority on review under sections 188, 189 and 200. [Interruption.] The hon. Member for Bath is quibbling again. Perhaps he would like to tell me where I am wrong.

There are two stages, the first of which is a review process that is carried out internally; there is then an appeals process, which is an opportunity for a second bite at the cherry. We could, of course, use confusing terminology and say that an appeal is being made against the review, but that would involve us in the appeals process. In the first case, the person is saying that he is not happy with the decision that was made and is asking that the case be reviewed. It is that particular stage to which I refer.

I think that we are both arguing about the same thing: the powers to be used when, in an applicant's opinion, the local authority has failed to review the case properly. The applicant has the power to take the matter on a point of law to the county court on appeal. We are discussing the duty of the local authority and whether it should house that applicant during an appeal to the county court.

That is what we are arguing about.

No.

Well, that is what the Act says.

The hon. Gentleman constantly refers to the 1996 Act. I suggest that he looks at the Clause that we are debating, clause 11, which already significantly amends section 204 of that Act. Section 188, a few pages earlier in the 1996 legislation, should also be amended.

I have already referred to sections 188, 189 and 200. The hon. Member for Bath is just trying to ensure that if the local authority fails to review properly in accordance with those sections and an applicant decides to appeal to the county court, the local authority will have the right to re-house.

No.

Well, that is my understanding. If I am wrong, no doubt the Minister will tell me. The hon. Member for Bath's Amendment is otiose and unnecessary. It is a wrongly worded way of achieving something that could be brought about much more simply.

The Clause amends section 204 of the 1996 Act, but with highly complicated wording. I had to read it about three times before I understood it—and I am not sure that I fully understood it even then. New section 204(4) will be added to the original section 204. Subsection (3) states that an appeal may not be brought until

``after the final determination by the county court of the main appeal.''

I wonder whether the drafters are in a muddle. They seem to be saying that the main appeal on a point of law has to take place before the subsidiary appeal against detailed aspects of failing properly to operate previous clauses and the review.

Subsection (6) states:

``An order under subsection (5) . . . may only be made if the court is satisfied that failure to exercise the section 204(4) power in accordance with the order would substantially prejudice the applicant's ability to pursue the main appeal.''

An element of tautology is discernible here. We have already been told under subsection (3) that the final appeal must be brought before the substance appeal, but in subsection (6) it seems to be the other way round.

I have just listened to the hon. Gentleman's account of what subsection (3) says, but it sounded different from the wording in the Bill. He said that the appeal could not be brought ``until'' after the final determination of the main appeal, but it does not say ``until''. Until he realises that, what he said is meaningless.

I accept that. Let me read out subsection (3) for the total avoidance of doubt:

``An appeal under this section may not be brought after the final determination by the county court of the main appeal.''

In other words, the main appeal has to be heard before the substance appeal. If I am wrong, the Minister will tell me. If I am wrong on subsection (3), I presume that there is no contradiction with subsection (6). Is that what the hon. Gentleman is saying?

It does not matter. When the appeal has been dealt with by the county court, that is it. Time is up.

We are talking about two appeals: one on a point of law and one on a point of substance. The question is which comes first. The wording of this complicated section 204A is not clear. The Minister may tell me that it is quite clear, but speaking as a layman, I do not believe that it is. Will the Minister explain the procedure in clear, simple English? I shall sit down and allow the Minister to explain it.

I shall attempt to do what the hon. Member for Cotswold (Mr. Clifton-Brown) asks of me before I proceed with Clause 11 and the Amendment proposed by the hon. Member for Bath.

I have a little chart that shows that the court may require the local authority to accommodate only if the court has already quashed the local authority's decision not to accommodate and is satisfied that, if the applicant were not accommodated, that would substantially prejudice his ability to proceed. They are not consequent but parallel actions. As the hon. Member for Cotswold said, the county court's determination of the main appeal deals with whether a person should be accommodated while an appeal is taking place. Therefore, what he presents as an apparent sequence of events is in fact not a sequence but a series of parallel developments that ensure not only that the person must have succeeded to some extent in establishing the problem of accommodation, but that the failure to provide accommodation would prejudice the person's ability to continue with the action. The hon. Member for Cotswold is incorrect. I hope that that elucidates a complex issue.

