At the risk of being technical, I should like to be clear on a point that bears on the Clause. My reading is that if the Competition Commission decides that there is no adverse effect on competition, we do not reach the provisions under this clause, and the Competition Commission simply publishes a report. However, if the commission concludes that there is an adverse effect, the report is put in the hands of the Secretary of State, who may take such decisions as flow from it.

It is interesting that the power provided on market investigations in which a public interest Intervention notice is served is not simply the power to vary the remedies proposed by the Competition Commission in the relevant public interest. It is a wider power to decide which remedies should be taken, and the Secretary of State need only "have regard to" the commission's report. The only constraint on the Secretary of State is that, if the Competition Commission decides that there is an adverse effect on competition, the Secretary of State cannot decide that there is not. So far as I understand, the Secretary of State is otherwise free to vary any or all the remedies proposed for dealing with the "adverse effect on competition" or the "detrimental effect on customers".

I make that point in a stand part debate because I think that it would be far better if the whole clause were rewritten to make it clear that the Secretary of State should follow the advice of the Competition Commission on the effect on competition and how it is to be remedied. I would make changes to the clause as are required in relation to the public interest raised by the Secretary of State.

There are two dangers, perhaps the most obvious being that the Secretary of State will find it tempting to substitute his or her judgment for that of the Competition Commission on how competition effects should be dealt with. Secondly, I refer to the Secretary of State's temptation to find a relevant public interest consideration at any stage up to four months after a market investigation has been initiated. Having served an intervention notice on any public interest consideration that can be specified, the Secretary of State brings the whole of the subsequent process of determining all the remedies into his or her own hands. That is inherently undesirable because consistency and predictability of independent competition authorities require that the process be conducted

independently. The more that public interest intervention notices are served—especially if they are specified for consideration other than for national security—the more that remedies will be put back into the hands of the Secretary of State and not the competition authorities.