Determination of Ministerial Offices

Part of Report Of First Minister (Designate) And Deputy – in the Northern Ireland Assembly at 3:30 pm on 16 February 1999.

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Photo of Mitchel McLaughlin Mitchel McLaughlin Sinn Féin 3:30, 16 February 1999

No, I will not give way. It would be useful if they were to give us their thoughts on how they are going to address that matter.

It is critical that the provisions are spelt out — and I regret that they have not been spelt out in this report — that will enable the parties to have an input into and to scrutinise the office of the First Minister (Designate) and the Deputy First Minister (Designate). They must not be an unaccountable kitchen cabinet. Members should say no to back-door arrangements; to crude power plays; and to new forms of majority rule.

We have heard many contributions from the range of Unionist parties in the Chamber, some very considered, some very intemperate. Since the late 1960s the rising expectations of the Nationalist community have forced the British State into renegotiating its relationship with Nationalism and Unionism. This has brought into sharp focus the role of the British State in Ireland which, in turn — and Sinn Féin recognises this — has had the effect of destabilising large sections of the Unionist community.

This restructuring of the power relationship between Unionism, Nationalism and the British State revolves around a dynamic which seeks to create a political equilibrium between the Nationalist and Unionist communities. But this process is by its very nature unstable, because it has not yet reached that required political equilibrium. We have made a good beginning. The peace process and its product, the Good Friday Agreement, mark a solid beginning of which we all can be proud.

Beginning in the 1980s an analysis of the political mechanisms needed to resolve the conflict has been the basis for a narrow strategic consensus between the SDLP and Sinn Féin. As is obvious from the debates in this Chamber, there are many issues that divide us. But other issues have also formed the basis of this consensus, which was the first building block of the Irish peace process. The appeal of the Hume-Adams initiative was sufficient to bring other major political forces into the frame. Since the cessations of 1994 it has become clear that many within political Unionism cannot handle the absence of conflict or the negotiation process itself.

Today Unionism fights a rearguard action as a way of slowing down its loss of power. Its political stance on decommissioning, the release of prisoners and the segregation even of victims, allied to attacks on Catholics, all represent a strategy to undermine the Good Friday Agreement and to minimise Nationalist political advances.

But Unionism cannot turn back the clock. It can delay the process of change, but it cannot stop the momentum pushing all of us towards a new political dispensation.

These delaying tactics are symptomatic of Unionism’s inability to negotiate change. At their core, many Unionists are deeply uncertain about their future. The past is the only reference point around which they measure present political realities, and, unable to shape the change, they retreat into a form of political and moral limbo, while insisting that "Norn Ireland was a great wee place" and that political crisis and instability only began with the formation of the Civil Rights Movement.

They remain blind to their role during the long Stormont years and their part in creating the conflict. They refuse to recognise their role, and therefore they display no sense of responsibility for finding a resolution to the conflict. And this form of political denial, to quote the First Minister (Designate) is "the anchor thought process that forms the basis of the Unionist rearguard strategy."

Where Unionist intransigence meets Nationalists’ expectations, Nationalists have had to drag Unionists into the process for change. For many Unionists this creates the perception of a continuous political humiliation, and their only response is to retreat further into the comfort of their own limbo. Unable to shape the future, they paralyse themselves inside a loop of constant political humiliation and defeat.

I acknowledge readily that Unionism is no longer monolithic and that there are Unionists who embrace change. But today Unionism is a volatile entity: on the surface its delaying tactics may appear to be working, yet there is no sense of a confident or victorious Unionism emerging. Indeed, closer inspection of Unionist opinions reveals highly volatile undercurrents.

The hopeless rant from the anti-agreement lobby; the attitude of the Orange Order in Portadown; the developing mixture of evangelical Protestantism and Loyalism, with the formation of new Loyalist groupings, gives us some indication of the working-out of such undercurrents.

Unionism is now giving the clear impression of being on the retreat. It is in a state of internal turmoil. Its constituency is split between those who support the Good Friday Agreement and those who are opposed to it. There are substantial numbers of Unionists without a political voice in this Assembly who accept the inevitability and the necessity of change. But, instead, we hear from those who seek to minimise the extent of that change.

The peace process, the Good Friday Agreement and today’s report have all been necessary because the Unionist relationship with the British Government and the British state has been fractured. It now competes with a strong Nationalist community for the political and economic leadership of the Six Counties, and it is mesmerised by the prospect of changing demographics. The ability of its social organisations, such as the Orange Order, to intimidate Nationalists has been diminished and is being constantly challenged. Its armed wing, the RUC, is a major issue of contention in the wider community and will have to be replaced. The links with its church base and business community continue to be weakened, and it exists on an island where the thrust of the economics is that there should be an island infrastructure. Members should remember that politics and economics are two sides of the one coin, and they tend to follow one another.

Last but not least, Unionism has signed up to a political agreement, and, by doing so, it has conceded equality of political power with Northern Nationalists which strengthens — [Interruption].