On clause 11 and new clause 2, I note the predilection of the hon. Member for Bath for postcards. It is a triumph of consensual democracy that a Bill that was apparently entirely written by Opposition Members and introduced by a Labour Government may be going on the statute books. If they could agree who had written what, our cup would run over.

Before I turn to the new clause, I shall explain in some detail the purpose and effect of clause 11. Homeless applicants have the right to appeal to the county court on a point of law about decisions made by the local housing authority that relate to their homelessness application. That right applies when applicants have asked the authority to review a decision that, for example, they do not fall within a priority need group and are dissatisfied with the authority's decision on review, or if the authority has failed to provide a decision in the required period.

Authorities may at their discretion continue to secure accommodation for an applicant pending an application to the county court and must take into account the circumstances of each case in deciding whether to exercise that power. Currently, if an applicant wants to challenge an authority's decision not to exercise its power to continue to accommodate, he or she must ask for a judicial review of that decision by the High Court. The High Court has the power to quash the decision if it is unlawful and may require the authority to accommodate the applicant until the application for judicial review can be heard.

Clause 11 inserts a new section, 204A, into the Housing Act 1996, and gives the county court powers that are broadly equivalent to current High Court powers to consider decisions made by the housing authority not to accommodate pending an appeal to the county court on a point of law. Therefore, in future, the county court will be able to deal with all aspects of appeals that relate to homelessness decisions and co-ordinate the appeal on the substantive homelessness decision, together with any application to consider the authority's decision not to continue to accommodate.

Proposed new section 204A(2) gives applicants the right to appeal to the county court against an authority's decision that results in their not being accommodated for the full period until the final determination of their appeal against the substantive homelessness decision, which I shall refer to as ``the main appeal''. Proposed new section 204A(3) provides that such appeals cannot be brought after the final determination of the main appeal on the homelessness decision, as I said in response to the hon. Member for Cotswold.

Proposed new section 204A(4) gives the county court new powers, to which the hon. Member for Bath referred. The court may require the authority to accommodate the applicant for a period before the court hears the appeal against the authority's decision not to accommodate. The court must confirm or quash the decision of the authority that is being appealed against. In considering which to do, it must apply the principles of judicial review that are used in the High Court. If the county court quashes the authority's decision, new section 204A(5) gives the court the power to require the housing authority to accommodate the applicant for a period specified by the court, subject to certain conditions.

The conditions are set out in new section 204A(6). First, the court can require the authority to accommodate only if the court is satisfied that a failure to do so would

``substantially prejudice the applicant's ability to pursue the main appeal''.

Secondly, an authority cannot be required to continue to accommodate an applicant after their main appeal has been finally determined. Those are the two parallel points that I mentioned earlier.

Clause 11 will provide new rights for homeless applicants and new powers for the county court that will enable the court to deal with all aspects of appeals against a local housing authority's decision on a homelessness case, including any decision not to continue to accommodate the applicant pending the appeal.

Let me respond to the other point made by the hon. Member for Cotswold by saying that, as far as I can see, the substitution of the word ``must'' for ``may'' would mean that, instead of the local authority having discretion subject to appeal, that discretion would go and the local authority would have to accommodate and therefore go down an entirely different route from the one that I have set out. Far from that change simplifying matters, it would bring in an entirely new meaning.

I admire the construction of the new clause tabled by the hon. Member for Bath, which has a certain familiarity. He may have hit on a device that could save millions of pounds by taking templates for legislation and dropping new words into them. That could be a productive way to construct our legislation in future. It could lead to mass unemployment, but it might be useful.

Clause 11 gives the county court the power to intervene in decisions by housing authorities not to exercise their discretion to continue to accommodate an applicant pending an appeal to the county court under section 204 of the 1996 Act. New clause 2 would give the county court similar powers to intervene in decisions by an authority not to continue to accommodate pending a review by the authority of its decision on the homelessness case. I can see the attraction of the symmetry of provision that the new clause seems to offer when taken with clause 11. However, as with so much in life, the issues are not simple or clear-cut. The two instances are not equivalent, although the hon. Gentleman sought to convince the Committee that they are.

A fundamental point is that the homelessness legislation makes clear distinctions between those who have a priority need and those who do not, and between those who have become homeless through no fault of their own and those who, through their own action or inaction, have brought homelessness on themselves. That reflects reality. It is essential to ensure that vulnerable groups—such as those with dependent children and those who are less able than others to look after themselves—have somewhere suitable to live, but it is not practical or reasonable for local housing authorities to have to arrange accommodation for everyone every time that they face having to find a new home.

Since its inception in 1977, the homelessness legislation has given housing authorities an immediate duty to secure accommodation for new applicants where there is reason to believe that they are homeless and in priority need—until the authority has had a chance to look into their circumstances and satisfy itself whether they are indeed homeless, whether that was caused by the applicants and whether there is priority need. That interim duty is imposed by section 188 of the 1996 Act.

It is right that authorities should have that obligation and that applicants should have the right to ask the authority to review any decision—for example, that they do not have a priority need or that they became homeless intentionally—that goes against their interests. It is also right that authorities should have the discretion to continue to accommodate applicants during a review where there is good reason to do so.

Case law, particularly the London Borough of Camden v. Mohammed in the High Court in 1997, has established that authorities must balance the objective of maintaining fairness for homeless persons where it has been decided that no duty is owed to the applicant, and the possibility that the applicant may be right and that depriving them of accommodation may deny them something to which they are entitled. The court also set out clear criteria that authorities must consider when deciding whether to exercise their discretion to continue to accommodate an applicant after the interim duty under section 188 has ended.

It is appropriate that discretion as to whether applicants should continue to be accommodated once the authority has completed its detailed inquiries and satisfied itself of the facts of the case should rest with the authority. In the Court of Appeal in the case of Ali v. City of Westminster and Nairne v. London Borough of Camden, which concerned an application for judicial review of a decision by an authority not to exercise its discretion to continue to accommodate, Lord Justice Otton said:

``Local authorities are well used to dealing with these type of cases. They know the circumstances of the applicants, and the range and availability of accommodation in their area. They have policies in place to guide them in exercising their discretion. It is a matter of common sense that such decisions should remain within their ambit, and not the courts.''

Of course, there needs to be an avenue of redress for applicants in the event that an authority does not make a proper and reasonable decision—for example, by failing to give due consideration to all circumstances, or perhaps failing to consider them at all. Currently, that route is an application for a judicial review of the authority's decision by the High Court. The hon. Member for Bath may jump to his feet at this point, and insist that that mechanism is too remote and inaccessible for the average homeless applicant. Like the hon. Gentleman, and no doubt all other members of the Committee, I believe in the importance of the principle of access to justice. However, I also believe that it is important that the discretion of housing authorities is not undermined. There is an inherent tension.

Will the Minister explain why there are two different strands? An appeal against the authority's failure to review properly must go to a judicial review, which is a difficult way to progress to the High Court, but the failure to continue to house an applicant pending that judicial review is a matter for the county court. Why can we not have a step-like approach, which would be normal in law, in which the county court decides both matters in the first instance before progression up through the legal system?

The points of the hon. Member for Bath are similar to that of the hon. Gentleman. There is a tension between the principle that local authorities should have the discretion to decide the proper protection of a person during a review, which is not the same as a judicial review through the High Court, and the right of a person who is challenging that internal review to be able to do that properly and not be disadvantaged by the fact that he or she is deprived of accommodation.

The route suggested by the hon. Member for Bath provides for an appeal to the county court and it is therefore likely that the discretion would be undermined. The hon. Gentleman made a point against himself when replying to the suggestion of the hon. Member for Cotswold that ``may'' should be replaced by ``must'', in indicating that that would undermine the discretion of the local authority. In attempting to maintain the point supported by Lord Justice Otton that it is desirable for local authorities to exercise their discretion, the Government believe that the rights of a person who is appealing are best maintained by ensuring that the authority retains discretion and, at the same time, allowing a route of judicial review through the High Court, but not by suggesting that an appeal that would become a matter of course should go through a county court.

Before we go through a tortuous, though necessary, discussion, I ask the Minister a simple question. Does he believe that the decision on whether the local authority was right to deny someone accommodation during the review process should be made in a county court—as the Government have accepted for the appeals process—or through judicial review? If he believes that it should be through judicial review, will he explain why the Government believe that judicial review is appropriate for one case and county court for the other?

That is because appeals on the process and on accommodation are not exactly the same.

I did not ask that question.

Perhaps the hon. Gentleman would like to clarify his question.

I was trying to separate the debate on the local authority's decision under review or appeal from the issue of whether it is right to deny accommodation. If there is to be a court Intervention on that specific question, should the court concerned be the local county court or the High Court through judicial review? If it is not the county court, why does the Minister want one system for appeal and another for review?

As I understand it, that is because the determination of the local authority's discretion in its review should be protected while still allowing for a review process. As the hon. Gentleman has said, the Government have made it clear that it would be in order for appeals on the first part of the process to proceed through the county courts. However, the hon. Gentleman is attempting to provide a symmetry to the proceedings that is unwarranted because of the tension that I described. That is why the processes cannot be symmetrical in the way that he would want.

Applying to the courts to overturn an authority's decision should be a matter of last resort and considered only when it is clear that the authority has not made a proper decision, and that is also the view of the Court of Appeal. In the case of Nacion v. Brighton and Hove Council, Lord Justice Tuckey said:

``the provision of temporary accommodation pending appeal (and the same applies pending review) is entirely in the discretion of the council. Where a council...has obviously considered the material factors it is an entirely futile exercise to seek to say that in some way that discretion was wrongly exercised...Applications for judicial review on this basis should be strongly discouraged. It is only in a very exceptional case that there will really be any reasonable prospect of interesting the court by way of judicial review to interfere with the exercise of the very broad discretion which the council have.''

Why then are we making provision to improve access to justice by giving powers to the county court to intervene in authorities' discretion to continue to accommodate pending an appeal to the county court but not pending a review by the authority? Why should applicants still have to go to the High Court on that issue pending the review by the housing authority? That question was put by the hon. Member for Cotswold and pursued by the hon. Member for Bath.

The answer, put simply, is that there is no overriding need to improve access to the courts in seeking a review of an authority's decision. That course of action should be pursued only in exceptional circumstances, whether it is to the High Court or the county court. However, when an applicant wishes to apply to the court to review a decision not to continue to accommodate at the same time as he or she is making an appeal to the county court on the substantive homelessness decision—that is, for example, that the homelessness was intentional or that there was not a priority need—it does not make sense, either from the perspective of the applicant or the courts, for the two applications to be considered by different courts.

Put even more simply, where the county court is considering an appeal under section 204 of the 1996 Act in regard to the homelessness decision, it makes sense that it should also consider any application to review the authority's decision not to exercise its power under section 204(4) to continue to accommodate pending the appeal.

I am disappointed by the Minister's reply. I suggest, as tactfully as possible, that his understanding of the situation—like that of the hon. Member for Cotswold—is somewhat confused. I shall put the situation as simply and succinctly as I can to give the Minister one more opportunity to explain the Government's position.

The situation is simple. An applicant can request a local authority to review its decision in respect of eligibility or priority. That is an internal review process, which is carried out under the discretion of the local authority. Nothing in my proposal would in any way fetter the local authority in carrying out that review process. However, it matters significantly during the review period whether the applicant has accommodation. In some cases, local authorities will continue to provide accommodation and in others they will not, to the disadvantage of the applicant. It therefore seems sensible for someone to be able to decide whether the local authority is right to refuse to continue accommodation—in respect not of the decision it makes during the review process but merely of its decision not to continue to provide accommodation.

The existing law states that there is a right of challenge to the courts, by the process of judicial review to the High Court. My proposed alternative is that, in the specific instance of an appeal against a local authority's decision, the local county court instead be given the opportunity to decide the case. I want a degree of symmetry—for the sake of common sense. The Government used the argument that it is more sensible to use the local county court in deciding to change the appeals procedure. The Government decided that it was crazy to use the High Court for that matter and that the local county court should be used instead.

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that access to justice demands quick, clear decisions? The local county court could make a much quicker, clearer decision by hearing in parallel the matter of whether a local authority should continue to house and that of whether the local authority used the correct discretion on its review period. That would create much quicker, clearer justice.

I cannot agree. The hon. Gentleman again confuses the two-stage process of how such matters are considered. I do not want to fetter the right of local authorities to try to sort those matters out themselves first at a local level. Only if they cannot do so should the matter go to court. I am discussing only whether accommodation has rightly or wrongly been denied to a particular applicant for the review process. I agree with the hon. Gentleman that that consideration should be quick and clear but I would go further and say that those aims would be more easily achieved by the local county court, which can take account of local circumstances.

Those are the very arguments that the Government used in making a decision in respect of the changes that they proposed in the Homes Bill. Even if the Minister is not prepared to accept new Clause 2 because I have drafted it in a misleading way, I hope that he would agree that there is strength in the argument that it is better to go to the county court to decide these matters, if a court must be involved, than to go to the High Court through judicial review. That is all I seek. The matter may appear complicated, but that is because the Government complicated the legislation by adding a range of additional categories. I welcome those additions, but the clause must cover all those eventualities.

Given that I am prepared to withdraw the new clause, I hope that the Minister will at least agree that he should reconsider that issue.

As the hon. Member for Bath made clear in his earlier contribution, he is pleased that under section 204A the Government have said that when an appeal is before the county court, it is sensible that that court should be able to make a decision on accommodation as well. He accepts that that is a logical step. I sought to persuade him that it is not logical to go a further step when a review is undertaken by the local authority itself and one wants to ensure that the local authority's discretion, with reasonable provision, is upheld.

As I said before, our position conforms to the opinion of the High Court. That court's opinion emphasised that under those circumstances, attempts to overturn the properly exercised discretion of the local authority in determining whether it should continue to provide accommodation while it reviews whether the interim criteria should be firmed up, need to be preserved. As the hon. Gentleman said, judicial review is a possible remedy that should be used in exceptional circumstances alone and should properly be taken through the High Court. It is not that there is no remedy, but the symmetry that the hon. Gentleman seeks to introduce is not there, and I freely concede that that is the case. However, that symmetry could be achieved only by pulling the tension between a local authority's discretion to review their own activities and the rights of those subject to that discretion to take action if they are dissatisfied with that discretion too far away from the proper exercise of that local authority's discretion. That is the nub of the case.

It is not a misunderstanding of what the hon. Gentleman seeks to achieve, but a difference of opinion about how best one proceeds to allow local authorities to exercise their discretion in respect of the review. The Government's position is that the course of judicial review through the High Court is the right course of action, so we cannot accept the new Clause.

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way and I promise that I do not intend to intervene again on this matter. Will the Minister tell me what difference it makes to the fettering of the discretion of the local authority in respect of the decision whether to continue to provide housing if the right to challenge that decision is made in the High Court or the county court? Surely in either case there would be a fettering of that discretion by allowing either of those routes to be entered into. I do not understand why one route is considered by the Minister to massively fetter the discretion of the local authority, whereas the other route is not. If there is no difference between the two, surely the symmetry argument comes into play.

As the hon. Gentleman knows—given that he underlined such a point in an earlier contribution—there is a difference. That difference is that judicial review through the High Court is a process to be used in exceptional circumstances. It is not to be used as a routine course of action if the first course of action fails, as has been suggested in some quarters might be the outcome of an appeal through the county court.

The hon. Member for Cotswold referred to the difficulties that would arise for a local authority if the word ``may'' became ``must''. I suggest that, while the two acts are not exactly parallel, the fact that a person may decide that an appeal to the county court was the routine next step would have the effect, while maintaining a theoretical discretion, of bringing us to the situation where, in effect, ``may'' had been replaced by ``must''. The reality is that, in seeking to maintain that proper space between the right of a local authority to exercise discretion and the right of the individual to seek redress, judicial review through the High Court is the right course of action and that is the approach that the Government wish to take.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 11 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Further consideration adjourned.—[Mr. Woolas.]

Adjourned accordingly at three minutes to Seven o'clock till Thursday 12 July at half-past Nine o'clock.